REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

REPORT NO. 2
CIVIL

FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2011

GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL

Table of Contents

	Paragraph	Page
Preface		**v**
Chapter 1: Introduction		**1**
Chapter 2: Performance Audit		
District-centric audit of Dakshin Dinajpur Health & Family Welfare, School Education, Development & Planning, Women & Child Development and Social Welfare, Panchayat & Rural Development, Public Health Engineering, Irrigation & Waterways, Power and Urban Development Departments)	**2.1**	**11**
Working of Siliguri Jalpaiguri Development Authority (Urban Development Department)	**2.2**	**51**
Chapter 3: Compliance Audit		
Audit of Non-compliance with Rules and Regulations	**3.1**	
Public Works (Roads) Department		
Unfruitful and avoidable expenditure	3.1.1	**73**
Public Works and Public Works (Roads) Departments		
Avoidable expenditure in works under RIDF Scheme	3.1.2	**74**
Housing Department		
Avoidable expenditure in housing project	3.1.3	**77**
Undue benefit to the contractors	3.1.4	**78**
Home (Police) Department		
Improper deployment of police personnel	3.1.5	**79**
Home (Police) and Health and Family Welfare Departments		
Purchase of stationery at rates higher than maximum retail price	3.1.6	**80**
Audit against propriety/ expenditure without justification	**3.2**	
Home (Police) Department		
Procurement of unsuitable police vehicles for extremist affected areas	3.2.1	**82**
Public Works (Roads) Department		
Avoidable expenditure owing to overlapping of works	3.2.2	**83**
Public Health Engineering Department		
Infructuous expenditure in sinking of Rig Bored Tubewells	3.2.3	**85**
Industrial Reconstruction Department		
Loss due to imprudent release of loan	3.2.4	**86**
Persistent/Pervasive irregularities	**3.3**	
General		
Irregularities in management of cash by drawing and disbursing officers	3.3.1	**88**
Lack of response of Government to audit	3.3.2	**90**

	Paragraph	Page
Follow-up action on earlier Audit Reports	3.3.3	**91**
Failure of oversight/governance	**3.4**	
Health and Family Welfare Department		
Wasteful expenditure on revival of a hospital	3.4.1	**93**
Non-functioning of newly constructed health centres	3.4.2	**95**
Information & Cultural Affairs and Public Works Departments		
Wasteful expenditure on construction of Kolkata Kala Kendra	3.4.3	**97**
Paschimanchal Unnayan Affairs Department		
Unfruitful expenditure on employment generation scheme	3.4.4	**99**
Power and Non-Conventional Energy Sources Department		
Implementation of hydel power projects in Darjeeling	3.4.5	**101**
Commerce and Industries and Food Processing Industries and Horticulture Departments		
Infructuous and idle expenditure under ASIDE scheme	3.4.6	**105**
Urban Development Department		
Delay in construction of a bus stand	3.4.7	**107**
Undue financial aid to contractor	3.4.8	**109**
Backward Classes Welfare Department		
Idle expenditure on SC/ST hostels	3.4.9	**111**
Agriculture (Marketing) Department		
Avoidable loss under support price scheme	3.4.10	**113**
Chapter 4: Chief Controlling Officer based Audit of Government Department		
Report on the Chief Controlling Officer based audit of Water Resources Investigation and Development Department **(Water Resources Investigation and Development Department)**	4	**117**

Appendices

Description		Page
Appendix 2.1.1	Statement showing amounts parked under different schemes	**149**
Appendix 2.1.2	Statement of year-wise and component-wise fund position during 2006-07 to 2010-11	**150**
Appendix 2.1.3	Statement showing non-availability of infrastructure facilities in health centres	**151**
Appendix 2.1.4	Statement showing status of construction of Sub-centre buildings	**152**
Appendix 2.1.5	a) Statement showing position of institutional deliveries in the District and sampled CHCs	**153**
	b) Statement showing the target and achievement in various terminal methods of family planning	**153**
	c) Statement showing Target and Achievement of full immunization of children up to one year of age	**153**
Appendix 2.1.6	Statement showing position of cataract surgeries performed in Dakshin Dinajpur	**154**
Appendix 2.1.7	Statement showing status of civil works	**154**
Appendix 2.1.8	Statement showing audit observations on Civil Works in test checked schools	**155**
Appendix 2.1.9	Statement showing the requirement of food materials (as per fixed scale) and actual consumption in the AWCs—short/excess consumption:	**155**
Appendix 2.1.10	Statement showing details of target and achievement under IAY	**156**
Appendix 2.1.11	Statement showing some instances of inordinate delay in completion of PMGSY road construction works in Dakshin Dinajpur	**156**
Appendix 2.1.12	Statement showing extra expenditure incurred by the PIU due to non-adherence to compaction rate of WBSRDA schedule by the consultant	**157**
Appendix 2.1.13	Statement showing actual receipt of funds *vis-à-vis* labour budget during 2006-07 to 2010-11	**157**
Appendix 2.2.1	Statement showing outstanding dues from different departments in connection with deposit works executed by SJDA during the period from 2006-07 to 2010-11	**158**
Appendix 3.1	Statement showing extra expenditure due to purchase of articles at prices higher than maximum retail price	**159**
Appendix 3.2	Statement showing details of Mismanagement of cash	**160**
Appendix 3.3	Statement showing year-wise position of Inspection Reports and Paragraphs pending settlement	**164**
Appendix 3.4	Statement showing names of the Departments who did not submit Action Taken Notes with number of para/reviews involved	**165**
Appendix 3.5	Significant recommendations of PAC against which Action Taken Notes were outstanding from Departments	**166**
Appendix 3.6	Statement showing status of unused infrastructure and equipment as of June 2011	**167**
Appendix 3.7	Statement showing non-functional Generator installed at Generator Room of Health Centres as of June 2011	**169**
Appendix 3.8	Statement showing sale proceeds of potato *vis a vis* expected sale proceeds and approximate avoidable loss	**169**
Appendix 4.1	Statement showing organisational structure of Water Resources Investigation and Development Department	**170**
Appendix 4.2	Statement showing list of test checked divisions	**171**
Appendix 4.3	Statement showing schemes dropped under RIDF and AIBP after approval	**172**
Appendix 4.4	Statement showing position of man power in key posts	**172**
Appendix 4.5	Statement showing detailed list of staff not transferred during 2006-11	**173**
Appendix 4.6	Statement showing non-functional instruments in the test checked laboratories	**175**

	Description	Page
Appendix 4.7	Statement showing non-maintenance of important registers/records	**176**
Appendix 4.8	Statement showing status of outstanding Inspection reports and paragraphs	**176**
Appendix 4.9	Statement showing dates of submission of Budget Estimates to SWID	**177**
Appendix 4.10	Statement showing status of unrealised Water Rates	**177**
Appendix 4.11	Statement showing status of preparation of reconciliation statement of energy bills of MI schemes	**178**
Appendix 4.12	Statement showing status of ground water level monitoring through PHS	**179**
Appendix 4.13	Statement showing non-obtaining of permits for new ground water based MI schemes	**179**
	List of Abbreviations	**180**

Preface

This Report on the audit of expenditure incurred by the Government of West Bengal has been prepared for submission to the Governor under Article 151 of the Constitution. The Report covers significant matters arising out of the compliance and performance audits of various departments including autonomous bodies. Audit observations on the Annual Accounts of the Government would form part of a Report on State Finances, which is being presented separately. The Report containing the observations arising out of audit of statutory Corporations and Government Companies and the Report containing observations on audit of revenue receipts of the Government are also presented separately.

The Report starts with an introductory Chapter outlining the profile of audited entities, audit mandate, planning and extent of audit, the status of fiscal operation of the Government of West Bengal and the key audit findings which emerged during the year-long audit exercise. Chapter 2 of the Report covers performance audits while Chapter 3 discusses material findings emerging from compliance audits. Chapter 4 includes the findings arising out of the Chief Controlling Officer based audit of Water Resources Investigation and Development Department.

The cases mentioned in this Report are among those which came to notice in the course of test audit of accounts during the year 2010-11 as well as those which had come to notice in earlier years but could not be dealt with in previous Reports; matters relating to the period subsequent to 2010-11 have also been included wherever necessary.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 About this Report

This Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (C&AG) relates to matters arising from performance audit of selected programmes/ activities and Government organisations and compliance audit of Government Departments and autonomous bodies.

Compliance audit refers to examination of transactions relating to expenditure, receipts, assets and liabilities of the audited entities to ascertain whether the provisions of Constitution of India, applicable laws, rules, regulations and various orders and instructions issued by competent authorities are being complied with. On the other hand, performance audit examines whether the objectives of the programme/activity/department are achieved economically and effectively.

District-centric audit assesses the status and impact of implementation of various socio-economic developmental activities in the district and evaluates improvement in the quality of life of the people.

The primary purpose of this Report is to bring to the notice of the Legislature, important results of audit. Auditing Standards require that the materiality level for reporting should be commensurate with the nature, volume and magnitude of transactions. The findings of audit are expected to enable the Executive to take corrective actions as also to frame policies and directives that will lead to improved financial management of the organisations, thus, contributing to better governance.

Chapter 1, in addition to explaining the authority, planning and extent of audit, provides a synopsis of significant audit observations, a brief analysis of the expenditure of the Government for the last three years, budget and expenditure controls of the Government, response of Government to draft paras/reviews and follow up action on Audit Reports. Chapter 2 of this Report contains audit of selected programmes/Government organisations. Chapter 3 contains observations on compliance audit of various departments and their functionaries. The findings of Chief Controlling Officer based audit of Water Resources Investigation and Development Department have been highlighted in Chapter 4 of the Report.

1.2 Profile of audited entities

There are 57 Departments in the State, headed by Additional Chief Secretaries/Principal Secretaries/Secretaries, who are assisted by Directors/ Commissioners and subordinate officers. Office of the Principal Accountant General (Audit), West Bengal conducts audit of 2770 units of various levels under those Departments. Besides, this office audits 108 bodies/authorities either substantially financed from the Consolidated fund of the State or audit of which have been entrusted by the Government under various sections of the CAG's DPC (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971.

The Works Audit Wing in the Office of the Accountant General (Receipt, Works and Local Bodies Audit), West Bengal is responsible for audit of

11 Departments of the Government of West Bengal and four autonomous bodies (total 659 units spread all over the State).

The comparative position of expenditure incurred by the Government of West Bengal during the year 2010-11 and in the preceding two years is given in **Table 1.1**.

Table 1.1: Comparative position of expenditure for 2008-09 to 2010-11

(Rupees in crore)

Particulars	2008-09			2009-10			2010-11		
	Non-Plan	Plan	Total	Non-Plan	Plan	Total	Non-Plan	Plan	Total
Revenue expenditure									
General services	20700.51	74.93	**20775.44**	26251.04	105.75	**26356.79**	28569.06	111.35	**28680.41**
Social services	10823.92	5560.90	**16384.82**	17243.86	6752.10	**23995.96**	18753.81	8589.28	**27343.09**
Economic services	11637.21	2388.20	**14025.41**	4637.01	3104.83	**7741.84**	4764.88	3325.62	**8090.50**
Grants-in-aid	406.38	21.26	**427.64**	398.20	7.09	**405.29**	403.65	20.51	**424.16**
Total	**43568.02**	**8045.29**	**51613.31**	**48530.11**	**9969.77**	**58499.88**	**52491.40**	**12046.76**	**64538.16**
Capital expenditure									
Capital Outlay	(-) 23.68	3728.98	**3705.30**	128.22	2882.84	**3011.06**	(-)6.08	2231.83	**2225.75**
Loans and Advances disbursed	64.40	695.25	**759.65**	-320.80	1073.24	**752.44**	71.16	336.57	**407.73**
Payment of Public Debt	4854.86	-	**4854.86**	7672.07	-	**7672.07**	6846.29	-	**6846.29**
Public Accounts disbursement	54915.45	-	**54915.45**	65056.63	-	**65056.63**	74227.77	-	**74227.77**
Total	**59811.03**	**4424.23**	**64235.26**	**72536.12**	**3956.08**	**76492.20**	**81139.14**	**2568.40**	**83707.54**
Grand Total	**103379.05**	**12469.52**	**115848.57**	**121066.23**	**13925.85**	**134992.08**	**133630.54**	**14615.16**	**148245.70**

Source: Finance Accounts

1.3 Authority for Audit

The Comptroller and Auditor General of India has been empowered to conduct audit in accordance with Articles 149 and 151 of the Constitution of India and C&AG's DPC Act, 1971. C&AG conducts audit of expenditure of State Government departments under Section 13[1] of the C&AG's DPC Act. Besides, there are units audited under Sections 14[2] (61 units), 19[3] (103 units) and 20 (1)[4] (16 units) of the said Act. The principles and methodology adopted for audit are prescribed in the Regulation of Audit & Accounts, 2007, Auditing Standards and Performance Audit guidelines issued by the Indian Audit & Accounts Department.

1.4 Organisational Structure/Jurisdiction of Audit Office

The Inspection Civil wing of the Office of the Pr. Accountant General (Audit), West Bengal conducts audit of all expenditure incurred by Civil Departments (except those covered by the Works Audit wing) of the State Government, Autonomous Bodies and authorities, etc. (total 2878 units spread all over the State). The Works Audit wing under the Accountant General (Receipt Works

[1] *Audit of (i) all expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of State (ii) all transactions relating to Contingency Funds and Public accounts and (iii) all trading, manufacturing, profit & loss accounts, balance-sheets & other subsidiary accounts.*

[2] *Several non-Commercial Autonomous/ Semi-Autonomous Bodies, established to implement Schemes for employment generation, poverty alleviation, spread of literacy, health for all and prevention of diseases, environment etc. and substantially financed by the Government, are audited under Section 14.*

[3] *Audit of the accounts of Corporations (not being Companies) established by or under law made by the State Legislature in accordance with the provisions of the respective legislations or as per request of the Governor of the State in the public interest.*

[4] *Audit of accounts of any body or authority on the request of the Governor, on such terms and conditions as may be agreed up on between the C&AG and the Government.*

& Local Bodies Audit), West Bengal is responsible for the audit of 11[5] Departments/ Directorates of the Government of West Bengal and four Autonomous Bodies comprising 659 units.

1.5 Planning and Conduct of Audit

Compliance audit is conducted as per the annual audit plan. The units are selected on the basis of risk assessment. Audits taken up are selected on the basis of topicality, financial significance, social relevance, internal control system of the units, occurrence of defalcation/misappropriation/embezzlement as well as findings of previous Audit Reports. Apart from the above parameters, all departmental, important directorates and district level units are audited annually so that fund flow to their subordinate formations comes to the notice of Audit.

Inspection Reports are issued to the heads of units after completion of audit. Based on replies received, audit observations are either settled or further action for compliance is advised. Important audit findings are processed further as draft paragraphs for inclusion in the Audit Report of C&AG.

In case of Performance Audit and CCO based Audit, objectives and criteria are framed and discussed in entry conferences with the concerned organisation. After conducting audit, the draft report is issued to the concerned Department. Observations arising out of audit effort are also discussed with the Departmental heads in exit conference.

Formal replies furnished by the Department as well as views expressed by the Heads of Departments in exit conferences are carefully considered while finalising the material for inclusion in the Audit Report. Audit Reports are laid before the State Legislature under Article 151 of the Constitution of India.

1.6 Significant audit observations

In last few years, Audit has reported on several significant deficiencies in implementation of various programmes/activities through performance audits, which impact the success of programmes. Besides, the deficiencies noticed during assessment of internal control mechanism of some Government departments as well as during compliance audit of the Government departments/ functionaries were also reported.

1.6.1 Performance audits of programmes/activities/department

The present report contains two performance audits viz. District Audit of Dakshin Dinajpur and Working of Siliguri Jalpaiguri Development Authority and Chief Controlling Officer (CCO) based audit of Water Resources Investigation and Development Department.

The major observations arising out of the performance audits and CCO based audit are outlined in the following paragraphs.

[5] *Forests, Housing, Irrigation & Waterways, Municipal Engineering, Public Health Engineering, Public Works, Public Works (Roads), Public Works (Construction Board), Sunderban Affairs, Urban Development and Water Resources Investigation & Development Departments.*

(i) District-centric Audit of Dakshin Dinajpur

In recognition of the importance accorded by the Planning Commission, Government of India, for a district-centric approach to devolution of finances towards integrated local area development, a district-centric audit of Dakshin Dinajpur District was carried out to assess the status and impact of implementation of various socio-economic developmental activities in the District during 2006-2011 and to evaluate improvement in the quality of life of the people. The review covered key Social Sector programmes relating to health, education and housing, water supply and Economic Sector programmes relating to creation of roads, infrastructure development, employment generation, electrification of villages.

While audit observed some positive trends in the health and education, there are quite a few areas that have been flagged for focused attention of the State/District administration.

- An area that calls for attention is the planning process to assess the gaps in various developmental and social security programmes and develop appropriate perspective and annual plans to bridge these gaps with proper prioritisation and clear timelines. Audit observed that the District Plan was either not prepared or prepared late. The State Government should build capacity at the local level to enable the blocks to formulate plans to address the locally felt needs.
- Implementation of National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), the flagship scheme in **Health Sector**, resulted in some positive impact as reflected in increased institutional deliveries and reduced infant mortality rate. However, Audit observed that households and facility surveys were not conducted, perspective plan was not prepared and functioning of Rogi Kalyan Samitis was deficient thereby compromising the idea of community participation and ownership. No new health centres were set up despite acute shortages and there were deficiencies in inpatient services, operation theatres, labour room, pathological test facility etc. Besides, there were significant shortages of medical officers and paramedics.
- In **Education Sector,** review of the Sarva Siksha Mission (SSA) revealed that there was no increase in the number of elementary schools during the last five years. Existing schools lacked requisite infrastructure like stipulated number of class rooms, toilets, etc. as various interventions of the Scheme were either not implemented or inadequately implemented. Disparities in posting of teachers in the district and inadequate capacity building of teachers may potentially affect the quality of teaching. Though drop-out and promotion rate of students improved, enrolment of children decreased during last five years.
- In **Nutrition Sector**, the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) programme failed to provide requisite nutrition to the targeted population for 300 days in a year mainly due to shortage in supply of food. The Anganwadi (AW) Centres suffered from inadequate infrastructural facilities. There were shortages of Child Development Project Officers, which also impacted supervision of AW Centres.

- Under **Water Supply,** review of the implementation of the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme in the District showed that safe drinking water could not be supplied to school children in quality affected area and 8.83 lakh people of fluoride affected areas due to delay in trial boring and investigation. In violation of Chief Engineer's order, Bacteriological test of the existing 40 Piped Water Supply Schemes (PWSS) was not conducted at all since July 2009. During 2006-11, chemical test on PWSS was less than six *per cent* of normative requirement.
- In **Housing and Sanitation Sector** during 2006-11, 83 *per cent* of the target under Indira Awas Yojana was achieved. Achievement in construction of sanitary complex, toilets for schools and AW centres was only 48 *per cent* of the targets even though target dates for full coverage had long elapsed.
- In **Roads Sector**, though length of road increased by 73 *per cent* and number of connected habitations by 64 *per cent*, 52 *per cent* of the habitations remained unconnected, even after implementation of Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana for last ten years. Effective steps need to be taken for gearing up completion of works within stipulated timeframes.
- **Employment generation schemes** like Swarna Jayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) and National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) failed to make the desired impact in the District and suffered from lax supervision. Under SGSY, only 16 *per cent* of the Self Help Groups formed were credit linked for income generating activities as of March 2011. Only 36 *per cent* of the job card holders were provided employment on an average under NREGS, but a negligible number of households were provided 100 days guaranteed employment.
- In **Energy Sector**, though the RGGVY succeeded in bringing electricity to all the mouzas in the District, all rural households in the District could not be energised after five years of launching the programme.

(ii) Working of Siliguri Jalpaiguri Development Authority

Located at the narrow corridor linking North-Eastern States to the rest of the country and on the traditional trade route to Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan and mandated with the responsibilities of planned and integrated development of Siliguri Jalpaiguri Planning Area (SJPA), Siliguri Jalpaiguri Development Authority (SJDA) was constituted in April 1980. Since then, it has taken leadership in providing connectivity with the existing state and national highways by way of constructing new and alternative bye roads, fly-overs and bridges and has executed a number of projects for development of housing and transport infrastructure. Audit has flagged certain areas of concern as regards planned use of land, strengthening financial and operational controls, acquisition, utilisation of land, infrastructure development and internal control.

- Contrary to its statutory responsibility to prepare Land Use and Development Control Plan within two years of notification, SJDA did not do so in respect of substantial part of its notified area after seven to 31 years of notifications. As a result, individual development works taken up by SJDA did not have desired linkage with long term development plans.

- Budget management was flawed as would be evident from instances of delays in sending budget proposals to Government and wide variation between budget and actuals. Financial management was deficient leading to shortfall in collection of toll charges, rents, etc. and retention of heavy cash balances in savings and current bank accounts.
- Inability to protect its interest was apparent from the instances of non-registration of 462.43 acres of land acquired, acquisition of excess land than requisitioned by the requiring body, transfer of 8.58 acres of land in excess of acquisition to a requiring body free of cost, etc. noticed in audit. Besides, 48.748 acres of land acquired at ₹ 7.83 crore was under encroachments, indicating lack of diligence.
- In the absence of comprehensive policy for fixation of prices for leasing out of land, decisions taken by SJDA were often arbitrary resulting in loss of revenue on allotment of land at reduced rate and extension of undue favour to lessees. Instances of execution of works outside SJPA were noticed.
- The control deficiencies in SJDA were compounded by lax monitoring by Urban Development Department, though the Act had mandated the Department to monitor the activities of the Authority and Government was represented in the board of the Authority by Minister and Principal Secretary of the Department.

(iii) Chief Controlling Officer based Audit of Water Resources Investigation and Development Department

Water Resources Investigation and Development Department (WRIDD) of the Government of West Bengal is responsible for planning, conservation, development, utilisation and management of water resources in sustainable manner for both the surface and groundwater in the Minor Irrigation (MI) sector. The Department plays a pivotal role in ensuring assured irrigation for agriculture by bringing more and more cultivable land under assured irrigation with minimum time and investment. The Chief Controlling Officer based audit of WRIDD was conducted to assess the performance of the Department during the period 2006-11. Audit observed some areas of concern relating to institutional, compliance and programme implementation, which affected the performance of the Department and call for Government attention.

- With a view to reduce excessive stress on ground water the 11th Five Year Plan envisaged special emphasis on utilisation of surface water for creation of MI potential. The Department, however, continued to depend more on ground water for creation of Irrigation Potential (IP) in disregard to the plan proposal.
- Vacancies in key posts and inadequate infrastructure of the State Water Investigation Directorate (SWID) adversely affected implementation of West Bengal Ground Water Resources Act, 2005. The laboratories were not properly equipped to analyse the chemical parameters effectively due to non-availability of modern instruments, non-functional equipment and irregular supply of chemicals/testing kits. None of the laboratories was equipped for testing of heavy metals, inorganic and organic pesticides, virological and bacteriological analysis of water samples.

- Internal control mechanism of the Department was found deficient. There was no departmental manual for guidance of the officers and staff in carrying out their duties and for exercising internal control over the activities of the Department.
- During 2006-11, 11990 MI schemes having command area of 1.08 lakh ha were handed over to unregistered beneficiary committees. Despite huge investment in these schemes the Department did not put an effective mechanism in place for maintenance and monitoring of the schemes to ensure optimum utilisation of created potential.
- Deficiencies in procurement, storage and accounting of materials were noticed. Material was procured in excess of requirement which resulted in piling of surplus materials for years.
- Utilisation of irrigation potential of Government operated MI schemes ranged between 29 *per cent* and 37 *per cent* during the period 2006-10 due to defunct schemes, reduction of designed command areas by habitation, insufficient maintenance and irregular power supply. The Department did not take effective step to revitalise the defunct schemes.

Lack of seriousness in implementation of the Act was evident as permits were not obtained from SWID prior to installation of 3705 groundwater based MI schemes by Water Resources Development Directorate (WRDD). Workshops on mass awareness were conducted only in eight districts during the first five years of implementation of the Act.

1.6.2 Compliance audit

Audit has also reported on several significant deficiencies in critical areas which impact the effective functioning of Government departments/ organisations. These are broadly categorised and grouped as (i) audit of non-compliance with rules, (ii) audit against propriety/expenditure without justification, (iii) persistent/pervasive irregularities and (iv) failure of oversight/governance.

Some important observations arising out of compliance audit are illustrated below:

Failure to adhere to technical norms in road construction and lacunae in prior investigation resulted in unfruitful expenditure of ₹ 2.13 crore and avoidable expenditure of ₹ 0.92 crore under Public Works (Roads) Department.

Paragraph 3.1.1

In disregard of the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund guidelines, PW and PW (Roads) Departments incurred an avoidable expenditure of ₹ 1.47 crore on road repair within the defect liability period, allowed price escalation of ₹ 0.33 crore in a bridge work and extended undue favour of ₹ 0.43 crore to the contractors by allowing longer road carriage and use of costlier bitumen.

Paragraph 3.1.2

Lack of monitoring and non-adherence to the BIS specification in testing of concrete by the West Bengal Housing Board led to payment of ₹ 1.87 crore as compensation to a contractor on a housing project.

Paragraph 3.1.3

West Bengal Housing Board paid compensation to the contractors in contravention to the terms of the agreement which led to undue benefit of ₹ 2.93 crore.

Paragraph 3.1.4

The Home (Police) Department procured two troop carriers worth ₹ 91.73 lakh without considering their suitability resulting in the vehicles not being used in anti-terrorist operations for more than two years and consequent blockage of funds.

Paragraph 3.2.1

Four Public Health Engineering Divisions sunk rig bored tube wells in the hard rocky parts of the State without ascertaining the availability of suitable aquifer from the concerned authorities. This led to an infructuous expenditure of ₹ 6.37 crore.

Paragraph 3.2.3

The objective of reviving the Mayo Hospital, Kolkata through creation of a joint venture company did not fructify owing to inaction and indifference of the Health and Family Welfare Department. Resultantly, Government had to shoulder wasteful/unfruitful expenditure of ₹ 10.25 crore for meeting liabilities of the joint venture company.

Paragraph 3.4.1

Newly created health services infrastructure and medical equipments/furniture worth ₹ 2.05 crore under Basic Health Project remained unused for two to five years. Resultantly, the objective of improvement of health services remained unachieved, besides possibility of damage of the infrastructure due to non-use.

Paragraph 3.4.2

Construction of Kolkata Kala Kendra remained at the foundation level even after lapse of 11 years from its initiation. Repeated change in scope of work coupled with failure of the Information and Cultural Affairs Department to expedite the progress of work not only led to steep enhancement in estimated cost, but rendered foundation piling work worth ₹ 1.01 crore wasteful.

Paragraph 3.4.3

A goat rearing scheme introduced by Paschimanchal Unnayan Parshad (PUP) in Birbhum and Purulia Districts did not succeed, as the PUP, District Magistrates and Zilla Parishads had not ensured supply of goats by a private agency. Resultantly, expenditure of ₹ 2.06 crore on construction of 752 unused sheds remained unfruitful.

Paragraph 3.4.4

Even after lapse of seven to eight years from approval, all six hydel power projects in Darjeeling remained either non-starters or defunct owing to failure of West Bengal Renewable Energy Development Agency (WBREDA) to address primary ground level issues. Resultantly, ₹ 1.25 crore spent on these projects was unfruitful/wasteful; while ₹ 1.23 crore remained parked in WBREDA's current bank account for three to eight years.

Paragraph 3.4.5

Objective of creation of export auction infrastructure for a flower market at Mallikghat, Kolkata was not achieved owing to failure of a Government Corporation and Food Processing Industries and Horticulture Department in ensuring temporary relocation of flower vendors. This resulted in idling of expenditure of ₹ 1.84 crore, while expenditure of ₹ 0.78 crore became infructuous.

Paragraph 3.4.6

1. 7 Budget and expenditure controls

A summary of Appropriation Accounts for 2010-11 in respect of the Government of West Bengal is given in **Table 1.2.**

Table 1.2 : Summary of Appropriation Accounts for 2010-11 **(₹ in crore)**

	Nature of expenditure	Original grant/ appropriation	Supplementary grant/ appropriation	Total	Actual expenditure	Saving (-)/ Excess (+)
Voted	I Revenue	49488.48	6088.23	55576.71	51350.04	(-) 4226.67
	II Capital	5745.36	294.20	6039.56	2483.34	(-) 3556.22
	III Loans and Advances	491.76	4.00	495.76	407.73	(-) 88.03
	IV. Public Debt	-	-	-	-	-
Total Voted		**55725.60**	**6386.43**	**62112.03**	**54241.11**	**(-) 7870.92**
Charged	V Revenue	15354.21	299.72	15653.93	14633.19	(-) 1020.74
	VI Capital	-	8.37	8.37	7.88	(-) 0.49
	VII Public Debt-Repayment	14844.25	4320.38	19164.63	26220.08	(+) 7055.45
Total Charged		**30198.46**	**4628.47**	**34826.93**	**40861.15**	**(+) 6034.22**
Appropriation to Contingency Fund (if any)		-	-	-	-	-
Grand Total		**85924.06**	**11014.90**	**96938.96**	**95102.26**	**(-) 1836.70**

Source: Appropriation Accounts

The overall saving of ₹ 1836.70 crore was the result of saving of ₹ 10167.43 crore in 47 grants and 22 appropriations under Revenue Section and 48 grants and 19 appropriations under Capital Section, offset by excess of ₹ 8330.72 crore in 13 grants and seven appropriations under Revenue Section and one grant and six appropriations under Capital Section.

1.7.1 Excess expenditure over available provisions

As per Article 205 of the Constitution of India, it is mandatory for a State Government to get the excess over a grant/appropriation regularised by the State Legislature. The time limit for regularisation of expenditure has, however, not been prescribed under the Article. Regularisation of excess expenditure is done after the completion of discussion of the Appropriation Accounts by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). However, excess expenditure amounting to ₹ 16637.64 crore for the years 2006-2010 was yet to be regularised as of December 2011. Moreover, excess expenditure under 13 grants and ten appropriations amounting to ₹ 8330.72 crore from the Consolidated Fund of the State was incurred over the amounts authorised by the State Legislature during 2010-11, which requires regularisation.

1.7.2 Unnecessary/excessive/inadequate supplementary provision

Supplementary provision aggregating ₹ 548.64 crore obtained in 13 cases (₹ 10 lakh or more in each case) during the year proved unnecessary as the expenditure did not come up to the level of original provision. On the other hand, in nine cases, supplementary provision of ₹ 7282.70 crore proved insufficient by more than ₹ 1 crore in each case leaving an aggregate uncovered excess expenditure of ₹ 7982.46 crore.

1.8 Response of the Departments to Draft Audit Paragraphs

Finance (Budget) Department issued directions to the departments in June 1982 to send their response to draft audit paragraphs proposed for inclusion in the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India within one month.

The Draft paragraphs are forwarded to the Secretaries of the departments concerned drawing their attention to the audit findings and requesting them to send their response within prescribed time frame. It is brought to their personal attention that in view of likely inclusion of such paragraphs in the Audit Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, which are placed before the Legislature, it would be desirable to include their comments in the matter.

Draft Paragraphs proposed for inclusion in this report were forwarded to the Secretaries concerned between May 2011 and November 2011 through letters addressed to them personally.

The concerned Departments did not send replies to 12 out of 26 Paragraphs/ Reviews featured in Chapters 2 to 4. The responses of concerned Departments received in respect of 14 paragraphs have been suitably incorporated in the Report.

1.9 Follow up on Audit Reports

Review of outstanding Action Taken Notes (ATNs) on paragraphs included in the Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Government of West Bengal upto 2009-2010 revealed that Action Taken Notes on 298 paragraphs (33 paragraphs from 1997-1998 to 2009-2010 selected by Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and 265 paragraphs from 1981-1982 to 2009-2010 not selected by PAC) involving 40 Departments remained outstanding as of September 2011.

It was observed that the Action Taken Notes on 35 Reports of the PAC, presented to the Legislature between 1991-92 and 2009-10 had not been submitted by 17 Departments[6] to the Assembly Secretariat as of September 2011. The matter has been discussed in detail in para 3.3.3 of this Report.

[6] *Agriculture, Commerce & Industries, Finance, Fisheries, Health & Family Welfare, Home, Housing, Irrigation & Waterways, Municipal Affairs, Panchayats & Rural Development, Public Health Engineering, Public Works, Public Works (Roads), School Education, Social Welfare, Transport and Urban Development Departments.*

Chapter 2: Performance Audit

2.1 District-centric audit of Dakshin Dinajpur

Executive Summary

In recognition of the importance accorded by the Planning Commission, Government of India, for a district-centric approach to devolution of finances towards integrated local area development, a district-centric audit of Dakshin Dinajpur District was carried out to assess the status and impact of implementation of various socio-economic developmental activities in the District during 2006-2011 and to evaluate improvement in the quality of life of the people. The review covered key Social Sector programmes relating to health, education and housing, water supply and Economic Sector programmes relating to creation of roads, infrastructure development, employment generation, electrification of villages.

While audit observed some positive trends in the health and education, there are quite a few areas that have been flagged for focused attention of the State/District administration.

