SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION OF INDIA

लोकहितार्थ सत्यनिष्ठा

Dedicated to Truth in Public Interest

Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Information Technology Audit of Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System in Government of Odisha for the year ended March 2023

Government of Odisha

Report No. 4 of the year 2025

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This Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year ended 31 March 2023 has been prepared for submission to the Governor of Odisha under Article 151 of the Constitution of India for being laid before the Legislature of the State.

Information Technology Audit of Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS) in Government of Odisha was conducted to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of this system from its inception (in 2013) till March 2023. Records were examined at the Department, at the office of the Director General of Police, State Crime Records Bureau and in 68 Police Stations under nine Ranges. Analysis of CCTNS database was conducted using various Computer Assisted Audit Techniques.

The audit has been conducted in conformity with the Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

Executive Summary

Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS) is a Mission Mode Project under the National e-Governance Plan (NeGP) of Government of India (GoI). It was conceptualised (2008) by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in consultation with all stakeholders, including the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), the State Governments, the Department of Information Technology (DIT), Government of India and the National Informatics Centre (NIC). CCTNS is a centrally sponsored programme aimed at creating a comprehensive and integrated system for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of policing at all levels, especially at the Police Station level by adopting the principles of e-Governance and creating a nationwide networking infrastructure for evolution of IT-enabled tracking system.

CCTNS was implemented in Odisha from 2013, and as of March, 2023 an expenditure of ₹176.16 crore has been incurred on it jointly by the Government of India and Government of Odisha. Audit noticed that there were deficiencies in planning, implementation, and monitoring of the project since inception. There were irregularities in the tendering process adopted by the State Crime Records Bureau, resulting in extension of undue benefit to the selected software services provider.

Data digitisation and migration was the most important activity and constitutes a major component in the successful implementation of CCTNS project. Proper digitisation and migration of past records into CAS database would help the police in efficient search and matching of records while enquiring/ investigating a case. As per the contract, System Integrator was to digitise old/past case records of 10 years from 2001 to 2010 as well as open cases (on-going investigation/trial) even if the case had been registered prior to 2001. It was noted that, instead, SCRB decided (December 2012) to only digitise old/past records for the period from January 2003 to December 2012, which was not in compliance with the contractual terms.

The process of data migration from the system used earlier (Crime and Criminal Information System and Common Integrated Police Application) was incomplete and incorrect, due to the absence of digitisation of key documents and material errors in digitisation of data from physical records. This in turn meant that CCTNS could not be utilised for retrieval of data as intended, for the period prior to 2013.

There were deficiencies in implementing essential controls such as mapping of Police Stations with the correct reporting authorities which adversely impacted effective supervision of the status of criminal cases through the system and resulted in continued use of offline, manual processes for this purpose. There were also deficiencies in the controls for user access management, resulting in continued access to cases by police personnel who were no longer in charge of these cases.

Application controls to ensure identification of accused/ criminals as well as complainants had not been implemented, resulting in multiple IDs for the accused/criminals and complainants in the system. This adversely impacted the main objective of the system- to keep track of all cases associated with an accused/ criminal and registered by the same complainant- and resulted in data inconsistency. There was significant control failure in enforcing chronological sequencing and logical sequencing of actions, resulting in untenable and illogical recording of events, such as registration of First Information Report (FIR) prior to registration of General Diary (GD) entries and recording of Arrests and Seizures prior to recording of FIRs. For instance, in 412 cases during January 2018 to March 2023, the FIR dates were recorded prior to GD dates, which reflected lack of data integrity. These instances indicate a material risk of interventions at the back end of the database, to modify data in the system without authorisation.

Business rules had not been mapped correctly into the system through implementation of necessary application controls, which resulted in discrepancies such as recording of 5,566 missing complaints of children below 18 years without registration of FIRs, which was pre-requisite and mandatory. Despite having provisions in the system for registration and maintenance, non-cognisable cases had not been recorded by the Police Stations in CCTNS.

Due to the absence of clear executive instructions to mandate the utilisation of the system and dispense with maintenance of manual records, the Case Diary Module had not been utilised by the Police Stations. Only 18,513 cases diary records were available in the database, when there were 7.44 lakh FIRs registered as per the manual records during January 2018 to March 2023. CCTNS had not been utilised as intended for the generation of Charge Sheets, due to which significant manual interventions were being made by Police Stations. Since the Police Stations continued to make use of manual records and processes instead of the CCTNS, Court Disposal Memos had not been recorded in CCTNS, resulting in incompleteness of the database and reduced oversight for reporting authorities through the system.

The maintenance of crucial system logs had not been ensured, resulting in the absence of a trail for actions such as deletion of critical records via the back end of the system.

As a result of the above deficiencies, the main objectives of implementing CCTNS had not yet been achieved and there remained residual risks of errors and chances of manipulation since the burden of compliance had not shifted from individual police officials to the system.

Good Practices

Director, SCRB had designed and implemented a color-coded ranking tool for districts and Police Stations for monitoring the performance of Superintendents of Police (SsP) like timely supervision of cases, generation of arrest memos, *etc.* This initiative had resulted in better use of CCTNS apart from effective monitoring. The other initiatives in the new state specific systems are as under:

- **Arakhi Mobile App** introduced by Odisha Police under the CCTNS Project helps the investigating officers in on-the-spot creation of digital record, generation of various forms easily, capturing activity digitally in chronological order, generation of case diaries for prompt and effective investigation.

- **Redesigning of CCTNS dashboard** as a single sign-on for all CCTNS modules, aimed at rearranging the entire information of the database using data analytics, to make it more informative and interactive.

Recommendations


Government should ensure that

- ***tendering process is conducted in compliance with Rules, in a fair and transparent manner. Change of scope of projects should be avoided after selection of the system integrator;***
- ***appropriate steps should be taken to digitize physical records and data related to those records, to enable migration of legacy data into the system;***
- ***user access management in CCTNS is compliant with business rules, so that the officers in charge are correctly mapped to roles and cases and police stations are also correctly mapped to reporting authorities;***
- ***deficiencies in GD numbering and FIR numbering should be fixed so that duplicate GD numbers and gaps in FIR numbers do not occur in the system;***
- ***chronological and logical sequencing of actions is enforced in the system, to preserve data integrity;***
- ***use of CCTNS is mandated for registering missing persons, non-cognisable cases, case diaries, arrest memos, seizure memos etc., in real time and maintenance of parallel manual records is dispensed with, in a phased manner with clear timelines;***
- ***business rules like 'Serving Notice' under section 41A of CrPC; mandatory registration of FIR in respect of missing persons below 18 years, automatic marking of cases under sections SC&ST POA Act, POCSO Act as SR cases, automatic marking of cases under defined sections like rape/POCSO etc., as 'sensitive', are incorporated in CCTNS and the system maintains a master data for Courts, to facilitate recording of data on forwarding of cases;***
- ***use of CCTNS is mandated for managing Chargesheets, and Court Disposal Memos in real time and maintenance of parallel manual records is dispensed with, in a phased manner with clear timelines;***
- ***appropriate application log and DBA log should be maintained to track users' actions and fix responsibility in case of gross errors/ manipulation in records;***
- ***appropriate validation and input controls are implemented to maintain data consistency;***

- ***synchronisation process should be rectified to maintain consistency of data between the offline and online database apart from ensuring data backups of the offline servers at police stations;***
- ***no primary record should be deleted and in case deletion is required, soft deletion method as mentioned in the system design documentation is adopted along with appropriate application and system logs;***
- ***a supervisory dashboard is developed to identify exceptional events by the technical team at headquarters and take necessary action. Further, periodic exception reports may be monitored by higher authorities; and***
- ***adequate training is imparted to users for smooth implementation of CCTNS.***

Chapter I

Introduction and Audit Framework



Chapter – I

Introduction and Audit Framework

1.1 Introduction

Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS) is a Mission Mode Project under the National e-Governance Plan (NeGP) of Government of India (GoI). It was conceptualised (2008) by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in consultation with all stakeholders, including the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), the State Governments, the Department of Information Technology (DIT), Government of India and the National Informatics Centre (NIC).

Prior to implementation of CCTNS, Crime and Criminal Information System (CCIS) and Common Integrated Police Application (CIPA) were launched in 1990 and 2004 respectively. CCIS was primarily an initiative to create exclusively crime and criminals related database that could be used for crime monitoring by security agencies. The aim of CIPA as a stand-alone system was to computerize and automate the functioning at the Police Station level to enhance efficiency and to bring transparency in various processes and functions and improve service delivery to citizens.

CCTNS is a centrally sponsored programme aimed at creating a comprehensive and integrated system for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of policing at all levels, especially at the Police Station level by adopting the principles of e-Governance and creating a nationwide networking infrastructure for evolution of IT-enabled tracking system. The CCTNS project covers 35 States and Union Territories (UTs). The CCTNS Core Application Software (CAS) has modules such as Registration, Investigation and Prosecution. Apart from the CAS, a Citizen Service Portal for services such as Complaint Registration, Character Certificate Request, Event/ Performance Request, Protest/ Strike/ Rally Registration Request, Foreigner Registration Requests *etc.,* has been developed by NCRB and provided to all States and UTs for configuration, customisation, enhancement, and deployment at their levels.

A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed (October 2009) between MHA, GoI and the Government of Odisha (GoO) for implementation of the CCTNS project in the State and the project was launched in 2013. The total expenditure under the project in the State, since its inception was ₹176.16 crore as of March 2023. Of this, ₹66.75 crore was provided by GOI while the GoO spent ₹109.41 crore.

For implementation of the project, GoO selected service providers to provide various functions as detailed below:

Functions	Service Providers	Services provided
State Designated Agency	State Crime Records Bureau, Odisha	Overall management and monitoring of the project and its implementation.
State Project Management Consultant	National Institute of Social Governance	Preparation of Request for Proposal and Project Implementation and Monitoring Reports
State Project Management Unit	Deloitte	Project monitoring
System Integrator	NIIT Technologies Limited (*till July 2022*) and KPMG Advisory Services Private Limited (*from August 2022*)	Providing bundle of services *i.e.,* configuration, customisation, enhancement and deployment of hardware and application

1.2 Governance Structure


GoI guidelines on implementation of CCTNS requires that the State Government constitute four governance committees namely, the State Apex Committee, the State Empowered Committee, State/UT Mission Team and District Mission Teams. These committees were constituted in Odisha between the period October 2008 to December 2008 and the functions of these committees are as below:

Governance Committee	Functions
State Apex Committee	Review progress of project, monitor fund utilisation, issue Policy directions, guidelines etc.
State Empowered Committee	Allocation of funds, sanctions for various project components, approval of various functionalities, review progress, ensure proper training arrangements, deployment of handholding personnel, guide State/ District Mission Teams
State/ UT Mission Team	Operational responsibility, formulating project proposals, hardware rollout and commissioning, co-ordination with various agencies, resolution of all software and other issues, assist the State Apex and Empowered Committees.
District Mission Teams	Prepare district project proposal, ensure proper rollout of the project in Police Stations, ensure hardware and software installation and operationalisation of the project, training of all police personnel in the district, site preparation, ensure separate account keeping for the project, *etc*.

1.3 Organisational Structure

The Government of Odisha designated the State Crime Records Bureau, Bhubaneswar as the nodal agency for implementation of CCTNS application and monitoring its overall progress.

Figure 1.1 : Organisational Structure of Odisha Police



* In CCTNS, Crime Investigation Department, Human Rights Protection Cell (HRPC) and Crime Branch were treated as police districts logically.

** One virtual Police Station and six belonging to the above three logical police districts

1.4 Audit Objectives

Audit was conducted with the objectives to assess whether:

- planning process for implementation of the CCTNS was effective;
- CCTNS system has been utilised for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of policing and delivery of citizen-centric services; and
- the system has adequate controls to maintain confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data.

1.5 Audit Criteria

- Request for Proposal (RFP) for CCTNS
- Technical documentation including Functional Requirement Specification, Software Requirement Specification, High Level Design Document, Low Level Design Document of each application/ module under CCTNS
- IT Act 2000 and subsequent amendments, National e-Governance policies, and standards, *etc.*
- Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC)
- Odisha Police Manual
- Orders and Guidelines issued by Home Department, the Government of Odisha
- Odisha General Financial Rules (OGFR)

1.6 Audit scope and methodology

Information Technology Audit on CCTNS was conducted to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of the system for the period 2013 (since inception) till March, 2023. The audit objectives, criteria and scope of audit were discussed with the Home Department in an Entry Conference held on 13 June 2023. Records were examined at the Department, office of the Director General of Police, State Crime Records Bureau and in 68 Police Stations under 18 Sub-Divisional Police Officers of 11 Police Districts in 9 Ranges, selected through simple random sampling without replacement method. Analysis of CCTNS database was conducted using various Computer Assisted Audit Techniques. After completion of Audit, the audit findings were discussed with the Home Department in an Exit Conference held on 27 May 2024.

1.7 Good practice

Director, SCRB had designed and implemented a color-coded ranking tool for districts and Police Stations for monitoring the performance of Superintendents of Police (SsP) like timely supervision of cases, generation of arrest memos, *etc.* This initiative had resulted in better use of CCTNS apart from effective monitoring. The other initiatives in the new state specific systems are as under:


- **Arakhi Mobile App** introduced by Odisha Police under the CCTNS Project helps the investigating officers in on-the-spot creation of digital record, generation of various forms easily, capturing activity digitally in chronological order, generation of case diaries for prompt and effective investigation.

- **Redesigning of CCTNS dashboard** as a single sign-on for all CCTNS modules, aimed at rearranging the entire information of the database using data analytics, to make it more informative and interactive.

1.8 System Overview

The following are the major processes that had been incorporated in CCTNS:

Figure 1.2: Flow chart showing processes in CCTNS



Registration: Under this process, all types of registrations *i.e.,* General Diaries (GD)[1], Complaints, FIRs, non-FIRs, missing persons reports, etc. are carried out.


Investigation: After registration of complaints, the investigation process deals with capturing crime details, preparation of arrest memos and seizure memos and preparation of final form/chargesheet are done by the Police Station users.

Prosecution: Under this process, court disposal memos and results of appeal are managed for interfacing to court and jails.

[1] The General Diary is used to record log of every event or activity during daily functioning of the Police Station. It includes incoming and outgoing communications, complaints received, actions taken, and notable incidents

Keeping in view the connectivity challenges faced by Police Stations in remote locations and to achieve the key goal of facilitating availability of real time information across Police Stations and higher offices, CCTNS was implemented as web applications in two different technology stacks *i.e.,* NET/MS SQL server at a central location in State Data Centre and J2EE/MySQL at Police Stations.

Figure 1.3 : Chart showing synching process




A synchronisation architecture was designed and implemented to maintain the consistency of data between the offline databases at Police Stations and the online database at State Data Centre. In case of failure in connectivity, the PS users could work on the offline servers and upon restoration of connectivity, the works done by them were to be automatically synchronised with the central online database server.

A total of 2.12 crores general diaries (GDs) and 18.49 lakh First Information Reports (FIRs)[2] were captured in the system as of June 2023. Audit analysed the database for the period from January 2018 to March 2023 involving 1.71 crore GDs, 7.44 lakh FIRs, 16.91 lakh crime details, 3.32 lakh arrest memos, 7.30 lakh seizure memos, and 7.11 lakh charge sheets, to examine and evaluate the general and IT controls.

The Audit observations based on the above detailed analysis, are grouped under seven chapters *i.e.,* Project Management, User Management, Registration, Investigation, Prosecution, Data Security and Supervision and Monitoring. Due to security reasons, suitable generalised phrases have been used in place of the actual table names, field names and process names in explaining the technical aspects of the system throughout the report.

[2] Any incident or complaint is recorded against a General Diary entry by the Police Station. Subsequently, if the incident is considered as cognizable offence, a First Information Report (FIR) is registered by the SHO against that General Diary.

Chapter II
Project Management



Chapter – II

Project Management

2.1 Project Management

For smooth execution of the CCTNS project, the Government of Odisha was to select a System Integrator (SI) through competitive bidding process. As per RFP, there were two stages 'Design and Development Stage', 'Operation and Maintenance Stage' in which System Integrator was to be engaged. In the 'Design and Development Stage' of CCTNS project (*i.e.,* stage prior to go-live), the System Integrator was to supply the project assets and install, commission, and implement them as per the product/ process specifications. Further, in this stage, the SI was to provide services like designing, enhancement, development of CAS (State), preparing the System Requirement Specifications (SRS), conducting system assessment, data migration, digitisation of old/past data, user testing and finally, delivering & commissioning of hardware at Police Stations and higher offices. In the 'Operations and Maintenance Stage', the SI was to provide services like annual maintenance, handholding, training etc.

2.2 Non-transparent process of selection of system integrator

2.2.1 Irregularities in the selection of M/s NIIT as system integrator

DG & IG of Police, Odisha floated a Request for Proposal (RFP) in April 2011 inviting proposals from potential bidders for providing the "bundle of services" required in implementing and managing CCTNS solution in the State.

In response six bidders[3] submitted their bids. The tender evaluation committee (for both technical and financial evaluation) was constituted (17 June 2011). The committee was chaired by Director IIT Bhubaneswar and consisted of members[4] such as Director SCRB and representatives of DG & IG Police, NCRB, IT Department, NIC and the project consultant.

The committee opened the technical bids in September 2011. However, the technical evaluation was conducted only later, in October-December 2011. Audit noticed that in the meeting (November 2011) in which the committee conducted the technical evaluation, only 08 out of 12 members were in attendance. Notably, the meeting was not attended by its Chairman, *i.e.,* Director IIT Bhubaneswar. The other members who were not present included representatives of NIC and the IT Department. Reasons for not deferring/ re-

---

[3] HP, SPANCO, WIPRO, NIIT, TCS, Tech Mahindra

[4] Director, IIT (Chairman), Bhubaneswar; Representative of DG & IGP; Director, SCRB (Nodal Officer); Representative of NCRB; Representative of IT Department, GoO; Representative of NIC and Representative of consultant member

scheduling the meeting to another date, when all these members with technical domain knowledge could have participated, were not found on record. In the absence of these members, the meeting was chaired by the representative of DG & IG Police and attended only by Director SCRB and the representative of the project consultant. Hence, the quorum of the committee on the date of technical evaluation consisted only of representatives of the DG & IG Police and the hired project consultant, with no other independent members in attendance.

Audit noticed that the committee evaluated the six bids and disqualified one bidder *i.e.,* M/s Tech Mahindra Limited who did not submit requisite tender paper cost and qualified the remaining bidders including M/s NIIT for the technical evaluation stage. However, the members of the truncated committee made the irregular decision (November 2011) to evaluate M/s NIIT as technically qualified, even though the bidder had not fulfilled two pre-qualification criteria, as described below:

Table 2.1: Table showing pre-qualification (PQ) evaluation of NIIT

<table>
<tr><th>Sl. No.</th><th>Pre-qualification criteria as per RFP</th><th>Evaluation Report</th><th>Audit Remarks</th></tr>
<tr><td>1</td><td>The Bidder must have a proven track record of providing a successful “Turnkey Solution“ for at least five (5) IT-projects.</td><td>Completion Certificate for two projects out of five not provided.</td><td>
<table>
<tr><th>#</th><th>Name of project</th><th>Stages</th><th>Project cost (₹ in crore)</th></tr>
<tr><td>1</td><td>Intranet Selo (Phase I to IV)</td><td>Complete</td><td>6.25</td></tr>
<tr><td>2</td><td>Connect India</td><td>Complete*</td><td>14.35</td></tr>
<tr><td>3</td><td>Intranet Prahari</td><td>Complete</td><td>73.8</td></tr>
<tr><td>4</td><td>Intranet Selo (Phase-V)</td><td>Complete</td><td>3.56</td></tr>
<tr><td>5</td><td>Management of IT operation for Holcim South Asia Group Companies</td><td>On going*</td><td>27.00</td></tr>
</table>
* The 5th project was ongoing and hence incomplete. Further, the bidder had not submitted Completion Certificates in case of the 2nd project which was stated to have been completed.
</td></tr>
<tr><td>2</td><td>The Bidder must have a proven track record of implementing at least two e-Governance projects summing up to a value of ₹10 crores.</td><td>--</td><td>The bidder had submitted details of only two e-Governance projects with aggregate value of ₹6.25 crore plus ₹0.14 crore = ₹6.39 crore which was less than ₹10 crore.</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Records of SCRB

Following this irregular decision during the technical evaluation of bids, a complaint was received (October & November 2011) by DGP, Odisha from the President, Communications & Manufacturing Association of India where the complainant stated that the reason for the absence of the technical committee

members was the difference in opinion among them, on the issue of PQ criteria being applied to the bidders. There was also a second complaint received (November 2011) from one of the bidders, M/s TCS, in which the complainant questioned the application of the PQ criteria. Audit noticed that in case of both these complaints, no action was taken to respond or offer clarifications to the complainants.

In its meeting held in 29 November 2011, the tender evaluation committee[5] evaluated the financial bids of the bidders who had been declared as technically qualified.