- An area that requires attention is strengthening the planning process to assess the gaps in various developmental and social security programmes and develop appropriate perspective and annual plans to bridge these gaps with proper prioritisation and clear timelines. Audit observed that the District Plan was either not prepared or prepared late. The State Government should build capacity at the local level to enable the blocks to formulate plans to address the felt needs at the grass root level.
- Implementation of National Rural Health Mission, the flagship scheme in **Health Sector**, resulted in some positive impact as reflected in increased institutional deliveries and reduced infant mortality rate. However, Audit observed that households and facility surveys were not conducted, perspective plan was not prepared and functioning of Rogi Kalyan Samitis was deficient. No new health centres were set up despite acute shortages and there were deficiencies in inpatient services, operation theatres, labour room, pathological test facility etc. Besides, there were significant shortages of medical officers and paramedics.
- In **Education Sector,** review of the Sarva Siksha Mission revealed that there was no increase in the number of elementary schools during the last five years. Existing schools lacked requisite infrastructure like stipulated number of class rooms, toilets, etc. as various interventions of the Scheme were either not implemented or inadequately implemented. There were disparities in posting of teachers in the district. Capacity building of teachers was also inadequate. Though drop-out and promotion rate of students improved, enrolment of children decreased during last five years.
- In **Nutrition Sector**, the ICDS programme failed to provide requisite nutrition to the targeted population for 300 days in a year mainly due to shortage in supply of food. The Anganwadi (AW) centres suffered from inadequate infrastructural facilities. There were shortages of CDPOs, which also impacted supervision of AW centres.
- Under **Water Supply,** review of the implementation of the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme in the District showed that safe drinking

water could not be supplied to school children in quality affected area and 8.83 lakh people of fluoride affected areas due to delay in trial boring and investigation. In violation of Chief Engineer's order, Bacteriological test of the existing 40 Piped Water Supply Schemes (PWSS) was not conducted at all since July 2009. During 2006-11, chemical test on PWSS was less than six *per cent* of normative requirement.

- In **Housing and Sanitation Sector** during 2006-11, 83 *per cent* of the target under Indira Awas Yojana was achieved. Achievement in construction of sanitary complex, toilets for schools and AW centres was only 48 *per cent* of the targets even though target dates for full coverage had long elapsed.
- In **Roads Sector**, though length of road increased by 73 *per cent* and number of connected habitations by 64 *per cent*, 52 *per cent* of the habitations remained unconnected, even after implementation of PMGSY for last ten years. Effective steps need to be taken for gearing up completion of works within stipulated timeframes.
- **Employment generation schemes** like SGSY and NREGS failed to make the desired impact in the District and suffered from lax supervision. Under SGSY, only 16 *per cent* of the Self Help Groups formed were credit linked for income generating activities as of March 2011. Only 36 *per cent* of the job card holders were provided employment on an average under NREGS, but a negligible number of households were provided 100 days guaranteed employment.
- In **Energy Sector**, though the RGGVY succeeded in bringing electricity to all the mouzas in the District, all rural households in the District could not be energised after five years of launching the programme.

2.1.1. Introduction

2.1.1.1 District profile

District Dakshin Dinajpur was created in 1992 consequent upon the bifurcation of erstwhile West Dinajpur District. It is bounded by Uttar Dinajpur District in the North-West, Malda District in the South-West and has international border with Bangladesh in the North-East and South-East.

The District spans an area of 2162 sq km and is headquartered at Balurghat. The District accounts for about 1.87 *per cent* (15.03 lakh) of the population of the State (801.76 lakh) with 86.89 *per cent* of them residing in rural areas. The literacy rate in the District is 64.46 *per cent* as against 58.83 *per cent* at State level and the National average of 65 *per cent*. Out of 4.32 lakh families of the district, 44 *per cent* (1.92 lakh families) live below the poverty line (BPL) which matches the percentage at the State level.

2.1.1.2 Administrative set-up

The district comprises of two Sub-divisions[1], two Municipalities[2] and eight Blocks[3]. To cater to rural development, eight community blocks cover 65

[1] *Balurghat and Gangarampur*
[2] *Balurghat and Gangarampur*
[3] *Balurghat, Bansihari, Gangarampur, Harirampur, Hili, Kumarganj, Kusmandi and Tapan.*

Gram Panchayats (GP). The District Planning Committee (DPC) is the apex body at the district level for approving the shelf of schemes for development of the district. The District Magistrate (DM) is in charge of overall administration and sanctions all development programmes. He is the Secretary of the DPC. He ensures co-ordination between District Rural Development Cell (DRDC), Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), field officers and all other departments of the State Government. DRDC is the agency which manages the implementation of poverty eradication programmes of the Ministry of Rural Development in the District.

2.1.2 Audit framework

2.1.2.1 Scope of audit

The audit involved a review of the significant socio-economic developmental programmes implemented in the District during 2006-11. These included an appraisal of Social sector programmes relating to health, education, nutrition, water supply and sanitation. In the Economic sector, infrastructure development was reviewed through an assessment of the projects and schemes implemented for improvement of road connectivity and provision of employment to the poor and vulnerable sections of the society. Provision of basic civic amenities by the municipal authorities was also reviewed.

2.1.2.2 Audit objectives

The objectives of audit were to assess:

- adequacy and effectiveness of the annual planning process for different programmes;
- economy and efficiency in the execution of various schemes;
- effectiveness of the developmental programmes in terms of achievement of targeted outputs and outcomes;
- adequacy and effectiveness of the processes for monitoring, reporting and evaluation.

2.1.2.3 Audit methodology

Before commencement of audit, an entry conference was held on 6 May 2011 with the Chief Secretary, Principal Secretaries/Secretaries of the nodal Departments responsible for operation of the schemes reviewed and the other departmental functionaries involved. The objectives and scope of audit were explained and their perceptions relating to various developmental programmes were obtained. Entry conference was also held at the District level involving the functionaries concerned at the District, Block and GP level.

Three Blocks *viz*. Balurghat, Harirampur and Kumarganj were selected out of eight for detailed scrutiny by applying Population Proportional to Sample (PPS) method giving weightage to parameters such as population, BPL population, SC/ST population and distance from district headquarters. Further, seven Gram Panchayats[4] (GP), 20 *per cent* of the GPs falling within these three Blocks were selected for audit based on simple random sampling without

[4] *Chakvrigu, Gopalbati, Jakirpur, Najirpur, Pundari, Safanagar and Vatpara*

replacement method. Audit was based on a scrutiny of the records in the nodal Departments[5] /nodal Agencies[6] of the schemes reviewed, the offices of the DM, selected Blocks and GPs. Besides, the records of the District Project Officer, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, District Project Officer, Integrated Child Development Services, District Health and Family Welfare Samity, Superintendent of Police, Zilla Parishad (ZP), Project Director, DRDC, Executive Engineers of Balurghat Division, PHED and Dakshin Dinajpur Irrigation Division, Balurghat Municipality and West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited were also scrutinised in-depth.

2.1.2.4 Audit criteria

Audit comments were framed on the basis of the following criteria:

- West Bengal District Planning Committee Act, 1994
- Relevant Government orders
- West Bengal Financial Rules
- Guidelines of schemes

2.1.2.5 Acknowledgements

We acknowledge the cooperation and assistance rendered by various departmental functionaries, DM, Dakshin Dinajpur and other district functionaries, the concerned BDOs and Gram Panchayat Pradhans, during the course of audit.

2.1.3 Planning

2.1.3.1 District Planning Committee

Government of India envisages an inclusive and participative planning process for the development of districts. Comprehensive district level planning is crucial in view of multiplicity of schemes being implemented in several areas of governance, which may lead to convergence in delivery mechanism. To this end, West Bengal District Planning Committee Act, 1994 mandated the establishment of a District Planning Committee (DPC) for consolidating the Annual Action Plans (AAP) prepared by the three tiers of local administration viz. ZP, Panchayat Samitis (PS) and GPs and Municipalities in the district into an integrated District Plan. The works not included in AAP were not to be taken up.

Sabhadhipati, ZP is the Chairperson of the District Planning Committee (DPC) and the MPs, MLAs, Chairpersons of Municipalities, *etc.* are members. The DM is the Secretary of the DPC. The Committee was required to meet and approve the shelf of schemes and review/monitor the progress of implementation of these schemes as and when necessary. As per instruction of Development & Planning Department, Government of West Bengal, District

[5] *Development & Planning, Health & Family Welfare, Irrigation & Waterways (I&WD), Panchayat & Rural Development, Power, Public Health Engineering (PHE), School Education, Urban Development and Women & Child Development and Social Welfare Departments*

[6] *Sarva Siksha Mission, State Health & Family Welfare Samiti, State Rural Development Agency and West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited.*

Plan is to be sent to the Department by 15th March for approval by State Planning Board.

Audit observed that District Plan was not prepared for 2006-07. During 2007-11, there were delays ranging between four and 11 months from the stipulated date (15th March of preceding financial year) in submission of draft plan to the Development & Planning Department. Further, after submission of the district plans, no communication was received from the Development & Planning Department in any of the years. DPC did not capture the flagship programmes under a separate document under District plan though required as per provisions of guidelines.

District plan was delayed by four to eleven months defeating its purpose

Due to delays in submission of the plans purpose of preparing the plans was not fully achieved.

2.1.4 Financial Management

Funds are allocated to the district through the State budget for various developmental activities. In addition, funds are placed directly with DRDC and other implementing agencies for various socio-economic programmes by the Central Government.

Funds received by the District during 2006-11 and expenditure there against in respect of certain significant schemes are indicated below. Significant findings on implementation of these schemes are discussed subsequently.

Table 2.1.1 Table indicating available funds and expenditure under various schemes

₹ in crore

Scheme	Funds provided	Expenditure incurred (percentage)	Amount unutilised (percentage)
National Rural Health Mission (NRHM)	48.84	26.69 (55)	22.15 (45)
Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (SSA)	161.70	139.67 (86)	22.03 (14)
Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS)	99.91	125.90 (126)	--
Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP)	33.52	25.21 (75)	8.31 (25)
Indira Awas Yojana (IAY)	91.36	91.20 (99.8)	0.16 (0.2)
IHSDP under JNNURM[7]	8.64	7.24 (84)	1.40 (16)
Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC)	16.85	12.81 (76)	4.04 (24)
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY)	161.08	153.76 (96)	7.32 (4)
Swarna Jayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY)	27.41	25.19 (92)	2.22 (8)
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS)	121.33	120.19 (99)	1.14 (1)
Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY)	99.54	71.16 (72)	28.38 (28)
UIDSSMT under JNNURM[8]	12.77	12.47 (98)	0.30 (2)
Total	**882.95**	**811.49**	**97.45 (11)**

(Source: Records of respective district level functionaries)

Audit observed that scheme funds remained unutilised as progress of works was slow due to non-availability of land and inadequate project management in the areas of planning, execution, monitoring and supervision. Audit noted instances of scheme funds amounting to ₹ 11.17 crore, received from GoI and State Government during 2006-11, remaining parked at the district/block

[7] *Figures relate to only Balurghat Municipality during 2009-11.*
[8] *Figures relate to only Balurghat Municipality during 2007-11.*

Scheme funds of ₹ 11.17 crore remaining parked with district/block level authorities

levels without being released/utilised/refunded ***(Appendix 2.1.1)***. This included ARWSP funds amounting to ₹ 2.43 crore transferred by Balurghat Division to the deposit accounts of PHED Divisions of Raiganj and Malda between 26-31 March 2009 in the name of execution of different works just to avoid the lapse of budget grant.

Test check revealed that advances/grants of ₹ 54.55 crore[9] relating to four schemes requiring submission of adjustment bills/Utilisation Certificate remained outstanding from various executing agencies[10] as of June 2011.

Audit also noticed that Balurghat Municipality submitted UC of 12th Finance Commission funds for Solid Waste Management showing an expenditure of ₹ 244.58 lakh against ₹ 224.95 lakh spent, inflating the UC to the extent of ₹ 19.63 lakh.

2.1.5 Social Services

Significant investment is being made by the Central and State Governments in the Social sector. Audit observed that implementation of the flagship programmes like National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) had positive impact in Health and Education sectors. However, the schemes lagged behind the intended targets. Other schemes *viz.* ICDS, ARWSP, TSC, IAY also failed to achieve the intended objectives as discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

2.1.5.1 Health sector

The Chief Medical Officer of Health (CMOH) Dakshin Dinajpur, functioning under the Health and Family Welfare Department is responsible for providing health care services to the people through a network of one district hospital (DH), one Sub-divisional Hospital, seven Community Health Centres (CHC), 19 Primary Health Centres (PHCs) and 247 Sub Centres (SCs). Besides, seven private nursing homes are also providing health care services. There is a District Health and Family Welfare Samity (DHFWS) headed by the District Magistrate which is responsible for planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and database management in the District. CMOH is the Member Secretary of DHFWS. Besides, there are Rogi Kalyan Samitis (RKS) at the Hospital/CHC level to ensure community ownership in delivery of reliable and accountable health services.

Audit scrutiny was conducted at the District Hospital, three CHCs[11], six PHCs[12] and 12 SCs[13] covering the period 2006-07 to 2010-11.

2.1.5.1.1 Planning

The Government of India (GoI) launched the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in April 2005 with a view to provide accessible, affordable,

---

[9] *for implementation of SSA (₹ 44.02 crore), SGSY (₹ 3.40 crore), Bidhayak Elaka Unnayan Prakalpa (₹ 6.14 crore) and ARWSP (₹ 0.99 crore)*

[10] *Panchayat Samitis, Village Education Committees, Schools and other agencies*

[11] *Harirampur , Khaspur (Balurghat) and Kumarganj*

[12] *Balihara, Boalder, Bolla, Deor, Kamarpara, and Samjhia*

[13] *Ajodhya, Chahatpur, Charkhanda, Dakshin Ramkrishnapur, Hajipur, Karenjabari, Kharua, Kurmanpur, Mallickpur, Naona, Shyamnagar and Thakurpura*

Perspective Plan for Health service was not prepared by the District H&FW Samity; household and facility surveys were also not conducted

accountable, effective and reliable health care facilities in the rural areas with the underlying strategy to bridge gaps in health care facilities, facilitate decentralised planning with community participation and provide an overarching umbrella for the existing health programmes including Reproductive and Child Health, Vector Borne Disease Control Programme and Tuberculosis, Leprosy and Blindness Control Programmes. The primary objectives of NRHM *inter alia* included reduction of infant and maternal mortality rate and population stabilisation and prevention and control communicable and non-communicable diseases.

DHFWS was required to prepare a perspective plan for the entire Mission period (2005-12) as well as the District Health Annual Plans (DHAPs) on the basis of inputs from the blocks. DHAPs were to be prepared on the basis of preparatory studies, mapping of services and household conducted to assess the health care requirements. Similarly, in order to identify input needs, facility surveys were to be conducted in each CHC, PHC and SC. These surveys were not conducted indicating deficient ground work for implementation of NRHM. No Perspective Plan was also prepared. DHAPs were prepared only for two (2008-09 and 2010-11) out of five years audited, that too without inputs from blocks.

Deficient functioning of Rogi Kalyan Samitis

NRHM envisaged setting up of RKS at the Hospital/CHC level to ensure community ownership in health delivery services and to develop a Citizen Charter for every level of health facility for time bound delivery of services. Though RKS was formed in hospitals and CHCs, but these were not formed in any of the 19 PHCs in the District. In three test checked CHCs and in District Hospital, frequency of meetings of RKS was inadequate as 10 and 15 meetings were held during 2006-11 against the requirement of 180 and 60 respectively. Inadequate functioning of RKS was also reflected in low utilisation of funds ranging from zero to 38 *per cent* during 2006-11, as shown in the table below.

Table 2.1.2: Utilisation of RKS funds

	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11
Funds available (₹ in lakh)	13	21	35	62.34	92.80
Utilisation (*per cent*)	5 (38)	0 (0)	5.66 (16)	2.54 (4)	8.19 (9)

(Source: Records of DHFWS, Dakshin Dinajpur)

2.1.5.1.2 Fund management

During 2006-11, out of ₹ 48.84 crore available with DH&FWS, ₹ 26.69 crore (55 *per cent)* was utilised as indicated in the table below (Component-wise details shown in ***Appendix 2.1.2***).

Table 2.1.3: Fund position of NRHM during 2006-11 *(₹ in lakh)*

Year	Opening Balance	Receipt	Available fund	Expenditure	Closing Balance
2006-07	260.12	727.53	987.65	171.17	816.48
2007-08	816.48	830.66	1647.14	233.83	1413.31
2008-09	1413.31	607.00	2020.31	482.40	1537.91
2009-10	1537.91	1110.82	2648.73	665.80	1982.93
2010-11	1982.93	1348.05	3330.98	1115.51	2215.47
Total		**4624.06**		**2668.71**	

(Source: Records of DHFWS, Dakshin Dinajpur)

This reflected unrealistic assessment of fund requirements or suboptimal absorption capacity or tardy/lackadaisical implementation.

During 2006-08, ₹ 4.60 crore was released to the GPs concerned for construction of 65 SC buildings. As of March 2011, ₹ 2.52 crore (54 *per cent*) was utilised. Seven PSs[14] did not refund the unspent balance of ₹ 81.17 lakh, though construction was complete. Further, ₹ 84 lakh, received (March 2007) for construction of 24 ANM quarters remained parked with DH&FWS as of June 2011.

2.1.5.1.3 Infrastructure

No new Health Centres were set up during 2006-11; there were acute shortage of CHCs, PHCs and SCs compared to the norms of NRHM

NRHM guidelines provide that there should be one CHC for population of 120000, one PHC for population of 30000 and one SC for a population of 5000. For the population of 13.06 lakh in the district as per 2001 Census, there were seven CHCs, 19 PHCs and 247 Sub-Centres. Following the norms, there was an additional requirement of four CHCs, 24 PHCs and 14 Sub Centres, without taking into account the increase in the population since 2001. There was no addition to the number of health centres five years after the launch of the Mission. The Annual Action Plans also did not address this shortage resulting in denial of optimum health facilities in rural areas.

➢ ***Status of infrastructure at health centres***

There were deficiencies in terms of infrastructures and medical facilities in the test checked health centres

The NRHM framework envisaged provision of certain guaranteed services at SCs, PHCs and CHCs as per norms of Indian Public Health Standard (IPHS). Test-check, however, revealed that basic infrastructure[15] and the required services[16] were not available in a number of audited health centres, as detailed in ***Appendix 2.1.3.***

Test check of three CHCs, six PHCs and 12 SCs disclosed the following deficiencies:

a) None of PHCs and SCs had emergency services, while five PHCs and 12 SCs did not have in-patient services.

b) All the test checked CHCs and PHCs functioned without facilities for X Ray, Ultra-sonography, ECG, blood storage and pathological tests;

c) Though Family Welfare Services such as ante-natal, post-natal, immunisation and spacing method of family planning were available, services such as obstetrics and gynaecology, emergency obstetric care (caesarian section and other medical intervention), newborn care, paediatrics, emergency care of sick children were not available in any of the test checked CHCs, PHCs and SCs.

d) 24-hour delivery services were available at three CHCs and one PHC and terminal method of family planning were available at three CHCs.

e) Five PHCs had no beds against sanctioned two to ten beds for each, while all three test-checked CHCs functioned with 15 beds against the norm of 30 each;

---

[14] *Balurghat, Banshihari, Gangarampur, Harirampur, Hili, Kumarganj and Tapan.*

[15] *suitable building, OPD rooms/cubicles for out patients, hygienic environment, water supply system, sewerage facility, medical waste disposal facility, electricity connection or standby power supply system, ambulance, etc.*

[16] *such as inpatient services, operation theatre, labour room, facilities for pathological tests, X-ray, emergency care, etc. required under IPHS norms,*

f) Though all three test checked CHCs had Operation Theatres (OTs), only minor surgery (Non-Surgical Vasactomy and Tubectomy) was carried out due to the absence of specialist surgeons and required equipment. None of the OTs was equipped with the requisite essential equipment as per IPHS norms.



Dilapidated staff quarter at Harirampur BPHC being used by villagers for making cowdung cakes

g) The staff quarters of three CHCs and five PHCs were dilapidated and were being used by villagers for storing straw, cow dung cakes, etc.

h) For reduction of Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) and Infant Mortality (IMR) by promoting safe motherhood through proportionate increase of institutional deliveries, 50 *per cent* of the total PHCs in the State were identified during the year 2008 for conducting normal deliveries. Accordingly, ₹ 1.71 crore was released to DHFWS in October 2009 for repair and renovation of 11 PHCs[17] along with residential quarters of Medical Officers and nursing personnel. There were delays ranging from 222 to 286 days in releasing the funds to Zilla Parishad for taking up the works. The works taken up in April-May 2010 and scheduled for completion in October-November 2010 were not completed till June 2011, thereby frustrating the target of facilitating institutional deliveries in these PHCs. Besides, ₹ 10 lakh was placed with DH&FWS (August 2008) for related purposes[18]. However, no expenditure was incurred on this account, reasons for which were not stated by the district authority, though called for.

i) Owing to non-formation of RKSs in none of the 19 PHCs, ₹ 38 lakh received from State Samity during 2009-11 for that purpose was kept with the district samity.

➢ ***Status of construction of SC buildings and ANM quarters***

Out of 247 SCs in the District, 89 function in rented premises. During 2006-08, ₹ 4.60 crore was released to GPs concerned for construction of 65 SC buildings. Out of this, 51 (79 *per cent*) were completed and 44 (68 *per cent*) were operational as of March 2011. Twelve SCs were under construction and construction of two SCs had not been started. The GP-wise status of construction of SCs is indicated in ***Appendix 2.1.4***. Thus, full benefit of the works did not accrue in respect of 14 SCs, though funds were released to GPs more than three years back.

[17] *Aminpur, Basuria, Batun, Boalder, Bolla, Dakra, Deor, Kamarpara, Malancha, Monohali and Trimonini.*

[18] *for renting accommodation for Medical Officer and Nursing personnel where quarters are not available, to hire vehicle for referral services in case of lack of ambulance, for purchasing cash card of mobile phone, expenditure on some minor repair works, etc. in eight PHCs .*

2.1.5.1.4 Manpower

Shortfall in manpower in test checked health cenres varied between 21 and 56 *per cent*

NRHM aimed at providing adequate skilled manpower at all health centres as per IPHS norms. It was seen that shortfall in manpower in test checked BPHCs, PHCs and SCs was 21 *per cent*, 56 *per cent* and 25 *per cent* respectively. There was 61 *per cent* shortfall of MOs in the test checked BPHCs; while shortfalls in the posts of Radiographer and General Duty Attendants (GDA) were 100 and 71 *per cent* respectively. In test checked PHCs, shortages were noticed in key posts like MO (42 *per cent*), Laboratory technician (83 *per cent*), Pharmacist (100 *per cent*) and GDA (42 *per cent*). In SCs, there were eight *per cent* shortage of ANM and 50 *per cent* shortage of Health worker.

Shortfall in number of ASHAs and delayed issue of drug kits

(a) Accredited Social Health Activist: Under NRHM, a trained female community health worker called Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA) was to be provided in each village in the ratio of one per 1000 population. ASHA was to be an interface between the community and the public health system. ASHAs were required to be provided with drug kits containing medicines for minor ailments, oral re-hydration solution (ORS), contraceptives, etc.

Against requirement of 1460 ASHAs in the District, 1067 were selected (during 2006-11), of which 978 were trained. Though they were appointed during April 2007 to March 2010, drug kits were supplied late to 923 ASHAs during January 2010 to March 2011, adversely impacting their utility.

2.1.5.1.5 Reproductive Child Health (RCH)

RCH is a major programme under NRHM aimed at reducing MMR, IMR, promoting family planning, immunisation, etc. to achieve population stability.

(a) Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY): Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), a component of RCH, aims to encourage pregnant women to have institutional delivery by providing cash compensation[19] to BPL/SC/ST pregnant women up to two live births. Though compensation for antenatal care to be paid after completion of 32 weeks of pregnancy, it was noticed that in case of 1489 (76 *per cent*) beneficiaries out of 1963 test-checked in 12 audited SCs, was paid with delays ranging from two to 656 days and even after delivery. In case of benefit for institutional delivery, in 197 out of 252 test checked cases in three test checked CHCs, cash compensation was paid after delays ranging from two to 226 days after discharge.

In the District, out of 163535 pregnant women registered during 2006-11, 125563 (77 *per cent*) received two antenatal checkups, 142034 women (87 *per cent*) were provided 100 days of IFA tablets and 148404 women (91 *per cent*) were fully immunised against TT. It emerged from audit scrutiny that shortfall in administration was due to non-supply or short supply of IFA tablets and doses of TT to SCs by State Health and Family Welfare Samitis.

Though coverage of institutional deliveries increased over the years, 52 *per cent* shortfall was noticed compared to registered pregnant women

(b) Institutional deliveries: NRHM envisages expanding coverage of institutional deliveries. Position of institutional deliveries during 2006-11 in the District and sampled CHCs compared to registered pregnant women (shown in the ***Appendix 2.1.5***) indicated that shortfall in institutional deliveries decreased from 71 *per cent* in 2006-07 to 52 *per cent* in 2010-11 in the District. However, reduction of shortfall over last five years indicated that the programme is making slow but positive impact. Non-availability of

[19] *₹ 1000 (₹ 500 for antenatal care and ₹ 500 for undergoing institutional delivery)*

delivery facilities at PHCs owing to absence of labour room, medical officer, etc. was the main reason for shortfall in institutional deliveries. Further, emergency obstetric care, including the facility to conduct operation caesarean section was not available in any test checked CHCs owing to absence of specialists, anaesthetists, and lack of requisite infrastructure.

(c) Maternal and infant deaths: NRHM envisaged containment of MMR (Maternal Mortality Rate) within 100 per lakh population. Against the same, MMR in the District during last four years stood at 253, 188, 180 and 191 per lakh. The District, however, presented a better picture in respect of Infant Mortality Rate (IMR). Against the NRHM target of containment of IMR within 30 per thousand live births by 2012, the same ranged between 22 and 27 during last four years, which is commendable, if viewed with the State IMR of 33 (in 2009). Thus, though infant deaths were under control, maternal deaths remained a matter of concern.

(d) Family Planning: RCH has launched a number of family planning initiatives to achieve the goal of population stability. The position of achievement *vis-à-vis* target of sterilisation is shown in ***Appendix 2.1.5***, which shows that percentage of annual coverage increased from 18 *per cent* in 2006-07 to 77 *per cent* in 2010-11. CMOH attributed (November 2011) such noticeable improvement to posting of trained surgeons in the District.

(e) Immunisation: Target and achievement in respect of full immunisation of children up to one year of age covering BCG, Measles, DPT and OPV[20] in respect of the district and the State are shown in ***Appendix 2.1.5.*** The overall shortfall varied between 13 *per cent* and 22 *per cent* during 2006-07 to 2010-11, which indicated similar performance as compared to the State as a whole. The shortfall in DT[21] for five to six years age group ranged from 26 to 52 *per cent* and that for the Tetanus Toxoid (TT) at the age of 10 ranged from 40 to 67 *per cent*.

2.1.5.1.6 National Programme for Control of Blindness (NPCB)

Achievement in respect of cataract operations in the district ranged from 48 to 60 *per cent.* The District is more dependent on NGOs and Private Practitioners for cataract operations

(a) Cataract operations: NPCB aimed to reduce prevalence of cases of blindness to 0.3 *per cent* by 2020 *inter alia* through increased cataract surgery, school eye screening, free distribution of spectacles and strengthening of infrastructure by way of supply of equipment and training of eye surgeons and nurses. Performance of the District in cataract operations is depicted in ***Appendix 2.1.6,*** which indicated achievement ranging from 48 to 60 *per cent* of the target set. The shortfall in achievement against target for cataract operation in Government sector was due to non-availability of eye surgeons in health centres. Against the norm of deployment of one eye surgeon in each CHC, eye surgeons were not posted in any of the three CHCs test checked.

(b) Refractive error: The programme envisaged training of teachers in Government and Government aided schools for screening students for refractive errors and free distribution of spectacles. As against 1169 such schools in the District, these activities were limited to only 315 schools

[20] *BCG: Bacillus Calmette-Guérin, DPT: Diphtheria-Pertussis-Tetanus and OPV: Oral Polio Vaccine,*
[21] *Diphtheria-Tetanus*

(27 *per cent*) during 2006-11. The facility for eye donation had not been created in any of the hospitals in the District.

2.1.5.1.7 Revised National Tuberculosis Control Programme (RNTCP)

Cure rate under RNTPC lagged at 49 *per cent* as compared to normative target of 85 *per cent*

The main objective of RNTCP was to diagnose as many cases as possible and to ensure cure rate of at least 85 *per cent* of smear positive cases through Direct Observed Treatment Short Course (DOTS). New sputum positive cases detected were 79 to 89 per lakh population during 2006-11 against the target of 75 per lakh. The achievement against the targets of sputum examination ranged from 68 to 87 *per cent*. The cure rate of 49 *per cent* in the District was way behind the target of 85 *per cent*.

2.1.5.1.8 National Vector Borne Disease Control Programme (NVBDCP)

NRHM stipulated achievement of Annual Blood Examination Rate (ABER)[22] of 10 *per cent* and API[23] of less than 0.5 per thousand by 2007-08. Though the level of API (0.19 to 0.22 per thousand during 2006 to 2010) was lower than the level fixed by NRHM, the same remains inconclusive, given the fact that actual ABER (ranging between 7.73 and 5.07 *per cent* during 2006 to 2010) was below the target of 10 *per cent*. The ABER for the State as a whole ranged between 5.4 and 6.3 *per cent* during 2006 to 2009, while the API for the same period ranged between 1.1 and 1.9.

2.1.5.1.9 Monitoring

In order to address the lack of oversight, being an important reasons for steady decline of NRHM activities in the State, the Department introduced (June 2007) a system of regular periodical supervision of Government health facilities through inspections of health centres (by officers at various levels) and submission of monthly reports to the H&FW Department. For this purpose, the CMOH was required to nominate officers of the district as Nodal Officer for regular supervisions of sub-centres, BPHCs, PHCs and Rural Hospitals of particular block. Further, physical checking of at least five *per cent* of all JSY beneficiaries in the district by the District Nodal Officer is mandatory. Scrutiny of the records of DHFWS and selected BHFWS showed that neither the CMOH did nominate any Nodal Officer, nor was any such monitoring done at the District level. Moreover, from records of the CMOH it was observed that the District authorities were unaware of the order on physical checking of JSY beneficiaries.

Recommendations

- ***The DHFWS should commission household and facility surveys to assess the requirement and identify the gaps in health care infrastructure in the district;***

[22] *ABER- percentage to the total population, covered every year by blood examination for surveillance against Malaria. It is calculated as (No of slides examined in a year / Total population) X 100.*

[23] *Annual Parasite Incidence -Positive malaria cases per thousand population*

- ***Initiatives should be taken for time-bound completion of construction of SCs and to equip all the health centres with facilities and manpower as per IPHS norms to achieve the objectives of the programme;***
- ***The monitoring mechanism stipulated by the Department should be implemented effectively.***

2.1.5.2 Elementary Education

Education is one of the most important indicators of social progress of a nation. Both the State and the Central Governments have been spending large amounts on increasing the enrolment and retention of children in schools, especially in the elementary segment. Focus is on inclusive progress, with special attention to girls, SC/ST communities, other vulnerable sections of society and remote and backward areas. The Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), one of the flagship programmes of the Government for universalisation of primary education, was subjected to audit scrutiny. The District Project Officer, Sarva Shiksha Mission (DPO) is responsible for implementation of the scheme. Records of the DPO as well as records of four Circle Resource Centres[24] (out of 17) and 18 schools (out of 351 schools in the test checked Circle Resource Centres) pertaining to the period 2006-2011 were scrutinized by Audit.

2.1.5.2.1 Fund management under SSA

Position of funds received and utilised by the District Project Office (SSA) during 2006-11 is given below:

Table 2.1.4: Funds received and utilised at district level during 2006-11 *(₹ in crore)*

Year	Approved outlay	Opening balance	Fund received	Interest and other source	Total available funds	Expenditure incurred *(per cent)*	Balance
2006-07	34.34	5.05	13.84	0.2	19.09	18.55 (97)	0.54
2007-08	49.12	0.54	48.79	0.56	49.89	27.97 (56)	21.92
2008-09	47.91	21.92	11.34	0.63	33.89	24.55 (72)	9.34
2009-10	56.76	9.34	37.33	1.01	47.68	28.59 (60)	19.09
2010-11	120.32	19.09	42	0.95	62.04	40.01 (64)	22.03
Total	**308.44**		**153.30**	**3.35**	**161.70**	**139.67 (86)**	

(Source: Data furnished by District Project Office)

Only 50 *per cent* of the total outlay was released by State authority during 2006-11 due to delayed preparation of Annual Work Plan and Budget (AWP&B) and failure of district authority to spend available funds in time.

2.1.5.2.2 Planning

Guidelines of SSA required the DPO to prepare Perspective Plan (with projections for 10 years) as well as AWP&B for the District. Although the AWP&Bs were prepared every year, the Perspective Plan was not prepared by the DPO. Further, to ensure reflection of the grassroots level reality, SSA envisaged participatory planning through household survey as well as consultative meetings and interaction with the community and target groups by formation of core teams at District, block and village levels. Such consultation at the grassroots level was not ensured by the DPO.

[24] *Balurghat Sadar, Balurghat West, Bansihari North (Harirampur) and Kumarganj North*

2.1.5.2.3 *Infrastructure*

There was improvement in the position in terms of availability of classrooms over last five years.

(a) School buildings and class rooms: During 2006-11, the number of elementary schools remained static at 1335 in the district. SSA norms stipulated that there should be two class rooms with verandah for each primary school. It was observed that there was improvement on this count, as numbers of schools with single class room came down from 260 in April 2006 to 34 in March 2011. Further, there were only 35 habitations (out of 4648) in the District which had no primary school /SSK[25] within one kilometer radius as per SSA stipulation, which also represented a positive picture.

Scrutiny of District Information System on Education (DISE) database showed that out of total 5813 class rooms in the elementary schools of the district, there were 818 class rooms which required minor and 591 class rooms which required major repairs respectively. Though 24 *per cent* of the classrooms were not in good condition (March 2011), budget provision was not made by the DPO for major and minor repairs in any of the AWP&B from 2006-07 to 2010-11 (excluding the year 2008-09, in which Budget provision was made for major repairs), nor did School authorities place demand for funds.

There were deficiencies in basic amenities like toilets, drinking water, electricity etc.

(b) Basic amenities: Scrutiny revealed that a large number of elementary schools did not have the basic minimum amenities, as detailed below:

Table2.1.5: Shortfall in basic amenities in elementary schools *(In numbers)*

	Number of schools (total number of elementary schools in the District being 1335)					
	Toilets	Drinking water	Electricity connection	Boundary wall	Playground	Kitchen for Mid-Day Meal
Available	979 (73)	1305 (98)	325 (24)	350 (26)	636 (48)	1144 (86)
Not available	356 (27)	30 (2)	1010 (76)	985 (74)	699 (52)	191 (14)

Source: DISE data of the district office
(Figures in the brackets represent percentage with respect to total number of schools)

(c) Civil Works: The targets set during 2006-2011 under major components of Civil Works of SSA (additional class rooms, new school building, girls toilet) as per annual work plans and the achievements there against up to March 2011 are shown in ***Appendix 2.1.7***, which indicated that construction of 583 ACRs (19 *per cent*) and 22 toilets (79 *per cent*), though targeted and funds were released, were not taken up as of August 2011.

Against the budget provision of ₹ 81.47 crore for execution of 3647 works, the district authority released (2006-2011) ₹ 66.02 crore for 3451 works (95 *per cent*). Of these, 2174 works (60 *per cent* of target as per AWP) were completed up to March 2011.

It was noticed that there were deviations from AWP, as funds of ₹ 3.89 crore meant for building Additional Class Rooms (ACR), were released (March and November 2008) and spent for construction of buildings for 70 new upper primary schools. These new schools were not provided funds for provision of basic amenities like kitchen shed, toilet and drinking water facilities.

Further, ₹ 1.41 crore released for construction of 71 ACRs in 70 primary and upper primary schools remained parked in bank accounts of the schools between 2006-07 and 2009-10. The most deprived Blocks were Gangarampur,

[25] *Sishu Siksha Kendra, a type of school under Panchayat & Rural Development Department.*

Balurghat and Tapan. Before release of funds, DPO did not verify the capacity of VECs to undertake construction, availability of land, requirement of class rooms as per norms of student class room ratio, etc. which led to parking of funds. Irregularities like use of constructed ACR for cultural activities and as office room, non-completion of ACRs, etc. were noticed in five out of 18 test checked schools[26] as indicated in ***Appendix 2.1.8***.



Funds spent, but class room incomplete - Bahadurpur F.P. School (Sl No. 2 of Appendix 2.1.8)



Class underway in courtyard (June 2011) -Funds for ACR were utilised for constructing staircase-Khidirpur FP School.(Sl No. 5 of Appendix 2.1.8)

(d) Computer Aided Learning Programme (CAL): Computer Aided Learning Programme (CAL) was introduced in 116 upper primary schools (including six test checked) in the District during 2006-2011 to make learning joyful. Though 644 computers worth ₹ 1.72 crore were purchased, the Programme could not be implemented due to non-imparting of requisite training to 98 *per cent* of the teachers (only 40 out of 2347 teachers were trained) as well as non-supply of requisite e-Teaching Learning Material (TLM).

Purpose of CAL remains unachieved even after spending ₹ 1.72 crore

DPO, SSA, Daskhin Dinajpur stated (July 2011) that training could not be conducted as there was no reputed agency to do so. However, there was no record to show that the DPO had taken any steps since 2007-08 for imparting CAL training to upper primary school teachers.

2.1.5.2.4 Availability of Teachers

As against the norm of two teachers per primary school and at least three teachers for every upper primary school, there were a number of primary schools which had only one teacher as can be seen from the table below.

Table 2.1.6 Primary schools not having minimum number of teachers

Year	Total number of primary schools	Number of primary schools with single teacher	Number of students in primary schools with single teacher (average number of students)
2007-08	1169	33	1941 (59)
2008-09	1169	45	2520 (56)
2009-10	1169	79	4819 (61)
2010-11	1169	48	2412 (50)

(Source: DPO, SSA, Dakshin Dinajpur)

Extreme disparity in PTR in four test checked circles

Average Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR) of primary and upper primary schools was 39:1 and 56:1 respectively against the norm of 40:1. Though the average PTR

[26] *In the selected four Cirlcles—Kumarganj North, Banshihari North (at Harirampur), Balurghat West and Balurghat Sadar in three Blocks (Kumarganj, Harirampur and Balurghat), 18 schools were test checked comprising 12 primary schools and 6 upper primary schools.*

of primary schools indicated availability of adequate number of teachers, there were 48 schools with single teacher against the norms of minimum two. This indicated that there was scope of deploying teachers as per SSA norms. This was further confirmed by the extreme disparities in PTR ranging from 116:1 to 13:1 found while analyzing the PTR of 432 schools in four test checked circles. On the other hand, although all 166 upper primary schools had more than three teachers as of March 2011, the adverse PTR indicates shortage of teachers. Shortage of teachers may potentially affect the quality of education.

Training of Teachers: Orientation course required to be conducted for 20 days for newly appointed teachers was not conducted during 2006-2011 except in 2008-09. Against the target of in-service training of all teachers for 20 days in two phases, only one phase varying from five to 10 days was conducted. Out of approved outlay of ₹ 3.45 crore for training, only ₹ 34.54 lakh (10 *per cent*) was spent during 2006-11, indicating inadequate attention towards capacity building of teachers. DPO stated (July 2011) that training could not be conducted owing to late receipt of training modules and lack of co-ordination between DPO and District Primary School Council (responsible for the administrative control of primary school teachers).

2.1.5.2.5 Coverage of focus groups

Non-implementation of schemes: SSA has various components and interventions like National Programme for Education of Girls at Elementary Level (NPEGEL), Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya (KGBV), Inclusive Education for Disabled (IED), Innovative activity for the benefit of SC/ST children, etc. Audit scrutiny revealed that NPEGEL and KGBV were not implemented in the District despite having five and two eligible blocks[27] respectively. Innovative programme for education of SC/ST children was also not implemented despite having outlay of ₹ 60 lakh during 2006-11. The performance of IED programme which aimed at mainstreaming children with special needs (CWSN), was unsatisfactory as 58 *per cent* (3068) of the identified CWSN (5293) remained out of school as of March 2011 though ₹ 1.95 crore was spent for this purpose.

Due to delays of one to nine months in distributing text books, full benefit of the scheme did not accrue

Free Text Book Grant: During 2006-07, the approved Budget outlay for Free Text-Book Grant for girls/SC/ST students studying in classes VI to VIII of Government/Aided schools was ₹ 1.10 crore. Out of this ₹ 16.50 lakh was released (September 2006) to 165 upper primary schools for developing Book Banks, deviating from the original purpose. The remaining fund of ₹ 94.13 lakh was parked in bank account of DPO since 2006-07 instead of refunding the same to the State Project Office of SSA. During 2008-11, DPO released funds one to nine months after the commencement of the academic session. Consequent delay in the distribution of books by the concerned schools meant that the beneficiaries were deprived of the intended benefit for a good part of the academic year. In all six test checked upper primary schools, students received book grants four to 10 months after the commencement of academic year. Free text books for Class I to V were provided by the State Government.

[27] *Educationally Backward Blocks (EBB) with rural female literacy less than the national average (46 per cent) or five per cent SC/ST population and SC/ST female literacy rate is below 10 per cent in case of NPEGEL (Haririampur, Hili, Kumarganj, Kushmandi and Tapan) and EBBs with rural female literacy less than the national average in case of KGBV (Haririampur, and Kushmandi).*

2.1.5.2.6 *Enrolment*

Enrolment of children in the targeted age group of 6-14 years in primary and upper primary schools decreased by 18 *per cent* during 2006-11, as can be seen from the table below:

Table 2.1.7: Table showing enrolment in Primary and Upper Primary schools

Year	Total number of schools			Total enrolment of children		
	Primary	Upper Primary	Total	Primary	Upper Primary	Total
2006-07	1169	166	1335	156036	118402	274438
2010-11	1169	166	1335	114188	111851	226039
Percentage decrease				27	6	18

(Source: Data provided by DPO, SSA, Dakshin Dinajpur)

DPO stated (May 2011) that a special study would be undertaken on the issue by Research and Study Cell of the District SSA.

Sixty one *per cent* out of school children identified could not be enrolled during 2007-11

Bhartikaran Karmasuchi (enrolment drive) was undertaken every year for identifying out of school children and enrolling them in schools. Out of 56756 children identified, 34764 (61 *per cent*) could not be enrolled during 2006-11. Unsatisfactory implementation of various interventions for increasing enrolment and retention in schools could be responsible for decline in enrolment and large number of out of school children.

2.1.5.2.7 *Drop out, Repetition and Promotion of Students*

Cohort study[28] conducted every alternate year by the District SSA to identify dropouts and repeaters studying in primary and upper primary levels threw up the following results:

Promotion rate, though increased, was not satisfactory. The increase in promotion rate at upper primary level was significant.

Table 2.1.8: Cohort Study results- Primary Schools

Cohort Study year	Total students in Class I (year)	Dropout students (*per cent*)	Repeater student (*per cent*)	Migration (*per cent*)	Promoted from Class IV (*per cent*)
2006-07	27903 (2002-03)	6217 (22)	11046 (40)	874 (3)	9766 (35)
2008-09	31288 (2004-05)	3131(10)	12992 (42)	2627 (8)	12682 (40)

(Source: Data furnished by DPO, SSA, Dakshin Dinajpur)

Table 2.1.9: Cohort study results-Upper Primary Schools

Cohort Study year	Total students in Class V (year)	Dropout students (*per cent*)	Repeater students (*per cent*)	Migration (*per cent*)	Promoted from Class VIII (*per cent*)
2007-08	19743 (2003-04)	5763 (29)	6984 (35)	1030 (5)	5966 (30)
2009-10	30297 (2005-06)	3530 (12)	7529 (25)	1068 (3)	18170 (60)

(Source: Data furnished by DPO, SSA, Dakshin Dinajpur)

Decrease of dropout rate in primary and upper primary schools indicated positive impact of SSA. Though promotion rate of class IV registered an increase from 2006-07 (35 *per cent*) to 2008-09 (40 *per cent*), it was not satisfactory. The increase in promotion rate at upper primary level was significant. However, considerable number of repeaters and low pass


[28] *This is a scientific way to find out the transition patterns between the grades and the percentage of students completing the primary/upper primary education within the desired time.*

percentage indicated that the quality of education was not up to the desired standard.

Significant percentage of drop-outs and repeaters were attributable to teaching without TLM, non-implementation of interventions for SC/ST and backward students, insufficient class rooms, deployment of teachers in deviation from the SSA norms, lax monitoring by VEC and delayed issue of text books.

***Performance Indicators*:** Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) and Net Enrolment Ratio (NER)[29] have been indicated as performance indicators for the Scheme. GER and NER of the district during 2007-11 are depicted in the chart.

Chart indicating GER and NER for primary and upper primary schools



It is evident from the chart that there has been substantial fall both in GER (from 108 *per cent* in 2007-08 to 89 *per cent* in 2010-11) and NER (93 to 72 *per cent*) in Upper Primary section, while in Primary section, though GER decreased from 81 to 75 *per cent*, NER remained static. The comparison suggested that implementation of SSA in Dakshin Dinajpur did not have the desired impact in improving enrolment position over the last four years.

2.1.5.2.8 Monitoring

Village Education Committee (VEC) is entrusted with the primary level task of ensuring effective functioning of schools with community participation. No records in support of any such monitoring were available in any of the 18 VECs test checked. Periodic monitoring teams were not sent to the schools to assess the position of the class-rooms, sanitation, attendance of teachers and students and the overall performance of the school in imparting quality elementary education. No records were maintained by the district office relating to any visit (2006-11) by State Level Committee or National Level Committee to supervise and monitor the implementation of SSA in the district.

Recommendations

- ***Civil works should be geared up to provide the minimum infrastructural facilities to all the schools in a time-bound manner;***
- ***Posting of teachers needs to be rationalised to remove extreme disparities in PTR.***

2.1.5.3 Nutrition: Integrated Child Development Services

The District has a child population (0-6 years) of 246034 as per 2001 Census. Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) aims to improve the nutritional and health status of children in the age-group 6 months-6 years through services such as supplementary nutrition, immunisation, health

[29] *GER=(Total enrollment/Total targeted child population)x100; NER==(Enrollment of children belonging to targeted population/Total targeted child population)x100*

check-up, referral services, pre-school non-formal education and nutrition and health education through Anganwadi (AW) Centres. Out of these services, Supplementary Nutrition Programme (SNP) was subjected to audit scrutiny through test check of records (2006-2011) in offices of the District Project Officer (DPO), Child Development Project Officers (CDPO) of three Projects[30] in three selected Blocks *viz* Balurghat, Harirampur and Kumarganj and 12 AW centres under these projects.

2.1.5.3.1 Infrastructure

There were 3212 operational AW centres against 3279 sanctioned in the District as of March 2011. As is evident from the following table, infrastructural facilities available in the operational AW centres were largely inadequate.

Table 2.1.10: Infrastructural facilities in AW centres

Total No. of AW centres in the district	Infrastructural facilities (No. of AW centres)					
	Having own building	Accommodated in rented single room building	Running in other places	Running in open air	Drinking water provided	Toilet facilities available
3212	832 (26)	2280 (71)	80 (2)	20 (1)	1191 (37)	1044 (33)

Source: records/MPRs made available by the local office
Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage.

Infrastructural facilities available in operational AW centres were largely inadequate

During 2008-10, the Women, Child Development and Social Welfare Department released ₹ 13.73 crore in two tranches for construction of 334 AW centres with DFID[31] assistance, the last of which was to be completed by March 2010. It was noticed that 280 AW centres (84 *per cent*) had been completed, 29 AW centres were under construction, while construction of 25 had not been started as of June 2011. Due to negligence on the part of the Gangarampur Panchayat Samiti (PS), ₹ 1.03 crore allotted[32] in September 2008 was not drawn by the PS in time.

Audit observed that funds of ₹ 4.11 crore meant for construction of 100 AW centres remained parked with State Nutrition Strategy and Monitoring Unit, while ₹ 2.40 lakh continued to be expended annually on rent. Besides, the beneficiaries were deprived of more conducive room/place for availing the services of ICDS.

2.1.5.3.2 Manpower

As of March 2011, from Child Development Project Officers (CDPO) down to the level of AW Helpers, 6218 persons were in position in various cadres against 6721 sanctioned indicating shortage of seven *per cent*. Shortage of AW Workers and AW Helpers who are entrusted with the delivery of services in AW centres were 166 (five *per cent*) and 169 (five *per cent*) against the sanctioned strength of 3212. Out of nine projects in the District, Project Officers were available in four[33]. The District Project Officer (DPO) stated (July 2011) that the district authority was facing a lot of problems due to

[30] *Balurghat (Rural), Harirampur and Kumarganj ICDS Projects.*
[31] *Department for International Development, Government of United Kingdom.*
[32] *The amount had to be further sanctioned in September 2010.*
[33] *CDPOs were available in Gangarampur, Harirampur, Kumarganj and Tapan ICDS Projects CDPOs were not available in Balurghat (Rural), Balurghat (Urban), Banshihari, Hili and Kushmandi ICDS Projects.*

shortage of staff. However, nothing was on record to show that any initiative had been taken by him for pursuing the matter with the Directorate/Department to address the problem. He, however, added that the matter would be taken up with the higher authority.

2.1.5.3.3 Supplementary Nutrition Programme

Supplementary Nutrition Programme (SNP) is provided to children of six months to six years of age and pregnant and lactating women. As per norms, Government must ensure 300 days of feeding in every AW centre. Scrutiny revealed the following:

There was 16 to 44 *per cent* shortfall in provision of SNP to pregnant women and lactating mothers and 21 to 64 *per cent* to children;

- All targeted beneficiaries were not brought under the Programme. Out of 8.06 lakh eligible children, 4.84 lakh children were provided supplementary nutrition, shortfall being 3.22 lakh (40 *per cent*) during 2006-11. As regards pregnant and lactating women, supplementary nutrition was provided to 77 *per cent* eligible women leaving out 31632 during 2006-11. DPO attributed (July 2011) the shortfall to shortage of AW Workers/Helpers. AW Supervisors stated that factors like reluctance of women and children from economically better families to visit the AW centres contributed to shortfall in covering eligible population.

Beneficiaries were not provided with food of prescribed nutritional value due to increasing market price

- Audit observed that during 2007-11, on an average 248 AW centres failed to provide food as per norm of 25 days in a month. Out of this, 150 centres provided food for 15-20 days, 68 for 1-14 days while 30 had zero feeding days. The DPO stated (July 2011) that due to negligence of food supplier, the number of feeding days required per year was not achieved. The reply may, however, be viewed with the fact that while there was short supply of food material during 2009-11 in two test checked CDPOs ranging from 11 to 35 *per cent* of the requirement (***Appendix 2.1.9***), foodgrains worth ₹ 25.90 lakh were consumed (2009-11) in excess in CDPO, Balurghat (R). This indicated lapses in assessment of requirement.

- Against the norm of 500, 600 and 800 K. Calories per day per beneficiary respectively for children (six months to six years), pregnant and lactating mother and severely malnourished children, the actual provision was in the range of 314-384, 426-498 and 417-456 K. Calories respectively. This was attributable to price hike of food materials and consequent reduction in quantum of foodgrains every quarter to keep the cost per beneficiary within the limit as fixed by the Government of India. Cost per beneficiary was last revised by GoI in February 2009 and the Department had to reduce the quantum of foodgrains eight times till March 2011 in view of the price rise of food materials.

2.1.5.3.4 Monitoring and supervision

Shortfall in inspection of AW centres by CDPOs and Supervisors

Prior to October 2010, CDPOs were to undertake field visits for at least 18 days in a month. With effect from October 2010, CDPOs had to visit all AW centres once annually, while supervisors were required to visit AW centres under their jurisdiction six times a year. As against this, during 2006-11, CDPOs visited five to nine *per cent* of the AW centres annually. In three test checked projects, against the normative requirement of 14430 inspections by Supervisors during 2008-11, only 9947 (69 *per cent*) were conducted. It was

observed that during 2006-2007 to 2010-11, annually 13 to 56 *per cent*[34] of AW centres were not at all visited by Supervisors during 2006-11. Thus, lack of oversight over the scheme was evident. The DPO stated (July 2011) that necessary steps would be taken to improve supervision and monitoring by higher authorities.

Recommendations

- ***Immediate steps should be taken for improvement of infrastructural facilities of AW centres.***
- ***Provision of adequate food material should be ensured to provide stipulated nutrition to the beneficiaries for 300 days in a year.***
- ***Monitoring mechanism needs to be strengthened.***

2.1.5.4 Water Supply

Provision of adequate and safe drinking water to all the citizens, especially those living in the rural areas, has been a priority area for the Government. In this backdrop, implementation of the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP), a Centrally sponsored programme, in the District of Dakshin Dinajpur was reviewed through test check of records (2006-07 to 2010-11) of Balurghat Division, Public Health Engineering Department (PHED). From 2010-11, ARWSP has been modified as National Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP). During the period 2006-11, ₹ 33.52 crore was provided to the District for the Programme, against which ₹ 25.22 crore (75 *per cent*) was spent. The audit findings revealed that the ARWSP failed to create the desired impact owing to various shortcomings in planning, execution and monitoring of the schemes as discussed in the following paragraphs:

2.1.5.4.1 Status of drinking water supply in the District

Drinking water supply of the District managed by the PHED depends mainly upon 15311 spot sources and 40[35] ground based (including one surface based) Piped Water Supply Schemes (PWSS). As per the Status report (March 2010) of PHED, 3.50 lakh people (23 *per cent* of the total population of the District) was covered under PWSS. In the test checked Blocks of Balurghat, Harirampur and Kumarganj, coverage was 26, 10 and 11 *per cent* respectively.

Balurghat Division, PHED did not maintain the basic data of year wise coverage of habitations during the last five years. Though Habitations survey[36] was conducted in 2003-04, no data was available in the Divisional Office. The habitation data prior to habitation survey and those furnished by the EE are as under:

---

[34] *Number of AW centres not visited: 2006-07: 166 (13 per cent) out of 1285; 2007-08: 906 (34 per cent) out of 2630; 2008-09: 1341 (51 per cent) out of 2630; 2009-10: 1707 (56 per cent) out of 3071; and 2010-11: 1671 (52 per cent) out of 3212.*

[35] *ARWSP: 24 and MNP:16*

[36] *Habitation Survey was conducted to assess status of rural drinking water supply coverage in the villages.*

Table 2.1.11: Habitation data

	Fully covered (FC)	Partially covered (PC)	Not covered (NC)	Total
Data prior to- Habitation Survey (December 2003)	5242	52	207	5501
Date furnished by EE (March 2011)	4607	135	28	4770

Further, Executive Engineer (EE) stated that against the target of covering 229 NC habitations in the last five years, 56 habitations were partially covered and 134 habitations were fully covered. This is contradictory because even after coverage of 190 habitations, 39[37] habitations remained uncovered as of March 2011, while only 28 NC habitations existed as per information furnished by the EE. This implied that the data for coverage of habitations was not accurately maintained.

2.1.5.4.2 Inadequacy of planning

Though ARWSP guidelines required preparation of Annual Action Plans (AAPs), Balurghat PHED did not prepare AAP during the year 2006-07 to 2010-11. The EE replied that the AAP was prepared at State level. As no plan was prepared at the district level, priority for completion of the incomplete works, actual assessment of NC/PC habitations as well as their target for coverage etc. were not meaningfully considered in the AAP.

2.1.5.4.3 Financial management

Scrutiny revealed that out of Central and State allocation of ₹ 25.36 crore and ₹ 8.16 crore respectively, ₹ 17.55 crore and ₹ 7.66 crore were utilised resulting in aggregate savings of ₹ 8.31 crore (25 *per cent*) during 2006-11. In 2010-11 alone, against the Central allocation of ₹ 11.54 crore on NRDWP, the Division could utilize only ₹ 4.46 crore, leaving a balance of ₹ 7.08 crore (61 *per cent*) as of March 2011.

2.1.5.4.4 Implementation

The shortcomings noticed in the implementation of the programme are discussed below:

(i) Under ARWSP, out of total 24 PWSS taken up during 2006-07 to 2010-11 for covering 1.93 lakh population, 18 schemes were completed and six schemes were at various stages of completion. Two[38] schemes due for completion in December 2010, were yet to be completed as of July 2011, while two other schemes intended to benefit 5642 people had not been taken up due to land dispute (Baidyanathpara scheme) and insufficiency of water source (Ellahabad Scheme) to cater to the needs of the targeted population. Remaining two schemes were ongoing as of July 2011.

(ii) Out of total eight blocks in the district, ground water of five blocks[39] is contaminated with excess fluoride beyond permissible limit of 1.5 mg/litre. As ground water is more susceptible to fluoride contamination, it was felt necessary to tap alternative surface water source. In this backdrop, Fluoride Mitigation Programme was undertaken in two blocks (Gangarampur and Banshihari). Scrutiny revealed that the programme was not taken up in a

[37] *229 targeted **minus** 190 covered either fully or partially*
[38] *Chak Ramprasad W/S Scheme and Alipur W/S Scheme*
[39] *Banshihari, Gangarampur, Kumarganj, Kushmandi and Tapan*

Even after five years of introduction of the work, safe drinking water could not be supplied to 8.83 lakh people of fluoride affected areas due to delay in trial boring and investigation

comprehensive manner professing detailed work programme as only survey and investigation had been done till date. In May 2006, CE decided to conduct trial boring in three river beds of Punarbhava, Tangon and Baliakhari to assess the quality and sustainability of water, the work was completed in August 2009 at a cost of ₹ 7.47 lakh. Thereafter, PHED conducted (July 2011) geo-hydrological investigation to ascertain estimated discharge of sub-surface flow and its sustainability at a cost of ₹ 9.95 lakh. Thus, due to delay in trial boring and hydrological investigation, no fruitful action for providing safe drinking water to 8.83 lakh people residing in fluoride affected areas was taken even after lapse of five years since launching of the programme.

Even after two years of taking up the work under Jalmoni programme, safe drinking water could not be supplied to the school children in quality affected areas

(iii) With a view to providing safe drinking water to the school children in quality affected areas[40], GoI decided to install stand alone water purification system under Jalmoni programme. The PHED accorded (November 2009) administrative approval of ₹ 12.50 crore and allocated an amount of ₹ 6.03 crore for implementation of the programme in the State. Scrutiny revealed that out of ₹ 17 lakh received by Balurghat Division during 2009-10 for this purpose, ₹ 10.97 lakh had been spent in March 2010 on procurement of PVC-ASTM[41] pipes of various diameters, which had no relevance with the programme. Thus, not a single filter had been installed in the District as of March 2011. Thus, school children in the fluoride[42] affected areas of five[43] blocks were deprived from safe drinking water. On this being pointed out, the EE admitted the fact and stated that the matter was communicated to the higher authorities in April 2011.

(iv) As per ARWSP guidelines, 15 *per cent* of ARWSP funds are earmarked for operation and maintenance of the created assets like spot sources, PWSS, etc. Out of ₹ 33.52 crore received by this District on the programme, ₹ 5.03 crore was earmarked for operation and maintenance. Scrutiny of records revealed that due to various reasons, such as, shortage of spare parts, lowering of water tables etc., 5220 tube wells (25 *per cent*) out of total 20531 tube wells were lying defunct as of March 2011.

Though responsibility for maintenance of tube wells lies with the Dakshin Dinajpur Zilla Parishad (DDZP), technical support and funds required for the maintenance were provided by PHED. Despite financial and technical support being provided by PHED, a large number of tube wells remained defunct.

While admitting the facts, EE pointed out (July 2011) that the ZP was authorised to carry out all necessary maintenance. Regarding recharging of groundwater and water conservation, he stated that the PHED had no role to play. Reply was not convincing since both the implementing agencies (PHED and DDZP) were required to work in close co-ordination for proper maintenance of tube wells in the District. Moreover, the ARWSP guidelines emphasize on regular maintenance of created assets and taking up of water conservation measure on sustainable basis.

---

[40] *Areas affected with the water quality problem viz. suffering with chemical or bacteriological contamination in the source of water.*

[41] *Poly Venyl Chloride-American Society for Testing and Material*

[42] *Ingestion of fluoride contaminated drinking water may lead to diseases like dental fluorosis, skeletal fluorosis and non-skeletal fluorosis besides inducing aging to human beings*

[43] *Banshihari, Gangarampur, Kumarganj Kushmandi and Tapan blocks*

Thus, defunct tube wells could not be made functional and availability of water supply could not be ensured to the targeted beneficiaries.

2.1.5.4.5 Monitoring of water quality

In violation of CE's order, Bacteriological test of the existing 40 PWSSs was not conducted at all since July 2009. During 2006-11, chemical test on PWSS was less than six *per cent* of normative requirement.

Periodic testing and monitoring of water quality is essential for providing safe drinking water to the population on a sustained basis. As per Chief Engineer's (CE) instruction (May 2006), water samples collected from existing PWS schemes were to be tested for bacteriological and chemical parameters once in a month to ensure the safe quality of water supplied to the people. Although the EE stated (July 2011) that the bacteriological and chemical test of PWSS were conducted regularly, audit scrutiny of records of one water testing laboratory (Divisional Laboratory[44]) out of three in the District revealed that the instruction of the CE were not adhered to as indicated below:

- Bacteriological test of the existing 40 PWSSs (including 24 ARWSP schemes) was not conducted at all during July 2009 to July 2011.
- Against the target of conducting 480 chemical tests (40 PWSSs X 12 months), only eight water samples were tested in 2010-11. In last five years (2006-11) the test conducted on PWSS ranged from less than one *per cent* to six *per cent*, due to lack of monitoring and supervision by the EE.

Further, though water samples of 14 out of 40 PWSS collected during May 2009 to November 2010 were found to be contaminated with iron and fluoride affecting 1.67 lakh populations, records regarding any action taken to mitigate the contamination were not available.

2.1.5.4.6 Monitoring and Supervision

It was seen that against the requirement of 60 monthly progress reports (MPRs) to be sent to the Circle office during 2006-11, Divisional office sent only six[45] MPRs. Records regarding monitoring and supervision of ARWSP schemes by the Superintending Engineer during last five years were not available at the circle or at divisional level. In absence of these records, necessary checks and supervision exercised by the supervisory officers could not be verified in audit. As a result, proper supervision on the implementation of the programme could not be exercised which affected the timely completion of the schemes.

Recommendations

- ***Annual Action Plan should be prepared in accordance with the guidelines indicating the prioritisation of incomplete works particularly NC habitations.***
- ***Monitoring the schemes and testing the water quality at prescribed interval should be enforced.***

2.1.5.5 Housing

Two schemes for providing shelter to the poor *viz.* Indira Awas Yojana and Integrated Housing and Slum Development Programme were reviewed in

[44] *Divisional Laboratory was responsible for testing of water quality of PWSSs in the district.*
[45] *MPR of December 2008, January 2009, March 2009, July 2009, August 2009 and March 2010.*

audit through test check of records (2006-07 to 2010-11) of DRDC, Zilla Parishad, three sampled PSs (Balurghat, Harirampur and Kumarganj) and seven sampled GPs[46].

2.1.5.5.1 Indira Awas Yojana

Indira Awas Yojana (IAY) is a flagship scheme to provide houses to the rural poor people and is being implemented through ZPs. The objectives of the scheme are:

(i) Primarily to help construction/upgradation of dwelling units of members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, free bonded labourers and other below poverty line non SC/ST rural households by providing them a lump-sum financial assistance; and

(ii) Utilisation of 60 *per cent* of total allocation for SC/ST BPL households.

During 2006-07 to 2009-11, the ZP, Dakshin Dinajpur spent ₹ 91.20 crore (99 *per cent*) out of total available funds of ₹ 91.36 crore. Annual expenditure under the scheme increased steadily from ₹ 8.15 crore in 2006-07 to ₹ 28.83 crore in 2009-10, but came down to ₹ 24.25 crore in 2010-11.

Scrutiny revealed that percentage of utilisation in the sample GPs was ranging between 17 and 96 *per cent* during 2006-11. Sample PSs, as executive agency since July 2009, utilised 29 and 31 *per cent* of total fund available during 2009-10 and 2010-11 respectively.

Implementation of the schemes

During 2006-11, against the target of construction of 26805 houses and upgradation of 3110 houses, actually 83 *per cent* (22348) houses were constructed and 77 *per cent* (2476) houses were upgraded in the District ***(vide Appendix 2.1.10)*** as per reports of the ZP.

Audit scrutiny revealed the following:

(a) The guidelines stipulated that the opening balance of the district should not exceed 10 *per cent* of the funds available during the previous year. In case, the opening balance exceeded the permissible limit, the Central share of the excess amount would be deducted proportionately at the time of release of the second instalment. It was seen that the ZP failed to adhere the said condition and GoI has deducted ₹ 1.33 crore from the second instalment of the Central share due to the ZP during 2009-10.

(b) The P&RDD directed (June 2008) that the beneficiaries should be selected first from the list of persons who are homeless or dependent on others for accommodation (P2=1) and then from the list of persons having one room mud-built house (P2=2) based on the Rural Household Survey (RHS). Deviating from this directive, five[47] out of seven sample GPs provided IAY assistance to 383 beneficiaries under P2=2 list though a good number of P2=1 beneficiaries existed in those GPs. Thus, those GPs deprived an equal number of beneficiaries identified as P2=1 under RHS.

[46] *Bhatpara, Chakvrigu, Gopalbati, Jakirpur, Nazirpur, Pundari and Safanagar.*
[47] *Bhatpara, Jakirpur, Nazirpur, Pundari and Safanagar.*

(c) Two (Harirampur and Kumarganj) out of three sampled PSs utilised scheme funds of ₹ 5.26 lakh towards payment of telephone bills, hire charges of vehicle and fuel cost etc.

(d) In Chakvrigu and Pundari GPs (out of seven sample GPs), 68 beneficiaries did not construct houses after receiving the IAY assistance.

Recommendations

- ***Strict financial control and monitoring to be enforced to prevent misuse of funds and deprivation of central funds.***
- ***The district authorities may analyse reasons for disproportionate financial and physical progress.***

2.1.5.6 Sanitation

2.1.5.6.1 Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC)

TSC envisaged improvement in the general quality of life in the rural areas and accelerate sanitation coverage in rural areas to provide toilets to households by 2012, covering schools by March 2008 and Anganwadi Centres by March 2009.



Unhygenic toilet at Nadipar High School under Chakvrigu GP

Since inception of the project (April 1999), Dakshin Dinajpur District incurred an expenditure of ₹ 12.81 crore out of total available funds of ₹ 16.85 crore (GoI: ₹ 9.87 crore, State: ₹ 3.92 crore, Panchayats' contribution: ₹ 1 crore and beneficiary contribution: ₹ 2.06 crore) leaving unutilised balance of ₹ 4.04 crore (March 2011).

(a) Target and achievement

Achievement in Sanitary Complex, School Toilet and *Anganwadi* toilet was very low even though target dates for full coverage had long elapsed. Even in case of Individual Household Latrine (IHHL) for BPL, the District was far from achieving target of full coverage by 2012.

Table 2.1.12: Target and achievement (1999-2011)

Component	Targets	Achievement	Percentage of achievement
IHHL for BPL	182621	151400	83
IHHL for APL	194577	31711	16
Sanitary complex	50	7	14
School toilets	3712	1633	44
Anganwadi	2642	165	6
Total	**383602**	**184916**	**48**

(Source: Records of ZP, Dakshin Dinajpur)

Expenditure on Information, Education and Communication (IEC), a very important component of the prorgramme was a mere 3.3 *per cent* (₹ 0.42 crore) against the stipulated 15 *per cent* on the project outlay. However, the ZP failed to furnish any reason for poor performance.

Thus, the programme failed to achieve the objective of providing toilets to all schools and anganwadis by March 2008 and 2009 respectively. Further, it seemed unlikely that the district would be able provide toilets to all by 2012.