During the financial evaluation, the members of the committee made the irregular decision to declare M/s NIIT as L1, even though its financial bid had not been submitted in the prescribed format and the bidder had separately quoted an additional amount of ₹15.17 crore towards cost of toners for printers and cost of paper, over and above the financial bid amount of ₹54.82 crore. The committee evaluated the financial bids as below:

Table 2.2: Statement showing comparative statement

Sl. No.	Name of Bidder	Technical Score (Tn) out of 100	Commercial Bid (in ₹)	NPV (Cb)	Lowest NPV (in ₹) (Cmin)	Overall Score [Bn=0.3 * Tn + 0.7 * (Cmin/Cb * 100)]
1.	NIIT	78.90	69,99,84,418	64,21,02,022	64,21,02,022	93.67
2.	Spanco	80.05	72,07,66,033	68,03,50,420		90.08
3.	Wipro	77.55	74,61,55,862	72,37,89,701		85.36
4.	TCS	83.75	81,40,41,867	78,19,79,401		82.6
5.	HP	83.50	129,77,29,513	119,07,81,100		62.8

Source: Records of SCRB

In this manner, the committee had irregularly evaluated the technical and financial bids submitted by M/s NIIT, which then resulted in its declaration as L1 (November 2011).

2.2.2 Irregular reduction of scope of work for L1 after completion of the tender process, without competitive bidding to discover revised market price for the reduced scope of work.

According to the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) guidelines, post-tender negotiations with the L1 (lowest) bidder are generally discouraged due to the potential for corruption. Such negotiations are permitted only in exceptional situations, such as the procurement of proprietary items, items with limited

[5] Principal Secretary, Home Department; Special Secretary, Home Department; ADG-cum-Director, SCRB; Inspector General of Police, Provision, State Police Head Quarters; Deputy Secretary, Finance Department; 1st Additional LR, Law Department; Deputy Director, Directorate of EP&M; FA-cum-Additional Secretary, Home Department; General Manager, NISG

sources of supply, or when there is suspicion of cartel formation. These stipulations are outlined in CVC Circular No. 4/3/07, dated March 3, 2007.

After selection (November 2011) by the tender evaluation committee of M/s NIIT as the SI with a contract value of ₹69.99 crores, the State Level Purchase Committee[6] asked (November 2011) M/s NIIT to reduce its cost to ₹42.71 crores, on the grounds that funds available were limited and insufficient to meet the contract value discovered through the tendering process.

In response, M/s NIIT submitted (December 2011) revised financial quotation for an amount of ₹42.71 crores. The reduction from the original amount of ₹69.99 crores was achieved by M/s NIIT by excluding items[7] worth ₹24.08 crores from the scope of the project and extending a discount of ₹3.20 crores.

The State Level Purchase Committee (SLPC) accepted the revised financial quote from M/s NIIT for ₹42.71 crore, with the reduction of scope of work. Subsequently, the agreement with M/s NIIT was signed in July 2012 for the provision of SI services with contract validity from the date of signing the contract (July 2012) to 36 months after the date of go-live for the project.

In this regard, Audit noticed that

- GoI had communicated the fund position (February 2011) to the State Government well before the issuance of the RFP (in April 2011) for the selection of the SI. Hence, the scope of the project should have been suitably reduced before the tendering process, based on internal estimates for the expected contract value.
- Even after completion of the tendering process, the SLPC did not communicate the list of items of work proposed to be excluded from the scope of work to all the bidders who had participated. SLPC did not seek revised financial bids from them for the reduced scope of work. Instead, communication was initiated only with the L1 bidder for a reduced project cost limit and the reduced project scope. Hence, other bidders did not get an equal opportunity to offer their best prices. This action was highly irregular and objectionable, since it vitiated the tendering process and the L1 bidder was at liberty to decide the scope

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6 Principal Secretary, Home Department – Chairman, Special Secretary, Home Department –Member, ADG-cum-Director, SCRB, Inspector General of Police, Provision, State Police Head Quarters, Deputy Secretary, Finance Department, 1st Additional LR, Law Department, Deputy Director, Directorate of EP&M, FA-cum-Additional Secretary, Home Department, General Manager, NISG.

7 The major excluded items were (1) Operations and Maintenance for 5 years- ₹ 6.52 crores, (2) Cost for handholding and deployment of personnel- ₹ 2.98 crores, (3) Enterprise Management System- ₹ 1.84 crores, (4) Toners for Printers– ₹5.63 crores (5) 2 KVA Generator Set- ₹ 3.46 crores.

of work to match the fixed project cost limit. There was no competitive pressure on the L1 bidder, in the absence of other bidders.

Noting the observations of Audit on selection of System Integrator, Government stated (September 2024) that due care would be taken in future for proper evaluation.

2.3 Lack of due diligence in contract management, resulting in excess payment of ₹4 crore to BSNL

NCRB had signed an agreement (October 2011) with BSNL for providing bandwidth to all Police Stations across States to be used for creating CCTNS network over State Wide Area Network (SWAN), Virtual Private Network over Broadband (VPNoBB)[8], Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMax)[9] and Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT)[10] technologies and requested (March 2012) SCRB to sign the Service Level Agreement (SLA) with BSNL for the same.

Accordingly, GoO signed (April 2012) SLA with BSNL for three years. The SLA was extended up to March 2018, till then the payment for connectivity was to be funded by GoI. After that the State Government had to pay for the connectivity. As per the SLA, the minimum uptime for VSAT and VPNoBB was set at 96 *per cent* and 97 *per cent* in a quarter respectively, with penalties of two times of rental value for downtime beyond the above permissible limit. Penalty was to be calculated on a quarterly basis deductible from the next quarter's payment, and not to be refunded in cash by BSNL.

NCRB instructed (April 2016) all States to use a software *i.e.,* Enterprise Management System (EMS) to compare the bandwidth utilisation report against the SLAs committed by BSNL, before disbursing payments to BSNL. Therefore, SCRB was required to pay BSNL for the bandwidth utilisation after verification of uptime/ downtime report from EMS, and after deducting penalty calculated based on the EMS Report, from the quarterly claims of BSNL.

Audit examined records related to processing of payments to BSNL and noticed that as of March 2020, BSNL had raised invoices amounting to ₹8.88 crore as shown below:

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8 Virtual Private Network over Broadband (VPNoBB)-functions as a private virtual network in Multi Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) cloud.

9 It is an IP based Wireless Broadband Access Technology utilising IEEE 802.16e-2005 standard as the air interface.

10 VSAT is a satellite communication network and is used to provide computer network to remote locations.

Table No.2.3: Statement showing release of payment without calculation of penalty to BSNL

Invoice period	Bill raised for VPNoBB by BSNL	Disputed amount over the date of link commissioning in the Units as mutually agreed by BSNL and SCRB	Eligible billing amount as per SCRB calculation based on uptime/ downtime report as per EMS	Penalty calculated by SCRB after release of payment based on downtime report as per EMS downtime ranged between 3 *per cent to* 100 *per cent*	Payment released by SCRB
	(₹ in crore)				
October 2016 - March 2018	5.86	1.55	1.08	6.47	4.00
April 2018 – March 2020	3.02	-	0.79	Not calculated by SCRB	--
Total	**8.88**	**1.55**	**1.86**	**6.47**	**4.00**

Source: Records maintained by SCRB

SCRB released (November 2018) ₹4.00 crores against claims of ₹5.86 crore by BSNL up to March 2018, without calculating the penalty.

Subsequently, SCRB calculated (March 2020) a penalty of ₹6.47 crore and asked BSNL to refund ₹8.60 crore (₹6.47 crore *plus* ₹4.00 crore *minus* ₹1.86 crore). However, BSNL did not refund the amount quoting the SLA clause which stated that the penalty was to be deducted from the payment of the next quarter and was not to be refunded in cash. It was noted that after March 2020, M/s Airtel was appointed as the network provider selected through open tender and SCRB could not effect recovery of penalty from BSNL.

Thus, SCRB failed to observe due diligence in contract management by making payment without verifying contract terms which resulted in release of ₹4 crore without calculating the applicable penalty even though they had to verify it from the EMS report.

Admitting excess payment made to BSNL, Government stated (September 2024) that they had released ₹4.00 crore to BSNL in good faith since it was a Government PSU. The response was not tenable, since ensuring compliance with contractual terms was the responsibility of SCRB. Efforts are required to be made for recovery of amount paid in excess.

2.4 Digitisation of old/past records

Data digitisation and migration was the most important activity and constitutes a major component in the successful implementation of CCTNS project. Proper digitisation and migration of past records into CAS database would help the police in efficient search and matching of records while enquiring/ investigating a case.

As per the contract (12 July 2012), the SI *i.e.,* M/s NIIT Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (NIIT) was responsible for data digitisation and migration of past records from 2001-2010. NIIT was to digitise all the relevant data/ records till the CAS was operational. As per the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for data digitisation and migration, data digitisation would involve digitisation of all the documents related to a case diary *i.e.*, first information report, crime details form, arrest/ surrender form, seizure form, final report/ chargesheet, court disposal form, result of appeal, medico-legal cases, missing person registration, unidentified dead body form, lost property form *etc.*

Apart from digitizing the physical records, NIIT was also responsible for migrating the data of those Police Stations and higher officers that were operational on CCIS and CIPA using a Data Migration Utility (DMU) developed by NCRB. System Integrator was to validate the data in these systems prior to migration to CCTNS.

2.4.1 Non digitisation of old/past records from 2001 onwards

As per the contract, SI was to digitize old/past case records of 10 years from 2001 to 2010 as well as open cases (on-going investigation/trial) even if the case had been registered prior to 2001. It was noted that, instead, SCRB decided (December 2012) to only digitize old/past records for the period from January 2003 to December 2012, which was not in compliance with the contractual terms.

Audit examined the status of digitized records available in CCTNS and noticed that old/past records had been digitized for the period from 2004 to 2013 in Keonjhar and Khurda districts and for the period from 2005 to 2014 in case of the remaining districts. As a result, the original objective and contractual requirement of digitizing the old/past records for the period from 2001-10 had not been fully achieved.

2.4.2 Lack of due diligence by System Integrator in digitising data, resulting in significant errors and discarding of the digitised data

The digitisation of data pertaining to old/past records was started in November 2012, for the period of 10 years from January 2003 to December 2012. The data entry was to be carried out in reverse chronological sequence starting with the latest year.

During the data digitisation process, SCRB pointed out (December 2012 to April 2015) several inconsistencies and errors in the data entered into CCTNS, due to lack of training and frequent changes of Data Entry Operators and Supervisors who were deployed by the SI and due to lack of due diligence in validating the data by deployed Sub-Inspectors/Assistant Sub-Inspectors (100

per cent), SHOs (50 *per cent*) and SsP (20 *per cent*) with reference to the underlying old/past records.

NCRB also observed (April 2013) that the quality of data digitisation was not up to the mark. SCRB issued instructions (May 2013) to all SsP for validation of digitised data by Sub-inspector/ Assistant Sub-inspector of the respective PSs (100 *per cent*), head of the PS (50 *per cent*), District SP (20-25 *per cent*) and Nodal Officer of the State (10-15 *per cent*).

Subsequently, the process of data digitisation continued from November 2012 to August 2015 and 70 *per cent* of the data pertaining to old/past cases was digitised, but with errors of more than 95 *per cent*, as observed by SCRB (August 2015).

Since more than 95 *per cent* of the digitised data pertaining to old/past case records was found to have been entered incorrectly, SCRB decided August 2015 to discard the entire digitised data. Thus, the digitisation process got delayed.

2.4.3 Deficiencies in attempt to digitise data pertaining to old/past records through pre-defined data templates filled by Police Stations

After the above decision to discard the incorrect digitised data, the Apex Committee (August 2015) suggested to follow the model for digitisation adopted in Tamil Nadu, wherein data pertaining to old/past records was to be filled into pre-defined data templates by each Police Station and data entry work from these templates was to be carried out at district level by the SI.

Accordingly, this model for data digitisation started in November 2015. During review (April 2016) of the digitised data using this model, SCRB found that there were 30 to 40 *per cent* of errors in the data entered into CCTNS. Also, given the pace of progress made in digitizing data using this model, SCRB observed that completion of the process would require four years' time, which would be beyond the contract period of the SI. As a result, SCRB decided (July 2016) to discontinue data digitisation using this model.

2.4.4 Change of scope of work for digitisation of data pertaining to old/past case records

After discarding the data entered directly by the SI (95 *per cent* incorrect data) and after discontinuing the data entered through data templates filled in by Police Stations (30-40 *per cent* incorrect data), SCRB decided (21 June 2016) to digitise data pertaining to non-SR[11] cases by limiting the data to only those

[11] Special Report Cases relate to heinous crimes like rape, murder etc. Non-SR cases are those other than SR Cases as declared by the SP.

contained in the physical Crime Index Registers and limiting the old/past records in these cases to only the scanned copy of the physical Crime Index Registers, while continuing to digitise the full data pertaining to SR cases from the data template formats filled in by Police Stations along with scanning and uploading of all the underlying old/past records.

In this way, by March 2017, only partial digitisation of old/past records had reportedly been completed, covering the period 2004–2014 for all 36 police districts.

Audit reviewed the digitized old/past records and the digitised data pertaining to the old/past records in CCTNS and made the following observations :

2.4.5 Deficiencies in digitised data and digitised old/past records

- Scan and upload of key old/past records such as photos of the accused, judgement copies, confession statements of the accused, images of fingerprints, post-mortem certificates, wound certificates, medical reports for the accused and victims *etc.,* which were required to be carried out as per SOP had not been completed.

- Data[12] from the Crime Index Registers of 7,29,231 FIRs and 7,10,213 Chargesheets were required to be digitised. Out of these, the full set of data fields related to 7,28,354 FIRs (99.88 *per cent*) and 7,10,207 Chargesheets (100 *per cent*) were not entered. Due to this, the old/past data on FIRs and Chargesheets was incomplete and of limited relevance to users.

- Crime Detail Forms (IIF-II) had not been digitized. Only crime detail form serial numbers had been entered into the database against the FIRs digitized.

- Arrest Memo (IIF-III) details for the period 2005-11 had not been entered into the system. The number of Arrest Memos supposed to be uploaded in the system was 1,780 (2012), 21,608 (2013) and 91,547 (2014) but the details entered into the system were incomplete.

- Seizure Memo (IIF-IV) details for the period 2005-11 had not been entered into the system. For the years 2012, 2013 and 2014, the number of Seizure Memos whose details were entered was not complete, with only 1,671, 18,857 and 71,091 entered into the system respectively.

[12] Contains FIR Number, Place of occurrence, Date and time of complain received at PS, FIR date, name and address of the complainant/ informant and accused, name of the police personnel who is deployed for investigation by IIC, Crime with section of Act, Date and form of final report, name of person sent up to court and absconding

- Complete details of 6.44 lakh Court Disposal Memos from the years 2005 to 2014 had not been entered into the system. Only the Court Case numbers had been entered into the database. As the name of the Court, name of the Judge, Judgement Date, Court remarks, name of the Public Prosecutor *etc.,* had not been entered, the data was of limited use and relevance to the users, and the system could not facilitate meaningful retrieval of data. The current status and result of the trial process was not recorded in the system.
- No data had been entered in respect of result of Appeal Forms (IIF-VII), Man Missing Reports (IIF-VIII) and Unnatural Death Cases (IIF-XI).
- **Presence of gaps in FIR serial numbers**:-The FIR serial number is systematically generated, beginning with '0001' for each Police Station and calendar year to ensure the uniqueness of FIRs. The system generates sequential numbers, and therefore there should be no gap between two consecutive FIR serial numbers.

Audit analysed the digitised data for the period from 2005 to 2014 in CCTNS and noticed that data pertaining to 7,29,231 FIRs had been entered for this period. However, there were gaps ranging from one to 8,385 between two consecutive FIR serial numbers in 1,645 instances during this period, as shown below:

Table 2.4: Year-wise instances where there were gaps in FIR numbers

Year	Number of instances	Gap range between two consecutive FIR	
		Minimum Gap	Maximum Gap
2005	400	1	208
2006	449	1	1,086
2007	173	1	241
2008	177	1	1,814
2009	5	1	224
2010	10	1	403
2011	16	1	1,650
2012	44	1	1,768
2013	76	1	123
2014	295	1	8,385
Grand Total	**1,645**		

Source: CCTNS database

These gaps indicated lack of due diligence in data entry, since the data for the missing FIR serial numbers had not been digitised.

Penal provisions

The amount in bundle of services as per Agreement with System Integrator for ₹42.71 crore, which included the charges for digitization amounting to ₹61.11

lakh. Clause 3 on the violations and associated penalties of the Agreement with System Integrator provides that number of violations in the reporting period for each level of severity will be totalled and used for calculation of penalties. For each high severity violation 0.1 *per cent* and for medium severity violation 0.05 *per cent* of respective payment was to be deducted as penalty.

Despite the penal provisions, no severity assessment of the violations/ erroneous performance in the process of data migration/ digitisation was conducted. No calculation of amount for imposition of penalty as per the agreement was done.

2.4.6 Non-Migration of legacy data from CCIS/ CIPA applications to CCTNS

As per the contract with the SI, legacy data pertaining to 4.60 lakhs FIRs for the period from January 1993 to December 2004 from the CCIS/ CIPA applications was to be migrated to CCTNS using a Data Migration Utility (DMU) supplied by NCRB.

However, this legacy data was stated to have been stored separately in the database in the production server, along with the CCIS/ CIPA data restored at the State Data Centre. This legacy data had also not been transferred to NDC, due to which other States could not access and use the legacy data.

The absence of migration of legacy data not only resulted in non-compliance with the contractual terms by the SI, but also resulted in the objectives of antecedent search, statistical analysis and generation of comparative statements not being achieved.

With regard to audit observations on digitisation of old/past records, Government admitted the presence of the errors in the digitisation of legacy data and assured (September 2024) to take due care so that such mistakes are not repeated in future.

Recommendation

Government should ensure that

- *tendering process is conducted in compliance with Rules, in a fair and transparent manner. Change of scope of projects should be avoided after selection of the system integrator; and*
- *appropriate steps should be taken to digitize physical records and data related to those records, to enable migration of legacy data into the system.*

Chapter III
User Management



Chapter – III


User Management

3.1 Chargesheet prepared by Officers who were not the designated Investigating Officers (IO) for the case

When an FIR is registered, the Inspector in Charge (IIC) assigns the case to an Investigating Officer (IO), who is tasked with conducting the investigation and eventually filing the chargesheet upon completion. However, in the event of the IO being transferred or assigned to a different task, the concerned IIC reassigns the case to a new IO. This new IO then assumes responsibility for continuing the investigation and ultimately filing the chargesheet.

Each IO possesses the authority to modify case details and file a chargesheet solely within the duration of their assignment to the case. However, once the case is reassigned to a different IO, the previous IO should not have access to the case within CCTNS. The intended workflow for this process is depicted below in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Flow Chart showing workflow of an FIR



For managing the assignment of a FIR to an investigating officer, the table 'FIR assign' contained Assigned IO's name for the period in which he/she was the IO of a particular FIR. Whenever there is a reassignment of the case to a different IO, a new entry is inserted into that table mentioning the date from which the new IO is in-charge of the case. In this way there is a detailed list of officers who were in-charge of different cases, and their respective periods are maintained. When an IO submits the chargesheet, the chargesheet details were

Figure 3.2: Picture showing a chargesheet by inappropriate IO

FIR No.0109

FIR reassign table

Particulars	Name of Officer	Period of assignment	
		Date from	Date to
Assignment of FIR	Suman	17 Nov 2021	27 May 2022
Re-assignment of FIR	Biswambar	27 May 2022	

Chargesheet table

On 25 May 2022, the chargesheet of the FIR was submitted by Biswambar when he was not the IO of the FIR

captured in another table 'Final Report' where along with chargesheet details the user ID of the IO and date of creation of record were also captured. Audit analysed these two tables in the database and noticed 2,080 instances across 217 Police Stations during the period from 2018 to 2023, where the chargesheet in CCTNS had been prepared by an Investigating Officer (IO) who had not been assigned to the concerned cases, as detailed below:

Table 3.1: Statement showing year-wise chargesheets filed by an officer other than the IO assigned

FIR Registration Year	Number of chargesheets filed by an officer other than the IO assigned to do so
2018	300
2019	390
2020	315
2021	635
2022	363
2023	77
Total	**2,080**

Source: CCTNS database

The above-mentioned deficiency indicated a significant control failure, as the system permitted the filing of charge sheets by personnel not authorized to do so. This carried the risk of modifications/manipulations to the chargesheets by Officers who were not the designated IOs.

Government stated (September 2024) that PS-wise specific details are being sent to concerned Superintendents of Police (SsP) for compliance and for fixing responsibility on the erring Inspectors-In-Charge (IICs) in the cases where proper authorisation was not done as per CrPC.

Despite the Government's reply, the fact remains that CCTNS still lacked necessary data validation controls to prevent such unauthorised transactions.

3.2 Unauthorised use of CCTNS credentials

Credentials, such as username and password are provided to help verify the identity of the person or entity trying to access a system. This authentication process ensures that only authorized users are granted access. By requiring credentials, a system can track and log who is accessing it. This accountability is essential for monitoring user actions and ensuring compliance with policies and regulations. Without proper authentication, unauthorized individuals or malicious actors could gain access to sensitive data or perform unauthorized actions. Credentials serve as a barrier to prevent such unauthorized access. Different users may have different levels of access and permissions within a

system. Credentials help determine what resources and functionalities each user is allowed to use. Organisations are required to comply with regulations that mandate secure authentication to protect sensitive information and maintain data privacy. Credentials are essential for managing user accounts, including creating, updating, and deactivating them. They are also crucial for user administration and security.