Recommendations

- ***Implementation of the programme needs to be geared up for achievement of targets.***
- ***IEC activities should be strengthened.***

2.1.6 Economic Services

2.1.6.1 Infrastructure

Good infrastructure will go a long way in enhancing the growth potential of the District and bridging the gap between urban and rural areas. Infrastructure includes provision of good all weather roads, adequate electricity for households, industrial and irrigation needs, railway and air links and reliable communication facilities.

The District does not have any airlink. The District is connected by rail through eight railway stations. A review of the development of roads in the district through implementation of PMGSY revealed that only 48 *per cent* habitations had been provided road connectivity as of March 2011, as against the target of connecting all rural habitations by 2007. The deficiencies noticed in audit are discussed below:

2.1.6.1.1 Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY)

Though length of road increased by 73 *per cent* and number of connected habitations by 64 *per cent*, 52 *per cent* of habitations are yet to be linked by road

The PMGSY was launched in December 2000, which aimed at connecting all rural habitations by providing all weather roads. West Bengal State Rural Development Agency (WBSRDA) implements the PMGSY through its Programme Implementation Unit (PIU) at the district level. During 2006-11, funds provided for the Programme was ₹ 161.08 crore in the District, of which ₹ 153.76 crore (96 *per cent*) was spent during this period.

Out of 1663 habitations in the District, 801 (48 *per cent*) had been provided road connectivity as of March 2011. Number of habitations connected through roads increased by 64 *per cent* since 2001 and road length increased from 632 kms in April 2001 to 1092 kms in March 2011 registering an increase of 73 *per cent*[48]. As of March 2011, 52 *per cent* of habitations were yet to be linked by roads. The status of connectivity as of March 2011 is shown in **Table 2.1.13.**

Table 2.1.13: Status of habitations connectivity as of March 2011

Habitation size in terms of population	Total numbers of habitations	Habitations as on 31.3.2011		Percentage of shortfall in connectivity
		Connected	To be connected	
More than 1000	428	283	145	34
More than 500	508	255	253	50
More than 250	727	263	464	64
TOTAL	**1663**	**801**	**862**	**52**

(Source: Figures provided by PIU)

[48] *Year-wise figures for 2006-11 were not furnished to audit.*

(a) Status of works

PMGSY guidelines stipulate that works should be completed within a period of twelve months from the date of the work order. During 2006-11, out of total 122 works sanctioned, 115 were awarded by the PIU. Of these awarded works, due dates for completion of 21 works were not yet over. Of the remaining 94 works, 84 (89 *per cent*) were completed. Of the completed works, 33 were completed within the stipulated date of completion. Forty works were completed with delays ranging between 111 days and 894 days. Ten works remained incomplete though 11 to 28 months had passed from due date of completion. The major cases of delays in completion of roads (complete and ongoing) works are shown in ***Appendix 2.1.11.***

The reasons attributed by the PIU for delays in completion of road works were land problem and lapses on the part of contractors. It was noticed in audit that the PIU had poor control and monitoring over the contractors in execution of the road works as would be evident from the following instances.

(b) Financial irregularities in execution of works

Audit scrutiny revealed non-recovery of royalty leading to loss of revenue of ₹ 1.44 crore and rate differences in Detailed Project Report (DPR) *vis-à-vis* WBSRDA[49] schedule of rates (SOR), deviations from instructions, etc. resulting in excess/unauthorised payments amounting to ₹ 6.65 crore to contractors, as detailed below:

Excess quantity of different items of works worth ₹ 6.65 crore as compared to DPR was approved without obtaining reasons for such deviations

- As per West Bengal Minor Minerals Rules, 2002, the State Government is to be paid royalty charges at the rate of ₹ 17 per cu. m. for use of earth and the same is to be recovered from Running Account bill of contractors. State exchequer lost revenue of ₹ 1.44 crore on use of 847670.78 cu. m of earth as royalty was not deducted by the PIU from contractors' bills pertaining to 2006-07. However, from 2007-08 onwards the PIU deducted royalty from contractors' bills.
- Avoidable extra expenditure of ₹ 71.18 lakh was incurred on construction (July 2007 to April 2010) of 11 roads by allowing higher compaction rates (between ₹ 384.75/cu.m and ₹ 451.67/cu.m) in DPR than the rate as per WBSRDA Schedule of Rates (₹ 113.56/Cu.m) as shown in ***Appendix 2.1.12***. The higher rates were proposed by the Executive Engineer of PIU and approved by the Chief Engineer of WBSRDA.
- In two road works under package WB-18/33, DPR included higher rate for stone dust at ₹ 2880.80 per cu. m. as compared to ₹ 2188.80[50] admissible under WBSRDA schedule. This resulted in excess expenditure of ₹ 12.90 lakh[51].
- Road construction under PMGSY is undertaken after NRRDA[52] approves the DPR prepared on the basis of survey, feasibility study, etc. Approved DPR indicates the drawing of alignment, cross section of road, proposed height, width and length, source of earth, etc. While increase in

[49] *West Bengal State Rural Development Agency is the Nodal Agency in West Bengal for PMGSY.*
[50] *Cost of compaction of 1 cu. m stone dust includes material cost including materials (₹2130.70) and compaction cost (₹58.10).*
[51] *2340.94 cu. m x (₹2880.80-₹2188.80)*
[52] *National Rural Road Development Agency, the national level agency for PMGSY.*

any item of work to the extent of 10 *per cent* of the quantity indicated in DPR is permitted during execution, excess beyond 10 *per cent* requires a revised estimate indicating specific reasons for the excess. Scrutiny revealed that out of 66 road works completed during 2006-11, 60 (91 *per cent*) required excess earth ranging from 12 to 977 *per cent* over the quantities indicated in DPR. This resulted in excess earth work involving unauthorised expenditure of ₹ 4.94 crore[53]. Contrary to the norms, the excess earth work was approved by the Chief Engineer (WBSRDA) / Superintending Engineer (WBSRDA) without obtaining any reason.

- During scrutiny of DPR for the year 2006-07, NRRDA instructed that Granular Sub Base (GSB) layer should be done with the appropriate blending of suitable material available within normal rates. Bats may be made by breaking bricks and allowing carriage of bricks, if necessary. Audit observed that out of 36 works executed in 2006-07, brick bats worth ₹ 586.49 per cu. m were used in GSB layer in case of 31 works, while stone metal costing between ₹ 1200 to ₹ 1550 per cu. m. was used in the remaining five. Usage of stone metal in five works involving 11373.06 cu. m. resulted in excess expenditure of ₹ 90.99 lakh.

The Executive Engineer, PIU stated (July 2011) that PIU had no role in fixing the rates of items of work as the Chief Engineer (WBSRDA)/Superintending Engineer (WBSRDA) was the competent authority in this respect. The reply was not tenable as he was liable to exercise 30 *per cent* check on DPR and the Assistant Engineer, 100 *per cent*.

Recommendations

- ***Financial controls should be made stringent to avoid excess payments.***
- ***Efforts should be made to complete works within stipulated time.***

2.1.6.1.2 Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM)

JNNURM is an urban modernisation scheme launched by the GoI Ministry of Urban Development in December 2005. It *inter alia* consists of sub-missions:

- Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) with the focus on water supply and sanitation, solid waste management, road network, urban transport and redevelopment of old city areas; and
- Integrated Housing and Slum Development Programme (IHSDP) administered by Ministry of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation aiming at providing adequate shelter and basic infrastructure facilities to the slum dwellers of identified urban areas.

Out of two Municipalities of Dakshin Dinajpur, implementation of the programmes in Balurghat was reviewed in Audit.

(a) UIDSSMT

Balurghat Municipality undertook drainage and other works under UIDSSMT at a cost of ₹ 14.64 crore in 2007 with the technical assistance from the

[53] *After allowing 10 per cent permissible excess*

Municipal Engineering Directorate. The works were scheduled to be completed in 2009. Audit noticed that out of 27075 meters sanctioned, the Municipality completed 24121 m of drainage (89 *per cent*) as of March 2011. Against the sanction of 35 outfall structures, 16 were constructed (46 *per cent*). Similarly, 18 culverts were completed (75 *per cent*) out of the sanctioned target of 24 culverts. Under the renovation and restoration of 3500 m of old drains, 2900 m (83 *per cent*) was covered. However, works relating to one pumping station for 'K' sub-basin and 35 penstock gates were not taken up as of March 2011. The Municipality attributed (May 2011) the tardy progress of works to non-availability of funds, encroachment of land etc. The reply was not tenable as the Municipality itself released only ₹ 0.27 crore, against its contribution of ₹ 1.53 crore. Further, the Municipality was required to take up the works after ensuring availability of the sites.

(b) Integrated Housing & Slum Development Programme (IHSDP)

Against the target of 790 DUs, 345 were complete, 386 were under construction and 59 were not taken up as of March 2011

IHSDP was launched in Balurghat Municipality in 2009–10. During 2009–11, against the approved allocation of ₹ 15.77 crore (₹ 7.90 crore for dwelling units and ₹ 7.87 crore for infrastructure development, etc.), the Municipality received ₹ 8.64[54] crore, of which it expended ₹ 7.24 crore (84 *per cent*). Of the same, ₹ 7.19 crore was spent only on construction of dwelling units.

Against the target of constructing 790 DUs, Balurghat Municipality could complete 345 DUs, while 386 DUs were under construction and 59 DUs were not taken up as of March 2011. Project Director, DRDC attributed (May 2011) the shortfall in construction of DUs to the irregular supply of building materials by local suppliers. However, steps taken to overcome the hindrances were not intimated to Audit.

2.1.6.2 Employment Generation

The GoI and the State Government have initiated a number of livelihood programmes to tackle poverty and unemployment. Implementation of two such programmes -- Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana and National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) were reviewed in audit.

2.1.6.2.1 Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY)

The objective of the SGSY is to facilitate poor families to climb above the poverty line by ensuring appreciable sustained level of income over a period of time through their organisation into Self Help Groups (SHGs) brought about by a process of social mobilisation, training and capacity building and provision of income generating assets through a mix of bank credit and subsidy.

Each District Rural Development Cell headed by Project Director (PD) may utilise the scheme funds on provision of revolving fund to SHGs, training, infrastructure development and subsidy. Providing infrastructure support under SGSY aims primarily to bridge the gaps in available infrastructure. Further, the progress/performance of the SHG/individual in management of assets for generation of incremental income has to be continuously followed up, monitored and evaluated. The programme is implemented by Panchayat

[54] *Including interest of ₹ 4.78 lakh earned upto 31 March 2011.*

and Rural Development Department in the State and by the DRDC in the District. The follow up on the projects undertaken by the *Swarozgaris* should be done by DRDC/Block officials and bankers to assess the capability to generate the projected income. The funds received and expenditure incurred during 2006-11 are indicated in Table below.

Table 2.1.14: Funds received and expenditure incurred during 2006-11 (Rupees in lakh)

Year	Allocation		Opening balance	Release		Miscellaneous receipts	Funds available	Expenditure	Closing balance
	Central	State		Central	State				
2006-07	201.51	67.17	43.70	195.99	65.32	0.77	305.78	276.56	29.22
2007-08	307.48	102.49	29.22	305.72	103.74	10.13	448.81	345.69	103.12
2008-09	363.50	121.17	103.12	363.50	105.63	3.74	575.99	494.57	81.42
2009-10	440.08	146.69	81.42	462.70	161.82	8.90	714.84	708.83	6.01
2010-11	507.59	169.20	6.01	507.59	177.14	5.72	696.46	693.59	2.87
Total	**1820.16**	**606.72**		**1835.50**	**613.65**	**29.26**	**2522.11**	**2519.24**	

(Source: Data furnished by DRDC, Dakshin Dinajpur)

In three test checked blocks and the ZP, out of ₹ 3.08 crore released (training: ₹ 0.83 crore, and infrastructure: ₹ 2.25 crore) during 2006-11, ₹ 1.22 crore meant for infrastructure and ₹ 7.29 lakh meant for training in one Block (Kumarganj) remained unutilized, while utilisation of ₹ 0.66 crore released to two other test-checked blocks[55] for training could not be ascertained due to non-maintenance of records by the Executive Officers of the PSs.

(a) Status of Self Help Groups

Before credit linking, SHGs have to undergo two stages of evaluation to ensure that they have developed credit discipline and financial management skills. SHGs are evaluated six months after their formation for assessment of their eligibility for being benchmarked as Grade I, which would make them eligible for receipt of first installment of Revolving Fund (RF). Grade I SHGs are further evaluated six months after the receipt of RF and successful groups enter Grade II stage for credit linkage to start income generating activities. Target and achievement during 2006-11 are indicated in the table below:

Table 2.1.15: Status of SHGs

Year	Target for SHG to be formed	SHG formed	SHG passed Grade -I	SHG passed Grade –II	SHG started economic activities
1999-2005	NA	3009	2503	307	297
2006-07	NA	3327	1901	231	73
2007-08	NA	2694	2007	452	132
Total	**NA**	**9030**	**6411**	**990**	**502**
2008-09	366	462	383	334	329
2009-10	278	244	2061	222	447
2010-11	2450	429	620	605	357
Total	**3094**	**1135**	**3064**	**1161**	**1133**
Grand total		**10165**	**9475**	**2151**	**1635**

(Source: Records of DRDC, Dakshin Dinajpur)

Sixteen *per cent* of SHGs could reach the level of income generating activities with credit linking

During the years 2006-07 and 2007-08, 6021 SHGs were formed, while no targets were available with the DRDC. During 2008-11, only 1135 (36 *per cent*) SHGs were formed against 3122 targeted. Though the targets fixed during 2008-11 were low, achievement in formation of SHG were poor. As of March 2011, 51 *per cent* of BPL families (98450 out of 191885) in the District were covered under the Scheme. The performance of the programme was unsatisfactory as out of 10165 SHGs formed, only 1635 (16 *per cent*) were credit linked for income generating activities as of March 2011. Considering that each group normally consists of 10 persons, benefit of the

[55] *Balurghat and Harirampur*

scheme was actually accrued to approximately 16350 BPL families (nine *per cent)* of the District.

Scrutiny of records revealed the following:

- There were delays beyond the permissible limit of 30 days in processing applications for RF/ loans by PSs and DRDC. In 849 test checked cases of RF (out of 1338 cases in 2010-11) and 79 cases of activity loan/subsidy (out of 358 cases in 2010-11), substantial delays in processing the cases were noticed in test check as under:

Table 2.1.16: Delays in processing application for revolving fund

	Agency	Number of cases with processing time			
		0 to 30 days	31 to 180 days	181 to 365 days	Above 365 days
Releasing RF	**By PSs**	264	567	nil	18
	DRDC	75	670	104	nil
Activity loan/subsidy	**By PSs**	01	69	nil	09
	DRDC	nil	64	15	nil

Source: Record of DRDC

- Records of three test-checked blocks and ZPs, revealed that ₹ 2.21 crore was released (as of March 2011) to the executing agencies for construction of cluster houses, green houses, training centres, etc. Deviating from stipulation to release funds in phases according to the progress of work, funds were released lump sum without assessment of the requirement. This led to parking of ₹ 90 lakh[56] (41 *per cent*). As of March 2011, 12[57] such houses out of 25[58] were completed, while work was yet to be taken up in case of 10 (40 *per cent*) due to land problems, etc. Out of the 12 houses completed, 10[59] constructed at a cost of ₹ 89.51 lakh were not handed over to DRDC by PSs for over ten to 42 months owing to non-completion of electrical works, non transfer of land to DRDC, want of water source, etc. In reply, PD, DRDC stated (July 2011) that he did not have technical personnel to assess the requirement of funds for construction and to monitor the progress of work.



Incomplete cluster house in Kumarganj Block



Unutilised Green House in dilapidated condition in Kumarganj Block. Green House constructed in July 2009 could not be utilised for want of water source

- Audit interviewed 66 SHGs in three test checked blocks for impact assessment and found that individual members of 35 credit-linked SHGs

[56] *Unutilised funds: ₹ 78.50 lakh and unspent balances retained: ₹ 11.50 lakh*
[57] *clusters house(8), green houses(2) , training centre(1) and facility centre(1)*
[58] *clusters house(17), green houses(2) , training centre(1)and facility centres(5)*
[59] *clusters house(8), green houses(2) , training centre(1)and facility centre(1)*

generated monthly income ranging from ₹ 400 to ₹ 900 against the target of ₹ 2000. As revealed from interview with beneficiaries, inadequate income generation was attributable to SHGs engaging in individual activity instead of group activities, taking up activities other than for which they were credit-linked, parking of loans in fixed deposits without being invested in the stipulated activity[60] etc. The same was confirmed (August 2011) by the PD, DRDC.

Stipulated monitoring mechanism of SGSY was not working effectively in the District. The District SGSY Committee which was to review the progress of SGSY met only 11 times during 2006-2011 *vis-à-vis* stipulated 60. There were no records to indicate whether various levels of functionaries undertook stipulated number of field visits. Though the inspection reports of field visits were to be discussed in the governing body of DRDC, no such body was existing in the District. PD, DRDC admitted that lack of proper monitoring was the main hindrance of progress of SGSY.


2.1.6.2.2 National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS)

National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) was enacted in September 2005. In West Bengal, the Panchayats and Rural Development Department (P&RDD) is the nodal agency for implementation of NREGS; while at the District level the District Programme Co-ordinator implements the scheme through the Programme Officers at PS level and GPs. The primary objectives of the scheme are as under:

(i) To enhance the livelihood security of the rural people by providing at least one hundred days of guaranteed wage employment in every financial year to every household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work; and

(ii) Payment of daily wages to the labourers on a weekly basis or in any case not later than a fortnight after the date on which the work is done.

During 2006-11, out of ₹ 145.62 crore available under NREGS, ₹ 120.19 crore (83 *per cent*) was expended. Percentage of utilization of available funds in sample GPs ranged between 67 and 86 *per cent*.



Audit observed that the scheme suffered due to lapses in planning and implementation as discussed below:

[60] *Out of 35 credit-linked SHGs, all were engaged in individual activities, 12 in activities other than for which they were credit-linked and 21 had parked loan amounts ranging from ₹ 50000 to ₹ 2.5 lakh in term deposits.*

(a) Annual Plan and Labour Budget

Annual Action Plan is a proposal of developmental projects keeping in view of local needs and contains estimated demand for employment opportunities. The labour budget containing anticipated demand for unskilled manual work is to be prepared by the District Programme Coordinator. Scrutiny revealed that only 41 *per cent* of labour budget estimate was received by the District during 2007-11. The year-wise position is shown in ***Appendix 2.1.13.***

Achievement against target in respect of both labour budget and AAP was far below during 2008-09 and 2010-11 than the achievement in 2007-08.

Table 2.1.17: Achievement against target in respect of labour budget and AAP

Year	Target (number of schemes)		Achievement (number of schemes)		Percentage of schemes completed with reference to	
	Labour budget	AAP	Completed	Ongoing	Labour budget	AAP
2006-07	Not available	Not available	1801	906	-	-
2007-08	2874	21231	2137	229	74	10
2008-09	1298	10010	317	378	24	3
2009-10	972	12888	1688	1089	100	13
2010-11	7696	19457	1255	692	16	6
Total	**12840**	**63586**	**7198**	**3294**		

(b) Generation of Employment

It was noticed that on an average only 36 *per cent* of the job card holders were provided employment, but a negligible number of households were provided 100 days guaranteed employment. The shortfall in providing guaranteed 100 days wage employment to card holders who had demanded employment ranged between 92 and 99.71 *per cent* as shown in the table below:

Table 2.1.18: Shortfall in providing employment to card holders *(Number in lakh)*

Year	Number of Job Cards Issued	Job card holders who demanded and were provided employment	Job card holders provided 100 days employment	Percentage of shortfall *vis-à-vis* card holders demanding for employment	Total no. of mandays generated
2006-07	2.45	1.76 (72)	0.009	99.49	27.70
2007-08	2.46	0.87 (35)	0.021	97.59	18.62
2008-09	2.46	0.70 (28)	0.002	99.71	17.30
2009-10	2.69	0.56 (21)	0.011	92.04	29.84
2010-11	2.74	0.78 (28)	0.005	99.36	20.02
Total	**12.80**	**4.67 (36)**	**0.048**		**113.48**

Audit scrutiny revealed deficiencies in implementation of the scheme, as discussed below:

- Wages were to be paid to the labourers on a weekly basis and in any case within a fortnight of the work being done. Any delay in payment of wages entitles the labourers for compensation. In two sampled GPs[61], there were delays ranging from 2 to 35 days in payment of wages (amounting to ₹ 4.51 lakh) to 887 labourers during 2008-10. However, the labourers were not paid any compensation.
- In the sampled GPs, photographs were not affixed on 19124 job cards out of 27796 job cards in contravention of the provision of the guidelines. In absence of photographs possibility of issuance of more than one job card to any person could not be ruled out.

[61] *Bhatpara and Gopalbati*

- Social audit was not conducted during 2006-09. Though social audit forum was constituted at the GPs level, only 59 *per cent* of targeted number of social audit was conducted during 2009-11.
- Though the District NREGA cell stated that inspection of works was conducted, no record in support of the same could be produced to audit despite ₹ 13.53 lakh shown as spent towards hire charges of vehicles and fuel during 2006-11 on account of inspection.

Thus, achievement against the targets for Annual Action Plan was very low. Basic tenet of providing 100 days of guaranteed wage employment to every household has not been achieved. Implementation of the programme was deficient as reflected from delay in payment of wages, non payment of compensation, lack of effective inspection and absence of social audit.

Recommendations

- ***Steps need to be taken for effective utilisation of created infrastructure.***
- ***Concerted efforts needed to be taken for achieving the targets as per labour budget and thereby ensuring 100 days employment.***
- ***Effective oversight needs to be ensured.***

2.1.6.3 Energy

2.1.6.3.1 Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY)

Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) was launched by GoI in April 2005 to provide electricity to all rural households within a period of five years. The scheme is implemented with 90 *per cent* subsidy from GoI. Electrification of below poverty line (BPL) rural households is fully financed by GoI. The West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (WBSEDCL) is the implementing agency. During 2006-11, out of the available funds of ₹ 99.54 crore, ₹ 71.16 crore (72 *per cent)* was expended.

Twelve *per cent* of the targeted households and 18 *per cent* of BPL households were covered under RGGVY

As per DPR prepared by WBSEDCL, the aim was to (i) electrify 185 virgin mouzas and (ii) energise 1.75 lakh rural households including 1.09 lakh BPL households in 1346 mouzas by March 2010.

As of March 2011, with the electrification of 185 virgin mouzas, all the mouzas in the District were electrified. However, against the target of energising 1.75 lakh rural households in 1346 mouzas, achievement was mere 0.21 lakh households (12 *per cent*) in 392 mouzas. This included 0.19 lakh BPL households which accounted for 18 *per cent* of the targeted 1.09 lakh. Thus, the targets were not met as of March 2011 and the objective of electrifying all rural households remained unachieved. WBSEDCL attributed non-achievement of targets to delay in procurement of materials and non-mobilisation of manpower.

Further, out of 659 mouzas and 0.33 lakh BPL households where electrification work was completed, 267 mouzas (41 *per cent*) and 0.18 lakh BPL households (46 *per cent*) were not energised. This was attributed by

WBSEDCL to lack of co-ordination among its various wings and apathy of WBSEDCL towards energisation of BPL consumers.

As per Rural Electricity Policy (2006), a village would be declared as electrified based on the certificate issued by GP. It was noticed that out of 577 mouzas energised in Dakshin Dinajpur, 244 (43 *per cent*) were not declared as electrified for want of certificates from GP. Thus, though all the mouzas in the District were electrified as per WBSEDCL records, they were not declared as electrified. WBSEDCL attributed this to delay in collection of GP certificates by contractor.

Audit noted the following irregularities in course of scrutiny:

- Under the scheme, BPL households were to be provided the connection free of cost. Joint inspections (with Gram Pradhan) of five[62] mouzas in three selected blocks where the scheme was implemented under the Tenth Plan (up to March 2007), however, revealed that 52 out of 53 (98 *per cent*) BPL households had to pay ₹ 150 to ₹ 200 for Pressed Cement Concrete (PCC) pole for service connection. It was seen that in Eleventh Plan[63] (2007-12), BPL households were provided connection free of cost using 'U' shaped service pipe instead of PCC pole. Audit noted that BPL beneficiaries had to pay money for faulty planning of WBSEDCL.


- For creation of Rural Electricity Distribution Backbone WBSEDCL awarded (August 2006) work for construction of one sub-station at Rampur in Tapan Block at ₹ 3.11 crore to a contractor. The sites were, however, handed over (September 2007) 13 months after the award. Further, WBSEDCL had to change the design and Bill of Quantity[64] and delayed approval of the drawings which was indicative of inadequate planning. Thus, the sub-station slated to be completed by August 2007 got delayed by 22 months depriving the beneficiaries of quality power for 22 months. Further, work for erection of 1279 KM of three phases and 131 KM of single phase LT lines was awarded to another contractor in February 2009. Against the same, 260 KM (20 *per cent*) of three phase lines and 440 KM (336 *per cent*) single phase lines have been extended as of March 2011. Abnormal extension of single phase line disproportionate with three phase lines resulted in heavy load demand leading to frequent burning of Distribution Transformers (DTRs) and power interruptions frustrating the objective.

- RGGVY is implemented by the Rural Electrification (RE) wing of WBSEDCL. After completion of electrification work of 185 virgin mouzas, excess material worth ₹ 1.30 crore was returned by contractors between June and September 2009. WBSEDCL transferred the excess materials, which should have been part of the RE store, to its O&M division. This was tantamount to diversion of scheme fund of ₹ 1.30 crore.

[62] *Bunnapara, Mahasani, Paschim Gobindpur, Setor and Srikol*
[63] *RGGVY had two tranches of funds – 10th plan funds and 11th plan funds.*
[64] *Estimated quantity of material*

- It was noticed that 0.986 KM of 11 KV and 0.664 KM of LT 3 phase lines and three 10 KVA DTRs were erected (September 2006) in Pyrapur mouza under Jakirpur Gram Panchayat at a cost of ₹ 9.11 lakh. The expenditure of ₹ 9.11 lakh proved unfruitful as the mouza was uninhabited according to the record of GP.

- Guidelines mandate engagement of Third Party Inspection Agency (TPIA) to ensure that the required materials and the workmanship conform to the prescribed specifications. The defects and deficiencies pointed out by TPIA were to be rectified by the contractors. Accordingly, WBSEDCL entered (September 2008) into an agreement with RECPDCL[65] to monitor the electrification of 185 virgin mouzas[66] at a cost of ₹ 40 lakh. The electrification work, however, had been completed in April 2007. Engagement of TPIA 18 months after the completion of work served no purpose as the contractors refused to rectify the defects and deficiencies pointed out in inspection (January to March 2009) owing to lapse of guarantee period. Thus, delay in engaging TPAI led to infructuous expenditure of ₹ 40 lakh.



Illegal tapping of electricity from transformer in Srikol mouza

- Srikol under Harirampur Block was electrified in March 2007 under Tenth Plan (2002-2007). As per records of GP, this mouza was no longer populated by 2006 and four BPL households had been residing there after 2006. Out of the four BPL households, one was electrified. On joint inspection of this mouza with Gram Pradhan (June 2011), it was noticed that electricity was being illegally tapped from the transformer (which was erected to electrify this mouza) for drawing water from Shallow Tube Well. This illegal connection was known to be continuing since 2007. WBSEDCL was unaware of this illegal connection owing to poor monitoring.

- Out of 7094 connections effected under the scheme (as of June 2011), bills were not raised in respect of 3011 resulting in loss of revenue of ₹ 45.16 lakh[67] during May 2007 to June 2011. Lack of co-ordination between the Rural Electrification wing which implements the scheme and the Supply wing which raises the bill led to non-billing.

Recommendation

- ***Activities of concerned wings of WBSEDCL should be co-ordinated for effective implementation of the Scheme.***

[65] *Rural Electricity Corporation Power Distribution Company Limited.*
[66] *Apart from Dakhsin Dinajpur, TPIA jurisdiction extended to seven other districts.*
[67] *Calculated at the minimum bill of ₹ 30 per month for 50 months (up to June 2011) in respect of 3011 beneficiaries.*

2.1.7 Monitoring

2.1.7.1 Supervision

Guidelines for implementation of the Central and State plan schemes stipulate monitoring requirements. However, the DM is responsible for monitoring the overall progress of implementation of various developmental programmes and ensuring that these are executed within the specified timeframe and approved budget. In view of convergence of multiplicity of developmental schemes and involvement of larger number of implementing agencies, stronger and comprehensive district level monitoring mechanism needs to be in place. However, in the absence of any such consolidated monitoring mechanism at the district level, sufficiency of monitoring was not assessable against standards set. However, that DPC convened only four review meetings during 2006-11, no meeting having been convened in 2007-08 and 2010-11, speaks of the gaps in monitoring. Lack of monitoring impacted execution of schemes significantly, as discussed in specific cases.

2.1.8 Conclusion

While audit observed some positive trends in the Social Sector programmes relating to health and education, there are quite a few areas that have been flagged for focused attention of the State/District administration.

The overall impact of various socio-economic developmental programmes being implemented in Dakshin Dinajpur District on the living standards of the people of the District was limited as indicated by non-achievement of targets. The district either failed to formulate district plans or formulated these with such delay that the exercise proved to be futile. The individual planning of major schemes reviewed were also deficient. While PRIs are empowered to prepare specific plans for integrated development of their area, lack of structured annual action plans at these levels resulted in their inability to expend funds provided to them for implementation of various programmes. Absence of adequate participation from PRIs in the planning process is hindering the planned progress of the District and the felt needs at the grass root level remain unaddressed.

Under the Health sector, though Implementation of NRHM brought about some positive effect in terms of wider coverage of institutional deliveries and reduction in infant mortality, there is much scope for improvement as regards setting up of new health centres and supplementing deficient facilities in inpatient services like, operation theatres, labour room, pathological test facility etc. Besides, significant shortages of medical officers and paramedics were also a matter of concern, which potentially affected quality of health care services. Functioning of Rogi Kalyan Samitis needs to be honed up for ensuring better community participation and ownership in health delivery services.

There was no increase in the number of elementary schools during the last five years. Even the existing schools lacked requisite infrastructure like stipulated number of class rooms, toilets, etc. as various interventions of the Scheme were either not implemented or inadequately implemented. Disparities in posting of teachers coupled with deficiencies in capacity building of teachers might potentially affect the quality of teaching. Though drop-out and promotion rate of students improved, enrollment of children decreased during last five years.

ICDS programme failed to provide requisite nutrition to the targeted population for 300 days in a year mainly due to shortage in supply of food. Besides, not only the Anganwadi Centres (AW centres) suffered from inadequate infrastructural facilities, supervision on their functioning was also compromised owing to shortages of CDPOs.

Under Water supply sector, out of 24 works taken up under ARWSP during 2006-2011, two schemes due for completion in December 2010, were yet to be completed as of July 2011, while two other schemes had not been taken up due to land dispute and insufficiency of water sources. Slow implementation of work resulted in safe drinking water not being supplied to school children in quality affected area and 8.83 lakh people of fluoride affected areas. In violation of CE's order, Bacteriological test of the existing 40 PWSSs was not conducted at all since July 2009. Remaining two schemes were ongoing as of July 2011.

Even after implementation of PMGSY for last ten years, 52 *per cent* of the habitations remained unconnected, though length of road increased by 73 *per cent* and number of connected habitations by 64 *per cent*.

The components of JNNURM like sanitation and construction of houses were restricted due to irregular supply of building material and encroachment of land.

Employment generation schemes like SGSY and NREGS failed to make the desired impact in the District and suffered from lax supervision. Concerted efforts need to be taken to exercise effective oversight in order to achieve the targets.

Though the RGGVY succeeded in bringing electricity to all the mouzas in the District, all rural households in the District could not be energised after five years of launching the programme.

The State Government will have to address these serious issues in order to ensure development of Dakshin Dinajpur District at the desired pace.

The matter was referred to the Government in September 2011; reply is, however, awaited (November 2011).

2.1.9 Summary of recommendations

- ***Under NRHM, the District Health Society should commission household and facility surveys to assess the requirement and identify the gaps in health care infrastructure in the District. Initiatives should be taken for time-bound construction of Sub-centres to equip the health centres with facilities and manpower as per IPHS norms, to achieve the Programme objectives.***

- ***Under SSA, the civil works should be geared up to provide the minimum infrastructural facilities to all schools in a time-bound manner. Posting of teachers needs to be rationalised to remove extreme disparities in PTR.***

- ***Under ICDS, immediate steps should be taken for improvement of infrastructural facilities of Anganwadi centres. Provision of adequate food material should be ensured to provide stipulated nutrition to the beneficiaries for 300 days in a year.***

- ***Annual Action Plan for the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme should be prepared in accordance with the guidelines indicating the prioritisation of incomplete works particularly the Not Covered habitations. Monitoring of the schemes and testing the water quality at prescribed interval should be enforced.***

- ***Under Indira Awas Yojana, strict financial control and monitoring to be enforced to prevent misuse of funds and deprivation of central funds. The district authorities should analyse reasons for disproportionate financial and physical progress.***

- ***Implementation of Total Sanitation Campaign programme needs to be geared up for achievement of targets. IEC activities should be strengthened.***

- ***Under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana, financial controls should be made stringent to avoid excess payments. Also, efforts should be made to complete works within stipulated time.***

- ***Steps need be taken for effective utilisation of infrastructure created under NREGS and SGSY. Concerted efforts needed to be taken for achieving the targets as per labour budget and thereby ensuring 100 days employment under NREGS.***

- ***Activities of concerned wings of West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Corporation Limited should be co-ordinated for effective implementation of the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana.***

URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

2.2 Working of Siliguri Jalpaiguri Development Authority

Executive Summary

Located at the narrow corridor linking North-Eastern States to the rest of the country and on the traditional trade route to Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan and mandated with the responsibilities of planned and integrated development of Siliguri Jalpaiguri Planning Area (SJPA), Siliguri Jalpaiguri Development Authority (SJDA) was constituted in April 1980 under the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979. Since then, it has taken leadership in providing connectivity with the existing state and national highways by way of constructing new and alternative bye-roads, fly-overs and bridges and has executed a number of projects for development of housing and transport infrastructure. During 2006-11, 481 developmental works valuing ₹ 256 crore were undertaken by SJDA, of which 177 were completed up to March 2011. It has a total notified planning area of 5.75 lakh acres under its jurisdiction and prepared long term Master plan for land use in the form of Land Use and Development Control Plan (LUDCP) for 1.35 lakh acres. Audit has flagged certain areas of concern as regards planned use of land, strengthening financial and operational controls, acquisition, utilisation of land, infrastructure development and internal control.

- Contrary to its statutory responsibility to prepare Land Use and Development Control Plan within two years of notification, SJDA did not do so in respect of substantial part of its notified area after seven to 31 years of notifications. As a result, individual development works taken up by SJDA did not have desired linkage with long term development plans.
- Budget management was flawed as would be evident from instances of delays in sending budget proposals to Government and wide variation between budget and actuals. Financial management was deficient leading to shortfall in collection of toll charges, rents, etc. and retention of heavy cash balances in savings and current bank accounts.
- Inability to protect its interest was apparent from the instances of non-registration of 462.43 acres of land acquired, acquisition of excess land than requisitioned by the requiring body, transfer of 8.58 acres of land in excess of acquisition to a requiring body free of cost, etc. noticed in audit. Besides, 48.748 acres of land acquired at ₹ 7.83 crore was under encroachments, indicating lack of diligence.
- In the absence of comprehensive policy for fixation of prices for leasing out of land, decisions taken by SJDA were often arbitrary resulting in loss of revenue on allotment of land at reduced rate and extension of undue favour to lessees. Instances of execution of works outside SJPA were noticed.

- The control deficiencies in SJDA were compounded by lax monitoring by Urban Development Department, though the Act had mandated the Department to monitor the activities of the Authority and Government was represented in the board of the Authority by Minister and Principal Secretary of the Department.

2.2.1 Introduction

Siliguri Jalpaiguri Development Authority (SJDA) was constituted in April 1980 under the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979 (the Act) with the main objective of ensuring planned and integrated development of Siliguri Jalpaiguri Planning Area (SJPA) by providing facilities like land, roads, drainage system, housing complexes, industrial estates, marketing complexes etc. SJPA comprises total area of 575031 acres notified (up to February 2011) by the Government of West Bengal (GoWB) in the jurisdiction of ten Police Stations of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri Districts.

The Annual accounts of SJDA are prepared through Chartered Accountants, while audit of the accounts is entrusted under Section 20 (1) of CAG's DPC Act 1971 to the Comptroller and Auditor General of India by the Government in pursuance of Section 111 of the Act *ibid.* The SJDA has been incurring losses for last four years up to 2009-10; the accounts for 2010-11 has not yet been finalised.

2.2.2 Organisational set up

The SJDA functions under the administrative control of Urban Development Department and its activities are managed by a Board[1] constituted by the GoWB under Section 11 of the Act, *ibid.* The Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who is the Member-Secretary of the Board, supervises day-to-day activities of SJDA. There are four wings in SJDA. They are Engineering, Planning, Administrative and Accounts headed by Superintending Engineer, Associate Planner, Assistant Executive Officer and Accounts Officer respectively, who assist the CEO in their respective fields. Besides, there are 65 regular officers/staff of different cadres and 11 personnel under contract service.

The Board of Directors of SJDA is chaired by the Minister in Charge of UD Department with Principal Secretary of UD Department, Divisional Commissioner of Jalpaiguri Division, District Magistrates of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri as Members. As per the Act, soon after the close of a year, SJDA shall prepare a report of its activities during the preceding year and submit it to the State Government.

2.2.3 Audit objectives

The objective of audit was to examine whether

[1] *Comprising 12 to 14 members including the Chairman, the Minister in Charge of UD Department*

- planning for development of the area was adequate and effective;
- financial management was economical and prudent;
- land acquired by SJDA for different purposes were utilised fruitfully and leasing of land was transparent, efficient and cost effective;
- schemes taken up for infrastructure development were appropriate and executed successfully; and
- internal controls were adequate and functioning of SJDA was adequately monitored.

2.2.4 Audit criteria

Audit criteria used for the study were as under:

- Norms and procedures laid down in West Bengal Town and Country (Development and Planning) Act, 1979 and Development Authority (Audit and Accounts) Rules, 1981 (DA Rules);
- Guidelines of individual schemes framed by Government of India and executed by SJDA;
- Monitoring mechanism formulated by the State;
- Land Acquisition procedure followed by Land and Land Reforms Department; and
- Public Works Code.

2.2.5 Audit coverage and methodology

The performance audit of SJDA was conducted during May-July 2011 covering activities during the period 2006-2011 through test check of records of the Authority, including the records relating to 105 works out of 177 works completed during 2006-11. An entry conference was conducted in July 2011 with the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department and with the CEO of SJDA in May 2011 to ascertain the activities of SJDA and schemes executed during 2006-2011 and to share with them the audit objectives, audit criteria and the audit methodology. On completion of audit, the audit observations were discussed in November 2011 with the Principal Secretary, UD Department in an exit conference and the views of the Government have been incorporated in appropriate places. The important audit findings are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Audit Findings

2.2.6 Developmental Plan

According to Section 31 of the Act *ibid*, every Development Authority shall, within two years of declaration of the planning area and with the approval of the GoWB, prepare Land Use and Development Control Plan (LUDCP) formulating

the policy and the general proposals in respect of the development of land and indicating broadly the manner in which the land is proposed to be used, such as residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, natural scenic beauty, forest, wild life, natural resources, fishery and landscaping for public and semi-public open spaces, parks and playgrounds.

The Planning Section of the SJDA is responsible for preparation of LUDCP, which, after approval by the Board of Directors, was to be forwarded to the UD Department for approval.

2.2.6.1 Land Use and Development Control Plan

LUDCP prepared only for 59 *per cent* of Planning area notified up to May 2004

Initially, SJPA comprised (April 1980) an area of 2,87,130.2 acres spread over six PS *viz* Bhaktinagar, Jalpaiguri, Matigara, Naxalbari, Rajganj and Siliguri. Subsequently, 2,87,901.152 acres in four PSs[2] were added to SJPA between March 2002 and February 2011. Thus, as of March 2011, the planning area of SJDA comprised a total of 5,75,031.352 acres in 10 PSs of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts.

Against 2,87,130 acres of land area available under its jurisdiction in 1980, SJDA prepared LUDCP for 1,35,262.54 acres (47 *per cent*), which was approved by GoWB in August 1992. The LUDCP due for 41488.09 acres of SJPA land notified between March 2002 and May 2004 was also not prepared as of November 2011. Thus, LUDCP for 1,93,355.75 acres (59 *per cent*) of land was not done even after seven to 31 years of notifications. As a result, SJDA was unable to assess and identify the areas available for various developmental works and to check unplanned growth, if any, within its planning area.

The SJDA received grant of ₹ 0.59 crore during November 2005 to March 2009 from GoWB for preparation of LUDCP. The amount remained parked in the deposit account for 24 months (₹ 0.59 crore) to 64 months (₹ 0.03 crore) up to March 2011, as the works were not taken up. The CEO, SJDA attributed (July 2011) the same to lack of sufficient in-house qualified planning expertise, but assured that preparation would be taken up shortly.

The reply did not address the issue of non-preparation of LUDCP for the notified area within the stipulated period of two years, which was the statutory responsibility of SJDA. Further, the Act stipulated that in case a Development Authority fails to prepare the development plan within the stipulated period, the State Government may direct any of its officers to prepare or cause to be prepared the same. The UD Department did not take any such step to get the LUDCP done.

The CEO intimated (November 2011) that the Government had consented to SJDA's proposal for strengthening the Planning Section. It was further intimated that SJDA engaged a private agency in June 2006 for preparation of Land Use Map and Register, which was almost complete as of November 2011. Though,

[2] *March 2002: 25856.544 acres in Phansidewa PS, May 2004: 15631.546 acres in Mainaguri PS and February 2011: 50410.871 acres in Phansidewa PS: 59007.48 acres in Khoribari PS and 136994.711 acres in Mal PS., LUDCP in respect 246413 acres of land added in February 2011 is not yet due.*

CEO assured to take proper steps to complete the LUDCP expeditiously, no target date for finalisation of the same was intimated.

2.2.7 Financial management

SJDA earns revenue receipts from development charges, bank interest, toll charges, lease rent of land/ market/ shops, parking fees, etc. Besides, it receives loans from State Government and grants/ subsidy from State/ Central Governments for different developmental works and schemes. During the period 2006-10, the quantum of such grants and loans stood at ₹ 97.63 crore and ₹ 9.69 crore respectively. Year-wise position of receipts and expenditure *vis-à-vis* budget estimates is given in **Table 2.2.1.**

2.2.7.1 Delay in submission of budget

Budgets for 2006-07 and 2007-08 were submitted to State Government after delays of 29 months and 17 months

According to Section 110 of the Act, *ibid,* read with DA Rules, 1981, SJDA was required to submit budget for the next financial year to the Government on or before 1 November every year, showing estimated receipts and expenditures in prescribed forms. SJDA intimated that it submitted the budgets to the GoWB for the financial years 2006-07 and 2007-08 both on 7 April 2008 with delays of 29 months and 17 months respectively, after close of the concerned financial years. It, however, could not produce the copies of budget estimates to Audit. The dates of submission of budgets for the financial years 2008-09 to 2010-11 were also not made available to Audit, though called for. As the estimates of fund requirements of the SJDA were sent to GoWB only after closure of the relevant years, there was no linkage between the funds allotted by the GoWB and the schemes sanctioned/taken up by the SJDA. Scrutiny revealed that due to non-receipt of funds, eight works with estimated cost of ₹ 14.44 crore sanctioned during 2008-09 (seven works) and 2010-11 (one work) were not started, while one work[3] with estimated cost of ₹ 2 crore (sanctioned in 2007-08) was abandoned in 2009-10. This was accepted (July 2011) by the CEO.

The laxity in budget preparation resulted in variations in actual receipts and expenditures as compared to budget estimates of the SJDA during the years 2006-07 to 2009-10. Accounts for 2010-11 has not been prepared (November 2011).

Table 2.2.1: Budget and actuals in receipts and expenditures during 2006-07 to 2009-10

Particulars	2006-07		2007-08		2008-09		2009-10		Total	
	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual
	(Rupees in crore)									
Receipt	15.88	135.73 (855)	97.09	43.94 (45)	194.39	79.37 (41)	251.10	178.71 (71)	558.46	437.75 (78)
Expenditure	34.24	137.43 (401)	24.84	38.55 (155)	91.88	70.74 (77)	235.17	210.64 (90)	386.13	457.36 (118)

(Source: Budget figures furnished by SJDA and actuals as shown in Annual Accounts of SJDA)
Figures in brackets represent percentage of actuals with respect to budgets.

[3] *Town Drainage Scheme, Jalpaiguri, for which no grant was received from the State Government and the project was not included in the Budget for 2009-10*

High annual variations between budget estimates and actuals indicated unrealistic budget preparation

As evident from the above table, during 2006-10, total receipts fell short of budget estimate by 22 *per cent*; while expenditure surpassed budget estimates by 18 *per cent*. However, annual variations were higher, indicating unrealistic budget preparation which rendered the exercise meaningless. Reasons for such wide deviations from budgets were neither available on record nor intimated to Audit, though called for.

Further, the actual expenditure as intimated by CEO to Audit were at variance with those booked under annual accounts as shown under:

Table 2.2.2: Statement showing figures of actuals reported by SJDA and those booked in SJDA Accounts

	2006-07		2007-08		2008-09		2009-10		Total	
	(Rupees in crore)									
	As reported by SJDA	As per SJDA accounts	As reported by SJDA	As per SJDA accounts	As reported by SJDA	As per SJDA accounts	As reported by SJDA	As per SJDA accounts	As reported by SJDA	As per SJDA accounts
Receipts	135.73	135.73	46.65	43.94	78.30	79.37	48.61	178.71	309.29	437.75
Expenditure	54.46	137.43	38.31	38.55	65.56	70.74	86.27	210.64	244.60	457.36

(Source: Figures furnished by SJDA and Annual Accounts)

Such variations were indicative of flawed financial control in SJDA.

2.2.7.2 Working results

According to Section 112 of the Act, soon after the close of a year, SJDA shall prepare a report of its activities during the preceding year and submit it to the State Government. Further, in terms of Section 111 of the Act, *ibid* read with Development Authority (Audit and Accounts) Rules, 1981, SJDA was required to prepare annual accounts for submission to the Auditor appointed by the GoWB within 1 June every year.

Preparation of annual accounts was often delayed

It was noticed that SJDA appointed Chartered Accountants for preparation of the Accounts. The accounts for the years 2006-2010 were, however, submitted for audit with delays ranging from 160 days to 241 days while the accounts for 2010-11 had not yet (November 2011) been finalised. Government, however, continued to release funds without receiving the audited accounts. As a result, timely and proper utilisation of the funds allocated could not be ensured by the Government. Audited accounts for 2009-10 disclosed accumulated deficit of ₹ 87.89 crore. This was mainly on account of liability of ₹ 93.86 crore as interest on Government loans.

The CEO attributed (July 2011) the delay in preparation of accounts mainly to the time taken for estimation of different provisions and compilation of the same. The contention was not acceptable as it was a statutory duty to submit the accounts within 1 June every year and persistent delays weakened the financial management.

The SJDA suffered continuous losses during 2006-07 to 2009-10; year-wise losses being ₹ 7.33 crore, ₹ 11.12 crore, ₹ 10.36 crore and ₹ 9.47 crore respectively. However, test check disclosed instances of avoidable financial burden of ₹ 1.28 crore due to execution of schemes (₹ 47 lakh) outside its

planning area[4]; waiver (₹ 0.79 crore) of revenue on a market complex and financial aid (₹ 2.46 lakh) to individuals, clubs, mela committee etc.

CEO stated (July 2011) that the Board decided to bear the expenditure on works outside its planning area for developmental purpose, which was in the interest of the common people. The reply was not acceptable as SJDA was not statutorily liable to bear any expenditure on works outside SJPA.

2.2.7.3 Government dues remaining unpaid

SJDA did not repay any part of State Government loan; overdue loans and interest stood at ₹ 115.44 crore

Between March 1981 and March 2009, SJDA obtained loans aggregating ₹ 58.42 crore from GoWB at rates of interest varying from nine *per cent* to 15 *per cent per annum.* In terms of the Government orders, the overdue instalments of loan together with interest amounted to ₹ 115.43 crore[5] as of March 2011. SJDA neither paid interest nor repaid principal to Government till March 2011. The Department did not take any action for recovery of dues.

CEO stated (July 2011) that SJDA would focus on payment of interest and repayment of principal taken from GoWB.

2.2.7.4 Maintenance of balance in savings/current accounts

SJDA retained heavy cash balances in savings and current accounts; it did not prepare cash flow statement to assess requirement of liquid cash.

During 2006-11, SJDA maintained eight to nine bank accounts, of which two were designated for Valmiki Ambedkar Awas Yojana and West Bengal Municipal Development Fund[6]. Scrutiny of bank statements and pass books in respect of seven other accounts revealed retention of minimum monthly balances of ₹ 0.94 crore to ₹ 76.95 crore in aggregate. SJDA neither fixed any minimum amount to be retained in the bank account nor prepared cash flow statement to assess its requirement of liquid funds for day to day transactions so as to gainfully invest surplus funds. During 2006-11, SJDA maintained two current accounts (United Bank of India and State Bank of India) meant for day to day transactions. These accounts retained minimum balance of ₹ 0.10 lakh to ₹ 9.18 crore. The reasons for maintaining non-interest bearing current accounts was not stated, though called for.

The CEO stated (July 2011) that minimising the number of bank accounts was under active consideration. The reply was silent about reasons for maintenance of substantial cash balance in saving/current accounts. The CEO further intimated (November 2011) that conversion of current accounts into savings accounts was under process.

2.2.7.5 Financial burden in respect of service tax

As per Section 69 of Finance Act, 1994 read with Rule 4 of the Service tax Rules, 1994, every person who provided a taxable service of value exceeding ₹ 9 lakh in the preceding financial year is required to recover the service tax from the client

---

[4] *Excess expenditure incurred over the sanctioned amount out of its own fund for construction of bus terminus at Kurseong (₹ 0.32 crore) and Mirik College (₹ 0.15 crore)*

[5] *Overdue principal: ₹ 21.69 crore and interest accrued and due: ₹ 93.74 crore.*

[6] *with effect from February 2011.*

against services rendered. In case of non-recovery, value of services will be taken to be inclusive of service tax.

SJDA did not collect service tax on rent/ advertisement revenue in violation of the extant rule and incurred liability to pay ₹ 0.30 crore on this count

Scrutiny of records revealed that the revenue received by SJDA from rent and advertisement, became taxable considering the exemption limit under service tax rules from May 2005 and June 2007 respectively. SJDA, however, did not collect service tax from the clients in violation of the Rule. It was noticed that Additional Commissioner, Central Exercise & Service Tax claimed (June 2011) Service tax of ₹ 8.14 lakh from SJDA on account of rent collected from one of its premises. As per the accounts of SJDA, revenue amounting to ₹ 3.06 crore was earned on account of rent and advertisement during 2006-11, but no amount of Service tax was shown as payable in the accounts. As a result, SJDA would have to shoulder financial burden of ₹ 0.30 crore out of its rent/ advertisement revenue of ₹ 3.06 crore.

While accepting the Audit observations, CEO stated (November 2011) that service tax would be recovered from lessees/clients concerned and due process for the same was on.

However, chances of recovery of service tax in the present cases remained remote as agreement with the clients did not include enabling clause in this regard.

2.2.7.6 Lack of control over collection of revenue

SJDA had outstanding dues of ₹ 1.62 crore, of which Board decided to waive ₹ 0.37 crore

SJDA earned revenue from development charges, lease rent of land/ market/ shop rooms, toll charges, parking fees, etc. However, it has no policy to fix the reserve price for tenders for selection of toll collecting agencies. Besides, although the revenue from the tenants, shop owners and toll collecting agencies remained outstanding for more than one year to 17 years, SJDA did not enforce recovery from the defaulters. As a result, aggregate amount of outstanding dues increased from ₹ 1.08 crore in March 2006 to ₹ 1.62 crore in March 2010. Of this, ₹ 0.37 crore on account of rent of stalls at Surya Sen Market handed over to Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad, was irrecoverable because of delay in realisation. The Board decided (October 2010) to waive the amount in view of difficulties faced by the payees, leading to loss of revenue.

Further, SJDA printed two lakh toll receipts (1.5 lakh in May 2007 and 0.5 lakh in May 2009) of various denominations[7] worth ₹ 0.56 crore. Though the same was shown as issued in the stock register, details of issue were neither on record, nor intimated by the Authority. It was stated (August 2009) that receipts were utilised for collection of toll[8] during the process of selection of regular toll collecting agency. SJDA did not monitor utilisation of toll receipts and correlate these to the amount of tolls deposited during that period. Though, SJDA had stated that collections of toll were deposited regularly, it could not produce any record in support of amount deposited by the security agency. This indicated lack of monitoring of revenue collection by SJDA.

---

[7] *₹ 5, ₹ 6, ₹ 20, ₹ 37, and ₹ 55*

[8] *During the intermediate periods, the work of toll collection was assigned to the security agency of the office engaged by SJDA*

In reply CEO stated (November 2011) that the matter was noted for guidance to handle the situation in a more professional way in future.

2.2.8 Acquisition and leasing of land

As per order of GoWB (May 2011), SJDA prepared a status report of land. However, the basic records/registers in support of the data included in the Status Report could not be shown to Audit. As per the statement, SJDA acquired 1207.958 acres of land till March 2011 for ₹ 101.35 crore through Land Acquisition (LA) Collectors (821.468 acres) of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, on lease from Government Department/Authorities (324.98 acres) and direct purchase (61.51 acres) from land owners. Out of this 801.189 acres were utilised, 48.748 acres were under encroachment and 237.59 acres involved in litigation. Time frame for utilisation of remaining 120.431 acres was not fixed.

SJDA did not make available the details of land allotted/ utilised during 2006-11. As a result, the number of allottees and total quantum of land allotted during this period along with the purpose *vis-à-vis* the status of utilisation were not ascertainable in audit. Moreover, SJDA did not indicate mouza/plot-wise identification of the land in LUDCP; nor did the Board of SJDA draw any reference of the LUDCP in the acquisition proposals. As such, adherence to or deviation from the existing LUDCP could not be examined in audit. Scrutiny revealed instances of extra expenditure, blockage of funds and loss on leasing of land as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

2.2.8.1 Delay in registration of acquired land

Out of 1207.958 acres of land acquired, 462.43 acres of land has not been registered by SJDA

Out of 1207.958 acres of land acquired, SJDA was yet to register acquisitions/ lease deeds in respect of 462.43 acres of land acquired under West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, reasons for which were not on record. In absence of proper record keeping, it was not possible to assess the delays in registering the deeds. In absence of registered deeds, SJDA was unable to get the legal title on 462.43 acres of acquired land, indicating lack of seriousness in utilisation of the acquired land.

2.2.8.2 Extra expenditure on purchase of bulk land

In order to meet the requirement of land adjacent to urban areas, SJDA decided (June and September 2007) to create a land bank. During the period from November 2008 to January 2011, SJDA purchased 52.485 acres of land directly from owners at rates varying from ₹ 16.50 lakh to ₹ 30.80 lakh per acre against market value ranging from ₹ 6.01 lakh to ₹ 19.80 lakh per acre as discussed below:

In November 2007, owners[9] of 16.22 acres of land offered SJDA a price of ₹ 16.50 lakh per acre. For assessing acceptability of the cost, SJDA allowed

[9] *individuals, group of individuals, developers*

20 *per cent* enhancement (₹ 1.20 lakh per acre) in market value (₹ 6.01 lakh per acre) and added solatium[10] of 30 *per cent* (₹ 2.16 lakh per acre) of the enhanced price and notional rehabilitation cost of ₹ 8.27 lakh and arrived at the comparable price of ₹ 17.25 lakh[11] per acre. As the calculated price was higher than the offered price, the offered price was accepted and land was purchased accordingly.

SJDA purchased 52.485 acres of bulk land at prices higher than the market price leading to an extra expenditure of ₹ 2.21 crore

As LA Act justifies addition of 30 *per cent* solatium and 12 *per cent* additional amount on the value of land. Inclusion of 20 *per cent* enhancement, notional rehabilitation cost and 10 *per cent* administrative cost was thus not justifiable. As per the LA Act the admissible price of per acre land comes to ₹ 8.53 lakh per acre. Thus, there was an excess payment of ₹ 1.29 crore[12].

Similarly, land owners offered rates of ₹ 30.80 lakh per acre for 28.79 acres and ₹ 30 lakh per acre for 7.475 acres of land. SJDA accepted the offered price as it was less than the assessed the price of ₹ 30.92 lakh per acre calculated by adding 30 *per cent* solatium (₹ 5.94 lakh per acre), 12 *per cent* additional amount (₹ 2.37 lakh per acre) and 10 *per cent* administration cost (₹ 2.81 lakh per acre) on the market value (₹ 19.80 lakh per acre). As per the LA Act, the admissible price of land should be ₹ 28.11 lakh per acre. Thus, there was excess payment of ₹ 91.58 lakh[13].

Thus, there was an additional payment of ₹ 2.21 crore. The CEO stated (July 2011) that while approving the assessment, the Board had taken into consideration the additional funds that would have been expended on acquisition through LA Collector. However, the fact remained that SJDA had made excess payment even after allowing additional components of expenditures admissible under the Act.

2.2.8.3 Blockage of fund on acquisition of land in excess of requirement

SJDA acquired land in excess of the area requisitioned by the requiring body resulting in blockage of its own funds

To establish a Land Custom Station (LCS) at Fulbari, Jalpaiguri, SJDA initiated (February 2010) land acquisition proposal for 10 acres with the LA Collector, Jalpaiguri as per requirement of the Customs Authority, GoI, Siliguri, the primary requiring body (RB). During the initial stage of the process of acquisition of the land, RB intimated (April 2010) revised requirement of 6.51 acres. SJDA, however, did not take cognizance of the revision and acquired 10 acres on payment of ₹ 1.93 crore (February 2010: ₹ 0.38 crore and August 2010: ₹ 1.55 crore) out of its own fund. Though SJDA raised (July 2010) a claim of ₹ 1.26 crore for 6.51 acres of land, the RB did not pay the amount (July 2011). SJDA had also constructed a boundary wall around the entire area of 10 acres at ₹ 0.46 crore.

Thus, by acquiring land in excess of requirement, SJDA blocked ₹ 0.83 crore (land cost: ₹ 0.67 crore and proportionate cost of boundary wall around the excess

[10] *A statutory allowance payable in case of acquisition under LA Act.*
[11] *Though the price so arrived was ₹ 17.64 lakh, SJDA took it as ₹ 17.25 lakh.*
[12] *16.22 acres X (₹ 16.50 lakh - ₹ 8.53 lakh)*
[13] *28.79 acres X(₹ 30.80 lakh - ₹ 28.11 lakh) + 7.475 acres X (₹ 30 lakh - ₹ 28.11 lakh)*

land: ₹ 0.16 crore). CEO stated (November 2011) that 3.49 acres area would be utilised in near future, but did not specify the purpose and target date for utilisation of the same.

2.2.8.4 Transfer of land in excess of actual acquisition

SJDA erroneously transferred 8.58 acres of land in excess of actual acquisition to a requiring body

In accordance with the proposal (January 2004) of Central Reserve Police Force Authority, Siliguri (CRPF) for suitable land for establishment of Group Centre and Residential Colony, SJDA initiated land acquisition of 194.98 acres (Darjeeling District: 105.72 acres and Jalpaiguri District: 89.26 acres) and paid (July and December 2004) ₹ 7.16 crore to LA Collectors, Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri. SJDA was handed over (August 2005) possession of 182.39 acres of land. The balance 12.59 acres, being vested land was yet to be transferred (as of July 2011). After completion of all formalities, SJDA transferred the possession of the acquired land to CRPF in August 2005 and CRPF constructed boundary wall around the transferred land as per demarcation (December 2008) done by SJDA. However, on a joint survey conducted in April 2009, it was found that actual land area was 203.56 acres. Thus, there was excess transfer of 8.58 acres valuing ₹ 0.60 crore[14] free of cost to CRPF, depriving the State exchequer of revenue.

CEO stated (July 2011) that CRPF would be asked to hand over the excess land at the earliest in order to avoid complications. But the fact remained that SJDA had neither asked CRPF to hand over the excess land even after lapse of 30 months from joint survey nor taken action to ascertain the reasons for such excess transfer of land free of cost, indicating indifferent attitude.

2.2.8.5 Encroachment of land by unauthorised occupants

Out of 1207.958 acres of acquired land, SJDA failed to get physical possession of 48.748 acres of land acquired at ₹ 7.83 crore, as these were encroached upon by unauthorised occupants. Three such instances are indicated below:

48.748 acres of land acquired at ₹ 7.83 crore was under encroachment

a) SJDA did not get physical possession of 7.37 acres of land acquired (December 2003) at Eastern Bye Pass-Don Bosco connector, as the land had already been under encroachment at the time of acquisition. As a result, infrastructure development at the site could not be initiated. Though SJDA asked (April 2010) LA Collector, Jalpaiguri to refund ₹ 1.16 crore paid (September/ November 2003) for acquisition, the amount was yet to be refunded (October 2011).

b) SJDA took on lease (February 2008) 3.118 acres of encroached land (Nivedita Market: 1.442 acres and Hawkers Corner: 1.676 acres) from Railways at a cost of ₹ 4.87 crore[15] (paid between March 2006 and March 2007). Although the Railway Authority handed over (February 2008) the

[14] *Calculated at average rate of 194.98 acres of land*
[15] *Including ₹ 0.20 crore spent on registration of lease deed for Nivedita Market land*

possession of land at Nivedita Market on paper[16], SJDA failed to clear the encroachments as of July 2011. Several meetings with the business community to clear the encroachment met with no result. However, nothing was on record to show whether the issue was taken up by SJDA with other civil authorities. Thus, decision to develop lands which were not free from encumbrance resulted in expenditure of ₹ 4.87 crore infructuous. In reply, CEO stated (November 2011) that discussion and negotiations with the shop owners were going on for arriving at a solution.





Encroached land acquired by SJDA - Nivedita Market (left) and Hawkers Corner (right)

For establishment of cargo complex, SJDA acquired 3.91 acres of land (August 2006 and January 2008 and November 2008) at Dakshin Bagdogra mouza, Naxalbari PS through LA Collector, Darjeeling, at a cost of ₹ 0.75 crore. Though LA Collector handed over possession in July 2009, SJDA did not take necessary action to prevent encroachment of land. Consequently, SJDA failed to get physical possession of the land as of July 2011.

There was no record to show that there was any mechanism in SJDA to exercise diligence over acquired land and to take administrative measures to prevent encroachment of its land.

2.2.8.6 Allotment of land on lease hold basis

SJDA has no comprehensive policy for determining the economic price of land for allotment on lease

As of 31 March 2011, SJDA had allotted/utilised 801.189 acres of land for various purposes and developmental works on lease to entrepreneurs/individuals. It was observed that SJDA did not have any comprehensive policy regarding fixing of allotment price/lease premium of its land for various purposes. On an audit query, SJDA intimated (July 2011) that it had determined some rates for leasing of land in 1993 for allotting lands in Parivahannagar and Himachal Vihar and these rates were enhanced from time to time on initial base rate and actual allotment rate fixed through bidding/quotation/offer. It also decided to offer discounted rates for encouraging IT industries. It was observed that SJDA compromised its financial interest in the course of determination of the price of land to entrepreneurs, in the following cases.

[16] *Taking over note was signed by the Regional Planning Officer, SJDA*

- ***Leasing of land at food park***

SJDA took up construction (July 2006) of a food park in 32.77 acres of land at Siliguri at a cost of ₹ 18.60 crore[17]. Out of the 22.58 acres of land to be allotted to the intended industries, SJDA allotted 18.049 acres to 14 entrepreneurs on lease for 99 years at an aggregate cost of ₹ 5.19 crore at prices ranging from ₹ 20 lakh to ₹ 36 lakh per acre. It was, however, noticed that SJDA fixed the prices on *ad hoc* basis without any cost benefit analysis and without adding service charge, administrative cost and profit margin, unlike in another similar case, indicating absence of uniform policy.

While accepting the audit observation CEO stated (July 2011) that price of the land was fixed to encourage food processing industries and generate employment. However, the reply was not acceptable in the absence of policy in this regard. The fact remained that SJDA had incurred loss and would incur further loss on allotment of the remaining 4.531 acres unless the price is revised to cover the cost incurred.

- ***Leasing out of land at Tea Park***

SJDA incurred loss of ₹ 59.64 lakh due to injudicious fixation of lease price of land

SJDA, with financial assistance from ASIDE[18] scheme, decided (October 2007) to set up a Tea Park at approximately 50 acres of land at a project cost of ₹ 23.92 crore[19]. Out of the same, ₹ 16 crore was sanctioned (October 2008) under ASIDE scheme and SJDA was to provide the remaining ₹ 7.92 crore (including ₹ 6.03 crore being cost of land acquisition). As per the project report (October 2007), 24.61 acres of land was earmarked for allotment to the entrepreneurs, while the balance was to be utilised for common facilities and other infrastructure. In November 2009, SJDA constituted a three-member Pricing and Allotment Committee for deciding the allotment price. The Committee assessed the realisable amount from allotment of 24.61 acres of land in the park at ₹ 15.41 crore, after considering the contribution of SJDA (₹ 7.92 crore), 12 *per cent* interest for three years (₹ 2.85 crore) and working expenditure of SJDA for eight years to run the Park (₹ 4.64 crore[20]). The land was allotted to 152 entrepreneurs (July 2011).

Audit observed that while fixing the allotment price, the Committee had not taken into consideration ₹ 43.85 lakh spent by SJDA for registration of 50 acres of land. Thus, SJDA incurred a loss of ₹ 59.64 lakh (including ₹ 15.79 lakh as interest at the rate of 12 *per cent* for three years) on allotment land at Tea Park.

---

[17] *SJDA's contribution: ₹ 1.55 crore, NABARD grant: ₹ 7.70 crore, State Government: ₹ 2.97crore and ASIDE grant: ₹ 6.38 crore*

[18] *Assistance to States for Developing Export Infrastructure and Other Allied Activities*

[19] *The component wise project cost were : Land: ₹ 6.03 crore (already acquired land), Land development: ₹ 1.70 crore, Civil Construction: ₹ 3.91 crore, Road : ₹ 3.55 crore, Plant & Machinery: ₹ 6.59 crore, Electrical and automation : ₹ 1.75 crore and Government fees etc: ₹ 0.39 crore*

[20] *at an average expenditure of ₹ 58 lakh per annum*

While admitting the audit observation, CEO stated (August 2011) that ₹ 1.89 crore[21] of SJDA's contribution had not yet been spent and ₹ 59.64 lakh can be made good from the interest component on the unspent amount. The views of CEO were untenable as SJDA was committed to provide funds for creation of infrastructure at the park for which orders had been placed and the works were in progress.