In CCTNS, credentials are provided from the level of Assistant Sub Inspector to the Inspector General with authorisation and specific roles to perform as per their duties. When a Station House Officer (SHO) is out of the Police Station, the following steps were provisioned be taken to register an FIR:

a. SHO could nominate a police official as In-charge (Duty Officer) during the time.
b. All the rights for SHO would be delegated to the nominated user.
c. The delegated user could register FIRs on the SHO's behalf.
d. The administrator would assign the role of SHO to the nominated person.

Test check of manually maintained leave records of employees of ten selected SP Offices and analysis of CCTNS database revealed that the credentials of Inspectors-in-Charge (IICs)/ SHOs/ IOs were used to register FIRs/ Arrests when the IICs/ SHOs /IOs were on leave, in case of 7 users on 18 occasions (***Appendix-I***). This indicated that the credentials of the IICs/ SHOs /IOs had been shared with other individuals, instead of following the approved procedure outlined above.

As login credentials are a vital control for ensuring information security and privacy, the above practice of sharing user credentials created avoidable risks. This irregular practice, coupled with the absence of application logs (as discussed in the subsequent paragraphs) resulted in inability to monitor actions taken by users in viewing and modifying data in CCTNS, and fixing responsibility subsequently.

In response, Government stated (September 2024) that the discrepancies were being sent to the concerned Superintendents of Police, with a direction to fix responsibility on the erring IICs for their lapse in not entrusting any subordinate Officer to function as In-charge of the PS through the system. However, the lack of control in CCTNS in handling cases during leave of officers and delegation of their authorities still remained.

3.3 Incorrect mapping of Police Stations with Sub-divisional Police Offices

A Sub-Divisional Police Officer (SDPO) is responsible for overseeing law enforcement activities within a designated sub-division, which is a smaller administrative unit within a district. The SDPOs are responsible for supervision of the Police Stations within their sub-divisions. To enhance the effectiveness of supervision, each Police Station was required to be mapped to the concerned SDPO, within the CCTNS.

Audit analysed the database of Police Stations mapped to SDPOs and compared the mapping in the system with the stated jurisdiction of SDPOs and observed that

- 39 Police Stations had been incorrectly mapped by SCRB to 27 SDPOs, as shown in ***Appendix-II.***
- Six Police Stations[13] had not been mapped to any SDPOs.

In response, Government stated (September 2024) that the jurisdiction of all the SDPOs as reflected in ***Appendix-II*** had been duly mapped correctly in CCTNS. It was further stated that whenever the matter of changes to the SDPO jurisdictions comes to the notice of SCRB, the mapping would be updated.

The response was not tenable, as the responsibility for updating the mapping of PSs to SDPOs had been entrusted to SCRB, but the mapping had not been updated in the cases listed in ***Appendix II***. This resulted in deficiency in effective supervision over cases in those PSs for the relevant periods.

3.4 Absence of application controls to detect duplication of data related to the same accused/complainants

One of the main objectives of CCTNS was to create a centralised crime and criminal information repository, with images and fingerprints of criminals being stored and functionalities for advanced search and retrieval of details of criminals being available.

Such functionalities would enable the police to search for persons of interest, such as persons wanted on outstanding warrants, accused of crimes, charged habitual offenders, convicts, *etc.,* across a national database. This was intended to eliminate the need for duplicate and redundant entry of data as well as the need for repetitive manual preparation of reports, thus freeing valuable time and resources for the performance of core police functions. These

[13] Ananatpur, Laxmijore, Karlapat, Manoharpur, Malkangiri Sadar and Traffic PS-2 Chandrasekharpur

functionalities would also enable viewing and exchange of information efficiently among Police Stations and other Police formations.

Audit analysed the data on criminals stored in the CCTNS database and noticed that there were instances of duplication of entries related to the same individuals (complainants as well as accused), which were identifiable on the basis of matching of data fields such as a combination of 'Name', 'Gender', 'Relative Name', 'Relation Type', 'Year of Birth', 'Address', 'Mobile No.' *etc.,* as discussed below:

Case Study

During test check of records, Audit noticed that in Jhirpani PS in Rourkela, Case No.35/2019 and Case No. 59/2019 had the same individual as accused. However, the status of the accused was depicted as arrested in one case, while concurrently, in the other case during the same timeframe, the accused was depicted as absconding. This discrepancy arose due to creation of multiple records for the same accused individual.

Multiple Records for the same accused individuals

Audit identified 10,346 instances of accused individuals having multiple records in the database. The number of multiple records created for each accused individual ranged from two to 21. Examples of such multiple records created for the same accused individual by different PSs as well as within the same PS, are shown in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2: Showing creation of multiple records for the same accused individual

Accused_srno	District	PS	FIR_No	Accused_name	Gender	Relative_name	Relation	YOB	Age	Address_Vill	Add_PS_cd
24503003210002246	JAJPUR	BALICHANDRAPUR	0232/2021	At** B***r*	Male	Ka***ka B***r*	Father	1985	36	Digi	24490017
24503003210002295	JAJPUR	BALICHANDRAPUR	0240/2021	At** B***r*	Male	Ka***ka B***r*	Father	1985	36	Digi	24490017
24503063210001520	JAJPUR	SUKINDA	0173/2021	At** B***r*	Male	Ka***ka B***r*	Father	1985	36	DIGI	24490017
24503069210002478	JAJPUR	KUAKHIA	0236/2021	At** B***r*	Male	Ka***ka B***r*	Father	1985	36	Digi	24490017
24490018210002219	BHADRAK	DHUSURI	0178/2021	At** B***r*	Male	Ka***ka B***r*	Father	1985	36	Digi	24490017
24503025210002144	JAJPUR	JAJPUR	0266/2021	At** B***r*	Male	Ka***ka B***r*	Father	1985	36	Digi	24490017
24503073210001403	JAJPUR	PANIKOILI	0180/2021	At** B***r*	Male	Ka***ka B***r*	Father	1985	36	DIGI	24490017
24503026210002485	JAJPUR	JAJPUR ROAD	0231/2021	At** B***r*	Male	Ka***ka B***r*	Father	1985	36	Digi	24490017
24503073210001529	JAJPUR	PANIKOILI	0163/2021	At** B***r*	Male	Ka***ka B***r*	Father	1985	36	DIGI	24490017
24503026210002754	JAJPUR	JAJPUR ROAD	0167/2021	At** B***r*	Male	Ka***ka B***r*	Father	1985	36	Digi	24490017
24490005210002537	BHADRAK	BASUDEBPUR	0225/2021	At** B***r*	Male	Ka***ka B***r*	Father	1985	36	DIGI	24490017

Source: CCTNS database

Audit noticed that such creation of multiple records for the same accused individual had taken place due to the absence of application controls to detect duplicate entry of the same data.

Multiple Records of the same complainant

Audit identified 11,711 instances of complainants having multiple records in the database. The number of multiple records created for each complainant ranged from 2 to 138. Examples of such multiple records created for the same complainant by the same PS, are shown in Table 3.3 below.

Table 3.3: Showing creation of multiple records created for the same complainant

Person_code	District	PS	FIR_No	Complainant_name	Gender	Relative_name	Relation	YOB	Age	Mobile_No	Address_Vill	Tehsil	Add_PS_cd
24491001210202671	Ganjam	Aska	0413/2021	Ra**** K***r Ch**t***	Male	Lt Pi***a** Ch**t***	Father	1977	43	6371741271	Kotagaon	jaipatana	24495017
24491001210203270	Ganjam	Aska	0495/2021	Ra**** K***r Ch**t***	Male	Lt Pi***a** Ch**t***	Father	1977	43	6371741271	Kotagaon	jaipatana	24495017
24491001210202911	Ganjam	Aska	0444/2021	Ra**** K***r Ch**t***	Male	Lt Pi***a** Ch**t***	Father	1977	43	6371741271	Kotagaon	jaipatana	24495017
24491001210203269	Ganjam	Aska	0494/2021	Ra**** K***r Ch**t***	Male	Lt Pi***a** Ch**t***	Father	1977	43	6371741271	Kotagaon	jaipatana	24495017
24491001220201567	Ganjam	Aska	0331/2022	Ra**** K***r Ch**t***	Male	Lt Pi***a** Ch**t***	Father	1977	44	6371741271	Kotagaon	jaipatana	24495017
24491001210205026	Ganjam	Aska	0813/2021	Ra**** K***r Ch**t***	Male	Lt Pi***a** Ch**t***	Father	1977	44	6371741271	Kotagaon	jaipatana	24495017
24491001210204202	Ganjam	Aska	0672/2021	Ra**** K***r Ch**t***	Male	Lt Pi***a** Ch**t***	Father	1977	43	6371741271	Kotagaon	jaipatana	24495017
24491001220201237	Ganjam	Aska	0257/2022	Ra**** K***r Ch**t***	Male	Lt Pi***a** Ch**t***	Father	1977	44	6371741271	Kotagaon	jaipatana	24495017
24491001210202912	Ganjam	Aska	0445/2021	Ra**** K***r Ch**t***	Male	Lt Pi***a** Ch**t***	Father	1977	43	6371741271	Kotagaon	jaipatana	24495017

Source: CCTNS database

Having multiple records of the same complainant can lead to data inconsistency and inaccuracies in the database. Duplicate records could lead to confusion and inefficiencies during investigations, as it would lead to waste of time and resources spent in searching for information across multiple records. It would also hinder the effectiveness of the criminal justice system by impacting case management, court proceedings, and the ability to track individuals' criminal histories accurately.

Government stated (September 2024) that steps are being taken to add provision for using existing complainants in the CCTNS which was lacking.

3.5 Absence of mandatory authentication of mobile number and/ or email address during registration of users on the Citizen Portal

When users register for a service or platform, they typically provide identification details such as their mobile number and email address for verification. This process involves sending a code (such as One Time Password, OTP) to the provided contact device/email and the user must enter this OTP to confirm access. Odisha Police's Citizen Portal offers services like Character and Employee Verification, requiring registration of users with mobile number and email address.

However, Audit noticed that the Portal had provision for users to opt for "Remind Me Later" for authentication of mobile number and email address, due to which there were avoidable risks such as creation of fake accounts and

use of bots[14] to carry out Distributed Denial of Service Attacks[15], which could result in non-availability of the system for genuine users. If the number of fake accounts was significant, it could also lead to wasted time for police personnel on verification of such users' service requests.

In reply, Government stated (September 2024) that since there had been delays in generation and transmission of OTPs to mobile numbers/ email addresses provided by users, the functionality had been provided on the Portal to complete the authentication process at a later point of time. However, the issue had been resolved and the functionality of OTP based authentication would now be implemented on the Citizen Portal.

Recommendation

Government should ensure that

- *user access management in CCTNS is compliant with business rules, so that the officers in charge are correctly mapped to roles and cases and police stations are correctly mapped to reporting authorities.*

[14] A bot is an automated software application that performs repetitive attacks over internet

[15] A Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack is a malicious attempt to disrupt the normal traffic of a targeted server, service or network by overwhelming the target or its surrounding infrastructure with a flood of Internet traffic

Chapter IV
Registration



Chapter – IV

Registration

4.1 General Diary

A General Diary (GD) in a Police Station is a record maintained by the police to document all incidents, complaints, or any other relevant information that comes to their attention. It serves as an official logbook where police officers record daily activities, occurrences, and actions taken. GDs are generated on sequential basis for recording events where each entry is uniquely identified, enabling an accurate count of events within a given timeframe. This sequential approach not only ensures transparency within the organisation but also enhances accountability and facilitates effective monitoring of police activities. Since the system generates sequential numbers, there should be no gaps between two consecutive GD numbers.


Further, as per Police Manual, Odisha, CCTNS was to be designed in such a way that the GD number gets reset *i.e.,* starts from serial number one every day at 08:00 AM in a Police Station. This meant that entries made in the GD for the day would be typically recorded for a specific date and time, starting from GD No. 001 at 08:00:00 AM and ending with a maximum GD number in the day at 07:59:59AM of the next day. Analysis of the database for the period from January 2018 to March 2023 revealed inconsistencies in the data recorded in CCTNS related to GD numbers, as discussed below:

4.1.1 Gaps in generation of GD Serial Number

Audit analysed the data related to GD numbers in the CCTNS database and noticed that a total of 1,71,05,648 GDs had been generated across 656 PSs of the State, during January 2018 to March 2023. The other 16 PSs had not used the GD module (these were either Energy Police Stations, working under the Human Rights Commission, CID *etc*).

There were gaps in GD Serial Numbers in 33,018 instances (with a total gap count of 1,45,619) across 579 Police Stations, as listed in ***Appendix-III***. One such instance is explained as below:

Figure 4.1: Picture depicting gaps in GD Serial Numbers



Source: CCTNS Database

Such gaps in GD Serial Numbers not only indicated the lack of application controls to ensure data integrity in incremental generation of GD Serial Numbers, but also the material risk that primary records had been deleted from the system. Deletion of records without a clear log trail has serious implications for the investigation process, as it creates avoidable scope for collusion between police personnel and the accused to conceal evidence or manipulate records. In the absence of Database Administrator (DBA) logs *i.e.,* record of activities made by the DBA in the back end as pointed out in ***Paragraph No.7.3*** responsibility for such unauthorised deletions cannot be fixed. This reflected a major control failure in the system.

Admitting the presence of gaps in GD Serial Numbers, Government attributed (September 2024), the reason to the PS users who had manoeuvred the local desktop system date and time, to record the correct date and time of GD events at subsequent periods of time. However, the Government needs to ensure that changing the local desktop system date and time at the PS level should not result in gaps in GD Serial Numbers generated by the system.

Further, Government stated that NCRB would be contacted to implement remedial controls in the system to prevent gaps in GD Serial Numbers.

4.1.2 Multiple GDs with the same GD Serial Number within the defined 24-hour period

Audit noticed that multiple GDs had been created with the same GD Serial Number within the defined 24-hour period (08:00:00 AM to 07:59:59 AM), which should not have been permitted by the system.

Out of 1.71 crore GD records created during January 2018 to March 2023, there were 1.43 lakh instances of GDs having the same GD Serial Number within the same defined 24-hour period. The number of such GDs with the same GD Serial Number ranged from 02 to 25.


This issue arose due to following two reasons:

4.1.2.1 Provision for creation of Dynamic GDs while creating FIRs without underlying GDs in the system

Creation of every FIR requires a GD Number. However, in certain cases FIRs were allowed to be directly entered (*i.e.,* without reference to a previously entered GD) into the system with the date manually specified (including prior to the current date). While creating such FIRs, the user could enter the FIR date and timestamp manually, with a provision to create a GD entry known as 'Dynamic GD'. Such 'Dynamic GDs' were recorded in the system with the same date and timestamp as the FIR. At this point, the system generated a GD Serial Number corresponding to the sequential date and timestamp for the manually entered data, instead of generating a GD Serial Number incremental to the last GD Serial Number already generated for that 24-hour period.

Such back-dated insertion of GD Serial Numbers had resulted in duplication of GD Serial Numbers in cases where there were GD Serial Numbers already recorded for the particular 24-hour period, immediately following the manually entered date and timestamp. An example describing the creation of a duplicate GD Serial Number is given in the ***Figure-4.2*** below:

Figure 4.2: Picture depicting creation of duplicate GD Serial Number due to direct FIR entries with manually entered date and timestamp




Source: GD Master Table of CCTNS Database

Government stated (September 2024) that the same GD Serial Number for multiple GDs had been created by PS users who had manually entered date and timestamps for FIRs. The response was not tenable, since the system should have enforced referential integrity in the database, by requiring generation of an incremental GD Serial Number for that 24-hour period, instead of a duplicate sequential GD Serial Number corresponding to the manually entered date and timestamp.

4.1.2.2 Irregular creation of back-dated GDs by modifying the local desktop system date and time

Apart from the creation of duplicate GD Serial Numbers as pointed out above through use of 'Dynamic GDs', there were 1.22 lakh instances of duplicate GD Serial Numbers in the database, which indicated direct back-dated entry of GDs (without them being necessitated due to FIRs requiring 'Dynamic GD'), as depicted in the picture below:

Figure 4.3: Picture depicting creation of duplicate GD Serial Numbers due to back-dated manual GD entries



Source: GD Master Table of CCTNS Database

Audit noticed that users could manually modify the local desktop system date and time and the system used that modified date and timestamp to create back-dated GDs. At this point, the system generated a GD Serial Number corresponding to the sequential date and timestamp as modified on the local desktop system, instead of generating a GD Serial Number incremental to the last GD Serial Number already generated for that 24-hour period.

Such back-dated insertion of GDs had resulted in duplication of GD Serial Numbers in cases where there were GD Serial Numbers already recorded for the particular 24-hour period, immediately following the manually entered date and timestamp. There was no provision in the Odisha Police Manual or the FRS/ URS for creation of back-dated GDs (without being necessitated due to back-dated FIRs). As such, creation

of such back-dated GDs by modifying the local desktop system date and time was highly irregular.

Government admitted the audit observation (September 2024) and stated that the reason for the duplication was modification of the local desktop date and time by PS users.

The reason given was not tenable, since the system should have enforced referential integrity in the database, by requiring generation of an incremental GD Serial Number for that 24-hour period, instead of a duplicate sequential GD Serial Number corresponding to the manually entered date and timestamp.


The duplication of GD Serial Numbers affected the integrity of CCTNS and functioning of Police Station apart from creating confusion in selection of GD entries while using different functions such as creation of arrest memos, seizure memos, FIRs etc.

4.1.3 Inconsistency in GD date and timestamp recorded in GD master table and the FIR table

Whenever a General Diary (GD) entry was created, the data was recorded in the GD master table along with the GD date and timestamp. Subsequently, when a FIR references that GD, the system was required to retrieve the GD date and timestamp from the GD master table. This control would have ensured that the GD date and timestamp in the GD master table and the FIR table would remain consistent.

Audit analysed the GD master table and FIR table in the CCTNS and noticed that there was inconsistency in GD date and timestamps recorded in the two tables in 25 cases under 16 Police Stations of the State during January 2018 to March 2023. In all the 25 cases, the GD entry date and timestamp recorded in the GD master table were earlier than the GD entry date and timestamp recorded in the FIR table, with the difference in time ranging from two minutes to 104 hours, as detailed in ***Appendix-IV***. One such instance is highlighted in ***Figure 4.4***:

Figure 4.4: Picture depicting the inconsistency of GD Date in GD Master Table and FIR Master Table



Source: CCTNS Database

The inconsistencies in the date and timestamps indicated that instead of the system retrieving the data from the GD master table when users entering data into the FIR table referenced the underlying GD Number, users were required to manually enter the GD date and timestamp. This resulted in avoidable risks to data integrity in the FIR table.


Director, SCRB stated (May 2024) stated that the inconsistency of timestamps between GD table and FIR table had happened due to changing of local desktop system date and time by PS users.

The reply indicates that the required application control of retrieving the GD date and timestamp from the master table had not been implemented.

4.1.4 Inconsistency in generation of GD Numbers in GD master table

As per system design, a GD Number should consist of 23 digits and follows a predefined format, as specified in the source code. The first eight digits represent the code for the Police Station, the next eight digits represent the date, month and year in 'DD-MM-YYYY' format, and the next four digits represent the time in 'HH:MM' format, and last three digits represent the serial number of the GD in the defined 24-hour period, as depicted in the ***Figure 4.5***:

Figure 4.5: Format of the GD numbers created in GD Master Table



Source: CCTNS Database and Information received from SCRB

Audit analysed the GD Numbers generated in CCTNS and noticed the following discrepancies:

- **Discrepancies in digits representing time in generation of GD Numbers:** The system generated GD Numbers should be of 23 digits as per the system design. Audit noticed that there were 64,952 (with 64,933 in Hinjili Police Station) GD records for the period from October 2018 to March 2023, where the GD Number had 19 digits only. This was because the four digits representing time in 'HH:MM' format were absent. This inconsistency was noted in eight Police Stations, as shown in the following table:

Table No. 4.1: Table showing list of Police Stations where length of GD Number had 19 digits during the period from January 2018 to March 2023

Sl. No.	Police Station Code	Police Station	Number of GD records where length of GD Number is 19	Total number of GDs
1.	24875055	ULUNDA	1	51,618
2.	24491019	HINJILI	64,933	65,619
3.	24504014	CHHEND	1	45,161
4.	24867006	KHANDAGIRI	1	44,290
5.	24863012	KALIMELA	1	22,247
6.	24484056	TUREIKELA	1	39,317
7.	24867016	LAXMISAGAR	11	50,387
8.	24487010	CYBER CRIME	3	3,490
	Total		**64,952**	

Source: CCTNS database

This inconsistency indicated that the system process of generating unique GD Numbers was not functioning as intended. The deficiency created avoidable risks of GD Numbers being generated in the same Police Station (eight digits)

on the same date (eight digits), being dependent on the uniqueness of GD Serial Number (three digits) to ensure uniqueness of the overall GD Number. As described in Paragraph 4.1.2 above, there were instances of duplicate GD Serial Numbers within the same defined 24-hour period noticed in the database, which indicated the material risk that the overall GD Numbers generated would themselves not be unique. Such an outcome would pose significant data integrity challenges for the users.