- ***Undue favour to an entrepreneur***

SJDA extended undue favour of ₹ 0.70 crore to an entrepreneur as administrative expenses were not charged

Videocon Reality and Infrastructures Limited (Videocon) requested (April 2007) SJDA to allot approximately 25 acres of land to set up an Electronic and Bio-technology project at Satellite Township near Dabgram, Jalpaiguri. It was decided (May 2007) in a meeting chaired by the Minister in charge, Municipal Affairs and Urban Development Departments that Home (Police) Department would relinquish 34.32 acres of land to Land and Land Reforms (L&LR) Department for settlement in favour of SJDA for subsequent allotment of 25 acres to Videocon.

SJDA received possession of 34.32 acres of land in August 2007 from L&LR Department and handed over 25 acres to Videocon in December 2007. Videocon paid (November 2007 and September 2008) ₹ 11.25 crore, as demanded by SJDA. SJDA, however, did not charge incidental expenses like service and administrative expenses and profit margin etc. while calculating the price. Considering administrative expenses at the rate of 10 *per cent* as was charged by LA Collector while acquiring land on behalf of RBs the chargeable amount for taking the land on lease from L&LR Department should have been ₹ 11.95[22] crore. Thus, SJDA extended undue financial benefit of ₹ 70 lakh. Reason for the same was not communicated, though called for. However, it was noticed that SJDA had charged 20 *per cent* as incidental charges in a similar case in April 2010.

- ***Delay in construction process after leasing***

SJDA had no system in place to monitor timely utilisation of the land allotted

Lease deed agreements entered into with allottees envisaged that construction process should start within six months from the date of possession of land failing which SJDA was at liberty to cancel the agreement and resume the land. It was, however, seen that SJDA handed over 1.8 acres of land to Advanced Medical Research Institute (AMRI) in November 2009 and three acres of land to Siliguri Commerce College in June 2008. Though works have not been started in either of these cases even after expiry of 20 to 36 months from allotment, action has not been initiated by SJDA. It was observed that there was no system in place in SJDA to monitor timely utilisation of the land allotted.

[21] *₹ 7.92 crore minus ₹ 6.03 crore*

[22] *Proportionate cost for 25 acres including registration charge: ₹ 10.86 crore and service/ administrative charge/ profit at the rate of 10 per cent: ₹ 1.09 crore*





Land handed over to AMRI (left) and Siliguri Commerce College (right) not utilised (July 2011)

2.2.9 *Execution of schemes under Public-Private Partnership (PPP)*

During June 2003 to May 2008, SJDA took up six schemes[23] with estimated cost of ₹ 3013 crore for development of township, amusement park, IT Park etc. under Public-Private Partnership (PPP). Of these, only one project (Amusement park at Dagapur) has been completed as of March 2011, while remaining five were under various stages of execution. Audit noted the following.

2.2.9.1 Failure to implement the PPP project on development of a township

A township could not be set up even after spending ₹ 56.92 crore on land acquisition

In view of demand for infrastructure development in North Bengal, SJDA proposed (August 2003) to develop an integrated township in 232.4 acres of land near North Bengal Medical College and Hospital, Siliguri (Project) on PPP mode for the benefit of different groups of people. SJDA spent ₹ 56.92 crore up to March 2011 on acquisition of land and rehabilitation of some of the evictees. The project envisaged as Build Own Operate (BOO) was awarded (December 2006) to M/s Bengal Unitech Universal Siliguri Projects Ltd. (BUUSPL), Kolkata, a private company, which made the highest financial offer of ₹ 210.60 crore. As per work order (December 2006) BUUSPL was to pay ₹ 84.24 crore as first instalment and the balance in two instalments of ₹ 63.18 crore each by December 2007 and December 2008 and receive possession of the entire plot. Accordingly, BUUSPL deposited the first instalment of ₹ 84.24 crore in December 2006 and received possession (August 2007) of proportionate 92.96 acres. Meanwhile, SJDA entered (April 2008) into a 'Development Agreement' with BUUSPL. Clause 12.4 (vi) of the agreement empowered SJDA to terminate the agreement in case of delay of more than six months in payment of any instalment. BUUSPL was required to deliver 480 dwelling units (DU) or seven *per cent* of the total DUs, whichever was more, for resettlement of evictees.

[23] *Parking lot cum commercial complex near Hashmi Chawk, Siliguri (ongoing): ₹8 crore, New Township near NBMC (ongoing): ₹2500 crore, Amusement park at Dagapur (completed): ₹20 crore, Multi-utility infrastructural project, Dagapur (ongoing): ₹50 crore, Information Technology Park, Siliguri (ongoing): ₹400 crore and Inland Container Depot, Siliguri (ongoing): ₹35 crore*

Scrutiny of records revealed that BUUSPL did not pay the remaining instalments even after 29 months from the due date up to May 2010. Instead, it offered two options to SJDA - the land to be returned to SJDA on refund of ₹ 84.24 crore, else the project would be executed only on 92.96 acres. Thus, it was clear that BUUSPL had no intention to execute the project as per agreement. Despite BUUSPL defaulting on contractual obligations, SJDA did not invoke the termination clause of the agreement in time so as to avoid further delay in project. SJDA issued termination notice in December 2010 on intervention of GoWB. However, possession of the land has not yet been (June 2011) received back. As a result, the project got stalled defeating the objective of development of township despite incurring expenditure of ₹ 56.92 crore up to March 2011 on land and rehabilitation works. Further, 480 project affected families could not be rehabilitated despite acquisition of their land.

SJDA intimated (November 2011) that the matter was referred (October 2011) to the State Government for suitable decision.

2.2.9.2 Delay in development of an IT Park

Delay of SJDA to nominate its representatives in a JVC led to delay in development of an IT park

In order to develop, manage and operate an IT Park in 23.8 acres vacant land at Uttarayan Township, Siliguri, SJDA decided (November 2006) to form a Joint Venture Company (JVC) with equal share between SJDA and the selected partner. Accordingly, M/s Infinity Infotech Parks Ltd (IIPL) which made the highest offer of ₹ 2.21 crore per acre, was selected (December 2007) as JV partner. In terms of the letter of award (LOA) IIPL deposited ₹ 5.26 crore (January 2007: ₹ 10 lakh and January 2008: ₹ 5.16 crore) as 10 *per cent* of the financial bid (₹ 52.60 crore).

In August 2008, IIPL moved SJDA to develop the Park as Special Economic Zone (SEZ), for which minimum 25 acres of contiguous land was required. Though terms and conditions of SEZ were different from the original scope of work, SJDA did not call for new tender and accepted (August 2008) the proposal of IIPL and accordingly arranged (December 2009) the requisite extra land[24]. In September 2010, SJDA and IIPL entered into an agreement to form the JVC with a 10 Member Board of Directors, five each nominated by SJDA and IIPL. However, JVC was not incorporated as SJDA did not finalise nomination of its Directors[25] as of July 2011. Thus, the work of IT Park was not started, as SJDA failed to form the JVC. Besides, due to non-incorporation of JVC, SJDA could not realise the balance amount of ₹ 17.51 crore[26] receivable from the partner as per the agreement.

---

[24] *On joint physical survey (February 2009) land available with SJDA was found to be 18.91 acres. Lakshmi Township Ltd., another JVU of SJDA in a separate project, was to allot 3.915 acres at ₹50 lakh per acre to SJDA, 1.305 acres of developed land to JVC at IIPL bid price (₹2.21 crore per acre) and 1.59 acres was vested land.*

[25] *The nominated Directors for the JVC had not yet applied for Directors' identification numbers with the Registrar of Companies, Government of India*

[26] *₹ 25.23 crore being 50 per cent quoted price on 22.825 acres – (₹ 1.96 crore being price of 3.915 acres at ₹ 0.50 crore/acre + ₹ 5.26 crore already received + ₹ 0.50 crore for equity contribution).*

CEO stated (November 2011) that necessary formalities with the Ministry of Company Affairs, GoI have been completed and process of formation of the JVC has been taken up with IIPL.

2.2.9.3 Allotment of land at Dagapur Amusement Park

Highest bid for allotment of land for Amusement Park was rejected on flimsy ground leading to loss of ₹ 0.45 crore

In order to build, manage and maintain Amusement Park at Dagapur, Siliguri, SJDA invited (June 2005) Expression of Interest (EOI) and selected (October 2005) M/s Sanghu Valley (India) Ltd, Kolkata, (SVL) at a lease rent of ₹ 6.35 crore payable over a period of 21 years on the basis of technical and financial bids. The project was completed in November 2009 and presently is in operation.

Audit noticed that financial bid of ₹ 7.73 crore (₹ 7.35 crore for 21 years with provision of increment of 0.5 *per cent* per year) offered by one of the bidders, M/s Rnox Amusement (P) Ltd (RAPL), which qualified the technical bid was not accepted on the ground that their bid included a multiplex to be built within the park.

However, it was seen that SJDA, without any recorded justification, permitted (September 2006) SVL, the selected bidder, to install a Multiplex at the Park at ₹ 0.93 crore over the period of 21 years. Thus, rejection of offer of RAPL resulted in loss of ₹ 0.45 crore[27].

While accepting the audit observation, CEO stated (July 2011) that initial project report did not include the Multiplex. The fact, however, remained that the same was accepted at a later stage which indicated inconsistent decision making on the part of SJDA.

2.2.10 Execution of developmental works

During 2006-2011, SJDA placed 481 work orders valuing ₹ 256.08 crore[28] for development of land, construction/strengthening/widening/repairing of roads, bridges, construction of boundary walls, protection work of river banks, electrical works, etc. Out of these, 177 works were completed at a cost of ₹ 40.98 crore upto March 2011. Audit analysis of 105 completed works indicated that 32 works were completed with time over runs varying from three months to two years mainly due to delayed handing over of work site, delay in supply of departmental materials, problems in availability of land, involvement of additional work, local agitation, etc. Audit scrutiny revealed instances like intended benefits not being available from assets created at a cost of ₹ 7.02 crore, deficient planning for setting up sewage treatment plants (STP) leading to non-completion of work,

[27] *₹ 7.28 crore was receivable from SVL against ₹ 7.73 crore from RAPL*

[28] *2006-07: 25 work orders for ₹ 7.15 crore; 2007-08: 49 work orders for ₹ 15.33 crore; 2008-09: 142 work orders for ₹ 103.45 crore; 2009-10: 65 work orders for ₹ 44.34 crore and 2010-11: 200 work orders for ₹ 85.79 crore*

non-obtaining of environmental clearance for setting up STPs, non-recovery of dues on execution of deposit works on behalf of other agencies.

2.2.10.1 *Failure to derive intended benefits from created asset*

Capacity of a Rail over-bridge constructed at a cost of ₹ 7.02 crore was compromised restricting its usefulness

In order to facilitate connectivity of the Railway Colony and the surrounding areas of Siliguri junction station with the main city, SJDA decided (October 2006) to construct a Railway Over Bridge (ROB) for vehicular traffic up to six wheeler and 10 ton capacity with foot path for use of pedestrians, on deposit work basis through Railways. The Railway authority submitted (October 2006) estimate of ₹ 4.77 crore and SJDA paid ₹ 4.62 crore in August 2008 and May 2010. The work was started in October 2008 and was completed in October 2010 with an escalated cost of ₹ 7.02 crore.

SJDA pointed out (October 2010) the Railway authority that excessive vibration and lateral sway were noticed from the opening day of the bridge. The Railway authority admitted (October 2010) that some minor vibration was noticed during passing of goods train (on the tracks below) and during passing of light vehicles. They also stated that further strengthening of the bridge was being planned. However, SJDA did not pursue the matter with the Railway authority.

Subsequently, a nine feet high beam was erected on both sides of the bridge to restrict six wheelers. The ROB (for six wheeler and 10 ton capacity) created at a cost of ₹ 7.02 crore proved insufficient. Further, foot-path on ROB was not constructed and people from either side could not cross the bridge safely. Thus, in spite of spending ₹ 4.72 crore, purpose of the bridge was not fully achieved, as SJDA failed to pursue the issue with the Railway authority. The CEO, SJDA accepted (July 2011) the audit contention.



ROB without Foot Path at Siliguri with the beam for restricting six wheelers

2.2.10.2 *Implementation of Mahananda River Conservation Plan*

Under Mahananda River Conservation Plan (MRCP) Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) were to be constructed to ensure proper treatment of sewerage water of Siliguri and surrounding areas before discharge to river Mahananda. Accordingly, SJDA awarded (July and August 2010) work orders for ₹ 6.92 crore for construction of three Sewage Treatment Plants (STP: I, II & III)[29] at three different places to three different agencies with the stipulation that the work

[29] *STP-I: Right bank of Mahananda river, STP II: Left bank of Mahananda river and STP III: Dabgram*

Construction of none of the STPs on Mahananda fructified due to deficiencies in planning

should be completed within four to six months from the date of issue of work orders. However, STP-II & III, started in July 2010, had not been commissioned even after sixteen months from the date of issue of work orders, as works of the main pumping stations were not completed as of October 2011. Such delays were attributed by SJDA Authority to monsoon, encroachment of land, lapses of contractor, etc. Construction of STP-I had not been started as of October 2011, as the required land had not been transferred in the name of SJDA by the L&LR Department. Although, SJDA took up (November 2010) the matter with L&LR Department, no progress was noticed as of October 2011.

Further, another work for laying of trunk sewer line along the right bank of river Mahananda under MRCP was taken up in October 2007 through M/s Makintosh Burn Ltd at a cost of ₹ 1.93 crore though title of the land for construction of STP-I had not been transferred in favour of SJDA. The work due to be completed within October 2008 remained suspended as of October 2011. The contractor was, however, paid ₹ 0.67 crore towards earth excavation work, cement/reinforced concrete work, spreading of river bed materials and fixing/fitting work etc. Thus, incurring of expenditure of ₹ 0.67 crore towards laying of sewer line proved to be an idle investment. Moreover, possibility of deterioration in the condition of the sewer line with passage of time could not be ruled out.

SJDA stated (November 2011) that delay in completion of STP II and III was due to delay in receiving possession of land from Housing and Land & Land Reforms Departments and due to removal of encroachments, heavy monsoon, etc. It was further intimated that vigourous persuasion was going on for having possession of requisite land from L&LR Department. The reply was not tenable as the decision (February 2007) to construct sewer lines before possession of land was not justifiable.

- ***Environmental clearance not obtained***

Ministry of Environment and Forest, GoI notified (September 2006) a list of projects or activities including construction of Common Effluent Treatment Plants which required prior environmental clearance from the Pollution Controlling authorities. Any construction without obtaining appropriate pollution clearance certificate would therefore frustrate the ultimate purpose of MRCP.

Scrutiny of records revealed that SJDA, in violation of GoI's instruction *ibid*, did not obtain environmental clearance from the appropriate authority before construction of the three Sewage Treatment Plants, indicating its indifference towards environment as well as statutory obligations.

SJDA stated (November 2011) that necessary action would be taken for obtaining required permission from proper authority as well as for early completion of the STPs.

2.2.10.3 Non-recovery of dues on execution of deposit works

SJDA expended ₹ 4.48 crore on deposit works in excess of amount deposited by other agencies

SJDA executed construction works on behalf of various Government Departments, Municipalities and other local bodies on 'Deposit' basis. The cost of 'Deposit Works' is required to be borne by the requiring bodies concerned. SJDA is required to review the work monthly to see that no expenditure is incurred in excess of the deposit obtained. If any excess is anticipated, expenditure on the work should be restricted to the deposit received till acceptance of the additional expenses of the party is obtained and additional funds are deposited.

Scrutiny revealed that an amount of ₹ 12.13 crore was spent by the SJDA against receipt of ₹ 7.65 crore during 2006-11 in respect of 17 works as detailed in ***Appendix 2.2.1***. Expenditure of ₹ 4.48 crore incurred in excess of the deposit was not received from the requiring bodies by SJDA as of July 2011.

SJDA, while accepting the audit observation, intimated (July 2011) that correspondence was on with the concerned departments for obtaining additional funds as early as possible.

2.2.11 Internal Control

Inadequacies in internal control were observed in budget preparation, financial management and operational control

Internal Control is an integral component of an organisation's management to provide reasonable assurance that the operations are carried out economically, effectively and efficiently to achieve the organisational objectives.

Audit noticed the following inadequacies in internal controls:

Budgetary controls in SJDA were deficient as indicated by delays in submission of budget and significant deviation of actuals from the budget. Retention of substantial funds in savings bank accounts depriving SJDA of interest income of ₹ 0.32 crore reflects lack of financial control. Absence of controls were evident as SJDA failed to chalk out a repayment schedule although principal loan and interest amounting to ₹ 115.43 crore was overdue for repayment to GoWB.

Further, as per PW code, any construction work, estimates of which exceeds ₹ 1.25 crore, requires sanction of Chief Engineer (CE). Test-check, however, showed that out of 10 such works, technical approval of three were obtained from CE (Construction Board), PWD, while the remaining seven were approved by SE, SJDA. The Authority stated (July 2011) that the same had to be done as SE was the highest technical authority under SJDA. In the exit conference it was intimated that Government received proposal for sanction of post of CE in SJDA. Principal Secretary, however, opined that such cases should have been referred to outside agencies with appropriate technical expertise, like Engineering College authorities.

The deficiencies in financial and operational management were indicative of Departmental monitoring over functioning of SJDA, despite the Board of the Authority being represented by Minister and Principal Secretary of the Urban Development Department.

2.2.12 Conclusion

The objective of planning and development of SJDA was adversely affected as SJDA, ignoring its statutory responsibility to prepare Land Use and Development Control Plan within two years of notification, did not prepare the same in respect of substantial part of its notified area, even after seven to 31 years of notifications. As a result, development works undertaken by SJDA did not have the desired linkage with long term development plan.

Budget management was flawed as would be evident from instances of delays of 29 months and 17 months in sending budget proposals to the Department. Instances of non-initiation and abandonment of works due to non-receipt of Budget allotments were also noticed.

Lack of internal controls over realisation of revenue led to loss on account of unrealised toll charges, rents, etc. Retention of heavy cash balances in bank savings and current accounts without gainfully investing them in term deposits led to loss of possible additional interest.

Indifference towards financial interest of the Authority was also apparent from instances of non-registration of acquisition of 462.43 acres of land, acquisition of excess land than requisitioned by a requiring body, transfer of land in excess of actual acquisition to a requiring body free of cost. Besides, 48.748 acres of land acquired at ₹ 7.83 crore was under encroachments

In the absence of comprehensive policy for fixation of prices for leasing out of land, SJDA often took arbitrary decisions resulting in loss of revenue owing to allotment of land at reduced rate, extending undue favour to lessees.

Execution of developmental projects in PPP model failed to yield the intended benefits due to indifferent approach of the Authority in taking timely action.

The deficiencies in financial and operational management were indicative of inadequate departmental monitoring over functioning of SJDA, though the Government was represented in the board of the Authority by the concerned Minister and Principal Secretary of the Urban Development Department.

Recommendations

- ***SJDA should take immediate action for preparation of Land Use and Development Control Plan for entire notified planning area in a time-bound manner.***

- ***SJDA should seriously pursue realisation of funds from Departments/bodies on behalf of which it is undertaking the deposit work and should prepare cash flow statement to assess the requirement of funds so as to allow gainful investment of surplus funds.***

- ***Comprehensive policy for determining lease allotment/value of land should be adopted to avoid extra payment/loss on this account.***

- ***The Urban Development Department should actively monitor the functioning of the SJDA and provide necessary guidance/instructions, wherever necessary.***

Chapter 3: Compliance Audit

3.1 Audit of non-compliance with Rules and Regulations

For sound financial administration and financial control it is essential that expenditure conforms to financial rules, regulations and orders issued by the competent authorities. This not only prevents irregularities, misappropriation and frauds, but also helps in maintaining financial discipline.

In the course of audit of State Government Departments and their functionaries, various cases of non-compliance with departmental codes and manuals, Government orders/rules as well as non-adherence to the stipulations imposed by various scheme guidelines etc. were noticed. Some major cases of deviations from norms/rules are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. As these were arising only out of test-check of some offices, the Government should ascertain occurrence of similar cases in other departments/districts and evolve adequate mechanism to arrest these irregularities.

PUBLIC WORKS (ROADS) DEPARTMENT

3.1.1 Unfruitful and avoidable expenditure

Failure to adhere to technical norms in road construction and lacunae in prior investigation resulted in unfruitful expenditure of ₹ 2.13 crore and avoidable expenditure of ₹ 0.92 crore

Specifications for roads and bridges works of Indian Road Congress (IRC) and Schedule of Rates of Public Works (Roads) Department[1] (PWRD) stipulate that laying of Water Bound Macadam (WBM) over an existing bituminous layer should be avoided since it may cause internal drainage of the pavement at the interface of the two layers. However, in case laying of WBM is absolutely necessary, it is desirable to pick out the existing bituminous layers completely before laying of WBM. Furthermore, before undertaking any strengthening work it is essential to conduct detailed investigations to find out the profile of the existing crust and design the proposed crust thickness.

Scrutiny revealed (February 2011) that the Superintending Engineer, State Highway Circle-VI awarded (July 2007) the work of strengthening of Barjora-Maliara-Durlavpur Road (18.20 km stretch) to two agencies at the tendered amount of ₹ 5.29 crore for completion by November 2007. The scope of work *inter alia* included laying of two layers of 75 mm WBM with stone metal consolidation, 50 mm Bituminous Macadam (BM) as base course and 20 mm mix seal surfacing as wearing course. The work was completed in April 2008 at a cost of ₹ 6.11 crore. Departmental inspection revealed (June 2008) that the road was severely damaged within two months of the completion of the work *i.e* within the defect liability period of one year. The contractors initially started (June 2008) repairing of the damages but later refused (September 2008) to repair stating that the damages were due to failure of sub grade and presence of rigid pavement underneath the WBM layers. An

[1] *Section 404.3.1 of IRC and clause B 7.3.1 of general specification of the Schedule of Rates, Public Works (Roads) Directorate.*

Enquiry Committee headed by the Chief Engineer, Planning and Quality Assurance (the Committee) to investigate the premature damage of the road work attributed (September 2009) it to the existence of underneath hard bituminous layer of average thickness of 100 mm which were not taken into consideration at the time of project preparation. As per the recommendations of the Committee an estimate of ₹ 8.59 crore was prepared (November 2009) in phase-I for special repair of the entire road. The estimate proposed for picking out the entire hard crust of 6.35 km (200 metre to 700 metre of each kilometre of the entire stretch) of the severely damaged stretches of the road. The estimate was yet to be approved (August 2011) by the Department.

Audit also observed that the Executive Engineer, Bankura Highway Division did not carry out the required detailed investigations to find out the existing crust composition and design the pavement accordingly before taking up of the strengthening work. The WBM was laid without picking up the underneath bituminous layer. Consequently, the entire stretch (18.20 km) of the newly strengthened road surface got damaged. Pending approval of the said special repair work, the division incurred an expenditure of ₹ 0.92 crore on patch repair of the entire stretch of the road between January and December 2010 to make the road trafficable.

Thus, Department's failure to adhere to IRC and PWRD specifications regarding conduct of detailed investigation before strengthening work rendered the expenditure of ₹ 2.13 crore[2] on strengthening work unfruitful besides avoidable expenditure of ₹ 0.92 crore on repairs of 6.35 km stretch. The Department stated (October 2011) that action was being taken on the basis of recommendations of an Enquiry Committee constituted to investigate the matter.

PUBLIC WORKS AND PUBLIC WORKS (ROADS) DEPARTMENTS

3.1.2 Avoidable expenditure in works under RIDF Scheme

In disregard of the RIDF guidelines two Departments incurred an avoidable expenditure of ₹ 1.47 crore on road repair within the defect liability period, allowed price escalation of ₹ 0.33 crore in a bridge work and extended undue favour of ₹ 0.43 crore to the contractors by allowing longer road carriage and use of costlier bitumen.

National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) sanctions loans under Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) for improvement of rural roads and bridges. Twenty seven divisions in the Public Works Department (PWD) and Public Works (Roads) Department (PWRD) responsible for maintenance of rural roads were audited during 2010-11 to examine whether the works under RIDF loan were executed in accordance with the prescribed guidelines. The results of audit are enumerated below:

3.1.2.1 Non-inclusion of performance guarantee clause in work agreement

Revised guidelines for schemes under RIDF issued (May 2002) by the Finance Department, Government of West Bengal stipulated that performance

[2] *₹ 6.11 crore / 18.20 X 6.35*

guarantee for three years after completion of work should be obtained from the agencies for the schemes worth ₹ 1 crore and above. Accordingly, the Department was required to incorporate suitable clauses relating to the performance guarantee in the contract agreement as a safeguard against the defaulting contractors.

Superintending Engineer, Eastern Circle, PWD (SE/EC) awarded (February 2006) the strengthening and shouldering work of Barasat- Basirhat Road (26.40 km stretch) under RIDF-XI to a contractor at ₹ 6.11 crore for completion by August 2007. The work was completed in August 2007 at a cost of ₹ 5.28 crore. The terms and conditions of the contract included a defect liability period of three years from the date of completion of the work. In case of any defect detected during this period, the agency would be liable to rectify the defect at its own cost. The contract, however, did not include any performance guarantee clause for submission of bank guarantee by the contractor for recovery of the cost towards repairing of defective works from the defaulting contractor as envisaged in the RIDF guidelines.

Audit scrutiny revealed (June 2010) that the road was damaged within March 2008 within the defect liability period. But, the agency did not take up any repair work. Consequently, the Division incurred ₹ 1.63 crore on patch repair and special repair work to maintain the road trafficable between April 2009 and February 2010 on the same stretch of the road.

The Department served (June 2010) a notice to the contractor to deposit the cost of repair, but did not initiate further legal action. However, it forfeited the earnest money of ₹ 0.12 crore and credited (February 2011) to the Government account. The final bill valuing ₹ 0.04 crore had been lying with the division. The chances of recovery of the balance amount of ₹ 1.47 crore from the contractor remained bleak due to non-incorporation of any enabling provision of "Performance Guarantee" in the tender agreement in violation of the RIDF guidelines.

The Department stated (July 2011) that the Division was compelled to take up the repair work due to non-trafficable condition of the road and it was not possible to realise the cost from the agency due to hike in cost of bitumen. The reply was not tenable as the Department failed to recover the cost of repair for want of any performance guarantee.

3.1.2.2 Inclusion of cost-escalation clause beyond the ambit of RIDF guidelines

Para 17 of revised guidelines (May 2002) of RIDF schemes stipulate that time and cost over-run and the consequent cost escalation will not be permitted.

Superintending Engineer, State Highway Circle-III (SE/SHC-III), PWRD, Siliguri awarded (November 2002) construction of bridge over Kalindri river at Madiaghat under RIDF-VII to an agency at a cost of ₹ 8.18 crore for completion by May 2005. The work was completed in February 2006 at a cost of ₹ 8.46 crore including payment on cost escalation to the tune of ₹ 32.52 lakh.

Audit scrutiny (December 2010) revealed that even though the RIDF guidelines prohibit payment of cost escalation, the SE/SHC-III included cost

escalation clause in respect of labour, material and POL in the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) issued in June 2002. The NIT also stipulated that admissibility of such cost escalation was subject to the approval of the Government. The SE, however, entered into (September 2002) an agreement with the contractor including the clause of escalation without obtaining Government's approval. The Government accorded *post-facto* approval (February 2003) towards acceptance of the tender subject to the condition that no payment due to escalation would be allowed. However, the contractor on completion of the work claimed (March 2006) escalation based on the relevant clause of the NIT forming part of the contract and the Joint Secretary, PWRD paid (November 2010) ₹ 32.52 lakh to the agency on account of price escalation.

Thus, in violation of RIDF guidelines and the conditions of Government sanction, SE/SHC-III had irregularly included escalation clause in the tender document, which led to an avoidable expenditure of ₹ 32.52 lakh on account of undue payment of price escalation to the agency.

3.1.2.3 Undue favour to contractors by allowing longer road carriage and use of costlier bitumen in the tender

Superintending Engineer, State Highway Circle-IV (SE/SHC-IV), Siliguri PWRD awarded (April 2007) widening and strengthening work of two roads[3] in North Bengal to two contractors at a total cost of ₹ 13.95 crore for completion by October 2008. The estimate was technically sanctioned by the Chief Engineer, PWRD. The works were completed (April and June 2008) at a total cost of ₹ 13.95 crore.

Audit scrutiny revealed (December 2010) that the contracted rates of Bituminous Macadam (BM) and Mix Seal Surfacing (MSS) in the two tenders included longer road carriage for procuring packed bitumen of 60/70 grade from the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) depot at Uluberia which is located at the southern part of the State. The SE had allowed carriage for a longer distance (705 km and 677 km) from the Uluberia depot, although the same was available at Siliguri depot (located in North Bengal) of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL), which was only 52 km and 59 km away from the work sites. Scrutiny of delivery challans of 735 MT bitumen produced to Audit (out of 1109 MT of bitumen used in these two works), however, revealed that the bitumen was purchased from the HPCL depot at Siliguri. Delivery challans of the balance 374 MT of bitumen used in the work was not produced to Audit. Further scrutiny of another reach (0 kmp to 6 kmp and 8 kmp to 10 kmp of the GMS road), in the same road, revealed that during the same period the Division considered carriage of bitumen from Siliguri depot in the estimate.

Furthermore, the rates of the bituminous items in the estimates included cost of carriage and 60/70 grade bitumen. However, as per Appendix-4 of IRC guidelines on selection of the grade of bitumen, penetration grade 80/100 having lower viscosity should be used in high altitude. Moreover, use of

[3] *Peshoke- Mungpoo road (0 to 17 km) and Garidhutra- Mirik- Simanabusti (GMS) Road (from 30 to 45 km)*

80/100 bitumen is also cost effective[4]. Scrutiny of records also revealed that 200 MT of 80/100 bitumen was purchased and utilised in the work out of available challan of 735 MT of bitumen supplied from the Siliguri depot.

In view of availability of the required bitumen at Siliguri Depot, the Department was required to frame estimates considering road carriage from Siliguri instead of longer carriage distance from Uluberia. Besides, considering the suitability and economy, the Department could have considered 80/100 grade bitumen instead of 60/70 grade. Thus, due to imprudent decision of the CE to allow longer road carriage and consideration of costlier grade bitumen in the tender estimate, the rates of BM and MSS were inflated, which resulted in undue benefit of ₹43.28 lakh[5] extended to the contractors.

The Department stated (October 2011) that action was being taken on the basis of recommendations of an Enquiry Committee constituted to investigate all the three cases.

HOUSING DEPARTMENT

3.1.3 Avoidable expenditure in housing project

Lack of monitoring and non-adherence to the BIS specification in testing of concrete by the West Bengal Housing Board led to avoidable payment of ₹ 1.87 crore as compensation to a contractor on a housing project.

Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) code stipulates that samples from fresh concrete shall be collected, cured and be tested on 28 days in accordance with IS:516-1959 for testing the strength of concrete. In all cases, the 28 days comprehensive strength shall alone be the criterion for acceptance or rejection of the concrete. Samples of at least three test specimens should be collected for testing. Additional cubes may also be collected to determine the duration of curing and checking the testing error.

West Bengal Housing Board (WBHB), an autonomous body under the Housing Department entrusted with construction and outright sale of flats, awarded (June and July 2005) construction of five HIG[6] buildings to an agency through two separate tenders at a total cost of ₹ 26.87 crore for completion by March 2008. As of May 2011, the work was in progress and the contractor was paid ₹ 27.75 crore up to May 2011 including compensation of ₹ 1.26 crore. As per agreement the contractor was required to carry out the required tests conforming to the BIS at his own cost. The Engineer-in- charge (EIC) of the project was responsible for collection and testing of cubes as per BIS code.

Audit scrutiny (October 2010) of the cube register maintained by EIC for monitoring and supervision of the test of cubes revealed that mandatory tests on concrete as per BIS code was not conducted by the agency in 26 out of

---

[4] *As per schedule of rates of PWRD applicable to these works the rate of bitumen of 60/70 grade and 80/100 grade at Siliguri Depot were ₹ 25062 and ₹ 23114 per metric tonnes*

[5] *₹ 21.35 lakh on account of extra carriage and ₹ 21.93 lakh for use 60/70 grade of bitumen.*

[6] *Three number of ground+ Underground+ eleven storied buildings and two number of ground+ Under-ground+ fifteen storied High Income Group (HIG) buildings of Eastern High at New Town.*

129 columns in three towers. Further, when concrete in 14 columns (out of 102 columns for which mandatory test on concrete was conducted) in those towers could not achieve the desired strength as per BIS specification on 28 days, rechecking of testing errors, if any, could not be conducted due to inadequate collection of concrete samples. As a result, the work had to be suspended in December 2005.

Consequently, the agency engaged (January 2006) two testing organisations[7] to ascertain the quality of the concrete. As sufficient number of concrete cube blocks was not preserved for retesting, non-destructive rebound hammer test was conducted, which brought out contradictory and inconclusive results of concrete strength. Meanwhile, with a view to examine the structures in question and suggest remedial measures, the WBHB constituted (February 2006) a Technical Committee headed by the Vice Chairman, WBHB which recommended (May 2006) demolition of columns where either cube crushing strength was not available (26 columns) or fell short of the design strength (14 columns) on 28 days. The WBHB again entrusted (September 2006) the Civil Engineering Department of the Indian Institute of Technology, Khargapur to carry out the test on the structures in question to be sure about the structural safety of the columns, which also could not give (November 2006) any conclusive result.

Finally, the agency was instructed (April 2007) to resume work on those Towers after dismantling the columns as suggested by the Technical Committee. The columns were re-constructed by the contractor at their own cost. Audit observed that due to lack of technical supervision and monitoring on the part of EIC regular testing and collection of adequate samples of concrete could not be ensured. As a result, the work remained suspended for 15 months and the WBHB had to pay ₹ 1.87 crore[8] to the agency for rise in price of building materials, compensation towards damages on tools and plants, shuttering materials and cost of steel jacketing[9]. The suspension of work by 15 months and consequent extra expenditure could have been avoided had there been adequate monitoring for collection and testing of concrete as per BIS code.

Thus, poor monitoring coupled with non-adherence to the BIS code resulted in avoidable expenditure to the tune of ₹ 1.87 crore.

3.1.4 Undue benefit to the contractors

WBHB paid compensation on variation of cost of building material in contravention to the terms of the agreement resulting in undue benefit of ₹ 2.93 crore to the contractors.

WBHB had taken up (between December 2006 and January 2008) construction of three[10] housing projects at a total cost of ₹ 29.76 crore. The

[7] *Civil Engineering Department of the Jadavpur University and National Test House.*

[8] *₹ 1.35 crore (for the works executed post 31.01.2008 in the enhanced rate of few items)+₹ 0.25crore (for damages and depreciation on tools and plants and shuttering materials) + ₹0.27 crore extra expenditure on steel jacketing.*

[9] *In tower 9, where floor slab above the concerned columns had already been cast steel jacketing with epoxy grouting were carried out by WBHB*

[10] *Matkal Nimta Housing Project (phase-II) at Birati, East Horizon Housing Project (Moon Beam) at New Town and Eastern Grove project at New Town.*

terms and conditions of the agreements *inter alia* stipulated that the agencies had to procure building material on their own and no claim on account of enhanced rates due to price fluctuations would be entertained during the period of the contract.

Audit scrutiny however, revealed that the project execution was delayed as the contractors refused to carry out the works and appealed for compensation due to abnormal price hike of building material. WBHB allowed compensation of ₹1.59 crore with effect from February 2008 and April 2008 based on the variation of cost of material as per current Schedule of Rate. It also decided to supply (February and April 2008) steel material departmentally to the agencies in respect of Matkal Nimta and Moon Beam projects at subsidised rates[11]. Audit scrutiny revealed that in the above two projects total 923.61 MT of steel material was issued departmentally at a subsidised rate with financial benefit of ₹ 1.34 crore.

Audit observed that the benefit of compensation was extended to the agencies on the condition that the works would be completed expeditiously within the stipulated time. However, only Moon Beam project was completed with a delay of 18 months and other two projects were yet (May 2011) to be completed defeating the very purpose for extending the benefit of compensation. Thus, the payment of compensation of ₹ 2.93 crore on variation of cost of the building materials in contravention of the terms of the agreements led to undue aid to the agencies.

The matter was referred to the Government in June 2011; no reply had been received (November 2011).

HOME (POLICE) DEPARTMENT

3.1.5 Improper deployment of police personnel

In violation of Police Regulation of Bengal and Government orders to take economic measures, the Superintendents of Police in North 24 Parganas and South 24 Parganas Districts unauthorisedly deployed Home Guard and National Volunteer Force at the residences of retired IPS officers for the services not related to security. Police cost of ₹ 0.70 crore was also not recovered during December 2006 to June 2011.

Police Regulation of Bengal (PRB) lays down the rules for deployment of police guards on permanent or temporary basis to Government organisation / private parties. According to the rules, the Superintendent of Police (SP) may at his discretion depute temporary police guards to private parties, provided that, such guards should be in excess of the sanctioned allotment of the district and proper sanction of Government for such deployment has been obtained. To economise Government expenditure the Finance (Budget) Department issued (June 2008) instructions against posting of Home Guard (HG)/National Volunteer Force (NVF) in the residence of any officer, except where it is specifically needed for security reasons and approval of Chief Secretary of the State has been obtained. Further, in October 2009, Department of Civil Defence decided in principle that no HG should be attached with any officer

[11] *Steel materials were issued departmentally at a recoverable rate of ₹28500 against the prevailing market rate of ₹43000*

after his superannuation. Accordingly necessary instructions were issued (January 2011) to all district SPs for withdrawal of HGs attached to any superannuated officer.

Test check (February and July 2011) of the records (December 2006 to June 2011) of the SPs, North 24 Parganas and South 24 Parganas revealed that police personnel/ HG/NVF were unauthorisedly deployed in the residences of retired IPS officers/ higher officers in North 24 Parganas and South 24 Parganas Districts. However, no approval of the Chief Secretary was obtained for such deployment. Besides, police cost was also not recovered from them. The SPs in reply stated that officers of the rank of DIG and above either in service or retired are entitled to have a security guard for protection of his life. Scrutiny of disposition register, however, revealed that 37 HG/NVF were deployed in the residences of retired IPS officers as Residential Telephone Operator cum Messenger (RTCM)/ Official Telephone Operator cum Messenger (OTCM) during December 2006 and June 2011. Deployment of the HGs/NVFs as telephone operator and messenger for retired officers can not be attributed to security reason. Police cost of ₹ 0.70 crore[12] in respect of 37 HG/NVFs for the period of their deployment was also not recovered from those retired officers. Moreover, there were shortages in HG and NVF cadres in two districts[13].

Consequent upon audit observations, SP, South 24 Parganas directed (July 2011) the retired officers to release the NVF personnel attached with them with immediate effect.

Thus, improper deployment of HG/NVF by the SPs of North 24 Parganas and South 24 Parganas at the residence of retired IPS officers for reasons not related to security led to unauthorised diversion of force from their primary objective of maintaining law and order. Cost to the State exchequer, due to non-realisation of police cost was ₹ 0.70 crore.

The matter was referred to the Department in July 2011; reply is, however, awaited (November 2011).

HOME (POLICE) AND HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS

3.1.6 Purchase of stationery at rates higher than maximum retail price

Procurement of stationery and other articles at prices higher than the maximum retail prices under Home (Police) Department and Health & Family Welfare Department in violation of financial norms resulted in excess expenditure of ₹ 57 lakh by 14 Drawing and Disbursing Officers.

Clauses 4.121 and 4.122 of West Bengal Treasury Rules (WBTR) stipulate that every Government officer shall exercise the same vigilance in respect to petty contingent expenses as a person of ordinary prudence may be expected

[12]

Districts	*No. of HG/NVFs*	*Police cost (Rupees in lakh)*
North 24 parganas	*28*	*45.13*
South 24 parganas	*09*	*24.82*

Of ₹ 0.70 crore, including ₹ 66.31 lakh pertaining to the period June 2008 to June 2011

[13] *North 24 Parganas: 18 per cent in HG cadre and 44 per cent in NVF cadre as of January 2011; South 24 Parganas: 63 per cent in NVF cadre as of July 2011*

to exercise in spending his own money. The rules also stipulate that the rates of items included in a contingent bill should be fair and reasonable. Further, the Standard of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977 *inter alia* provides that no retail dealer or other person including manufacturer, packer or wholesale dealer shall make any sale of any commodity in packaged form at a price exceeding the retail sale price thereof.

Scrutiny (between February 2008 and June 2011) of the records of 13 DDOs[14] under the Home (Police) Department and one DDO[15] under Health & Family Welfare Department pertaining to the period 2007-08 to 2010-11, however, revealed that the above Rules were being flouted while making purchase of various stationery and other items. It was noticed that during 2007-08 to 2010-11, the DDOs purchased various articles at prices higher than the maximum retail prices (MRP) printed on the packages. Test check of purchase price[16] of various articles available in the stores of those offices *vis-a-vis* the MRP printed on the packages revealed that the 14 DDOs incurred extra expenditure of ₹ 57 lakh ***(Appendix 3.1)*** between April 2007 and March 2011 on this count.

While 11 DDOs admitted the audit observation and stated that the aspect would be taken into consideration during future purchases, the SP, Howrah contended (August 2010) that the contracts were made for a year and the rates were quoted by the suppliers considering enhancement of cost price of each item in future. The SP, Howrah further stated that suppliers offered rates above MRPs considering the delays in making payments due to shortage of funds. The contention, however, is not tenable as Financial Rules do not authorise such enhancement of price. Besides, delayed payment due to shortage of funds indicates financial mismanagement on the part of the Department. Two other DDOs[17] did not furnish reply.

Thus, purchase of various articles at rates higher than the MRPs by 14 DDOs under Home (Police) Department and Health & Family Welfare Department in violation of financial norms led to extra expenditure of ₹ 57 lakh.

On being referred to by Audit, West Bengal Police Directorate instructed (March 2011) all subordinate offices not to purchase articles at rates higher than the MRP. Formal responses of the two Departments are, however, awaited (November 2011).

[14] *Superintendents of Police (SP) Bankura, Dakshin Dinajpur, Howrah, Malda, North 24 Parganas, Nadia, Paschim Medinipur, Purulia, South 24 Parganas, Jalpaiguri, Hooghly and Inspector General of Police (Training), Police Training College, Barrackpore, Additional Director General & Inspector General of Police (Intelligence Bureau)*

[15] *Superintendent, Pavlov Hospital, Calcutta*

[16] *As ascertained from copies of bills, challans and stock register*

[17] *Additional Director General & Inspector General of Police (Intelligence Bureau) and SP Nadia*

3.2 Audit against propriety/ expenditure without justification

Audit against propriety/ expenditure without justification endeavours to bring to light every matter which appears to involve improper expenditure or waste of public money or stores even though the accounts themselves may be in order and no obvious irregularity has been committed. The objective is to support a reasonably high standard of public financial morality and sound financial administration and devotion to Government's financial interests.

However, in many occasions instances came to notice where decision of the Department or functionaries was questionable from the point of view of propriety. In the succeeding paragraphs some major instances of Government expenditure becoming either unfruitful or wasteful or were tantamount to undue benefit to some outside agencies are discussed.

HOME (POLICE) DEPARTMENT

3.2.1 Procurement of unsuitable police vehicles for extremist affected areas

The Department procured two troop carriers worth ₹ 91.73 lakh without considering their suitability resulting in the vehicles not being used in anti-terrorist operations for more than two years and consequent blockage of funds.

M/s Ural India Limited (Company), a joint venture company[18] of West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation, is a heavy vehicle manufacturing company at Haldia. On being approached by the Company, the Chief Secretary instructed (February 2007) Director General & Inspector General of Police (Police Directorate), Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) and Fire and Emergency Services Department to assess the suitability of vehicles for use in those Departments. While both KMC and Fire Services Department opined (August 2007) that the vehicle was unsuitable[19] for their purpose, a troop carrier vehicle was demonstrated (April 2007) by the Company in the police lines of Superintendent of Police (SP), Paschim Medinipur.

In his reports (April and December 2007), the SP, Paschim Medinipur intimated that the vehicle had no bomb blast proof technology. Moreover, the vehicle was too big to be used along the narrow roads. It was also pointed out that field trials of the vehicle could not be completed as the company had not agreed to keep the vehicle with SP for seven days. The SP opined that the vehicle should be procured only if found effective against land mine explosion, as the same was to be used in extremist affected areas. Similarly, the Police Directorate expressed (March 2009) reservation about the efficacy of the vehicle on account of high cost, inconclusive field trials and non-availability of technical certificate regarding the vehicle being

[18] *Between URALAZ of Russia, Motijug Group and WBIDC*

[19] *KMC intimated that the vehicle was not suitable for its purpose owing to high price, lesser volumetric capacity, higher operational and maintenance cost, difficulties in driving in normal city condition; while Fire Services Department opined that the vehicle was too big to maneuver on Kolkata road.*

mine-proof, and the fact that the vehicle could be repaired only by the supplier. Further, neither were the vehicles under DGS&D Rate Contract nor was open tender called for procurement. Despite the reservations expressed by the SP, Paschim Medinipur and Police Directorate, the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department viewed (April 2009) that suitability of the vehicles could be assessed after their procurement on a trial basis.

With the approval of Home (Police) Department, Police Directorate procured (April 2009) two vehicles at a cost of ₹ 91.73 lakh for use in anti-terrorist operations in affected districts and deployed those vehicles with SP Paschim Medinipur and SP Purulia. Scrutiny (December 2010) of records of SP Paschim Medinipur revealed that the vehicle was not utilised for a single operation since its deployment (May 2009) as it did not have bomb blast proof technology and due to its low fuel economy and inability to move in narrow roads and forests due to its large size.

SP, Purulia stated (May 2011) that the vehicle allotted to Purulia could not be utilised in operation against extremists due to enormity of its size and consequent inability to move along narrow roads in the hilly terrain. He further intimated that the back of the vehicle being open, it was unsuitable for use in operations and was being utilised for shifting of camps and movement of force necessitated during major law and order problems in the district.

Thus, procurement of two unsuitable troop carrier vehicles worth ₹ 91.73 lakh ignoring the opinion of district police authorities, resulted in the vehicles not being used for anti-terrorist operations for more than two years since their procurement and blockage of funds.

The Department in its reply (July 2011) stated that no irregularities had been found in procurement of MPVs, as these had been procured directly from manufacturers. The reply, however, failed to justify purchase of vehicles unfit for the avowed purpose.

PUBLIC WORKS (ROADS) DEPARTMENT

3.2.2 Avoidable expenditure owing to overlapping of works

Superintending Engineer, State Highway Circle-VI undertook the 'Improvement of Riding Quality of Panskura Durgachak Road' immediately before taking up of the Widening and Strengthening work on an overlapping stretch to utilise the fund available under the Twelfth Finance Commission, which resulted in avoidable expenditure of ₹ 1.38 crore on bituminous items of earlier work.

Superintending Engineer (SE), State Highway Circle (SHC)-VI, Medinipur awarded (14 November 2008) the work of Improvement of Riding Quality[20]

[20] *Smooth riding capability of road by mending depressions, maintaining lines and grades and then covering the road with wearing course.*

(IRQ) on 10 kilometres (km) stretches (35 km to 41 km and 44 km to 48 km) of Panskura Durgachak Road at a cost of ₹ 2.49 crore to four contractors for completion by March 2009 under fund from the Twelfth Finance Commission grant. The work *inter alia* mainly consisted of repairing of pot holes and laying of bituminous courses like Bituminous Macadam (BM), Premixed Carpet and Premixed Seal Coat on that stretch of the road. The work was completed by February 2009 and the agencies were paid ₹ 2.61crore in January and February 2009.

Scrutiny of records, however, revealed (February 2010) that the same SE awarded (February 2009) the work of Widening and Strengthening (W&S) of 32.20 Km (29.90 km to 62.10 km) of the same road to an agency at a cost of ₹ 46.55 crore for completion within 24 months. The estimate of the work was prepared in April 2008 and the administrative approval was obtained (12 November 2008) from Government of India under Central Roads Fund. The work *inter alia* mainly consisted of Stone Metal Consolidation (SMC), laying of BM as base/binder course and Semi Dense Bituminous Concrete (SDBC) or Mastic asphalt as wearing course on the entire stretch of the road including 10 km stretches in which IRQ was completed only in February 2009. The work was in progress (November 2011) with an expenditure of ₹ 16.43 crore.

Audit observed that there was no justification for awarding (14 November 2008) the IRQ work on the overlapping stretches of the road even after obtaining the administrative approval of W&S work (12 November 2008) which resulted in superimposition on bituminous courses of the earlier work by the latter. If any delay was apprehended for commencement of the W&S work, the pot holes and depression could have been made good by executing routine repair and maintenance works[21]. This indicated that the Department did not have any necessity or justification for taking up the IRQ work just before W&S work and could have kept the road traffic worthy between November 2008 and February 2009 by undertaking routine repair and maintenance works.

Scrutiny also revealed that the fund received (August 2008) by the division under the Twelfth Finance Commission Grant for the IRQ work was to be utilised within March 2009. To utilise the above fund within the financial year the division hastily undertook the IRQ work.

Thus, deficiency in planning by the Department led to avoidable expenditure of ₹ 1.38 crore on bituminous courses of the earlier work (IRQ) which were being superimposed by the latter work (W&S) on the same road stretches.

The Department stated (October 2011) that action was being taken on the basis of recommendations of the enquiry committee constituted to investigate the matter.

[21] *This work includes repairing of pot holes and patching of the distressed road surface as was done between July 2007 and September 2008 by incurring an expenditure of ₹ 33.82 lakh.*

PUBLIC HEALTH ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

3.2.3 *Infructuous expenditure in sinking of Rig Bored Tubewells*

Four Public Health Engineering Divisions sunk rig bored tube wells in the hard rocky parts of the State without ascertaining the availability of suitable aquifer from the concerned authorities. This led to an infructuous expenditure of ₹ 6.37 crore.

In the hard rocky parts of the Districts of Purulia, Bankura, Birbhum and western part of Bardhaman, ground water is accumulated in *restricted and limited*[22] manner due to heterogeneity in aquifer system. The Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) is entrusted with the function of supplying safe potable water to the people living in that part by sinking of rig bored tube wells (RBTWs). Though aquifers in these districts were rare and scarce[23], the PHED did not assess beforehand the availability of aquifer at the sites selected by the Zilla Parishads for successful sinking of RBTWs.

Audit scrutiny revealed that during 2004-11 the PHE Divisions[24] sunk 13049[25] RBTWs in those four districts at the sites selected by the respective Zilla Parishads without assessing the availability of potable ground water through the State Water Investigation Directorate (SWID), the authority competent to assess the quality and quantity of potable ground water in the State. Consequently, sinking of 1640[26] RBTWs failed due to non-availability of suitable aquifer. These also included 137 cases of repeat borings at the same selected sites although suitable aquifer was not available earlier. As a result, the Department incurred an expenditure of ₹ 6.37 crore on men and material on unsuccessful boring of RBTWs.

All the four divisional authorities accepted (April-June 2011) that the incidence of unsuccessful sinking of RBTWs could have been avoided had the sites been selected after obtaining technical guidance and support from the SWID.

Thus, due to failure in obtaining technical assistance from SWID to ascertain the availability of suitable aquifer before sinking of RBTWs, the Department had to incur an infructuous expenditure of ₹ 6.37 crore.

The matter was referred to the Government in June 2011 but reply has not yet been received (November 2011).

---

[22] *Source: Information furnished by State Water Investigation Directorate*
[23] *Source: Published materials of Central Ground Water Board, Government of India*
[24] *Purulia Mechanical Division (Purulia District), Bankura Mechanical Division (Bankura District), Bolpur Mechanical Division (Birbhum District) and Central Mechanical Division (Bardhaman District)*
[25] *2004-05=1444, 2005-06=2129, 2006-07=1679, 2007-08=2055, 2008-09=2034, 2009-10=1667 and 2010-11=2041*
[26] *2004-05−195, 2005-06−236, 2006-07−183, 2007-08−257, 2008-09−245, 2009-10−206 and 2010-11−318*

INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT

3.2.4 Loss due to imprudent release of loan

Industrial Reconstruction Department extended loan assistance to a sick private industrial unit ignoring non-viability of its revival plan and absence of any asset for collateral security. The unit was closed down in November 2006. The Department took no action for recovery of its dues. Resultantly, not only Government sustained loss of ₹ 1.10 crore, but the basic objective of revival of the unit did not fructify.

M/s Adhesive and Chemicals[27] (A&C), a sick small scale industrial (SSI) unit under private ownership, started suffering losses from 1989-90 onwards; the accumulated loss increased to ₹ 5.37 crore, the net worth stood at *minus* ₹ 4.96 crore and total liabilities stood at ₹ 5.47 crore in 2000-01. Value of fixed assets (₹ 0.44 crore) of A&C, which had already been mortgaged with Allahabad Bank, was far below its total borrowings of ₹ 4.81 crore as of March 2001. In April 2001, A&C approached Industrial Reconstruction (IR) Department with a revival scheme under 'West Bengal Industrial Renewal Scheme, 2001' (WBIRS).

Eligibility conditions for acceptance of any revival proposal under WBIRS *inter alia* mandated the support of financial institutions / banks. It was also stipulated that any soft loan granted by the State Government under the scheme had to be appropriately secured.

Records of IR Department showed that while communicating its view on the revival plan, Allahabad Bank had informed (September 2000) Government that given the financial assistance of over ₹ 2.60 crore already extended to A&C, it would not be in favour of any further exposure to A&C. The Bank further intimated (May 2001) that it would extend its help by way of re-schedulement of its earlier loan subject to arrangement of long term finance by A&C. Thus, there was no commitment from the Bank for releasing further loan to A&C. The cash flow for seven years from the year 2001-02 included in the revival plan, however, envisaged receipt of bank loans for sustaining business. The IR Department in concurrence with the Finance Department sanctioned (October 2001) a soft loan of ₹ 1.10 crore to meet the gap of resources followed by another loan of ₹ 0.10 crore[28] (March 2002) for liquidating the arrear sales tax dues of the unit as per provisions of WBIRS. The principal amount of the loans was repayable in eight years with a moratorium period of three years for the principal, while the interest (8.75 *per cent per annum*) had no moratorium period. Though A&C had no unencumbered assets to provide for reasonable collateral security, both the

[27] *Manufacturer and exporter of printing inks, reducers and thinners under the proprietorship of M/s. Alirhoma Chemicals Private Limited.*

[28] *The loan of ₹0.10 crore was not disbursed to A&C; rather it was directly adjusted in its commercial tax account*

loans were stated to have been secured by a *pari-passu* charge of an adequate amount of unencumbered assets ranking next to the charge in favour of Allahabad Bank.

A&C, however, failed to achieve the performance level envisaged in the revival plan owing to non-availability of need based working capital loan[29] from Bank and it was finally closed down in November 2006. Nothing was on record to show whether the Department had monitored the implementation of the revival plan. Though no part of the Government loan was repaid till closure, the Department took no legal action for recovery of its dues. Allahabad Bank, being the major stake holder, however, filed (August 2007) a case in Debt Recovery Tribunal for recovery of its dues (₹ 7.73 crore as of July 2007). Subsequently, the Government became (August 2009) an added party to the recovery proceedings. The Bank and A&C came to an out of the court settlement in May 2011, thereby leaving no scope for realisation of the dues of the Government with interest thereon.

Thus, despite being aware of the fact that bank had not been interested in providing loan assistance, essential for revival of A&C, and that the Government loan would not be secured in absence of any encumbrance free asset of the unit, Government released loan of ₹ 1.10 crore. The Department did not take any action for recovery of the loan given. This resulted in loss of Government money.

The Government stated (June and August 2011) that the loan had been sanctioned considering the views expressed by the bank regarding viability of the scheme. However, the reply was not acceptable as the bank expressed its inability to extend further loan required as per the revival plan of the unit. Release of Government loan was, therefore, against the tenets of financial prudence since without securing bank loan, success of the revival plan was remote.

[29] *Fund flow statement envisaged following incremental bank borrowings: ₹64.34 lakh in 2001-02, ₹28.83 lakh in 2002-03, ₹36.43 lakh in 2003-04, ₹33.18 lakh in 2004-05, ₹21.63 lakh in 2005-06, ₹1.03 lakh in 2006-07 and ₹0.02 lakh in 2007-08*

3.3 Persistent/ Pervasive irregularities

An irregularity is considered persistent if it is of continuing nature and occurs year after year. On the other hand, it becomes pervasive when it is prevailing in the entire system. The scope of this section is to bring to light certain irregularities of recurrent nature which have been noticed on several occasions during earlier audits as well as in many departments. Recurrence of such irregularities is not only indicative of lack of responsiveness of the Government, but also testifies absence of effective monitoring. Such lack of seriousness on the part of the Executive leads to deviations from the rules and regulations culminating in weakening of the quality of administration.

GENERAL

3.3.1 Irregularities in management of cash by Drawing & Disbursing Officers

Non-adherence to the provisions of Treasury and Financial Rules by 23 DDOs of six departments in nine districts resulted in financial irregularities including unadjusted vouchers, unauthorised advances from undisbursed cash, unexplained cash shortage, etc. amounting to ₹ 2.69 crore and retention of lapsed cheques amounting to ₹ 79.83 lakh

As per West Bengal Treasury Rules (WBTR), no money is to be drawn from the treasury unless it is required for immediate disbursement[30]. All financial transactions are to be recorded in the Cash Book of the respective units as soon as they occur, under proper attestation by the Drawing and Disbursing Officer (DDO). The cash book is required to be closed every day, while the head of the office is required to physically verify the cash balance at the end of each month and record a certificate to that effect. Bill-wise and date-wise analysis in respect of closing balance is also to be recorded[31].

Scrutiny of the records of 23 DDOs of six departments[32] in nine[33] districts disclosed financial irregularities due to non-compliance with the above provisions as shown in ***Appendix 3.2.*** Physical verification of cash conducted by these DDOs at the instance of Audit during July 2010 to May 2011 revealed actual total cash balance of ₹ 42.60 crore on the day of verification, against the aggregate cash book balance of ₹ 45.29 crore, indicating a shortage of ₹ 2.69 crore ***(Appendix 3.2).*** The shortages of cash was due to unadjusted vouchers (₹ 1.36 crore), advances from undisbursed cash (₹ 1.07 crore) and unexplained shortage / theft (₹ 0.26 crore).

---

[30] *Subsidiary Rules 229 under Treasury Rule 16*
[31] *Subsidiary Rules 31 under Treasury Rule 10*
[32] *Finance Department, Health & Family Welfare Department, Correctional Administration Department, Home (Police) Department, Land & Land Reforms Department & Agriculture Department.*
[33] *Bankura, Cooch Behar, Howrah, Jalpaiguri, Kolkata, Murshidabad, Nadia, North 24 Parganas and Uttar Dinajpur.*

It was noticed that ₹ 1.36 crore was paid by 12 DDOs[34] against cash receipts of purchases/expenses[35] which were termed as 'vouchers' and recorded in cash book. No bills were prepared / drawn for these expenses. These 'unadjusted vouchers' did not constitute cash balance.

Further, 13 DDOs[36] paid ₹ 1.07 crore out of undisbursed cash irregularly as temporary advances on account of travelling allowance, office expenses, VIP duties, buying Rail/Air tickets, etc. to different officials/staff, though such advances were to be made against regular budget provisions and through bills drawn from treasury.

During physical verification, 11 DDOs[37] failed to explain shortages of ₹ 24.71 lakh. There was also theft of ₹ 1.06 lakh in CMOH, Coochbehar which occurred on 26 September 1997. The amount is yet to be recovered/waived by the Department.

Cases of misutilisation of cash due to non-adherence to the provisions of WBTR by DDOs were mentioned repeatedly in the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the years ended March 1999 to March 2010[38]. Nevertheless, irregularities in management of cash continued due to lack of internal controls by the DDOs. The major defaulters were Principals of Kolkata Medical College (₹ 1.29 lakh) and R G Kar Medical College (₹ 3.13 lakh), Superintendent of Presidency Correctional Home (₹ 5.52 lakh), DMs of Jalpaiguri (₹ 4.69 lakh) and Nadia (₹ 2.32 lakh), MSVPs of Calcutta National Medical College and Hospital (₹ 0.72 lakh), NRS Medical College and Hospital (₹ 1.79 lakh) and R G Kar Medical College and Hospital (₹ 4.55 lakh) who unauthorisedly made temporary advances and incurred expenditure on different counts out of undisbursed cash balance.

Further, physical verification of cash of the Accounts Officer, West Bengal Secretariat, Finance (Accounts) Department revealed that 875 lapsed cheques amounting to ₹ 79.83 lakh, pertaining to various dates since 1976-77, were not delivered and were retained as cash as on 04 May 2011. These lapsed cheques reflected inflated expenditure, since, the amount had been drawn and shown as expenditure in treasury under respective Heads of Account, whereas, the same were still lying with the bank account of the DDO. Since these cheques had lost their currency, steps need to be taken either to revalidate the lapsed cheques for those which can be revalidated or attempts to be made to remit or refund the amount to the respective Heads of Account.

Thus, non-adherence to the provisions of Treasury and Financial Rules and inadequate internal controls over drawal and disbursement of cash by DDOs led

---

[34] *Sl. No. 1,3,4,5,6,7,9,10,12,15,16 & 17 of* **Appendix 3.2**

[35] *Office expenses, refreshment, contingencies, photocopying, automobiles, loading & unloading, medicines, etc.*

[36] *Sl. No. 1,3,5,10,12,13,14,16,17,18,20,22 & 23 of* **Appendix 3.2**

[37] *Sl. No. 2,3,4,9,10,11,16,17,19,20 & 21 of* **Appendix 3.2**

[38] *Para no. 3.31 of 1999-2000, Para no. 3.28 of 2000-01, Para no. 3.16 of 2001-02 , Para no. 4.5.6 of 2003-04, Para no. 4.6.1 of 2005-06, Para no. 4.6.5 of 2006-07, Para no.4.5.4 of 2007-08, Para no. 3.3.2 of 2008-09 & Para no. 3.3.1 of 2009-10.*

to serious financial irregularities and exposed the departments concerned to the risk of misappropriation of public money.

3.3.2 Lack of response of Government to audit

Principal Accountant General (Audit) (PAG) arranges to conduct periodical inspection of Government Departments to test-check transactions and verify the maintenance of important accounting and other records as per prescribed rules and procedures. These inspections are followed up with Inspection Reports (IRs) issued to the heads of offices inspected with copies to next higher authorities. Important irregularities and other points detected during inspection, which are not settled on the spot, find place in IRs.

Finance Department of Government of West Bengal, issued instructions (June 1982) for prompt response by the executive to the IRs issued by the PAG to ensure rectificatory action in compliance with the prescribed rules and procedures and secure accountability for the deficiencies, lapses, etc. noticed during inspection.

The heads of offices and next higher authorities are required to comply with observations contained in the IRs and rectify defects and omissions promptly and report compliance to PAG. Serious irregularities are also brought to the notice of the Government by the office of the PAG. A six monthly report showing the pendency of IRs is sent to the Principal Secretary/Secretary of the department to facilitate monitoring settlement of outstanding audit observations in the pending IRs.

Inspection Reports issued up to June 2011 relating to 428 offices in six departments (Land and Land Reforms, Agriculture, School Education, Technical Education and Training, Public Works and Housing Departments) disclosed that 1965 paragraphs relating to 611 IRs remained outstanding at the end of June 2011. Of these, 75 IRs containing 84 paragraphs had been lying unsettled for more than 10 years.

Department-wise and year-wise break-up of the outstanding IRs and Paragraphs are detailed in ***Appendix 3.3.***

These unsettled IRs contain 113 paragraphs involving serious irregularities like theft/defalcation/misappropriation of Government money, loss of revenue and shortage/losses not recovered/written off amounting to ₹ 47.15 crore. Department-wise and nature-wise analysis of the outstanding paragraphs of serious nature showed the following position:

Table No. 3.1 Analysis of outstanding paragraphs

Name of the department	Cases of theft/defalcation/ misappropriation		Loss of revenue		Shortage losses not recovered/ written off		Total	
	Para	Amount	Para	Amount	Para	Amount	Para	Amount
	(Rupees in lakh)							
Land and Land Reforms	14	549.19	15	2476.22	12	277.03	41	3302.44
Agriculture	08	11.86	04	3.02	02	1.17	14	16.05
School Education	07	559.41	03	17.90	01	0.56	11	577.87
Technical Education and Training	11	37.82	05	4.21	07	11.75	23	53.78
Public Works	-	-	-	-	18	479.00	18	479.00
Housing	-	-	-	-	06	286.00	06	286.00
Total	40	1158.28	27	2501.35	46	1055.51	113	4715.14

Audit committees, comprising of the Principal Secretary/Secretary of the administrative department and representatives of the Finance Department and the PAG (Audit), were formed in 50[39] out of 58 Departments of Government for expeditious settlement of the outstanding Inspection Reports/paragraphs. Of the 50 Departments where audit committees were formed, meetings were held only by sixteen Departments on 37 occasions from July 2010 to June 2011. As a result of these meetings, 301 paragraphs were settled. Meetings were not held by the other 34 Departments. Among the departments tabulated above, Public Works and Housing Departments held three and one meetings respectively and settled six paragraphs, while other four departments did not hold any meeting.

It is recommended that Government should ensure that a procedure is in place for (i) action against the officials failing to send replies to IRs/paras as per the prescribed time schedule, (ii) recovery of loss/outstanding advances/ overpayments in a time-bound manner and (iii) holding at least one meeting of each audit committee every quarter.

3.3.3 Follow up action on earlier Audit Reports

After tabling of the Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India in the State Legislature, the State Government Departments are required to submit *suo motu* replies to the audit observations relevant to them within one month. Review of outstanding replies on paragraphs included in the C&AG's Reports on the Government of West Bengal up to 2009-2010 revealed that replies on 298 paragraphs (selected for discussion by PAC: 33 from 1997-1998 to 2009-2010 and not selected: 265 from 1981-1982 to 2009-2010) involving 40 Departments remained outstanding as of September 2011 as detailed in ***Appendix 3.4.***

The administrative Departments were required to take suitable action on the recommendations made in the Reports of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC)

[39] *In absence of any auditable unit, question of formation of Audit Committee in two departments does not arise*

presented to the State Legislature. Following the circulation of the Reports of the PAC, heads of Departments were to prepare comments on action taken or proposed to be taken on the recommendations of the PAC and submit the same to the Assembly Secretariat within six months.

It was observed that the Action Taken Notes on 35 Reports of the PAC, presented to the Legislature between 1991-92 and 2009-10 had not been submitted by 18 Departments[40] to the Assembly Secretariat as of September 2011. Out of these, 16[41] Reports of the PAC had suggested recovery, disciplinary action, etc. A few significant cases are elaborated in ***Appendix 3.5***.

Thus, the follow up on the recommendations of the PAC and action taken by the administrative Departments could not be ascertained in audit.

The matter was referred to Government in July 2011; reply had not been received (November 2011).

[40] *Agriculture, Commerce and Industries, , Finance, Fisheries, Home, Housing, Irrigation and Waterways, Municipal Affairs, Panchayats and Rural Development, Public Health Engineering, Public Works, Public Works (Roads), School Education, Social Welfare, Transport, Urban Development, Health and Family Welfare and Co-operation Departments*

[41] *36th PAC Report 1999-2000, 3rd PAC Report 2001-02, 29th PAC Report 2004-05, 48th PAC Report 2005-06,, 9th PAC Report 2006-07, 1st PAC Report 2007-08, 10th PAC Report 2007-08, 12th PAC Report 2007-08, 4th PAC Report 2006-07, 15th PAC Report 2007-2008, 19th PAC Report 2008-09, 21st PAC Report 2008-09 and 27th PAC Report 2008-09, 28th PAC Report 2009-10, 30th PAC Report 2009-10; 34th PAC Report 2010-11*

3.4 Failure of oversight/governance

The Government has an obligation to improve the quality of life of the people. Proper oversight on the part of Government would ensure that public money is put to good use and the desired outcome of the same is derived.