Figure 4.6: Picture showing generation of GD without time part in its unique GD number

682	24491019230920181959003	99	24	24491	24491019	003	2018-09-23 19:59:03.000	2449111081256940
683	24491019240920180934001	99	24	24491	24491019	001	2018-09-24 09:34:19.000	2449111081256940
684	24491019240920181428002	99	24	24491	24491019	002	2018-09-24 14:28:36.000	2449111081256940
685	24491019260920181828001	99	24	24491	24491019	001	2018-09-26 18:28:48.000	2449111081256940
686	24491019260920182033002	99	24	24491	24491019	002	2018-09-26 20:33:00.000	2449111081256940
687	2449101905102018001	99	24	24491	24491019	001	2018-10-05 17:10:40.000	2449111081256940
688	2449101910102018001	99	24	24491	24491019	001	2018-10-10 10:57:32.000	2449111081256940
689	2449101910102018002	99	24	24491	24491019	002	2018-10-10 11:09:14.000	2449111081256940
690	2449101910102018003	99	24	24491	24491019	003	2018-10-10 11:21:35.000	2449111081256940

Source: CCTNS Database

Government accepted the inconsistency in length of GD numbers as a system flaw and stated (September 2024) that the SI is being directed to address the flaw.


4.2 First Information Report (FIR)

4.2.1 Gaps in generation of FIR Serial Number

The FIR Serial numbers are system generated in CCTNS, beginning with '0001' for each Police Station and each calendar year, to ensure their uniqueness. There should be no gap between consecutive FIR Serial Numbers in each Police Station.

Audit analysed the FIR Serial Numbers recorded in the CCTNS database and noticed that a total of 7,44,399 FIRs had been registered in all the PSs of the State during January 2018 to March 2023. However, there were 19 instances of gaps in the FIR Serial Numbers, as listed in ***Appendix-V***. One such instance is depicted in ***Figure 4.7***:

Figure 4.7: Figure showing gaps in generation of FIR number



	DISTRICT_CD	DISTRICT	PS_CD	PS	FIR_REG_NUM	REG_YEAR	FIR_SRNO	LEAD_FIR_SRNO	GAP_ANALYSIS
1	24499	MAYURBHANJ	24499		244990202102				
2	24494	BARAGARH	24494		244940092201				
3	24862	UPD, CUTTACK	24862028	Bentkar (+2 Mouza) PS	24862028220081	2022	81	83	
4	24505	JAGATSINGHPUR	24505018	ERSAM	24505018210216	2021	216	218	GAP OF 217
5	24870	RAYAGADA	24870016	GUNUPUR	24870016200216	2020	216	218	GAP OF 217
6	24864	NABARANGPUR	24864027	KUNDEI	24864027220067	2022	67	69	GAP OF 68
7	24864	NABARANGPUR	24864013	DABUGAON	24864013200137	2020	137	139	GAP OF 138
8	24488	ANGUL	24488050	THAKURGARH	24488050210031	2021	31	33	GAP OF 32
9	24870	RAYAGADA	24870011	CHANDILI	24870011200055	2020	55	57	GAP OF 56
10	24482	BALASORE	24482027	KHANTAPADA	24			312	
11	24508	KENDRAPARA	24508042	MARINE	24			97	

Source: CCTNS Database

Such gaps in FIR Serial Numbers not only indicated lack of application controls to ensure data integrity in incremental generation of FIR Serial Numbers, but the material risk that primary records had been deleted from the system.

Deletion of records without a clear log trail has serious implications for the investigation process, as it creates avoidable scope for collusion between police personnel and the accused to conceal evidence or manipulate records. In the absence of DBA logs as pointed out in ***Paragraph No.7.3***, responsibility for such unauthorised deletions cannot be fixed. This reflected a major control failure in the system.

Admitting that FIRs having data entry errors had been deleted by the Database Administrator (DBA) on the basis of requests received from Superintendents of Police, the Government stated (September 2024) that gaps had also arisen due to deficiencies in the system to generate FIR Serial Numbers. This has been subsequently resolved in the new version of CCTNS, which would be implemented in the next year.

The response was not tenable, as there should be no provision for deletion of FIRs from the system (as there is no legal provision for tearing off pages from the physical FIR Register). This practice was highly irregular and the FIRs with incorrect details should have only been marked on the system as incorrect/ closed.

4.2.2 Absence of application controls to maintain integrity of date and timestamps for sequentially dependent actions in the system workflow

As per system design when a record is created the date and timestamp of the record was required to be recorded as a data field, for the purpose of maintaining an audit trail, along with details of the user who created the record.

Similarly, each time the record is updated, a separate timestamp for the update was required to be recorded. Since any update to a record can only take place after the record is created, there is sequential dependency between these actions and the timestamps are required to reflect the same, with the record update timestamp being chronologically subsequent/later than the record creation timestamp. The same logic for maintaining the correct chronological sequence was applicable for all sequentially dependent workflows in CCTNS, such as FIR Registration timestamp was to be later than the GD timestamp, and timestamps for subsequent actions such as Arrest Memo, Seizure Memo *etc.,* were to be later than FIR Registration timestamp and so on.

Audit analysed the tables related to GD entry, FIR registration, Crime Detail Forms (CDFs), and Seizure Memos and noticed that during the period January 2018-March 2023, in case of 7,079 records, pertaining to 399 Police Stations, the timestamp for record updation was recorded prior to the timestamp for record creation. The details are in the following table:

Table No. 4.2 Table showing the records in four tables where record update timestamps are earlier than the record creation timestamps

Sl. No.	Table Name	Total number of records	Number of cases where record update timestamp is earlier than record creation timestamp	Number of Police Stations involving such inconsistent timestamps	Difference in timestamps	
					Up to one hour	More than one hour
1	GD entry	45,99,878	1,166	145	111	1,055
2	FIR Register	56,813	61	35	9	52
3	Crime details	2,69,185	5,724	205	1863	3,861
4	Seizure Memo	20,250	128	14	16	112
	Total	**49,46,126**	**7,079**	**399**	**1,999**	**5,080**

Source: CCTNS database

In addition, Audit also noticed instances of sequentially dependent actions having timestamps recorded with timecodes earlier than the actions on which they were dependent, such as-

i. FIR creation timestamp preceding the underlying GD entry timestamp
ii. Crime Details timestamp preceding the FIR creation timestamp
iii. Arrest Memo and Seizure Memo timestamps preceding the FIR creation timestamp

The above inconsistencies in the timestamps data across different tables indicated significant deficiencies in the application controls implemented in CCTNS to prevent recording of incorrect date and time by users who may either have non-operational date and time (system clock not operational) or have intentionally modified the date and time on their systems.

Government stated (September 2024) that these issues were noticed where PS users changed the offline server date and time while registering FIRs. CAS 4.5 version of CCTNS provided by NCRB did not have mechanism to prevent users from modifying system date and time. However, in CAS 5.0 version of CCTNS the issue has been resolved and the new version would be rolled out soon.

The response was not acceptable as the above instances reflect lack of application controls to enforce chronological and logical sequencing in the system. As per system flow, to map the FIR being registered to an underlying GD, a list of available GDs (prior to FIR date) should have been made available to the user, and similarly for other sequentially dependent actions.

In order to prevent such anomalies in timestamps, the system administrator privileges should have been revoked from the PS users, so that they would not have any scope to modify the date and time of the local offline systems. The system should also not have permitted any data entry in case the system clock was not functional.

4.2.3 Absence of validation controls to prevent incorrect mapping of GD with FIRs

Legally FIR is the most important document and is one of the important IIF Form (Integrated Investigation Form, IIF 1). An FIR is a direct indication of crime, and the original FIR details must be preserved. Also, once the FIR is registered, the details along with GD cannot be altered.

Analysis of CCTNS database revealed that Odisha Police linked one GD with multiple FIRs during FIR registration in 1,554 cases which indicated that either the FIRs were not linked with the actual GDs created for the purpose or no GD had been created for the respective FIR and linked with another GD.

Due to wrong selection of GDs during registration of FIR, the base (*i.e.,* GD) for registration of FIR was invalid and the actual crime occurrence time/ subject matters became contradictory as there was no relation between the two different dates/ subject matters mentioned in the GD and FIR. Further, as the IPC sections were fetched from the GDs during creation of FIR, CCTNS reported wrong IPC sections against these FIRs.

This deficiency in the system was due to lack of validation controls such as generation of alerts for the users that the underlying GD had already been mapped to another FIR to prevent mapping of multiple FIRs with the same GD and provision for previewing of GD contents before mapping with an FIR. Due to this deficiency, the PS users relied on manually maintained case records for their functional work.

4.3 Deficiencies in the use of CCTNS for registration of cases of missing persons and children

Whenever a complaint is received regarding a missing person or child, an entry in GD is required to be made. In case of a missing child, the FIR registration is mandatory as directed by Hon'ble Supreme Court (2013). After GD entry is made in CCTNS, details of the missing person such as name, age, height, picture of person, address *etc.,* are required to be entered into the system.

Audit reviewed the utilisation of CCTNS in cases of missing persons and missing children and noticed the following deficiencies:

- **Incomplete registration of missing persons cases in CCTNS:** Database analysis revealed that there were 77,268 cases of missing persons complaints registered in CCTNS for the period January 2018 to December 2022. However, Audit test checked the manually maintained records in 26 Police Stations and observed that during the above period, only 3,574 out of a total of 4,062 missing person cases had been registered through CCTNS. Out of the total missing cases as per 'Man Missing Register' (MMR), GD entry and registration had not been done in case of 488 missing persons. Further, 789 missing persons had been traced, but the status of these cases had not been updated in CCTNS ***(Appendix-VI).***
- **Non-registration of FIR in cases of missing children:** Analysis of the CCTNS database revealed a total of 13,792 complaints involving missing children below the age of 18 during the period January 2018 to March 2023. Among these, 5,566 missing complaints lacked a linked FIR, while in 35 complaints, the linked FIR number was recorded as '0' indicating non-registration of FIRs against these missing child complaints, in violation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's order. During test check of 68 selected Police Stations, Audit found that in one Police Station (PS Deogarh), the IO had not registered FIRs for cases of missing children in six out of 31 cases.

Due to non-registration and delayed registration of missing persons and children in CCTNS, the probability of tracing the person/ child was reduced. Further, the status of investigation into these missing persons/ children's cases could not be effectively supervised and the aim of having a common database of missing persons/ children at the State and national level could not be achieved.

Government admitted the audit observation and stated (September 2024) that necessary steps are being taken to incorporate appropriate controls in the system so that such mistakes are not repeated.

4.4 Incomplete registration of Non-Cognisable Reports (NCRs) through CCTNS

A non-cognizable report (NCR) is an offence in which police can neither register an FIR, investigate, nor effect arrest without the express permission or directions from the court. These mostly include minor offences such as abusing each other, minor scuffles without injuries, intimidation *etc.* All NCRs are provisioned to be registered and maintained through CCTNS.

However, audit analysis of the NCR table revealed that only 313 NCRs were available in CCTNS during 2018-2022. The year-wise details of the number of such NCRs in CCTNS are given in the following table:

Table No. 4.3: Statement showing year-wise number of NCRs registered in CCTNS

Sl. No.	Year	No. of NCRs registered
1.	2018	05
2.	2019	10
3.	2020	80
4.	2021	146
5.	2022	61
6.	2023 (up to June)	11
Total		**313**

Source: CCTNS Database

Audit test checked this aspect in 29 Police Stations and noticed that none of the NCRs were registered through CCTNS even though there were 9,642 NCRs in the manually maintained registers by these Police Stations as shown in ***Appendix-VII***. Due to the incomplete registration of NCRs in CCTNS, the objective of ensuring adequate accountability and effective supervision over police investigations in these cases through the system was not achieved.


Government stated (September 2024) that steps would be taken to ensure that all NCRs were registered on CCTNS.

Recommendation

Government should ensure that

- *deficiencies in GD numbering and FIR numbering should be fixed so that duplicate GD numbers and gaps in FIR numbers do not occur in the system; and*
- *chronological and logical sequencing of actions is enforced in the system, to preserve data integrity.*

Chapter V
Investigation





Chapter – V

Investigation

5.1 Under utilisation of Case Diary module

A Case Diary is to be maintained and updated by every police officer while carrying out an investigation. Particulars of the case, such as the time at which the case was reported, time at which the investigation began, the time when the IO closed the investigation, places visited for investigation should be noted in the Diary. Audit analysed the database for the period from January 2018 to March 2023, and noticed that though there were 7.44 lakh registered FIRs in the State, Case Diaries had been maintained in the system only for 19,255 (2.59 *per cent*) registered FIRs.

Government accepted the audit observation and stated (September 2024) that the SHOs are being instructed to use the Case Diary module in CCTNS.

5.2 Incorrect generation of chargesheets on CCTNS, resulting in manual interventions and work-arounds


After completing the investigation, the Investigating Officer (IO) was required to prepare the chargesheet on the orders of the SP. For this purpose, the IO was required to select the persons to be named in the chargesheet, from the list of accused persons created during investigation.

Each accused person had a serial number within the same chargesheet. Therefore, the serial number for an accused person in one chargesheet was not be mapped to any other chargesheet.

Audit analysed the list of accused persons in the chargesheet table in CCTNS and also the manually maintained records on test check basis and noticed that in 198 instances during the period from 2018 to 2023, the accused's serial number pertaining to one FIR had been incorrectly mapped with another FIR. These instances had arisen due to the absence of application controls which could limit the list of accused's serial number to only those pertaining to the FIR against which the chargesheet was being processed in CCTNS. This was a major lapse, since it resulted in police users incorrectly mapping accused's serial numbers pertaining to an unrelated FIR to the chargesheet being processed. One such instance is depicted in ***Figure 5.1***:

Figure 5.1: Figure comparing discrepancy in name in chargesheets generated from offline and online system

Chargesheet in manually maintained case records	*Chargesheet generated from CCTNS*



Source: CCTNS Reports

This significant control deficiency in the system undermined the reliability and integrity of the workflow for processing chargesheets in CCTNS. Such incorrect generation of chargesheets on CCTNS, with the risk of naming of individuals who were not even the accused persons in a particular FIR could vitiate the legal proceedings and create scope for avoidable harassment of individuals.

In the absence of reliability of this functionality in CCTNS, Audit noticed that police users had to perform manual interventions and work-arounds, such as the use of tools such as PDF editor to make modifications to the system generated Charge Sheets. However, this defeated the very purpose of developing and implementing provisions for error-free system generated charge sheets. As a result, the benefits from utilizing CCTNS for this process had not been realised.

Further verification of pending cases maintained manually with pending cases available in CCTNS of selected 68 Police Stations revealed that, in 452 cases, IIF-V (*i.e., Chargesheet/ Final Report*) were prepared by the respective Police Stations as per available case records (***Appendix-VIII***). However, on CCTNS, the chargesheets were not available for these 452 cases, which indicated that, submission of chargesheet was completed manually and not through CCTNS. Thus, due to absence of case records for the respective FIRs in CCTNS, the reports on chargesheets/ final reports had become incomplete.

Government stated (September 2024) that steps would be taken to ensure correct generation and submission of Chargesheets/ Final Form (IIF-V) through CCTNS.

5.3 Incorrect generation of Arrest Memos on CCTNS

As per Section 41A of CrPC, Police Officers may arrest a person without a warrant if they have reasonable suspicion or credible information that the person has committed a cognizable offense (an offense for which the police can arrest without a warrant). The officer must inform the person about the grounds of arrest and the right to bail. If the offense is not serious, the police must issue a notice under section 41A of CrPC instead of making an arrest, provided the person cooperates with the investigation and appears before the police at a specified time and place.

However, audit noticed that CCTNS had lacked an option for generating or serving notices under section 41A of CrPC to the accused who were not to be arrested.

Audit analysed the CCTNS database and noticed 13,689 instances during the period from 2018 to 2023, where even though the status against the accused was shown as 'Not Arrested', the 'Arrest Date' had been recorded.

Audit test checked these cases at five Police Stations and noticed that the Investigating Officer (IO) had actually not arrested the accused, due to acceptance of the Notice issued under Section 41A by the accused. However, Arrest Memos had been incorrectly generated in CCTNS, against the accused who had been issued these Notices. Absence of functionality in CCTNS to record the issue of Notice under Section 41A, resulted in data discrepancy related to the status of the accused leading to the 'Notice issued date' being incorrectly recorded in the system as the 'Arrest Date' despite actual status being 'Not Arrested'.

Admitting the absence of functionality for issuing Notice under section 41A of CrPC in CCTNS, Government stated (September 2024) that the functionality would be implemented in future versions of CCTNS.

5.4 Absence of executive instructions to mandatorily record Arrest Memos on CCTNS

Audit analysed the CCTNS database and noticed that there were 7.44 lakh FIRs registered during January 2018 to March 2023 against the cognisable cases and there were 3.32 lakh arrests recorded in 1.99 lakh FIRs.

However, Audit test checked 43 out of selected 68 PSs and observed that in 183 cases of cognisable offences, although 245 arrests had been made, details of IIF-III (*i.e., Arrest Memo*) were not recorded in CCTNS, as shown in ***Appendix-IX.*** This indicated that the reported figure for arrests was not

complete. This was due to the fact that executive instructions for mandatory recording of arrests in CCTNS had not been issued.

Thus, the citizen centric daily arrest reports and the MIS reports on arrests generated through CCTNS were unreliable.

Government stated (September 2024) that steps are being taken to ensure mandatory recording of Arrest Memos (IIF-III) through CCTNS.

5.5 Lack of application control in recording details of Arrest Memos

The 'Status of the accused' must be selected from one of the following seven options *i.e.,* Absconding, Bailed by Court, Bailed by Police, Forwarded to Court, In Judicial Custody, Not Arrested and Proclaimed Offender. For an accused whose date of arrest has been recorded in the system, the status in the system should not be 'Not Arrested'. Similarly, only if the date of arrest has been recorded in the system, the status in the system can be 'Bailed by Police' or 'Forwarded to Court'.

Data analysis further revealed that, during chargesheet preparation, the status of 62,124 accused in 593 Police Stations were selected as '*Forwarded to Court*' or '*Bailed by Police*', which implies that all the accused were arrested by the respective Police Station. However, the 'date of arrest' of the accused were blank in the respective chargesheets indicating that either the procedures of the Arrest Memos were completed manually, or the accused status had been incorrectly selected as '*Forwarded to Court*' or '*Bailed by Police*' during chargesheet preparation, which resulted in incorrect and logically inconsistent data being recorded on CCTNS. This deficiency had arisen due to lack of application controls to prevent user from selecting options such as "Bailed by Police" or "Forwarded to Court" in case of non-availability of details of Arrest Memo in the system.

Government has not given specific reply to the audit observation (September 2024).

5.6 Absence of executive instructions to mandatorily record Seizure Memos on CCTNS

Whenever the IO seizes any article during the investigation, documentation of the seizure details in the general diary is required. This documentation is crucial in linking the diary entry of the seizure to the creation of a Seizure Memo for the case. Additionally, the seized article can only be logged into the Malkhana register[16] for monitoring by the Malkhana officer after the preparation of

[16] A Malkhana Register is a document that records the details of items, date of seizure, crime location, FIR number, name of accused and other information in respect of the items kept in a police station's malkhana, or property room,

Seizure Memo. In cases (of illicit liquor) registered under Section 52A of the Orissa Excise Act-2008, the IO is specifically mandated to prepare a Seizure Memo for Excise goods seized during investigation.

Audit analysed the CCTNS database and noticed that in 5,443 FIRs registered under Sections 52A of the Orissa Excise Act-2008 in 430 Police Stations, the Seizure Memos had not been generated through CCTNS, rendering the database incomplete. This was due to the fact that executive instructions for mandatory recording of seizures in CCTNS had not been issued.

Apart from impacting the MIS reports, the delay or non-preparation of Seizure Memos via the system created the avoidable risk of unethical practices through subsequent modification of the data.

The Director, SCRB stated (May 2024) that steps would be taken to ensure registering Seizure Memos (IIF-IV) through CCTNS.


5.7 Deficiencies in functionality to make corrections to data entered into FIR Registration and Chargesheet Submission modules

Audit noticed that in 15 of the 68 test checked Police Stations alterations were made in 21 cases to the FIRs and chargesheets generated from CCTNS using tools such as PDF editors.


In two PS, there were modifications made to the Sections in the FIR, since incorrect Sections had been entered into CCTNS. An instance of the same is given below:

Figure 5.2: Figure showing altering of sections in an FIR after its generation from CCTNS

FIR of manual case record



FIR generated from CCTNS



Source: CCTNS Reports

Audit also noticed that one PS had changed the GD dates in the reports generated from CCTNS in three instances; and four PSs had changed the charge sheet date in seven instances. Thus, the FIRs and chargesheets in the manual case records were different from that of CCTNS.

Thus, due to lack of application controls to ensure correctness of data flow from GD to FIR to Arrest Memo/ Seizure Memo to Charge Sheet in CCTNS, as well as absence of provisions for police users to make modifications to rectify errors with the maintenance of user logs, the police users had been making manual interventions to modify the system generated IIFs using tools such as PDF editors, which was not only highly irregular and objectionable but also defeated the very purpose of developing and implementing provisions for error-free system generated charge sheets. As a result, the benefits from utilising CCTNS for this process had not been realised.

Government has not given specific reply to the audit observation (September 2024).


5.8 Absence of controls to map Courts with jurisdiction over Police Stations and Sections of IPC

To generate a chargesheet, the name of the Court to which it is to be forwarded was to be recorded. The system should have had provision for maintenance of master data related to the details of the Courts having jurisdiction (geographic or subject matter specific) over the different types of cases which could be registered by the PS, as well as application controls to map the PS and Sections of the IPC to the concerned Courts, to prevent/ minimise the probability of incorrect mapping of cases (such as incorrect mapping of chargesheets of murder cases of one district with another district Court, or incorrect mapping of chargesheets in murder cases with Family Courts).

Audit however noticed that neither was there any master data related to details of Courts maintained in the CCTNS database, nor were there any controls implemented to map the correct Court having jurisdiction over different types of cases for the concerned PS. As a result of this deficiency, PS users had to manually enter the names of Courts as a free text data field during the preparation of chargesheets, before forwarding them.

Audit noticed that the data entered in the free text data field 'Court Name' of IIF-V (Chargesheet) was incorrect in 3,755 out of 6.84 lakh entries in chargesheets, since text such as 'Unknown', 'Not known', 'Not noted', 'Person name', 'ab', 'xx' *etc*.

Figure 5.3: Figure showing irrelevant court name in Chargesheet



I.I.F.-V/एकीकृत जॉच फार्म-V

FINAL FORM / REPORT
अंतिम फार्म/रिपोर्ट
(Under Section 173 Cr.P.C.)
(दण्ड प्रक्रिया संहिता धारा 173 के अन्तर्गत)

IN THE COURT OF Not known के न्यायालय में)

1. District (जिला): JHARSUGUDA P.S. (थाना): JHARSUGUDA Year (वर्ष): 2019

FIR No. (प्र.सू.रि. सं.): 0530 Date (दिनाँक): 23/08/2019

Source: CCTNS Reports

As a result of these system lapses, the PS users were using manual interventions and work-arounds, such as the use of tools such as PDF editor to make modifications to the system generated Chargesheets before submitting to the Court. This defeated the very purpose of developing and implementing provisions for error-free system generated chargesheets. As a result, the benefits from utilising CCTNS for this process had not been realised.

Government has not given specific reply to the audit observation (September 2024).

5.9 Disclosure of identity of women victims and juvenile offenders

As per Police Circular of 2016, the following categories of the FIRs inter alia are considered sensitive and should be excluded from being disclosed on the Citizens Portal.

In CCTNS, the system design required a designated user in the SP Office to mark the following types of cases as sensitive.

a. Cases registered under Section 376, 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D IPC (rape/gang rape etc.), as the disclosure of identity of victims in such cases is a punishable offence under section 228A of IPC.

b. Cases registered under the provisions of "the Protection of children from sexual offences (POCSO) Act, 2012".

c. Cases involving a juvenile in conflict with law or a child in need of care and protection, as Section 21 of Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000 prohibits the disclosure of identity of such juvenile or child.

Audit analysed cases under these categories in the CCTNS database and noticed that there were 15,579 such cases during the period from January 2018 to March 2023. Out of these, only 13,948 cases had been marked as sensitive and their details had been excluded from disclosure. However, the remaining 1,631 cases in 405 Police Stations had not been marked sensitive and hence,

had been disclosed on the Citizen Portal, where citizens could download the details and know the identities of the women victims and juvenile offenders. Details are shown in ***Appendix-X***.

Audit noticed that the required application control of the system marking these cases as sensitive based on the Acts and Sections specified in the FIR had not been implemented and instead, there was reliance only on the user actions to ensure compliance with the instructions in the Police Circular Orders.


Government stated (September 2024) that all the concerned SsP were instructed to fix responsibility on the erring officers for allowing sensitive FIRs to be disclosed to public. Further, they also stated that application control for automatic marking of cases as sensitive by the system would be implemented, after approval by DGP.

5.10 Special Report (SR) Cases

The Government of Odisha developed (2019) a new state specific module called 'New SR Module' within the CCTNS system to monitor heinous crime cases like murder, rape, dacoity, offenses under SC & ST Prevention of Atrocity Act, POCSO Act *etc.,* naming those as the Special Report (SR) cases. The utilisation of the module had started from 20 January 2020.

As per the executive instructions, Functional Requirements Specification (FRS) of the 'New SR Module' were developed and these cases were to be monitored at the level of SP, Range DIG and Crime Branch/ HRPC. In this 'New SR Module', four Special Reports (*i.e., SR-I, SR-II, SR-III & SR-IV*) as depicted in the flow ***Figure 5.4*** below:

Figure 5.4: Flow Chart showing workflow of SR cases



Following the marking of an FIR as SR and appointment of a Supervising Officer (SO) by the District Superintendent of Police, SR-I reports are required to be generated in the SR Module. Subsequently, after the case has been supervised and the Supervision Note (SN) issued by the SO, SR-II reports are required to be generated. Similarly, for the submission of compliance by the

Investigating Officer (IO) to the supervision note issued by the SO, SR-III reports are required to be generated. Further, upon completion of the investigation and during the filing of the Chargesheet, SR-IV reports are required to be generated, detailing the facts of the case.

Audit analysed the SR module and the related data tables of CCTNs database and observed that there were deficiencies in application controls and under-utilisation of the module, due to which the objectives of implementing the module had not been achieved, as discussed below.

(i) Absence of application controls to enforce chronological sequencing

As can be seen from ***Figure 5.4*** above, the date of issue of the Supervision Note should be after the date of supervision.

Audit noticed that in 131 cases as outlined in ***Appendix-XI***, the date of release of supervision note was prior to the date of supervision.

Audit also noticed other inconsistencies in timestamps recorded for SR reports-

i. SR-II record created before SR-I record.

ii. SR-III record created before SR-I and SR-II records.

iii. SR-IV record created before SR-I, SR-II and SR-III records.

(ii) Absence of application controls to enforce sequential generation of SR Reports

As can be seen from ***Figure 5.4*** above, there is sequential dependence in generation of SR-I, SR-II, SR-III and SR-IV Reports. Audit noticed the existence of 'orphan records' in the tables related to these reports, in the CCTNS database, with generation of SR-IV reports without SR-I, SR-II and SR-III reports *etc.*

Apart from indicating the absence of application controls to enforce sequential dependence among these reports, the existence of such 'orphan' records was also due to deletion of SR records at the back end of the database, as discussed in ***Paragraph 7.3.***

(iii) Absence of application controls to enforce segregation of duties between Investigating Officer (IO) and Supervising Officer (SO) for SR cases

The SP appoints a Supervising Officer (SO) to oversee every SR case and also an Investigating Officer (IO) to investigate the case. Audit analyzed the SR module database in CCTNS and noticed that in 20 cases, the SO and the IO were the same Officer.

This had taken place since the system did not have application controls to enforce segregation of duties as required for compliance with the executive instructions.

(iv) Absence of application controls in SR module to handle modification of Sections in FIRs

The SR-II Form, designed to capture supervision details were different for each of the three SR types *i.e.,* for sections under murder, the SR Head was 'SR-M', for rape under section 376, the SR Head was 'SR-W' and for others was 'SR-Misc'.

During test check at Tangi PS, Khordha, Audit observed that in an FIR concerning a rape case, the SR-II form generated by the system was found to be blank. This had taken place since the case had been initially classified as a deceitful act under Sections 417 and 493 of the IPC (SR-Misc) but had been subsequently reclassified as a rape case under Section 376 of the IPC (SR-W). When the Sections in the FIR were changed, the SR type changed from 'SR-Misc' to 'SR-W', which had a different data format. Consequently, the information captured during the initial registration under 'SR-Misc' was not reflected in the SR-II report, which was formatted for 'SR-W'.

Audit further analysed 29,840 SR-II records of the database for the period between January 2020 and March 2023 and observed that there were 1,064 cases in 317 Police Stations where there were changes in the Sections of the FIR. In all these cases, CCTNS had generated blank SR-II, which indicated the missing application controls to handle the process of modification of the Sections of the FIRs for SR cases.

(v) Non-utilisation of CCTNS for SR management

Between January 2020 and March 2023, a database analysis of 4,83,880 FIRs for which chargesheets were prepared revealed that 38,744 FIRs were marked as SR cases. After marking as SR, the PS users have used the SR module fully in case of 18,999 cases (49 *per cent*). Out of the remaining 51 *per cent* cases, no SR forms (SR-1 to SR-IV) were generated in 7,767 cases (20 *per cent)* and some SR forms though generated were not in complete shape in 11,978 cases (31 *per cent)*.


Thus, SR module of CCTNS was not being utilised fully by the SsP of the Districts, as originally intended.

Government stated (September 2024) that the issues pointed out by Audit related to SR module of CCTNS would be examined and corrective action would be taken.

Recommendation

Government should ensure that

- *use of CCTNS is mandated for registering missing persons, non-cognisable cases, case diaries, arrest memos, seizure memos etc., in real time and maintenance of parallel manual records is dispensed with, in a phased manner with clear timelines.*
- *business rules like 'Serving Notice' under section 41A of CrPC; mandatory registration of FIR in respect of missing persons below 18 years, automatic marking of cases under sections SC&ST POA Act, POCSO Act as SR cases, automatic marking of cases under defined sections like rape/POCSO etc., as 'sensitive', are incorporated in CCTNS and the system maintains a master data for Courts, to facilitate recording of data on forwarding of cases.*



Chapter VI
Prosecution




Chapter – VI

Prosecution

6.1 Non-use of CCTNS for generation of chargesheets and recording of dates of forwarding to Courts

Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) stipulates that the investigation of an offence under sections 376 of the Indian Penal Code shall be completed within two months from the date on which the information was recorded by the officer in charge of the Police Station. As soon as the chargesheet is completed, the officer in charge of the Police Station shall forward it to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on the police report.

Figure : 6.1 Showing the sequence of processes from Registration of FIR to forwarding of chargesheet to the Court



Audit noticed that no executive instructions had been issued to make the generation of chargesheet through CCTNS mandatory, for mandatory uploading scanned copy of the finalised chargesheet or for mandatory recording of the date of forwarding of the finalised chargesheet to the concerned Court, along with the communication reference number (such as postal tracking number). As a result, the system could not facilitate effective supervision and monitoring of the status of cases. MIS Reports also were not being generated correctly by the system based on the status of the workflow for these cases. In the absence of instructions to enforce the use of workflows in CCTNS with appropriate application controls implemented for these purposes, these actions were instead being completed outside the system in offline mode and the status of these cases was being prepared manually (outside the system) and reported to the SP, by the Police Stations.

Audit test checked the veracity of such monthly reports being prepared manually and submitted to the SP by seven Police Stations and noticed that out of 368 cases reported as closed, 190 cases had been incorrectly reported as closed in the report, even though the finalised chargesheets in these cases had actually not been forwarded to the concerned Court. In the remaining 178 cases, the chargesheets had neither been generated through CCTNS nor had the concerned IO submitted the case records to the PS. Only chargesheet numbers for the respective FIRs had been recorded in the Chargesheet Register maintained manually at the PS. Even after lapse of two to 2126 days from the recorded date of the chargesheet, in these 368 cases, the chargesheets had not been forwarded to the concerned Court (till date of Audit).

These instances of incorrect reporting highlighted the fact that the benefits of obtaining a true and fair view of the actual status of cases at the ground level had not accrued to the senior police officers, despite implementation of CCTNS.

Further, during test check at PS, Audit noticed that there was delay by the PS in forwarding of Chargesheet/ Final Report to Court even after its completion in 811 cases. This delay ranged between four and 1,297 days in respect of these 811 cases.

The failure to forward the charge sheet to the Court after its completion created the avoidable and material risk of adverse legal consequences and opportunities for unethical practices.

This risk could have been mitigated by using CCTNS for generation of charge sheets and by generation of alerts/ MIS Reports for senior police officers in case of delays in forwarding of approved charge sheets to the concerned Courts. Instead, the PS were continuing to use manual registers to number the chargesheets and monitor the status.

Government stated (September 2024) that the discrepancies in the reports submitted to the SsP were being forwarded to them, for reconciliation and fixing responsibility for the lapses.

The fact remained that in the absence of executive instructions to make the use of CCTNS mandatory for generating chargesheets, uploading the copy of the finalised chargesheet and recording dates of forwarding to Court with the communication reference number, the responsibility of reporting the correct status continued to remain on the users, resulting in the risk of error/ deliberate misrepresentation of facts.

6.2 Non-utilisation of functionality to record copies and details of Court Disposal Memos, rendering the CCTNS database incomplete and the MIS Reports unreliable

As per system design, CCTNS had the functionality to record copies and details of Court Disposal Memos, after final judgement. Audit analysed the database and noticed that only 1,808 Court Disposal Memos had been recorded against 7.44 lakh registered FIRs during the period from January 2018 to March 2023. This indicated the material risk that all Court Disposal Memos were not being recorded in CCTNS, thus rendering the database incomplete and resulting in incorrect reporting of the status of cases in the MIS Reports. To verify whether all Court Disposal Memos were being recorded in the system, Audit test checked the actual status of cases in two police districts (Deogarh and UPD Bhubaneswar). Audit noticed that out of 2,893 Court Disposal Memos in these cases during the period 2018 to 2023, only 58 Court Disposal Memos (*i.e., IIF-VI*) had been recorded in CCTNS. The remaining 2,835 Court Disposal Memos had not been recorded in the system and instead, the details were being maintained manually in the Judgement Registers of SP Offices. The year-wise (*from 2018*) total number of Court Disposal Memos in the above two districts is detailed below:

Table 6.1 Year wise position of Court Disposal Memos (IIF-VI) in two test checked districts

Sl. No.	Year	No. of Court Disposal memos in Deogarh District manually maintained	No. of Court Disposal memos in UPD Bhubaneswar manually maintained	Total No. of IIF-VI maintained manually by the SP/DCP	Total No. of IIF_VI recorded in the CCTNS
1.	2018	334	500	834	0
2.	2019	36	569	605	0
3.	2020	18	241	259	0
4.	2021	89	258	347	0
5.	2022	304	365	669	17
6.	2023 (up to March)	61	118	179	41
Total		**842**	**2,051**	**2,893**	**58**

Source: CCTNS Database

The non-recording of the details of Court Disposal Memos had rendered the CCTNS database incomplete and the MIS Reports unreliable.

Government assured (September 2024) that steps are being taken to update the court disposal memos.

Recommendation

Government should ensure that

- *use of CCTNS is mandated for managing Chargesheets, and Court Disposal Memos in real time and maintenance of parallel manual records is dispensed with, in a phased manner with clear timelines.*

Chapter VII
System Security



Chapter – VII


System Security

7.1 Deficiencies in system process for synchronisation of data and in manual process for backup of data

To address the challenges of network connectivity at Police Stations located in remote areas, CCTNS (CAS) was implemented (2014) with a combination of online-offline architecture, with one central online server located at the State Data Center (SDC) at Bhubaneswar accessed directly through the web-browser and local offline servers located at each Police Station. Simultaneously, the system was also designed to take regular back ups in the hard disks and the PS users were required to take offline copies of the daily backups into an external media.

The transactions of the local offline servers and the central online server was designed to be synchronized when network connectivity between the State Data Centre and the remote Police Stations was available. Police stations could also choose to consciously work in offline mode despite available network connectivity for day to day work on CCTNS, since the system had higher responsiveness when working in offline mode. The details are described in the ***Figure 7.1*** below.

Figure 7.1 Chart Showing Data Synchronisation process



Source: CCTNS System Design Documents

The above diagram displays the overall process flow of using a custom sync framework through which the eligible data between SDC online database and Police Station local database were stated to be synced and *vice versa*. When the network status was online, reports of both the databases *i.e.,* online and offline would maintain consistency.

In order to protect against data loss at the Police Stations, in addition to the synchronisation activity between the local offline servers and the central online server, the system was also required to maintain a backup of the local database on a daily basis in the local offline server at the Police Station. The offline backup files were required to be moved periodically by the PS users to an external hard disk provided to each Police Station, to free up storage space on the local offline server.

Audit test checked the process of storing backups from the local offline server on external hard disks and noticed that in 56[17] out of 68 Police Stations, these prescribed procedures had not been followed. Such non-compliance created the avoidable risk of loss of data and the associated impacts on police investigation and prosecution.

To derive assurance about the correct functioning of the synchronisation process, Audit analysed the transaction data pertaining to 40 out of 68 selected Police Stations as available in their local offline servers and as available in the central online server and noticed mismatches in data in the 40 PSs[18] (***Appendix-XII***). These data mismatches are discussed below.

i. There was disparity between the number of records pertaining to each Police Station, as stored in the local offline databases and the central online database, as detailed below:

Table 7.1: Statement showing disparity in number of records for Police Stations, between local offline databases and central online database as on March 2023

No. of Police Stations whose data was verified	Table Name	No. of records in central online database	No. of records in the local offline databases	Remarks
37	FIR registration	11,566	11,488	• Two FIRs of offline database failed to sync with the online database. • 80 FIRs of the online database failed to sync with offline records. • During test check of Chudamani Marine PS, it was noticed that two FIRs of

[17] Audit could not verify the procedure in the remaining 12 PS due to reasons like three Police stations were energy PSs and one police station was a traffic police station which were not functional. There were technical problems in the remaining eight offline servers which could not be checked.

[18] Audit collected backups of offline databases from 40 police station during field audit. Some data tables could not be restored due to incompatibility of field types between MsSQL server data format and MySQL data format.

No. of Police Stations whose data was verified	Table Name	No. of records in central online database	No. of records in the local offline databases	Remarks
				Badagada PS, Ganjam were present in the offline database of Chudamani PS.
33	Arrest Memo	29,050	29,263	• 221 arrest records of offline database failed to sync with the online database. • Eight arrest records of online database failed to sync with offline records.
37	Charge Sheet/ Final Report	24,969	24,947	• Two chargesheet/ final report records failed to sync with the online database. • 24 chargesheet/ final report records failed to sync with offline records.
37	Missing person	1,916	1,944	• 28 missing person records failed to sync with the online database
35	Dead body Registration	2,435	2,444	• 51 dead body records of offline database failed to sync with the online database. • 40 dead body records of the online database failed to sync with offline records.
38	Accused information	2,77,924	2,80,012	• 2095 records of offline table were not available in the online table. • 8 records of the online table were not in offline table.
40	Accused charge sheeted	1,25,674	1,25,655	• 74 records of offline database were not available in the online database. • 93 records of the online database were not in offline database indicating deletion from offline server.

Source: CCTNS database

Due to above highlighted disparities there is a serious risk associated with the deletion of records in local offline servers and its relevance cannot be overstated. If backend access is provided to Police Station users without stringent controls, it opens up significant vulnerabilities. Also, the absence of DBA logs for backend activities while operating in offline mode (as discussed in **Paragraph 7.3)** aggravates this risk, as it eliminates the ability to trace and audit critical actions taken on the server. Additionally, the lack of application user logs to track deletion activities during offline operations is a security lapse. These deficiencies created an environment ripe for data manipulation and loss, potentially leading to legal consequences, including destruction of crucial evidence, disruption of investigations, and loss of public trust.

ii. There were mismatches in the contents/ values of data fields pertaining to seven test checked tables of the Police Stations, in the local offline

databases as compared to the central online database, which indicated synchronisation deficiencies in the system.

Table 7.2: Statement showing mismatches in contents/ values of data fields, between offline local databases and central online database

No. of Police Stations whose data was verified	Database Table Name	No. of data fields with mismatches	Count of total data mismatches
37	FIR registration	33	76,828
33	Arrest Memo	54	12,743
37	Charge Sheet/ Final Report	25	12,480
37	Missing person	12	2,633
35	Dead body Registration	33	1,891
38	Accused Information	50	41,508
40	Accused Charge sheeted	8	12,659

Source: CCTNS database

Thus, Audit concluded that there were deficiencies in the system process related to synchronisation of data between the local offline servers and the central online server of CCTNS. Further, the system lacked the functionality to generate alerts/ MIS/ Exception Reports when the synchronisation process led to mismatches between the number of records as well as the actual contents/ values of data fields in the tables of the database. The resulting inconsistent state of the central database rendered it incomplete, and hence the MIS Reports generated on the basis of the central database were not reliable.

During test check of local offline servers in the 68 selected Police Stations, Audit observed that in five Police Stations[19], the backups had not been moved from the server to the external hard disk periodically. Due to this lapse, the storage space on the local offline server was full, and the automatic daily back up had failed. This resulted in the risk that in case of system crash or database damage, it would not be possible to restore the system without data loss.

Audit noticed an instance of loss of critical data due to system crash in Sector-7 PS, Rourkela, as described in the case study below.

[19] Sheragada, Ganjam; Sadar PS, Jajpur; Mangalpur, Jajpur; Town PS, Jajpur; and Dhama, Sambalpur;

Case Study
Loss of FIR data in Sector-7 PS, Rourkela

Due to absence of periodic transfer of backup of offline CCTNS data to the external hard disk, the local server storage space was full and daily backup process could not take place.


Chargesheet in case of FIR No. 28/2020 of Sector-7 PS of Rourkela district had been prepared through offline mode in CCTNS (in March 2020) but, the chargesheet had not been synchronized with the online CCTNS. Subsequently, in May 2022, the hard drive of the offline sever of Sector-7 PS, Rourkela crashed. The CCTNS helpdesk eventually restored the offline server data from the central online database, since the offline server backup data had been lost. However, the restored data did not include this Chargesheet, since it had not been synchronized.

As a result, although the chargesheet in case of FIR No. 28/2020 of Sector-7 PS, Rourkela had been generated through CCTNS and was available as a hard copy in the PS's case records, the same is now missing from both the offline and online databases and the FIR status of this case is incorrectly reported as 'Pending Investigation' in CCTNS.

- **Deficiency in handing over of charge by officers**
  Audit also noticed that even after the transfer of IIC from a Police Station, the cases related to that Police Station could still be accessed by using the same credentials. Reports such as CDF and FIR generated by the transferred officer in the new Police Station continued to exhibit the place of posting as the old Police Station, as depicted in the examples below in ***Figure-7.2***.

Figure 7.2: Figure Showing discrepancy in CDFs generated from Offline and Online Servers

CDF (IIF-II) in the new station in online application	*CDF (IIF-II) in the new station in offline application*



N.C.R.B. (एन.सी.आर.बी.)
I.I.F.-II/एकीकृत जाँच फार्म-II

CRIME DETAILS FORM (अपराध विवरण प्रपत्र)

1. District (जिला): ROURKELA P.S. (थाना): SECTOR-7 Year (वर्ष): 2024
FIR No./F.I.R. सं.): 0003 Date (दिनांक): 05/01/2024

2.

S.No. (क्र.सं.)	Acts (अधिनियम)	Sections (धारा(एँ))
1	The Odisha Excise (Amendment) Act, 2016	52(a)(i)

3. Place of occurrence shown by (के द्वारा दिखाया गया घटना स्थल):

S.No. (क्र.सं.)	Name (नाम):	Relative Type (संबंध प्रकार)	Relative Name (संबंध का नाम)	Address (पता)

4. Type of crime (अपराध का प्रकार):


12. Gist (सारांश):

S. No. (क्र.सं.)	Gist (सारांश)

SECTOR-7

Place (स्थान): SECTOR-7
Date (दिनांक): 06/01/2024

Signature of Investigating Officer (जांच अधिकारी के हस्ताक्षर)
Name (नाम): [redacted]A
Rank (पद): Asst. SI (Assistant Sub-Inspector)
No. (सं.):



N.C.R.B. (एन.सी.आर.बी.)
I.I.F.-II/एकीकृत जाँच फार्म-II

CRIME DETAILS FORM (अपराध विवरण प्रपत्र)

1. District (जिला): ROURKELA P.S. (थाना): SECTOR-7 Year (वर्ष): 2024
FIR No./F.I.R. सं.): 0003 Date (दिनांक): 05/01/2024

2.

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1	The Odisha Excise (Amendment) Act, 2016	52(a)(i)

3. Place of occurrence shown by (के द्वारा दिखाया गया घटना स्थल):

S.No. (क्र.सं.)	Name (नाम):	Relative Type (संबंध प्रकार)	Relative Name (संबंध का नाम)	Address (पता)

4. Type of crime (अपराध का प्रकार):

12. Gist (सारांश):

S.No. (क्र.सं.)	Gist (सारांश)
1	

TOWN

Place (स्थान): TOWN
Date (दिनांक): 06/01/2024

Signature of Investigating Officer (जांच अधिकारी का हस्ताक्षर)
Name (नाम): [redacted]A
Rank (पद): Asst. SI (Assistant Sub-Inspector)
No. (सं.): 73231

Source: CCTNS Reports

Government did not furnish any specific reply to the synchronisation and backup issues, and stated (September 2024) that the SsP had been instructed to direct all SHOs to take backup from server to external hard disk periodically. However, the synchronisation issues still remained unresolved.

7.2 Manual data entry at the back end of the central online server by the DBA, due to lack of synchronisation caused by missing static IP addresses for 16 Police Stations

As per system design, each Police Station's offline server was to be allocated unique static IP address. This was a vital requirement to enable the correct synchronisation of data between both the local offline servers and the central online server.

Audit analysed the master table for Police Stations in the CCTNS database and noticed that 662 Police Stations out of 678 had been assigned static IP addresses, and the remaining 16 PSs had not been assigned the same, as shown in ***Table 7.3***:

Table 7.3: Table showing list of Police Stations with static IP addresses not assigned (for the period from January 2018 to March 2023)

Police Station Code	Name of the Police Station	Date of creation of record	IP Address	Number of FIRs registered	Starting date of registration of FIR	End date of registration of FIR
24482074	Anantpur	2023-01-09				
24484066	Agalpur	2023-01-09		48	2023-01-10 17:30:00.000	2023-03-30 20:45:00.000
24484067	Laxmijore	2023-01-09				
24495048	Karlapat	2023-01-09				
24496059	KOTIA			3	2022-06-10 09:30:00.000	2022-09-28 16:30:00.000
24496061	SPECIAL PS, ENERGY					
24497057	Manoharpur	2023-01-09				
24499044	Cyber Crime & Economic Offences, Mayurbhanj	2021-12-20		35	2021-12-31 20:43:52.000	2023-03-09 14:40:45.000
24499045	Bhanjapur	2023-01-09		89	2023-01-13 12:35:31.000	2023-03-31 19:00:00.000
24503064	TRAFFIC PS, CHANDIKHOL					
24503074	SPECIAL PS, ENERGY					
24861003	Airport Police Station, Jharsuguda	2022-12-01		35	2023-01-16 13:05:00.000	2023-03-31 20:20:00.000
24863028	Sadar	2023-01-09				
24864064	SPECIAL PS, ENERGY					
24865038	SPECIAL PS, ENERGY					
24867031	Traffic PS-2, Chandrasekharpur	2023-03-23				
	Total			**210**		

Source : CCTNS database

Out of these 16 Police Stations, 5 Police Stations had registered 210 FIRs during January 2018 to March 2023 through CCTNS. In the absence of static IP addresses, synchronisation of the data entered into the local offline servers was not possible.

Government stated (September 2024) that separate IPs have been allocated to the Police Stations. However, the fact remained that IPs had not been assigned to the above 16 Police Stations.

7.3 Deletion of key records in tables of CCTNS database, with inadequate maintenance of DBA logs to record such deletion of sensitive data

System design document specified that for each master data, there would be a user interface from which the administrators will be able to perform create, update, activate and de-activate a master record based on his privilege. The de-

activation would adopt soft deletion provision by marking 'D' in the appropriate status field of a record rather than deleting or removing the record. Audit noted hard deletion without any logs, contrary to the design documents as discussed below.

Audit examined records maintained by SCRB and noticed that SsP of Districts had raised requests to delete the FIRs/Complaints *etc.,* from the CCTNS database and the SI had deleted these FIRs/Complaints at the back end, through SQL script blocks. Audit analysed the database and noticed that there were 66 SQL procedures available which had been used for deletion of records from tables such as FIR master, chargesheet/ final form, accused, victims, witnesses, seizures *etc.*

Audit analysed the SQL procedure 'deletion of complete FIR' which was created on 17 January 2014 and observed that the procedure hard deleted the original records of the 332 FIRs of 148 Police Stations along with related complaints, accused, victims, witness records *etc.,* instead of soft deletion as prescribed above. The date and time of deletion, the FIR number and the user ID for the super-user were recorded in a log table, without preserving the original data deleted.

Further, detailed log details such as the old value stored in a database record when it was updated, were also not being recorded in the log table. The log table contained 890 records of deletions as shown below:

Table 7.4: Table showing details of types of deletions


Sl. No	Type of deletions	Number of Deletion	Starting date of deletion process	Last occurrence of deletion (Up to July 2023)
1	SEIZURE	59	2022-10-13 17:14:07.920	2023-06-07 11:46:20.363
2	Dead Body Registration	103	2022-10-13 19:03:20.653	2023-07-04 16:19:04.843
3	ARREST	93	2022-10-12 16:36:26.390	2023-06-17 19:08:59.837
4	Final Form	247	2022-10-12 17:55:07.830	2023-07-05 17:50:11.803
5	Missing Person	56	2022-10-13 18:46:02.187	2023-06-19 16:58:50.187
6	FIR	332	2022-10-12 16:41:15.230	2023-07-05 17:29:46.590
	Total	**890**		

Source: CCTNS Database

- There was hard deletion of original records of FIRs, accused, victims, chargesheets *etc.* Instead of deletion, the original records should have been marked or flagged as 'D', as per system design documents.

- The first log capture date in the log table was 12 October 2022 and log for the prior periods (17 January 2014[20] to 11 October 2022) were not available. This indicated either purging of earlier records or non-maintenance of logs for the prior period. As a result, Audit was unable to derive assurance that no unauthorized deletion of data had taken place during the period from January 2014 to October 2022.
- As per table design, every log was assigned a sequential number, beginning with one, and each subsequent log was assigned a number one higher than the previous one. However, the log sequence of the log table revealed that there was a gap in the sequence. This indicated that the log had been deliberately deleted.

Figure 7.3: A sample showing gap in the sequence of the log



Sl_no	DELETE_TYPE	REG_NUM
1	ARREST	24863022220087
2	FIR	24863022220215
3	Final Form	2449400722019501
4	Final Form	2449602222010301
6	Final Form	2449703022016701
7	SEIZURE	244970302200168
8	SEIZURE	244970302200167
9	SEIZURE	244970302200166

Source : Database analysis

- During inspection of the selected 10 SP offices, Audit collected and test checked 100 request letters for deletion of FIRs from five SsP in respect of 49 Police Stations which were deleted by the DBA. Audit compared these requests with the FIR deletion data in the database and observed that only 28 FIRs were shown deleted in the '*FIR Delete Log*' table. The remaining were deleted using raw SQL rather than using the procedure '*deletion of complete FIR*'. Due to this, the log trails in such deletions were not recorded or captured in the '*FIR Delete Log*' table.
- In case of three Police Stations[21], eight FIRs had been deleted using the system procedure without any written requests from SsP, as logs of these eight FIRs were in the '*FIR Delete Log*' table.
- There were 'orphan records'[22] in different tables, as mentioned below:

Table 7.5: Showing orphan records

Master Table	Transaction Table	Number of records not in Master Table but present in Transaction Table	Number of Police Stations involved
FIR Registration	Crime details	22	20
FIR Registration	Arrest Memo	06	06
FIR Registration	Seizure Memo	11	10

[20] Date of creation of the procedure for deletion of FIR

[21] Chauliaganj (4 FIR Nos: 24862004230029, 24862004230030, 24862004230031, 24862004230032), Mancheswar (2 FIR Nos: 24867011230007, 24867011230008) and Balipatna (2 FIR Nos: 24867017220325,24867017220326)

[22] Orphan records are database entries that reference non-existent parent records due to deletion or missing parent data, compromising data integrity.

Master Table	Transaction Table	Number of records not in Master Table but present in Transaction Table	Number of Police Stations involved
FIR Registration	Final Report/ Chargesheet	18	16
General Diary	FIR Registration	163	23
General Diary	Arrest Memo	1,563	256
General Diary	Seizure Memo	54	20

Source: CCTNS database

The presence of orphan records indicated that records of master table were deleted but the transaction table still had references to the deleted master records.

- **Absence of user IDs in system logs**: Whenever a record is created or updated, the system typically logs the user ID responsible for the action. However, data analysis revealed 7,350 instances from the four key tables of CCTNS where the system failed to record the user ID, as shown below.

Table 7.6: Showing instances where user ID who updated records was not recorded

Table Name	Number of Police Stations affected	Instances where user ID was not recorded
1. FIR Master	474	3,583
2. Crime Details	81	169
3. Accused Master	93	461
4. Chargesheet Master	206	3,137
Total		7,350

Source : CCTNS Database

In conclusion, there should have been no provision for deletion of FIRs from the system (as there is no legal provision for tearing off pages from the physical FIR Register). This practice was highly irregular and the FIRs with incorrect details should have only been marked in the system as 'incorrect/ closed'.

Absence of recording user IDs when changes are made to the key tables or in sensitive data fields related to police investigation, deletion of records at the back end without authorisation from the competent authority, deletion of records in an improper manner resulting in creation of 'orphan records', hard deletion of records and purging of records from the database instead of soft

deletion, lack of full details of old contents/ values of records in tables when they are updated - all indicated avoidable risk areas related to harassment of complainants and collusion with the accused individuals.

In reply, Government stated (September 2024) that the SI is being instructed to ensure that appropriate log data are captured in log tables for maintaining proper audit track.


Recommendation

Government should ensure that

- *appropriate application log and DBA log should be maintained to track users' actions and fix responsibility in case of gross errors/ manipulation of records;*
- *appropriate validation and input controls are implemented to maintain data consistency;*
- *synchronisation process should be rectified to maintain consistency of data between the offline and online database apart from ensuring data backups of the offline servers at police stations;*
- *no primary record should be deleted and in case deletion is required, soft deletion method as mentioned in the system design documentation is adopted along with appropriate application and system logs; and*
- *a supervisory tool is developed to identify exceptional events by the technical team at headquarters and take necessary action. Further, periodic exception reports may be monitored by higher authorities.*

Chapter VIII

Monitoring and Supervision



Chapter – VIII

Monitoring and supervision

8.1 Monitoring by Governance Committee

As per MoU signed (October 2009) between GoI and GoO & MHA letter of December 2008, GoO was to constitute a Governance Structure and ensure meetings as per the MHA guidelines. A Governance Structure consisting of four committees were created but the committees did not meet at regular intervals. Due to this, the prescribed number of meetings of these Committees were not held, as detailed below:

Table 8.1 : Status of meetings required as per MHA guidelines and held

Sl. No.	Name of Committee	Frequency of Meeting as per Guidelines	Meetings required to be held from January 2010 to March 2018	Meetings actually held as of March 2018	Percentage Shortfall (%age)
1	State Apex Committee (Under Chief Secretary)	once in a quarter	33	07	79
2	State Empowered Committee (under Director General of Police, Odisha Police)	once in a month	99	31	69
3	State Mission Team (under Director, SCRB)	once in a month	99	2	98

Source: Records of SCRB

There were shortfalls ranging from 69-98 *per cent* in the number of meetings held by the above committees. Therefore, it is evident that the Governance structure to review progress in implementation of CCTNS and provide policy directions, was not functioning as envisaged by MHA.

The Government stated (September 2024) that GoI funding for CCTNS project had ended on 31st March 2018. However, as per Government of Odisha guidelines, the project is now monitored by Home Secretary and DGP, Odisha at regular intervals. The reply is not tenable as there is no specific monitoring mechanism designed for effective review.

8.2 Inadequate training

As per Project Implementation and Monitoring Report (PIM), the objective of the CCTNS capacity building initiative was to equip 55,926 direct users of CCTNS with the right skills and knowledge to optimally use CCTNS. These included two types of trainings Basic Course for 28,221 users and Advance Course for 27,705 users. The SI was responsible for conducting the trainings. However, Audit observed that there was a shortfall in achieving the targets for training as shown in the table below:

Table 8.2: Showing achievement trainings

Training	Trainees planned	Trainees imparted	Shortfall (*percentage*)
State (Basic + Advance Course)	55,926	29,731	26,195 (46.84)

Source: Records of SCRB

Thus, there was a shortfall of 46.84 *per cent* in achieving the training targets for capacity building in the state. During test check of selected units[23] of 10 police districts, Audit also noticed that 460 police personnel out of 1,606 had not been imparted any training on CCTNS as of March 2024. Further, 707 police personnel did not have working knowledge on CCTNS. The cadre-wise training status of police personnel was as below:

Table 8.3: Showing cadre-wise training position in test checked districts

Designation of Employee	Total number of employees from whom information[23] collected	Total number of employees whom training was not given	Number of staff who claimed to have working knowledge of CCTNS	Number of staff who claimed to not possess working knowledge of CCTNS
S.P / DCP/ Addl. S.P.	23	2	21	2
ACP / Dy. S.P.	50	2	46	04
Inspector/ SI / ASI	547	71	440	107
Constable / HG/ OAPF	986	385	392	594
Total:	**1,606**	**460**	**899**	**707**

Source: Records of field offices

[23] SDPO Offices – 14, SP Offices – 13 and Police Stations – 64


Thus, capacity building within the Police Department was not adequate to ensure efficient implementation and operation of the CCTNS system. Further, even after more than seven years of working through CCTNS, there were employees who did not possess working knowledge of CCTNS.

Government stated (September 2024) that target to train at least 2,000 police personnel per year has been set for future.

Recommendation

Government should ensure that


- *appropriate monitoring mechanism be designed for effective review of functioning of the system; and*
- *adequate training is imparted to users for smooth implementation of CCTNS.*



Bhubaneswar
The

(ATUL PRAKASH)
Accountant General (Audit-II), Odisha

Countersigned



New Delhi
The

(K. SANJAY MURTHY)
Comptroller and Auditor General of India

Appendices

Appendix – I

(Please refer paragraph 3.2 at page 21)

Statement showing the IICs whose IDs was used to transact in CCTNS while they were on leave

Sl. No.	Name of the IIC/IO	Police Station	Type of Leave	Period of leave	FIR/ Arrest details created during leave period	FIR/ Arrest Created date in CCTNS
1	Santosh Kumar Sethi, Inspector	Kundheigola	04 days CL	01-05-23 to 04-05-23	FIR No. 127/2023	02-05-2023 14:36:48
					FIR No. 128/2023	02-05-2023 18:42:57
					FIR No. 129/2023	04-05-2023 12:33:41
2	Kanak Kumar Majhi, Inspector	Barkot	05 days CL	10-01-23 to 14-01-23	FIR No. 11/2023	14-01-2023 19:50:08
					FIR No. 10/2023	14-01-2023 11:52:17
					FIR No. 9/2023	12-01-2023 11:21:31
					FIR No. 8/2023	10-01-2023 11:07:02
			06 days CL and 02 days PL	01-04-23 PM to 09-04-23 PM	FIR No. 102/2023	08-04-2023 10:06:06
					FIR No.101/2023	07-04-2023 12:49:28
					FIR No.100/2023	07-04-2023 12:42:34
					FIR No.99/2023	07-04-2023 12:31:33
					FIR No.98/2023	03-04-2023 20:27:53
3	Sashikanta Rout, Inspector	Chauliganj	05 day CL and 01 day PL	08-04-22 PM to 14-04-22	FIR No. 107/2022	09-04-2022 07:21:08
					FIR No. 106/2022	09-04-2022 01:19:25
4	Rabinarayan Bhanja, Inspector	Lalbag	02 day CL and 01 day PL	11-05-23 PM to 14-05-23	FIR No. 0108/2023	12-05-2023 13:38:30
5	Gokulananda Behera, SI	Barkot	10 days EL	06-09-22 PM to 16-09-22 PM	One Arrest under FIR No. 328/2022	08-09-2022 14:00:17
6	Raghunath Swain, Inspector	Markatnagar	EL	06-06-2022 AM to 26-06-22AM	One Arrest under FIR No. 25/2022	25-06-2022 14:30:49
7	Suresh Ch. Das, Inspector	Madhupatna	EL 50 days	10-02-2022 PM to 01-04-2022	One Arrest under FIR No. 29/ 2022	04-03-2022 12:25:47

Appendix – II

(Please refer paragraph 3.3 at page 22)

Statement showing incorrect mapping of SDPOs

Sl. No.	District Name	Police Station	SDPO Mapping	
			As per CCTNS	As per Field Verification and SCRB Data
1	Sambalpur	Nakti Deul	SDPO Burla	SDPO Rairakhol
2	Sambalpur	Kisinda	SDPO Kuchinda	SDPO Rairakhol
3	Sambalpur	Badmal	SDPO Jharsuguda	SDPO Rairakhol
4	Sambalpur	Rengali	SDPO Rairakhol	SDPO Sambalpur Sadar
5	Sambalpur	Dhanupalli	SDPO Rairakhol	SDPO Sambalpur Sadar
6	Nabarangpur	Umerkote	SDPO Nabarangpur	SDPO Umerkote
7	Nabarangpur	Raighar	SDPO Nabarangpur	SDPO Umerkote
8	Nabarangpur	Jharigaon	SDPO Nabarangpur	SDPO Umerkote
9	Nabarangpur	Kosagumuda	SDPO Nabarangpur	SDPO Papadahandi
10	Nabarangpur	Tentulikhunti	SDPO Nabarangpur	SDPO Papadahandi
11	Ganjam	Sorada	SDPO Bhanjanagar	SDPO Aska
12	Khurda	Jankia	SDPO Balugaon	SDPO Khurda Town
13	Berhampur	Mahila PS	Superintendent of Police	SDPO Town
14	Bhadrak	Bhadrak Rural	SDPO Chandbali	SDPO Sadar
15	Bhadrak	Bhadrak Town	SDPO Sadar	City DSP
16	Bolangir	Agalpur	Superintendent of Police	SDPO Sadar
17	Bolangir	Puintala	SDPO Sadar	SDPO Patnagarh
18	Bolangir	Special PS, Energy	DSP Head Qtr	SDPO Sadar
19	Boudh	Special PS, Energy	Superintendent of Police	SDPO Boudh
20	Ganjam	Badagada	SDPO Purusottampur	SDPO Aska
21	Ganjam	Sheragada	SDPO Bhanjanagar	SDPO Aska
22	GRP Rourkela	Bonadamunda	SDPO Panposh	Jharsuguda
23	GRP Rourkela	Titlagarh	Superintendent of Police	Rayagada
24	Jajpur	Alakunda	Superintendent of Police	SDPO Jajpur Town
25	Jajpur	Dasarathpur	Superintendent of Police	SDPO Jajpur Town
26	Keonjhar	Cyber Crime & Economic Offences, Keonjhar	Superintendent of Police	SDPO Champua
27	Mayurbhanj	Baripada Energy	SDPO Rairangpur	SDPO Baripada Sadar
28	Mayurbhanj	Jamda	SDPO Baripada Sadar	SDPO Rairangpur
29	Mayurbhanj	Rairangpur Town	SDPO Baripada Sadar	SDPO Rairangpur
30	Rayagada	Muniguda	SDPO Rayagada	SDPO Bisam Katak
31	Rourkela	Bandamunda	SDPO Bonai	SDPO Panposh
32	Rourkela	Brahmanitarang	DSP Head Qtr	SDPO Panposh
33	Rourkela	Chandiposh	Superintendent of Police	SDPO Bonai
34	Rourkela	K Bolang	DSP Head Qtr	SDPO Bonai
35	Rourkela	Koida	Superintendent of Police	SDPO Bonai
36	Rourkela	Special PS, Energy	DSP Head Qtr	SDPO Panposh
37	Sambalpur	Sasan	SDPO Burla	SDPO Sambalpur Sadar
38	Sundargarh	Special PS, Energy	DSP Head Qtr	SDPO Birmitrapur
39	UPD Bhubaneswar	Cyber Crime & Economic Offences, UPD Bhubaneswar	Deputy Commissioner of Police Office	ACP-5

Source: Field verification and comparision of data furnished by SCRB

Appendix – III

(Please refer paragraph 4.1.1 at page 27)

Statement showing gaps in creation of GDs

Sl No	District Name	Gaps in GDs for No of Days	Total Gaps	Number of PSs affected
1	ANGUL	1,290	3,028	26
2	BALASORE	1,495	5,139	24
3	BARAGARH	1,736	17,528	17
4	BERHAMPUR	348	942	16
5	BHADRAK	353	1,727	14
6	BOLANGIR	840	4,525	19
7	BOUDH	408	1,108	6
8	C I D	4	34	1
9	CRIME BRANCH, CUTTACK	4	5	1
10	CUTTACK RURAL	375	1,183	18
11	DEOGARH	137	433	4
12	DHENKANAL	869	4,607	14
13	GAJAPATI	228	1,058	10
14	GANJAM	4,586	28,564	24
15	GRP CUTTACK	425	998	7
16	GRP ROURKELA	416	1,532	8
17	HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION CELL	1	1	1
18	JAGATSINGHPUR	422	905	13
19	JAJPUR	2,072	9,425	21
20	JHARSUGUDA	502	1,272	11
21	KALAHANDI	1,220	2,821	17
22	KANDHAMAL	633	2,382	18
23	KENDRAPARA	2,203	10,713	17
24	KEONJHAR	1,026	4,385	22
25	KHURDA	1,132	4,767	11
26	KORAPUT	614	1,650	19
27	MALKANGIRI	737	2,062	11
28	MAYURBHANJ	253	688	21
29	NABARANGPUR	627	1,252	13
30	NAYAGARH	556	2,916	12
31	NUAPADA	298	482	9
32	PURI	1,729	5,398	28
33	RAYAGADA	588	3,151	13
34	ROURKELA	740	3,975	20
35	SAMBALPUR	447	1,040	24
36	SUBARNAPUR	626	1,924	9
37	SUNDARGARH	332	1,222	13
38	UPD, BHUBANESWAR	2,082	4,016	25
39	UPD, CUTTACK	664	6761	22
Total		**33,018**	**1,45,619**	**579**

Source : CCTNS database

Appendix-IV

(Please refer paragraph 4.1.3 at page 31)

Statement showing the cases where GD entry date as per GD entry table is inconsistent with GD Date as per FIR Registration table

Sl. No.	Name of the Police Station	As per GD table				As per FIR Table		
		GD Serial Number	GD Date	GD Record created on	FIR Reg Number	FIR Reg Date	GD Entry Date	Difference (Mins)
1	ORIENT	248610442004261330001	2020-04-26 13:30:00.000	2020-04-30 21:15:38.193	24861044200077	2020-04-26 13:30:00.000	2020-04-30 21:15:00.000	6225
2	ORIENT	24861044200427211 5001	2020-04-27 21:15:00.000	2020-04-30 22:16:17.617	24861044200078	2020-04-27 21:15:00.000	2020-04-30 22:16:00.000	4381
3	KHURDA	244830232042121230002	2022-04-12 12:30:00.000	2022-04-14 13:15:15.450	24483023220179	2022-04-12 12:30:00.000	2022-04-14 13:15:00.000	2925
4	NILAGIRI	244820252201152035007	2022-01-15 20:35:00.000	2022-01-16 23:06:11.477	24482025220026	2022-01-15 20:35:00.000	2022-01-16 23:06:00.000	1591
5	SADAR	244820512011241100005	2020-11-24 11:00:00.000	2020-11-25 11:02:23.860	24482051200357	2020-11-24 11:00:00.000	2020-11-25 11:02:00.000	1442
6	NIRAKAR PUR	244830662301212100025	2023-01-21 21:00:00.000	2023-01-22 18:15:46.087	24483066230018	2023-01-21 21:00:00.000	2023-01-22 18:15:00.000	1275
7	JODAMBA	248630102204171815001	2022-04-17 18:15:00.000	2022-04-18 13:24:33.807	24863010220002	2022-04-17 18:15:00.000	2022-04-18 13:24:00.000	1149
8	KALIMELA	2486301203042021 1854001	2021-04-03 01:15:00.000	2021-04-03 18:43:02.583	24863012210087	2021-04-03 01:15:00.000	2021-04-03 18:43:00.000	1048
9	JAGANNATHPRASAD	2449100401082021 1833023	2021-08-01 18:15:00.000	2021-08-02 08:06:19.400	24491004210256	2021-08-01 18:15:00.000	2021-08-02 08:06:00.000	831
10	KHURDA	2448302315042022020 8015	2022-04-15 00:10:00.000	2022-04-15 13:26:24.767	24483023220182	2022-04-15 00:10:00.000	2022-04-15 13:26:00.000	796
11	LOCK	245050362005082242015	2020-05-08 22:42:00.000	2020-05-09 11:05:56.407	24505036200075	2020-05-08 22:42:00.000	2020-05-09 11:05:00.000	743
12	KENDRAPARA	245080292003082030014	2020-03-08 20:30:00.000	2020-03-09 08:48:17.613	24508029200036	2020-03-08 20:30:00.000	2020-03-09 08:48:00.000	738
13	SIMULIA	24482053040320211247005	2021-03-04 01:50:00.000	2021-03-04 12:38:08.793	24482053210049	2021-03-04 01:50:00.000	2021-03-04 12:38:00.000	648
14	HINJILI	2449101912092022053	2022-09-12 09:39:44.000	2022-09-12 09:39:44.000	24491019220489	2022-09-12 19:00:00.000	2022-09-12 19:02:23.000	563
15	BERHAMPUR	24492003130420222039016	2022-04-13 11:30:00.000	2022-04-13 20:31:45.087	24492003220026	2022-04-13 11:30:00.000	2022-04-13 20:31:00.000	541
16	HINJILI	244910191209202 2052	2022-09-12 09:24:19.000	2022-09-12 09:24:19.000	24491019220488	2022-09-12 17:00:00.000	2022-09-12 17:05:11.000	461
17	BERHAMPUR	24492003060420222116011	2022-04-06 14:30:00.000	2022-04-06 21:07:39.667	24492003220025	2022-04-06 14:30:00.000	2022-04-06 21:07:00.000	397
18	BERHAMPUR	24492003190420221954005	2022-04-19 14:05:00.000	2022-04-19 19:46:40.543	24492003220029	2022-04-19 14:05:00.000	2022-04-19 19:46:00.000	341
19	CAPITAL	24867005030220222224019	2022-02-03 19:00:00.000	2022-02-03 22:13:07.667	24867005220072	2022-02-03 19:00:00.000	2022-02-03 22:13:00.000	193
20	KALIMELA	24863012250320212311014	2021-03-25 20:15:00.000	2021-03-25 22:58:58.553	24863012210079	2021-03-25 20:15:00.000	2021-03-25 22:58:00.000	163
21	BAHALDA	24499013160320231604002	2023-03-16 13:30:00.000	2023-03-16 16:00:46.167	24499013230029	2023-03-16 13:30:00.000	2023-03-16 16:00:00.000	150
22	MURIBAHAL	24484063180220231428002	2023-02-18 12:10:00.000	2023-02-18 14:35:08.607	24484063230034	2023-02-18 12:10:00.000	2023-02-18 14:35:00.000	145
23	AIR FIELD	24867001110120231146003	2023-01-11 10:05:00.000	2023-01-11 11:43:16.730	24867001230009	2023-01-11 10:05:00.000	2023-01-11 11:43:00.000	98
24	SADAR	24482051290820202051004	2020-08-29 19:15:00.000	2020-08-29 20:39:02.290	24482051200236	2020-08-29 19:15:00.000	2020-08-29 20:39:00.000	84
25	GOPALPUR	24509016200420221211016	2022-04-20 11:59:58.443	2022-04-20 11:59:59.367	24509016220067	2022-04-20 12:10:17.000	2022-04-20 12:01:00.000	2

Appendix – V

(Please refer paragraph 4.2.1 at page 34)

Statement showing gap in generation of FIRs

Sl No	District Name	Police Station Name	Registration Year	FIR Serial Number	Next FIR Serial Number	Gap in FIR
1	Bolangir	Sadar	2022	407	409	Gap of 408
2	Mayurbhanj	Rairangpur Town	2022	216	218	Gap of 1
3	Nabarangpur	Kundei	2022	67	69	Gap of 68
4	Baragarh	Bhatli	2022	151	153	Gap of 152
5	Upd, Cuttack	Bentkar (42 Mouza) PS	2022	81	83	Gap of 82
6	Mayurbhanj	Khunta	2021	296	298	Gap of 297
7	Jagatsinghpur	Tirtol	2021	402	404	Gap of 403
8	Jagatsinghpur	Ersama	2021	216	218	Gap of 217
9	Angul	Thakurgarh	2021	31	33	Gap of 32
10	Kalahandi	Narla	2020	23	25	Gap of 24
11	Rayagada	Gunupur	2020	216	218	Gap of 217
12	Kandhamal	Raikia	2020	47	49	Gap of 48
13	Rayagada	Chandili	2020	55	57	Gap of 56
14	Nabarangpur	Dabugaon	2020	137	139	Gap of 138
15	Balasore	Khantapada	2019	310	312	Gap of 311
16	Cuttack Rural	Nemalo	2019	95	97	Gap of 96
17	Kalahandi	Narla	2019	142	144	Gap of 143
18	Kalahandi	Narla	2019	149	151	Gap of 150
19	Gajapati	Garabandha	2018	50	52	Gap of 51

Source: CCTNS database

Appendix – VI

(Please refer paragraph 4.3 at page 38)

Missing Person details for the period 2018-2022

District	PS	No of cases as per Man Missing Register	No of cases registered in CCTNS	Difference	Number of cases where missing person is traced but status not updated
Jajpur	Jajpur Ps	416	416	0	39
Jajpur	Jajpur Sadar	430	405	25	132
Jajpur	Mangalpur	462	407	55	68
Jajpur	Bari ramchadrapur	350	350	0	115
Jajpur	Kaliapani	35	33	2	1
Jajpur	Tomaka	48	42	6	1
Rourkela	Bandamunda	142	142	0	73
Rourkela	Bisra	93	89	4	17
Rourkela	Chandiposh	14	5	9	5
Rourkela	Gurundia	20	15	5	4
Rourkela	Lathikata	43	42	1	9
Rourkela	Brahmitarang	188	188	0	80
Rourkela	Jhirpani	78	69	9	1
Rourkela	Sector-7	140	140	0	40
Rourkela	sector-15	83	82	1	23
Sambalpur	Dhanupalli	200	47	153	13
Sambalpur	Rengali	99	70	29	19
Sambalpur	Charmal	47	38	9	20
Deogarh	Deogarh	208	157	51	25
Deogarh	Kundheigola	46	28	18	0
UPD cuttack	Malgodown	89	87	2	5
UPD cuttack	Chauliganj	175	171	4	2
UPD cuttack	Kandarpur	63	50	13	8
UPD Bhubaneswar	Airfield	167	167	0	89
Ganjam	Chatrapur	241	230	11	-
Khordha	Sadar	185	104	81	-
	Total	**4,062**	**3,574**	**488**	**789**

Appendix – VII

(Please refer paragraph 4.4 at page 39)

Statement showing non-use of CCTNS for non-cognisable report (NCR) cases

Year-wise total number of NCR cases									
Sl. No.	**District**	**Police station**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020**	**2021**	**2022**	**2023**	**Remarks**
1.	Deogarh	Barkot PS	58	56	128	165	113	107	up to 30/11/2023
2.	Deogarh	Deograh PS	198	83	63	188	218	172	up to 31/07/2023
3.	Deogarh	Kundheigola ps	140	158	71	133	92	53	up to 31/07/2023
4.	Jajpur	Jajpur PS	*	158	*	226	333	117	up to 30/11/2023
5.	Jajpur	Jajpur Sadar ps	*	*	136	208	242	116	up to 30/11/2023
6.	Jajpur	Dasarathpur PS	-	-	-	-	-	25	up to 30/11/2023
7.	Jajpur	Mangalpur PS	*	*	117	212	184	120	up to 30/11/2023
8.	Jajpur	Bari Ramachandrapur PS	145	134	*	215	245	160	up to 30/11/2023
9.	Jajpur	Kaliapani	18	102	38	70	44	28	up to 30/11/2023
10.	Jajpur	Tomaka PS	49	55	*	*	*	30	up to 30/11/2023
11.	Rourkela	Brahmanitarang PS	15	66	53	43	4	26	up to 31/07/2023
12.	Rourkela	Jhirpani PS	63	39	19	24	57	20	up to 31/07/2023
13.	Rourkela	Sector-7, Rourkerla	8	81	15	74	52	9	up to 31/07/2023
14.	Rourkela	Sector-15, Rourkela	*	26	6	22	13	4	up to 31/07/2023
15.	Rourkela	Township (Sec-19) Rourkela	43	50	42	36	34	15	up to 31/07/2023
16.	Rourkela	Chandiposh PS	50	2	12	2	7	*	up to 31/12/2023
17.	Rourkela	Gurundia PS	2	*	10	15	17	12	up to 31/12/2023
18.	Rourkela	Lathikata PS	34	59	47	40	42	42	up to 31/12/2023
19.	Rourkela	Bisra PS	24	60	*	*	69	51	up to 31/12/2023
20.	Rourkela	Bondamunda PS	*	36	82	49	57	30	up to 31/12/2023
21.	Sambalpur	Dhanupalli PS	*	*	43	33	57	53	up to 16/10/2023
22.	UPD Bhubaneswar	Airport	-	12	17	25	79	17	up to 31/07/2023
23.	UPD Bhubaneswar	Dhauli	26	20	22	13	50	20	up to 31/07/2023
24.	UPD Bhubaneswar	Airfield	73	70	16	15	20	19	up to 31/07/2023
25.	UPD Bhubaneswar	Nayapalli	42	47	55	32	53	24	up to 31/07/2023
26.	UPD Cuttack	Choudhar PS	*	*	*	59	40	6	up to 31/07/2023
27.	UPD Cuttack	Malgodwn PS	79	129	138	28	47	20	up to 31/07/2023
28.	UPD Cuttack	Chauliaganj PS	72	86	58	65	74	26	up to 31/07/2023
29.	UPD Cuttack	Kandarpur PS	30	43	33	61	34	28	up to 31/07/2023
		TOTAL	**1,169**	**1,572**	**1,221**	**2,053**	**2,277**	**1,350**	
		Grand Total	**9,642**						

** Non-Cog/ Non-FIR register not available in PS*

Dasarathpur PS started functioning from 2023. Airport PS started functioning from 2019

Appendix-VIII

(Please refer paragraph 5.2 at page 42)

Chargesheet missing in CCTNS in test checked Police Stations

Sl. No.	Name of the District and Police Station	Number chargesheet not available in CCTNS
1	**Deogarh**	**213**
	Barkot	103
	Deogarh	97
	Kundheigola	13
2	**JAJPUR**	**16**
	Bari Ramchandrapur	7
	Mangalpur	9
3	**Nabarangpur**	**17**
	Kundei	17
4	**Rourkela**	**57**
	Bandamunda	1
	Brahamanitarang	3
	Chandiposh	11
	Sector-15	11
	Sector-7	18
	Township Sector-19	12
5	**Sambalpur**	**36**
	Charmal	1
	Dhama	10
	Dhannupalli	17
	Khetrajpur	8
6	**UPD Cuttack**	**114**
	Chauliaganj	58
	Choudwar	29
	Kandarpur	7
	Malgodown	20
	Grand Total	**452**

Appendix-IX

(Please refer paragraph 5.4 at page 43)

Statement showing arrest memos not generated through CCTNS

District Name of Police Station	Number of arrests
Bhadrak	**5**
Basudebpur	2
Bhadrak Town	2
Chudamani Marine PS	1
Deogarh	**25**
Barkot	10
Deogarh	10
Kundheigola	5
Ganjam	**35**
Bellaguntha PS	6
Buguda	2
Chamakhandi	6
Chhatrapur	6
Gangapur	6
Gram Ganjam	4
Rambha	2
Sheragada	2
Tarasing	1
Jajpur	**28**
Bari Ramachandrapur PS	8
Jajpur PS	7
Jajpur Sadar PS	6
Kaliapani PS	2
Mangalpur PS	5
Khurda	**16**
Baghmari	4
Begunia	1
Khurda Sadar PS	11
Nabarangpur	**15**
Chandahandi	7
Kundei	8
Rourkela	**49**
Bonai	3
Brahmanitarang	15
Cyber PS Rourkela	1

District **Name of Police Station**	**Number of arrests**
Jhirpani	9
Lahunipada	1
Sector-15	6
Sector-7	4
Township (Sector-19)	10
Sambalpur	**59**
Charmal	3
Dhama	15
Dhanupalli	21
Khetrajpur	5
Mahila	5
Rengali	2
Town	8
UPD, Bhubaneswar	**13**
Air Field	8
Airport	2
Dhauli	3
Grand Total	**245**

Appendix-X

(Please refer paragraph 5.9 at page 48)

Statement showing number of cases under Section 36, POCSO Act and Juvenile Justice Act which were disclosed in the citizen portal for the period from January 2018 to March 2023

Sl. No.	Name of the police district	Total FIRs	Total FIRs uploaded in web site and disclosed	Number of cases pertaining to section 376 disclosed	Cases registered under POCSO Act disclosed	Juvenile cases in need of care disclosed	Total cases disclosed as per Col. No. 5, 6 and 7
(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*
1.	ANGUL	38,317	38,308	3	1	4	8
2.	BALASORE	30,350	30,305	6	2	11	19
3.	BARAGARH	23,320	19,388	20	7	3	30
4.	BERHAMPUR	17,582	16,631	10	5	5	20
5.	BHADRAK	26,663	25,843	14	7	2	23
6.	BOLANGIR	26,962	26,930	28	2	2	32
7.	BOUDH	6,630	5,541	1	1	8	10
8.	C I D	225	195	4	1	0	5
9.	CRIME BRANCH, CUTTACK	257	198	0	0	0	0
10.	CUTTACK RURAL	22,090	22,075	8	7	3	18
11.	DEOGARH	7,679	7,677	9	23	11	43
12.	DHENKANAL	21,627	21,586	8	5	2	15
13.	GAJAPATI	7,024	6,646	129	16	4	149
14.	GANJAM	48,321	48,321	38	131	14	183
15.	GRP CUTTACK	3,749	3,689	9	1	1	11
16.	GRP ROURKELA	2,346	2,325	1	1	4	6
17.	HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION CELL	6	1	0	0	0	0
18.	JAGATSINGHPUR	19,426	19,423	38	4	7	49
19.	JAJPUR	33,771	29,347	23	4	14	41
20.	JHARSUGUDA	16,303	15,008	22	4	4	30
21.	KALAHANDI	20,324	19,737	34	8	8	50
22.	KANDHAMAL	11,421	11,389	34	2	8	44
23.	KENDRAPARA	23,852	21,546	209	69	4	282
24.	KEONJHAR	24,804	24,768	15	7	2	24
25.	KHURDA	16,147	16,138	13	0	2	15
26.	KORAPUT	19,909	19,893	9	3	7	19
27.	MALKANGIRI	9,348	9,348	8	0	7	15
28.	MAYURBHANJ	31,824	28,960	10	14	7	31
29.	NABARANGPUR	12,759	11,692	21	2	5	28
30.	NAYAGARH	12,905	12,905	24	9	4	37
31.	NUAPADA	10,533	10,124	31	5	0	36
32.	PURI	32,365	31,921	39	11	8	58
33.	RAYAGADA	12,894	12,880	28	8	1	37
34.	ROURKELA	19,640	16,987			1	1
35.	SAMBALPUR	32,954	32,675	47	9	5	61

Sl. No.	Name of the police district	Total FIRs	Total FIRs uploaded in web site and disclosed	Number of cases pertaining to section 376 disclosed	Cases registered under POCSO Act disclosed	Juvenile cases in need of care disclosed	Total cases disclosed as per Col. No. 5, 6 and 7
36.	SUBARNAPUR	8,497	8,483	9	2	1	12
37.	SUNDARGARH	16,484	15,138	4		3	7
38.	UPD, BHUBANESWAR	45,901	45,901	74	30	17	121
39.	UPD, CUTTACK	29,190	29,175	20	34	7	61
	Total	**7,44,399**	**7,19,097**	**1,000**	**435**	**196**	**1,631**

Source: CCTNS database

Appendix-XI

(Please refer paragraph 5.10 at page 49)

Statement showing cases where supervision notes were mentioned prior to the date of supervision

Sl. No.	Name of District	Name of Police Station	FIR Number	FIR Year	Date of supervision	Date of release of supervision note (SN)	Date difference
1	Sundargarh	Bhasma	24507005210237	2021	29-10-2201 00:00:00	31-10-2021 00:00:00	65,741
2	Sundargarh	Kutra	24507050210126	2021	29-10-2201 00:00:00	02-11-2021 00:00:00	65,739
3	Cuttack Rural	Baramba	24485009210071	2021	06-04-2128 00:00:00	28-05-2021 00:00:00	39,029
4	Ganjam	Purusottampur	24491031220687	2022	25-11-2022 00:00:00	25-11-2000 00:00:00	8,035
5	Sundargarh	Sadar	24507035210186	2021	21-07-2021 00:00:00	24-07-2002 00:00:00	6,937
6	Ganjam	Chamakhandi	24491009220026	2022	30-03-2022 00:00:00	01-01-2012 00:00:00	3,741
7	Kalahandi	Bijepur Ps	24495045210031	2021	30-08-2024 00:00:00	24-09-2021 00:00:00	1,071
8	Kalahandi	Narla	24495036210059	2021	17-03-2023 00:00:00	24-03-2021 00:00:00	723
9	Nabarangpur	Kosagumuda	24864026200140	2020	12-11-2022 00:00:00	02-08-2021 00:00:00	467
10	Ganjam	Bhanjanagar	24491005230057	2023	28-01-2023 00:00:00	01-02-2022 00:00:00	361
11	Angul	Purunakote	24488037210151	2021	28-12-2022 11:00:00	31-12-2021 16:00:00	361
12	Sundargarh	Hemagiri	24507019220351	2022	29-12-2022 00:00:00	03-01-2022 00:00:00	360
13	Nayagarh	Daspalla	24866011210145	2021	25-08-2021 00:00:00	31-08-2020 00:00:00	359
14	Dhenkanal	Nihalprasad	24489032200142	2020	11-01-2021 00:00:00	20-01-2020 00:00:00	357
15	Nayagarh	Itamati	24866018220303	2022	20-12-2023 00:00:00	02-01-2023 00:00:00	352
16	Jharsuguda	Rengali	24861049220238	2022	23-12-2022 00:00:00	05-01-2022 00:00:00	352
17	Nayagarh	Ranpur	24866033200275	2020	20-10-2021 00:00:00	05-11-2020 00:00:00	349
18	Bhadrak	Dhamanagar	24490017210210	2021	19-12-2022 00:00:00	04-01-2022 00:00:00	349
19	Jharsuguda	Jharsuguda	24861027210081	2021	15-02-2021 00:00:00	05-03-2020 00:00:00	347
20	Nabarangpur	Tentulikhunti	24864061200165	2020	27-12-2020 00:00:00	19-01-2020 00:00:00	343
21	Ganjam	Dharakote	24491003230024	2023	28-01-2023 00:00:00	04-03-2022 00:00:00	330
22	Rayagada	Doraguda	24870013210173	2021	26-12-2022 00:00:00	31-01-2022 00:00:00	329
23	Rayagada	Chandili	24870011220242	2022	27-12-2023 00:00:00	18-02-2023 00:00:00	312

Sl. No.	Name of District	Name of Police Station	FIR Number	FIR Year	Date of supervision	Date of release of supervision note (SN)	Date difference
24	Upd, Bhubaneswar	Dhauli	24867021220173	2022	02-09-2022 00:00:00	19-04-2022 00:00:00	136
25	Kalahandi	Narla	24495036210194	2021	20-01-2022 00:00:00	29-09-2021 00:00:00	113
26	Koraput	Jeypore Town	24496018210162	2021	01-11-2021 00:00:00	03-08-2021 00:00:00	90
27	Jajpur	Byree Ps	24503075210214	2021	30-03-2022 11:00:00	04-01-2022 12:00:00	84
28	Nabarangpur	Umer Kote	24864063220342	2022	30-11-2022 00:00:00	25-09-2022 00:00:00	66
29	Koraput	Jeypore Sadar	24496019220177	2022	25-08-2022 00:00:00	26-06-2022 00:00:00	60
30	Upd, Bhubaneswar	Jatni	24867014210472	2021	25-06-2022 00:00:00	26-04-2022 00:00:00	60
31	Koraput	Semilliguda	24496057230039	2023	07-04-2023 00:00:00	07-02-2023 00:00:00	59
32	Upd, Bhubaneswar	Dhauli	24867021220251	2022	23-04-2023 00:00:00	04-03-2023 00:00:00	50
33	Kendrapara	Patkura	24508052220137	2022	11-04-2022 00:00:00	11-03-2022 00:00:00	31
34	Koraput	Damanjodi	24496014210024	2021	21-04-2021 00:00:00	21-03-2021 00:00:00	31
35	Puri	Talabania Ps	24502071210044	2021	04-04-2021 00:00:00	04-03-2021 00:00:00	31
36	Cuttack Rural	Athagarh	24485002210017	2021	28-01-2021 00:00:00	29-12-2020 00:00:00	30
37	Ganjam	Khallikote	24491025210217	2021	27-05-2021 00:00:00	28-04-2021 00:00:00	29
38	Keonjhar	Harichandanpur	24497017220076	2022	18-12-2022 11:00:00	18-11-2022 19:51:00	29
39	Nabarangpur	Nabarangpur	24864040210321	2021	29-09-2021 00:00:00	31-08-2021 00:00:00	29
40	Puri	Delanga	24502010210070	2021	12-04-2021 00:00:00	15-03-2021 00:00:00	28
41	Jajpur	Kalinganagar (Duburi)	24503017230005	2023	21-02-2023 10:00:00	25-01-2023 10:00:00	27
42	Puri	Sea Beach	24502038210131	2021	02-09-2021 10:00:00	06-08-2021 10:00:00	27
43	Keonjhar	Keonjhar Sadar	24497021210431	2021	19-11-2021 12:36:00	23-10-2021 15:44:00	26
44	Ganjam	Pattapur	24491032230119	2023	29-04-2023 00:00:00	03-04-2023 00:00:00	26
45	Rayagada	Puttasingh	24870051210049	2021	29-09-2021 00:00:00	03-09-2021 00:00:00	26
46	Sambalpur	Burla	24506006210760	2021	12-02-2022 00:00:00	17-01-2022 00:00:00	26
47	Jagatsinghpur	Jatadhari Muhan Marine Ps	24505067220022	2022	16-08-2022 11:00:00	22-07-2022 11:00:00	25
48	Mayurbhanj	Rasgovindpur	24499029210077	2021	25-04-2021 00:00:00	31-03-2021 00:00:00	25
49	Ganjam	Badagada	24491006210167	2021	28-06-2021 00:00:00	03-06-2021 00:00:00	25
50	Nabarangpur	Jharigaon	24864020210005	2021	10-02-2021 00:00:00	17-01-2021 00:00:00	24

Sl. No.	Name of District	Name of Police Station	FIR Number	FIR Year	Date of supervision	Date of release of supervision note (SN)	Date difference
51	Sambalpur	Sasan	24506056220032	2022	04-02-2022 00:00:00	11-01-2022 00:00:00	24
52	Jagatsinghpur	Raghunathpur	24505055220032	2022	05-04-2022 10:00:00	11-03-2022 17:00:00	24
53	Rourkela	Lahunipada	24504012220182	2022	06-11-2022 00:00:00	14-10-2022 00:00:00	23
54	Nuapada	Nuapada	24865030230029	2023	23-02-2023 00:00:00	02-02-2023 00:00:00	21
55	Jagatsinghpur	Tirtol	24505065220411	2022	29-06-2022 11:00:00	08-06-2022 11:00:00	21
56	Nabarangpur	Dabugaon	24864013210018	2021	05-02-2021 00:00:00	17-01-2021 00:00:00	19
57	Berhampur	Gopalpur	24509016220079	2022	25-07-2022 00:00:00	06-07-2022 00:00:00	19
58	Keonjhar	Harichandanpur	24497017220073	2022	22-06-2022 00:00:00	03-06-2022 00:00:00	19
59	Mayurbhanj	Tiring	24499035210108	2021	19-11-2021 00:00:00	01-11-2021 00:00:00	18
60	Kendrapara	Mahakalpara	24508041220026	2022	27-02-2022 00:00:00	09-02-2022 00:00:00	18
61	Kendrapara	Mahakalpara	24508041210019	2021	28-04-2021 00:00:00	10-04-2021 00:00:00	18
62	Baragarh	Sohela	24494057210114	2021	18-07-2021 00:00:00	30-06-2021 17:00:00	17
63	Angul	Bantala	24488009210325	2021	26-09-2021 11:20:00	08-09-2021 14:00:00	17
64	UPD Cuttack	Sadar	24862016210247	2021	25-05-2021 00:00:00	08-05-2021 00:00:00	17
65	Jajpur	Sukinda	24503063220189	2022	27-10-2022 10:00:00	10-10-2022 10:00:00	17
66	Mayurbhanj	Udala	24499041210297	2021	03-11-2021 00:00:00	18-10-2021 00:00:00	16
67	Ganjam	Aska	24491001220320	2022	24-07-2022 00:00:00	08-07-2022 00:00:00	16
68	Jagatsinghpur	Abhayachandpur	24505001210135	2021	05-01-2022 10:00:00	20-12-2021 17:00:00	15
69	Mayurbhanj	Betnoty	24499008220300	2022	09-11-2022 00:00:00	25-10-2022 00:00:00	15
70	Jagatsinghpur	Tirtol	24505065220637	2022	21-10-2022 10:00:00	05-10-2022 17:00:00	15
71	Ganjam	Aska	24491001210774	2021	17-12-2021 00:00:00	02-12-2021 00:00:00	15
72	Cuttack Rural	Khuntuni	24485007210129	2021	14-11-2021 00:00:00	31-10-2021 00:00:00	14
73	Baragarh	Melchhamunda	24494039210045	2021	21-04-2021 00:00:00	08-04-2021 00:00:00	13
74	Jagatsinghpur	Tirtol	24505065220169	2022	17-03-2022 10:00:00	03-03-2022 17:00:00	13
75	Jajpur	Jenapur	24503070220135	2022	24-06-2022 11:00:00	10-06-2022 16:00:00	13
76	Ganjam	Pattapur	24491032210028	2021	20-02-2021 00:00:00	08-02-2021 00:00:00	12
77	Keonjhar	Harichandanpur	24497017220028	2022	17-03-2022 00:00:00	05-03-2022 00:00:00	12
78	Jajpur	Binjharpur	24503008210067	2021	10-05-2023 10:00:00	29-04-2023 10:00:00	11

Sl. No.	Name of District	Name of Police Station	FIR Number	FIR Year	Date of supervision	Date of release of supervision note (SN)	Date difference
79	Nabarangpur	Nabarangpur	24864040210337	2021	01-10-2021 00:00:00	20-09-2021 00:00:00	11
80	Nuapada	Khariar	24865022220442	2022	12-11-2022 11:25:00	01-11-2022 12:17:00	10
81	Koraput	Bandhugaon	24496060200098	2020	14-11-2020 00:00:00	04-11-2020 00:00:00	10
82	Cuttack Rural	Tangi	24485067210075	2021	29-05-2021 00:00:00	19-05-2021 00:00:00	10
83	Malkangiri	Mathili	24863017220220	2022	11-11-2022 00:00:00	01-11-2022 00:00:00	10
84	Nabarangpur	Chandahandi	24864009210105	2021	29-09-2021 00:00:00	19-09-2021 00:00:00	10
85	Ganjam	Bellaguntha Ps	24491050220151	2022	14-06-2022 00:00:00	04-06-2022 00:00:00	10
86	Nabarangpur	Dabugaon	24864013210134	2021	01-10-2021 00:00:00	21-09-2021 00:00:00	10
87	Mayurbhanj	Baripada Town	24499005210008	2021	17-02-2021 00:00:00	08-02-2021 00:00:00	9
88	Angul	Thakurgarh	24488050210226	2021	12-09-2021 17:00:00	03-09-2021 11:00:00	9
89	Malkangiri	Mathili	24863017220144	2022	08-09-2022 00:00:00	30-08-2022 00:00:00	9
90	Koraput	Narayanpatna	24496039210001	2021	04-02-2021 00:00:00	26-01-2021 00:00:00	9
91	Kendrapara	Rajkanika	24508056220079	2022	18-04-2022 00:00:00	09-04-2022 00:00:00	9
92	Koraput	Machhakund	24496035210003	2021	04-02-2021 00:00:00	26-01-2021 00:00:00	9
93	Balasore	Chandipur	24482015220079	2022	22-08-2022 00:00:00	14-08-2022 00:00:00	8
94	Jajpur	Panikoili	24503073220135	2022	27-06-2022 10:00:00	19-06-2022 17:00:00	7
95	Kendrapara	Aul	24508001220065	2022	27-03-2022 00:00:00	20-03-2022 00:00:00	7
96	Nabarangpur	Dabugaon	24864013220052	2022	27-04-2022 00:00:00	20-04-2022 00:00:00	7
97	Sundargarh	Talsara	24507039230037	2023	09-03-2023 00:00:00	02-03-2023 00:00:00	7
98	Kalahandi	Bhawanipatna Sadar	24495011230078	2023	26-03-2023 00:00:00	20-03-2023 00:00:00	6
99	Rourkela	Sector-3	24504030210040	2021	27-05-2021 00:00:00	21-05-2021 00:00:00	6
100	Puri	Gop	24502016220083	2022	26-03-2022 11:00:00	20-03-2022 10:00:00	6
101	Kendrapara	Patkura	24508052230131	2023	06-03-2023 00:00:00	28-02-2023 00:00:00	6
102	Jagatsinghpur	Abhayachandpur	24505001220240	2022	28-06-2022 00:00:00	22-06-2022 18:00:00	5
103	Mayurbhanj	Mahuldiha	24499033200050	2020	22-04-2021 00:00:00	17-04-2021 00:00:00	5
104	Ganjam	Khallikote	24491025220379	2022	18-08-2022 00:00:00	13-08-2022 00:00:00	5
105	Nabarangpur	Raighar	24864054210161	2021	30-09-2021 00:00:00	26-09-2021 00:00:00	4

Sl. No.	Name of District	Name of Police Station	FIR Number	FIR Year	Date of supervision	Date of release of supervision note (SN)	Date difference
106	Koraput	Koraput Town	24496023210005	2021	04-02-2021 00:00:00	31-01-2021 00:00:00	4
107	Angul	Angul	24488001220613	2022	29-11-2022 11:00:00	24-11-2022 18:00:00	4
108	Ganjam	Chhatrapur	24491011210027	2021	19-02-2021 00:00:00	15-02-2021 00:00:00	4
109	Bhadrak	Puruna Bazar	24490002230032	2023	15-02-2023 00:00:00	12-02-2023 00:00:00	3
110	Kandhamal	Phulbani Town	24501032210054	2021	17-04-2021 00:00:00	14-04-2021 00:00:00	3
111	Ganjam	Chhatrapur	24491011220208	2022	16-06-2022 00:00:00	13-06-2022 00:00:00	3
112	Khurda	Banpur	24483002220564	2022	15-01-2023 10:00:00	12-01-2023 11:17:00	2
113	Cuttack Rural	Nischintakoili	24485001220052	2022	21-04-2022 00:00:00	19-04-2022 00:00:00	2
114	Mayurbhanj	Karanjia	24499021220102	2022	24-05-2022 00:00:00	22-05-2022 00:00:00	2
115	Nabarangpur	Umer Kote	24864063210200	2021	21-06-2021 00:00:00	19-06-2021 00:00:00	2
116	Kendrapara	Marsaghai	24508043220468	2022	05-01-2023 00:00:00	03-01-2023 00:00:00	2
117	Kalahandi	Narla	24495036210132	2021	07-08-2021 00:00:00	06-08-2021 00:00:00	1
118	Angul	Colliery	24488018220159	2022	05-04-2022 11:00:00	03-04-2022 18:00:00	1
119	Upd, Cuttack	Madhupatna	24862005210203	2021	03-11-2021 00:00:00	02-11-2021 00:00:00	1
120	Mayurbhanj	Badasahi	24499009210111	2021	23-05-2021 00:00:00	22-05-2021 00:00:00	1
121	Bhadrak	Sabrang Ps	24490057210261	2021	25-11-2021 00:00:00	24-11-2021 00:00:00	1
122	Cuttack Rural	Tangi	24485067220013	2022	27-01-2022 00:00:00	26-01-2022 00:00:00	1
123	Kalahandi	Kesinga	24495020210263	2021	13-08-2021 00:00:00	12-08-2021 00:00:00	1
124	Puri	Nimapara	24502025210105	2021	26-03-2021 00:00:00	25-03-2021 00:00:00	1
125	Dhenkanal	Parjanga	24489035220527	2022	21-04-2023 00:00:00	20-04-2023 00:00:00	1
126	Nabarangpur	Nabarangpur	24864040230034	2023	16-01-2023 00:00:00	15-01-2023 00:00:00	1
127	Mayurbhanj	Bisoi	24499012220089	2022	02-09-2022 00:00:00	01-09-2022 00:00:00	1
128	Jajpur	Kuakhia	24503069220313	2022	11-10-2022 10:00:00	10-10-2022 10:00:00	1
129	Kendrapara	Kendrapara Sadar	24508030210100	2021	30-05-2021 00:00:00	29-05-2021 00:00:00	1
130	Keonjhar	Ghat Gaon	24497015220138	2022	30-08-2022 12:00:00	28-08-2022 15:42:00	1
131	Ganjam	Purusottampur	24491031210122	2021	19-04-2021 00:00:00	18-04-2021 00:00:00	1

Appendix-XII

(Please refer paragraph 7.1 at page 58)

List of Police Stations from where offline backup database collected

Sl. No.	District	Police Station
1.	Sambalpur	Dhanupalli
2.	Sambalpur	Dhama
3.	Sambalpur	Khetrajpur
4.	Sambalpur	Mahila
5.	Sambalpur	Rengali
6.	Sambalpur	Town
7.	Sambalpur	Bareipalli
8.	Deogarh	Barkot
9.	Deogarh	Deogarh
10.	Deogarh	Kundheigola
11.	UPD Cuttack	Chauliaganj
12.	UPD Cuttack	Choudwar
13.	UPD Cuttack	Malgodown
14.	Rourkela	Jhirpani
15.	Rourkela	Sector-7
16.	Rourkela	Sector-15
17.	Rourkela	Township (Sec-19)
18.	Rourkela	Bandamunda
19.	Rourkela	Bisra
20.	Rourkela	Chandiposh
21.	Rourkela	Gurundia
22.	Rourkela	Lathikata
23.	Rourkela	Bonai
24.	Rourkela	K. Bolang
25.	Rourkela	Lahunipada
26.	Rourkela	Mahulpada
27.	Ganjam	Bellaguntha
28.	Ganjam	Buguda
29.	Ganjam	Gram Ganjam
30.	Ganjam	Sheragada
31.	Ganjam	Tarasingi
32.	Bhadrak	Basudevpur
33.	Bhadrak	Bhadrak Town
34.	Bhadrak	Chudamani Marine
35.	Bhadrak	Puruna Bazar
36.	UPD Bhubaneswar	Airfield
37.	UPD Bhubaneswar	Airport
38.	UPD Bhubaneswar	Nayapalli
39.	UPD Bhubaneswar	Dhauli
40.	Nabarangpur	Dabugaon

Glossary of Abbreviations

BSNL	Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
CAS	Core Application Software
CCIS	Crime and Criminal Information System
CCTNS	Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System
CDF	Crime Detail Form
CID	Crime Investigation Department
CIPA	Common Integrated Police Application
Cr.PC	Criminal Procedure Code
CS	Chargesheet
DBA	Database Administrator
DCP	Deputy Commissioner of Police
DG&IG	Director General and Inspector General
DIT	Department of Information Technology
DMU	Date Migration Utility
EMS	Enterprise Management System
FIR	First Information Report
FRS	Functional Requirements Specification
GD	General Diary
GoI	Government of India
GoO	Government of Odisha
HRPC	Human Rights Protection Cell
ID	Identity
IIC	Inspector in Charge
IIF	Integrated Investigation Form
IIT	Indian Institute of Technology
IO	Investigating Officer
IP	Internet Protocol
IPC	Indian Penal Code
IT	Information Technology
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MIS	Management Information System
MMR	Man Missing Register
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCR	Non-Cognisable Reports
NCRB	National Crime Records Bureau
NDC	National Data Center
NeGP	National e-Governance Plan
NPV	Net Present Value
OGFR	Odisha General Financial Rules
OTP	One Time Password
POCSO	Protection of Children against Sexual Offences
PQ	Pre-Qualification\
PS	Police Station
RFP	Request for Proposal
SCRB	State Crime Record Bureau
SDC	State Data Center
SDPO	Sub-Divisional Police Officer
SHO	Station House Officer
SI	System Integrator
SLA	Service Level Agreement
SLPC	State Level Purchase Committee
SN	Supervision Note
SO	Supervising Officer
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SP	Superintendent of Police
SQL	Structured Query Language
SWAN	State Wide Area Network
UPD	Urban Police District
URS	User Requirements Specification
UT	Union Territory
VPNoBB	Virtual Private Network over Broadband
VSAT	Very Small Aperture Terminal
WiMax	Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access

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