The objective of this section is to bring to light cases of failure of oversight and governance at various levels of administration. Resultantly, funds released by Government for creation of assets for benefit of public remained unutilised / blocked or expenditure incurred thereon became unfruitful/ unproductive/infructuous.

Some major cases of laxity in governance resulting in avoidable/ unfruitful/ additional expenditure from the Government exchequer are discussed in this section.

HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT

3.4.1 Wasteful expenditure on revival of a hospital

The objective of reviving the Mayo Hospital, Kolkata did not fructify owing to inaction and indifference of the Health and Family Welfare Department. Resultantly, Government had to shoulder wasteful/unfruitful expenditure of ₹ 10.25 crore for meeting liabilities of the joint venture company.

With a view to revive Mayo Hospital[42], Kolkata, Government decided (July 1994) to form a joint venture company namely, Eastern India Institute of Medical Sciences and Research Hospitals Limited (EIIMS). An agreement to that effect was executed (June 1994) between Government and Emergency Doctors Service Private Limited (EDS), promoter of the Joint Venture Company. It was agreed that the Government, the Promoter[43] and the Public would have equity shareholding of 26 *per cent*, 25 *per cent* and 49 *per cent* respectively. In the event of the project not materializing, EDS was to bear all pre-operative expenses[44].

The Department handed over (November 1994) land and buildings of the hospital to EIIMS on lease for a period of 30 years with the right to mortgage the same to any Financial Institution. It was agreed (November 1994) that the EIIMS would pay a premium of ₹ 1.52 crore in the form of 1,52,400 equity shares of ₹ 100 each. The EIIMS was to pay lease rent of ₹ 10 lakh *per annum* starting from the first week of January 1995. Through a subsequent rectification deed (October 1999) signed by Joint Secretary, the Department agreed to convert the

[42] *The hospital, situated at Strand Road, Kolkata was taken over by Government in August 1982. The Department could not furnish the total cost of revival project.*
[43] *Emergency Doctors Private Ltd, Private Health Plan (P) Ltd and Others*
[44] *Not estimated at the time of execution of the agreement.*

total lease rent payable (₹ 3.048 crore less ₹ 5.27 lakh already paid) over thirty years into equity shares of the company deliverable to the Government. This resulted in 65 *per cent* share being transferred to State Government, as against 26 *per cent* initially agreed upon making the joint venture company a Government Company. The reasons for converting the lease rent as equity share have not been stated to Audit.

For construction of the outpatient department (OPD) of the hospital, EIIMS acquired a loan[45] of ₹ 5.34 crore from HUDCO between January and October 1999 by mortgaging the property of the hospital. It was observed that EIIMS defaulted in repayment and HUDCO moved (September 2003) the Debt Recovery Tribunal for realisation of outstanding sum of ₹ 6.39 crore[46]. The realisable amount increased to ₹ 17.10 crore as per demand (May 2009) of HUDCO, against which the Government paid (May 2009) ₹ 8.60 crore in an out of court settlement to get back the mortgaged property from HUDCO.

The EIIMS engaged (February 1999) an agency 'A'[47] for construction of OPD and diagnostic unit for which it was liable to pay ₹ 1.48 crore[48] (as of February 2002). The agency filed (2003) a winding up petition in the High Court for recovery of its outstanding dues against EIIMS. As per High Court's order, Government paid (June 2009) ₹ 1.65 crore to the agency 'A'.

The Department ultimately cancelled the lease with EIIMS in June 2010 through a gazette notification and transferred back the land and building of the Mayo Hospital to the Department, which was subsequently handed (October 2010) over to Kolkata Medical College & Hospital for serving as its second campus.

Audit scrutiny (January 2011) of the records of the Director of Health Services revealed that the Department did not recover any amount from the promoter, though as per the agreement, the promoter (EDS) was to bear all pre-operative expenses in case the project did not materialise. Department also expressed (April 2011) ignorance about the balance funds lying with the EIIMS out of the loan funds or capital invested by it as well as about physical progress of work made by EIIMS in revival of the hospital. This was indicative of negligent approach of the Government, considering the fact that Government had equal representation in the Board of Directors of EIIMS and was in possession of 65 *per cent* of shares.

Thus, Government was forced to bear wasteful expenditure of ₹ 8.60 crore towards repayment of HUDCO loan, while ₹ 1.65 crore paid (June 2009) to the contractor remained unfruitful, leaving the promoter (EDS) unaccountable. The basic objective of reviving the Mayo Hospital did not fructify.

---

[45] *at a rate of 16.5* per cent *and repayable in 35 quarterly instalments between June 2000 and December 2008.*

[46] *Principal ₹ 4.96 crore, interest and penal interest ₹ 1.40 crore and loss of rebate ₹ 0.03 crore.*

[47] *M/s Larsen and Tubro Limited*

[48] *Over and above ₹ 1.82 crore already paid by EIIMS to agency A*

In reply, the Department failed to give any cogent reason for failure of the project. The Department stated (June 2011) that the clause in the agreement about the right to mortgage the property by the company was made in good faith to revive the Hospital. Regarding conversion of the lease rent for 30 years into equity shares, it was stated that the decision was taken by the Board of Directors of the Company without any concurrence of the Government. The reply was not factually correct as the Board of Directors had equal representation from the Government and the Department itself entered into the rectification deed (October 1999), which led to accrual of additional shares to Government. Evidently, the Department due to inaction and failure to monitor the activities of the joint venture company and invoke the clause in the agreement with the promoter to bear all pre-operative expenses in case of the project not materialising, compromised the interest of the Government.

3.4.2 Non-functioning of newly constructed health centres

Newly created health services infrastructure and medical equipments/ furniture worth ₹ 2.05 crore under Basic Health Project remained unused for two to five years due to non-posting of additional manpower and locational disadvantages. Resultantly, the objective of improvement of health services remained unachieved, besides possibility of damage of the infrastructure due to non-use.

With a view to improve the health conditions in the State through quantitative and qualitative improvement of health services, Health & Family Welfare (H&FW) Department had taken up (May 2001) implementation of KFW[49] Funded Basic Health Project. Eight districts[50] were selected[51] for implementation of the scheme at a total cost of ₹ 214 crore. The components of the project *inter alia* included civil works, including construction of additional buildings, for upgradation of health facilities and supply of equipment and furniture to the upgraded facilities. The Project was managed and implemented by the Programme Director and Ex-Officio Special Secretary, H&FW Department. Under phase I[52] of the project, total 215 works[53] (upgradation of 38 Block Primary Health Centres, 91 Primary Health Centres and 86 Sub-Centres) were completed between August 2005 and November 2008 at a total cost of ₹ 60.44 crore.

Scrutiny (May-June 2011) of the records relating to 52 works in the CMOsH of Jalpaiguri, Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad (SMP) at Darjeeling and Coochbehar

[49] *German Development Bank*
[50] *Bankura, Birbhum, Coochbehar, Darjeeling (SMP), Jalpaiguri, Paschim Medinipur, Purba Medinipur and Purulia*
[51] *Selection was based on joint survey by the Consultant and Project officers,* vis-à-vis *availability of the Project Fund.*
[52] *Out of total 236 works under the project, Phase I of the Project envisaged 215 works, while Phase II envisaged 21 works*
[53] *For BPHCs: Indoor wards, residential quarters, generator room, pump house etc.;*
for PHCs: Indoor ward, residential quarters, generator room , pump house etc. and
for SCs: new buildings.

along with records of the relevant Health Centres (52 out of 56 covered under the project) revealed that the newly upgraded infrastructure[54] created between May 2006 and October 2008 at a cost of ₹ 1.24 crore at 11 Health Centres (six PHCs and five SCs) remained unutilised as of June 2011 ***(Appendix 3.6).*** It was seen that though the buildings/wards were handed over to the Department between August 2005 and November 2008, the same could not be put into operation either due to non-posting of additional medical and para-medical personnel or owing to locational disadvantages.

Scrutiny showed that there were large vacancies in medical and paramedical cadres[55] in six[56] PHCs. The CMOH, Jalpaiguri intimated (May 2011) that demand for additional manpower was placed with the Government from time to time for smooth running of the facilities. However, no such correspondence except one made in June 2011 was shown to Audit.

Moreover, the Programme Director centrally procured (November 2007 to September 2008) medical equipment and furniture worth ₹ 2.77 crore for the Districts of Jalpaiguri and Coochbehar for utilisation in the newly upgraded Health Centres. Out of this, equipment[57] and furniture worth ₹ 38.41 lakh were found unutilised in packed condition in the above mentioned health centres for two to four years as of June 2011 ***(Appendix 3.6),*** as the centres were not functional.

Besides, generator rooms were constructed between May 2006 and November 2008 in 18 Health Centres (four BPHCs and 14 PHCs) in these three districts along with generators installed therein at a cost of ₹ 42.64 lakh. These, however, remained unutilised for two to five years since taking over possession ***(Appendix 3.7).*** The concerned MOs attributed non-utilisation to non-availability of operators and fuel.



Unused furnitures in Dhumpara PHC, Jalpaiguri



Cracks developed in the walls of Barnesh PHC, Jalpaiguri

[54] *Six Indoor wards, five buildings, staff quarters and pump house at one PHC*

[55] *Medical Officer: Five posts were vacant out of 12 sanctioned; Medical Technologists: All the sanctioned posts were vacant; General Nursing Midwife: Six posts were vacant out of 22 sanctioned*

[56] *Mathachulka, Dhumpara, Barnesh and Kharija Berubari PHCs in Jalpaiguri District; Gopalpur and Nayarhat PHCs in Coochbehar District*

[57] *Total 144 types of medical equipment which include Radiant Warmer, Autoclave, Labour Table, Stretcher with trolley, Ice-lined Refrigerator etc.*



Unused building of Tarbandha Sub Centre, Darjeeling



Unused furniture dumped in Nayarhat PHC, Coochbehar

Signs of damages (cracks in ceiling and walls, broken window glasses, damaged water tank, etc.) were noticed during inspection (May 2011) of the newly constructed buildings. During joint inspection by Audit and Block Medical Officers of Health concerned, Health Centre authorities also expressed concerns (May-June 2011) regarding safety of medical equipment against theft/damage due to non-construction of boundary walls. The issue was, however, not formally taken up by them with concerned CMOH.

Thus, newly created infrastructure and medical equipment/furniture worth ₹ 2.05 crore (₹ 1.24 crore *plus* ₹ 0.43 crore *plus* ₹ 0.38 crore) in Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling and Coochbehar remained unused due to non-posting of additional man-power and locational disadvantages, thereby frustrating the objective of quantitative and qualitative improvement of health services, besides rendering the infrastructure to risk of substantial damage.

Accepting the audit observations, the Programme Director and Special Secretary, H&FW Department, acknowledged (June 2011) that shortage of Medical Officers was a matter of concern and intimated that earnest efforts were being made to deploy additional manpower for optimum utilisation of upgraded infrastructure. As regards non-utilisation of generators in the backdrop of acute power shortage in the health centres, it was stated that the matter would be taken up with district authorities.

INFORMATION & CULTURAL AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENTS

3.4.3 Wasteful expenditure on construction of Kolkata Kala Kendra

Construction of Kolkata Kala Kendra remained at the foundation level even after lapse of 11 years from its initiation. Repeated change in scope of work coupled with failure of the Department to expedite the progress of work not only led to steep enhancement in estimated cost, but rendered foundation piling work worth ₹ 1.01 crore wasteful.

Information and Cultural Affairs (I&CA) Department, on the occasion of tercentenary of Kolkata, entered into an agreement (January 2003) with Agency

"A"[58] for construction of a cultural complex[59] named Kolkata Kala Kendra[60] (KKK) at Rowdon Square, which had a water body. The work aimed at environmental preservation and enrichment and beautification of the water body. The Public Works (PW) Department was to supervise the construction work. The agency placed (June 2004) an estimate of ₹ 15.87 crore[61] for making KKK of international standards, particularly in respect of stage with hydraulic lifting system, back stage, digital lights and sound system along with most modern greenroom facilities and soundless AC system. However, detailed drawings and specifications were not submitted by the agency to Government. The Secretary, KKK intimated (June 2011) that as the proposal had been initiated by the Principal Secretary, I&CA Department and endorsed by the Chief Engineer, Public Works (PW) Department, Detailed Project Report and Working Drawings were not prepared. The Secretary, KKK issued (November 2004) work order to Agency "A" for plinth level work[62]. As the whole complex was to rest on pile foundation, Agency "A" constructed (November 2004 to June 2006) 267 Reinforced Cement Concrete Bored piles.

Audit Scrutiny (May 2011) of the records of I&CA Department revealed that Department of Civil Engineering, Jadavpur University (JU) assessed (June 2006) the quality of pile-foundation and found that about 36 *per cent* of the piles were defective either in the form of deformed shafts or short in effective length, affecting the actual pile capacity *vis-à-vis* designed capacity. Inspection by JU further revealed that defective pile construction was mainly attributable to deficient examination of sub-soil condition in the pool area by the Agency and inappropriate technique adopted for piling; and laxity in quality control.

Based on remedial measures suggested (June 2006) by JU, Agency "A" constructed 75 additional piles and handed over (June 2008) the site to I&CA Department. Agency "A" was paid ₹ 2.71 crore up to November 2008 for the work, as per valuation made by PWD. No payments were made for construction of the 75 additional piles.



Present condition of the site for Kolkata Kala Kendra

[58] *Balmer Lawrie and Co. Ltd*
[59] *Which included a 1200 capacity auditorium, convention centre, exhibition hall, VIP lounge, guest rooms, car parking area, office space and other relevant facilities*
[60] *Formerly known as Calcutta Cultural Complex (CCC)*
[61] *Revising its earlier estimate of ₹ 7.30 crore.*
[62] *Kolkata Municipal Corporation had given provisional work permit up to plinth level*

In June 2008, PWD was entrusted with construction of the remaining work of KKK, which prepared (December 2008) an estimate of ₹ 42.03 crore. The reasons cited (December 2008) for the increase in the estimated amount were escalation in price of basic material as well as incorporation of all possible items of work intended to build KKK as a modern cultural complex of state-of-the-art nature. I&CA Department accorded (September 2009) administrative approval for ₹ 42.03 crore. As of March 2011, piling work was completed by PWD, while process of tendering for construction of superstructure was in progress. Executive Engineer (EE), PWD, West Kolkata Division intimated (September 2011) that only a part of the old foundation work worth ₹ 1.70 crore executed by Agency 'A' could be made use of. EE further stated (November 2011) that this was due to change in foundation design on account of revised architectural drawing.

Thus, not only work worth ₹ 1.01 crore[63] executed by Agency "A" became wasteful, but construction of the Kolkata Kala Kendra remained at the foundation level after lapse of 11 years from initiation. I&CA Department failed to expedite progress of the work, which was further compounded by subsequent change in the scope of work. Supervision by PW Department of the quality of work executed by the agency was inadequate.

The Joint Secretary, I&CA Department while admitting the wasteful expenditure, stated (September 2011) that the project could not materialise due to procedural formalities. He further added that delay in getting clearances from various authorities, frequent alteration of original plan and other consequential issues by different technical bodies were the major reasons for delay.

PASCHIMANCHAL UNNAYAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

3.4.4 Unfruitful expenditure on employment generation scheme

A goat rearing scheme introduced by Paschimanchal Unnayan Parshad (PUP) in Birbhum and Purulia Districts did not succeed, as the PUP, District Magistrates and Zilla Parishads had not ensured supply of goats by a private agency. Resultantly, expenditure of ₹ 2.06 crore on construction of 752 unused sheds remained unfruitful.

With the aim of generating self-employment among poor rural women in Birbhum and Purulia Districts through introduction of goat rearing scheme, Paschimanchal Unnayan Parshad (PUP) under the Paschimanchal Unnayan Affairs Department entered into separate agreements[64] with a private agency (Ascon Agro products exporter and Builders Private Limited) in November 2006 (Birbhum) and June 2007 (Purulia). Under the scheme, Self Help Groups (SHG)[65] were to be created, who were to breed and rear Black Bengal Goats. The scheme

[63] *₹ 2.71 crore* minus *₹ 1.70 crore*
[64] *Signed by respective Sabhadhipati, Zilla Parishad and District Magistrate on behalf of PUP.*
[65] *SHGs were created under the scheme Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana.*

envisaged round the year supply of marketable goats to a mutton and chevon production unit proposed to be set up in the State by the agency.

The scheme further envisaged that Zilla Parishad (ZP) would be responsible *inter alia* for arrangement of covered area for housing the goats and proper co-ordination and care in the project. They were also responsible for arrangement of subsidy for SHGs through District Rural Development Cell (DRDC) for infrastructure support and providing cooperation in implementation of the project.

According to the agreements executed between the agency and ZP/PUP, the agency was to provide breedable Black Bengal Goats to SHGs for the project period of five years and help them in development of superior breeding stock, provide medicines, vaccines, veterinary services and insurance for breeding stock and the kids. The agreements with the agency were, however, silent about schedule of supply of goats to co-ordinate with the construction of goat sheds. There was no penal provision in case of non-supply of goats by the agency.

Audit scrutiny (March and June 2011) of the records of District Magistrates (DMs), Birbhum and Purulia, DRDC under the ZP as well as nine Panchayat Samitis (PSs) (five in Birbhum and four in Purulia) revealed that the PUP released ₹ 2.23 crore[66] to the DMs, who in turn released the amounts to the PSs during 2006-07 for construction of 848 sheds. As of March 2011, 755 sheds[67] were constructed at a cost of ₹ 2.12 crore. It was noticed that goat rearing had started only at three sheds[68] from 2009-10, while 752 completed sheds remained unused owing to non-supply of goats by the agency. The district authorities, PUP or the ZPs did not take up the matter with the agency to ensure supply of goats as per agreements or to ascertain reasons for non-supply. The objective of generation of self employment was, thus, not achieved as of June 2011 despite incurring an expenditure of ₹ 2.06 crore[69] for construction of sheds.



Unused sheds at Basanti and Manadpara under Jhalda I Block in Purulia

66

Name of the District	Fund received from PUP	Sheds to be constructed	Sheds constructed	Fund Utilised
Purulia	9360000	780	685	8340000
Birbhum	12982135	68	70	12907135

[67] *Purulia: 525 sheds in 2008-09, 160 sheds in 2009-10;*
Birbhum: 60 in 2007-08 and 10 in 2008-09.

[68] *3 sheds with 85 goats in Suri I Panchayat Samiti in Birbhum District constructed at a cost of ₹0.06 crore*

[69] *₹2.12 crore **minus** ₹0.06 crore spent on construction of three functional sheds.*

Thus, failure of the DMs, ZPs as well as the PUP to take up the matter of non-supply of goats with the agency, after spending ₹ 2.12 crore on development of infrastructure resulted in the objective remaining unachieved and expenditure becoming unfruitful. Sheds continued to be constructed throughout the four years period despite non-supply of goats by the agency, which indicates lack of planning and co-ordination on the part of the Department.

The Chief Executive Officer, Paschimanchal Unnayan Parshad accepted (June 2011) the audit observation and intimated that the matter was being pursued with other departments for alternate use of the sheds in other income generation programmes.

The matter was referred to the Department in July 2011; reply is, however, awaited (November 2011).

POWER AND NON-CONVENTIONAL ENERGY SOURCES DEPARTMENT

3.4.5 Implementation of hydel power projects in Darjeeling

Even after lapse of seven to eight years from approval, all six hydel power projects in Darjeeling District remained either non-starters or defunct owing to failure of WBREDA to address primary ground level issues. Resultantly, ₹ 1.25 crore spent on these projects was rendered unfruitful/wasteful; while ₹ 1.23 crore remained parked in WBREDA's current bank account for three to eight years.

West Bengal Renewable Energy Development Agency (WBREDA), an organisation under the Power and Non-conventional Energy Sources (P&NES) Department of Government of West Bengal, is the nodal agency *inter alia* responsible for setting up small power projects using alternative sources of energy. Proposals for implementation of such projects are initiated by the WBREDA. After the same is approved techno-commercially by the P&NES Department, financial sanction is accorded by the Ministry of Non-conventional Renewable Energy (MNRE) [70], Government of India. It is the responsibility of WBREDA to assess availability of encumbrance-free land and viability of the project and identifying beneficiary committees before initiating the draft proposals.

For providing electricity in remote villages of Darjeeling District, MNRE sanctioned[71] (between March 2003 and August 2004) six hydel power projects

[70] *Earlier known as Ministry of Non-conventional Energy Sources*

[71] *Naxal Small Hydel Power Project 3x200 kw (2002-03), Dudhia Small Hydel Power Project 2x200kw (2002-03), Pacheng Khola shifted to Rabeng Khola Micro Hydel Power Project 50 kw (2004-05), Daray Khola Micro Hydel Power Project 50 kw (2004-05), Reaing Khola Micro Hydel Power Project 50 kw (2004-05), Rangbul khola Micro Hydel Power Project 50kw (2004-05)*

(four micro hydel and two small hydel projects) with a total capacity of 1200 kilowatt (kw) at a total project cost of ₹ 11.18 crore. Government of India was to contribute ₹ 6.31 crore, while ₹ 4.87 crore was to be borne by WBREDA/ State Government (GoWB). For implementing these six projects, WBREDA received a sum of ₹ 2.48 crore from MNRE (₹ 1.03 crore between March 2003 and August 2004) and GoWB (₹ 1.45 crore during February 2004 to March 2008).

Scrutiny (June 2011) of the records of WBREDA in respect of implementation of these projects revealed that three of these projects remained non-starter, one was dropped after partial implementation, while another, though commissioned, failed to deliver the intended benefits and was ultimately closed down. Out of ₹ 2.48 crore released by GoI and GoWB, ₹ 1.25 crore was spent on three of these projects during April 2005 to September 2009, while ₹ 1.23 crore was parked in bank current account of WBREDA for more than three to eight years. The Financial and physical status of six hydel power projects implemented by WBREDA in Darjeeling is shown in the table below:

Table No. 3.2 Implementation status and funds utilised in the six Hydel Power Projects

(Rupees in lakh)

	Name of the Project	Project Cost and date of approval of GoI	Fund released by MNRE	Fund released by the State	Amount spent	Amount lying unused	Implementation Status
Micro Hydel Power Projects approved under Remote Village Electrification Programme of MNES							
1	Pacheng Khola Micro Hydel Project subsequently shifted to Rabong Khola (50 KW)	246.00 approved in August2004	60.00 (August 2004)	15.00 (December 2004) 40.00 (March 2005)	43.11	(-) 2.98 (additional funds spent from other MNRE projects)	Project was abandoned mid-way
2	Rangbul Khola Micro Hydel Project (50 KW)				nil		Project did not take off; no recorded reasons
3	Daray Khola Micro Hydel Project (50 KW)				74.87		Project was commissioned, but closed down due to dis-satisfaction of the Beneficiary Committee over limited period of supply
4	Reaing Khola Micro Hydel Project (50 KW)				nil		Project did not take off; no recorded reasons
Small Hydel Power Projects approved under Capital Subsidy[72] project of MNES							
5	Naxal Small Hydel Power Projects	443.00 approved in March 2003	25.10 (March 2003)	15.00 (February 2004) 75.00 (March 2008)	7.40	107.70	Project was not completed
6	Dudhia Small Hydel Project	429.00 approved in March2003	18.00 (March 2003)	nil	nil	18.00	No development after pre-construction survey
Six projects		**1118.00**	**103.10**	**145.00**	**125.38**	**122.72**	

Source: Records of WBREDA

WBREDA ultimately dropped (June 2010) all small, mini and micro hydel power projects attributing the decision to law and order problems in Darjeeling District. Scrutiny of records of WBREDA, however, revealed various instances of

[72] *Subsidy was restricted to cost of electro mechanical equipment and 50* per cent *cost of civil works.*

deficiencies in ground level planning and preparedness which had culminated in stoppage of the projects midway or project not taking off at all, as discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

i) Pachengkhola Micro Hydel power project

WBREDA started (August 2005) the work at Pachengkhola through a private contractor A[73] at a project cost of ₹ 55.95 lakh. However, a private tea company raised objection in October 2005 on the ground that the construction site was on the land belonging to the tea company and the company had one defunct hydel power project awaiting overhauling in that area. WBREDA decided (June 2006) to shift the project to Rebongkhola with same technical specifications and rate. The same contractor 'A' conducted a pre-survey (July 2006) at Rebongkhola and took up the work (June 2007). Subsequently, Contractor A stated that the project site at Rebangkhola was different in character[74] and as such, estimated cost should be revised. WBREDA revised the project cost to ₹ 63.58 lakh and issued work order in June 2007. The Project cost was further revised to ₹ 105.25 lakh (July 2009) taking into account additional cost for purchase of material through Sikkim. The contractor executed part of civil work and was paid ₹ 43.11 lakh[75] during August 2005 to September 2009.

However, in consideration of factors *viz.* cost escalation, locational disadvantages, demand from villagers for grid power and inability to form beneficiary committee, rising number of beneficiaries etc. WBREDA decided (June 2010) to drop the Rebongkhola hydel power project.

Thus, improper selection of site and lack of groundwork namely, identification of encumbrance free land, formation of beneficiary committee, assessment of cost escalation of the project at the relocated site, resulted in wasteful expenditure of ₹ 43.11 Lakh.

ii) Daraykhola Micro Hydel power project

The work order of the Daraykhola project was issued (March 2005) to a contractor A at an estimated cost of ₹ 55.65 lakh, which was revised (September 2005) to ₹ 69.82 lakh. The work started in March 2005 concluded in July 2006 and the plant was inaugurated in September 2006. The contractor was paid (between April 2005 and October 2008) ₹ 74.87 lakh. Though Project Report envisaged supply of 140 watt electricity to 300 households for eight hours per day, WBREDA stated that a commitment for un-interrupted power supply under favourable conditions had been made, subject to proper operations and maintenance. However, the plant could supply power for three to four hours in a day and WBREDA attributed the same to failure of the beneficiary committee.

---

[73] *M/s AN Sharma & Co.*

[74] *The site of Rabengkhola could be approached only from Sikkim side and all material purchased attracted additional taxes and duties. Besides there was additional cost for carriage of construction materials by head load. These resulted in increase in cost of Civil Works. Besides, Construction of road was essential for running the power station after commissioning*

[75] *On account of cost of construction material, labour charge*

The beneficiary committee demanded (August 2007) 24 hours power supply through grid power from WBSEDCL[76] or Remote Electricity Development Corporation/ Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council, indicating lack of agreement and co-ordination with the beneficiary committee. Though WBREDA claimed that the project was capable of generating electricity for 24 hours a day, the beneficiary committee closed down the power house (September 2007).

Thus, the project failed in delivering its objectives as it could not meet the expectations of the beneficiaries.

(iii) Naxal Small Hydel Power project

WBREDA handed over the work of execution of the Naxal project on turnkey basis (May 2003) to West Bengal State Electricity Board (later renamed as WBSEDCL), which awarded the works to contractors during December 2004 to June 2007. Scrutiny revealed that no work, apart from pre-project survey (cost: ₹ 1.30 lakh) could be started, as the site was in the midst of various plantations[77], residential huts, burial ground etc. WBSEDCL and WBREDA decided (July 2008) to terminate the contracts. WBREDA on field inspection (November 2009) observed that the areas remained under private occupation despite release of ₹ 6.10 lakh (February 2008) to the DM, Darjeeling for payment of compensation to the Project affected persons. Moreover, it was also observed that water in the river where the project was to be constructed was available only for four to five months in a year.

WBREDA resolved (March 2009) to appoint West Bengal Green Energy Development Corporation Limited for supervision and execution of the work. However, no development in the matter was recorded as of October 2011.

WBREDA admitted (June 2011) that hydrology and meteorology of the site had changed and fresh study would be required. In these circumstances the prospect of implementation of this project seemed bleak.

While accepting the facts (June 2011), WBREDA attributed non-execution of the projects to law and order problems in the Darjeeling. The reply, however, did not address the issues of deficiencies in ground level planning and preparedness on its part to implement the projects.

Thus, after lapse of seven to eight years from approval, none of these six hydel projects in Darjeeling have fructified. This was mainly attributable to failure of WBREDA to address primary issues like, identification of encumbrance free land, assessment of viability of projects, formation of beneficiary committee and taking into account their expectations from the projects etc. Resultantly, expenditure of ₹ 1.25 crore either became wasteful or unfruitful, while Government funds of ₹ 1.23 crore remained parked in WBREDA's current bank account for three to eight years.

---

[76] *West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited*
[77] *Plantation of rubber, betel nut, cardamom, etc.*

In a reply endorsed by the Department, WBREDA stated (November 2011) that it had social obligation to implement renewable energy projects as technology demonstration projects and that operation and maintenance of these projects did not come under its purview of work. It was further stated that the local administration was responsible for development of adequate infrastructure facilities.

As regards Pachengkhola (shifted to Rebangkhola) project, it was intimated that being encouraged by the effort of one individual, who had been generating electricity for local people by tapping water from a nearby stream, WBREDA had undertaken the project. His dissociation from the effort, compounded by lack of infrastructural development and erratic availability of water at the stream, led to failure of the project.

Regarding Daraykhola project, WBREDA attributed the failure to non-co-operation from the local bodies.

The reply, however, indicates lack of careful assessment of infrastructural deficiencies in concerned areas by WBREDA. Further, failure of a project due to dissociation of a certain individual indicates that the project had been taken up without proper viability study and finalisation of modalities of operation and maintenance.

COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES AND FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRIES AND HORTICULTURE DEPARTMENTS

3.4.6 Infructuous and idle expenditure under ASIDE scheme

Objective of creation of export auction infrastructure for a flower market was not achieved owing to failure of a Government Corporation and Food Processing Industries and Horticulture Department in ensuring temporary relocation of flower vendors. This resulted in idling of expenditure of ₹ 1.84 crore, while expenditure of ₹ 0.78 crore became infructuous.

A project for setting up an export auction centre with modern infrastructure facilities at Mallickghat Flower Market, Kolkata was taken up (March 2006) by the State Level Export Promotion Committee (SLEPC)[78] at a total cost of ₹ 25.43 crore[79] under the scheme of Assistance to States for Developing Export Infrastructure and Allied activities (ASIDE)[80], for completion in 48 months. Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India accorded approval of Central assistance of ₹ 10 crore and released (March 2006) first instalment of ₹ 5 crore to West Bengal State Food Processing and Horticulture Development

[78] *Chaired by the Chief Secretary and Director of Industries being the Convener*

[79] *Revised to ₹ 20 crore, of which Central assistance was ₹ 10 crore*

[80] *ASIDE was launched by Government of India in March 2002 for creating appropriate infrastructure for development and growth of exports. Director of Industries (DI), Government of West Bengal was the nodal officer for implementation of ASIDE projects in the State. Assistance under ASIDE project is fully borne by the Central Government and released for implementation of Export oriented projects. Administrative expenses under such works are not to be incurred out of GoI funds and to be borne by the State Government.*

Corporation Limited (Corporation)[81], the implementing agency. The Director of Industries (DI) under the Commerce and Industries Department, the nodal officer for implementation of ASIDE projects, released (July 2006) ₹ 1 crore to the Corporation as State component. The project envisaged construction of 284 shops, sitting arrangement for 2000 to 3000 flower vendors, cold storage, sorting, grading, auction hall, conference hall, lodging facilities for auctioneers, bank, administrative office, basement parking area, etc.

Availability of land was one of the criteria for taking up a project under ASIDE. The land for Mullickghat flower market, which originally belonged to Kolkata Port Trust (KPT), was transferred in favour of Government of West Bengal in June 2002. In order to facilitate construction of infrastructural facilities, temporary relocation of flower vendors was necessary, for which another KPT-owned space at Jagannathghat was identified. The Food Processing Industries and Horticulture Department paid (June 2010) ₹ 1.22 crore[82] (₹ 78.37 lakh as licence fees, municipal and other taxes for 22 months from April 2008 to August 2010 and ₹ 43.48 lakh as security deposit) to KPT through the Corporation for the land, for temporary relocation of flower vendors.

Out of ₹ 6 crore, the Corporation spent ₹ 1.84 crore between August 2006 and June 2010 on the project towards fees for sanctions and approvals from statutory authorities[83] (₹ 113.15 lakh), project management consultancy fees (₹ 29.40 lakh), construction of temporary infrastructure for relocation of flower vendors (₹ 38.18 lakh) and miscellaneous/administrative expenses (₹ 3.21 lakh). However, utilisation certificate for the entire Central assistance of ₹ 5 crore was furnished in September 2007.

Audit scrutiny (January 2011) of the records of the Director of Industries revealed that poor response among the vendors of the Mallickghat flower market for shifting to a temporary relocation was a major impediment in execution of the project. Moreover, it took more than two and half years for the Corporation to obtain clearances for the Project from different authorities including KPT. In view of slow progress of implementation, GoI cancelled the project in July 2009 and demanded (June and August 2009) refund of the entire GoI assistance of ₹ 5 crore with interest[84] at the rate of 10 *per cent* from the date of release of fund. The Corporation refunded (December 2009) ₹ 3.16 crore (₹ 5 crore *minus* ₹ 1.84 crore utilised) to GoI. No penal interest has, however, been paid by the State till November 2011. The State contribution of ₹ 1 crore was retained by the Corporation as of August 2011.

Thus, failure of the Corporation in ensuring temporary relocation of vendors, and lack of initiative, coordinated effort and ineffective monitoring on the part of the FPI&H Department to provide a favourable condition for implementation of the project coupled with delay in obtaining clearances from the appropriate

---

[81] *Under the Department of Food Processing Industries & Horticulture.*
[82] *Over and above ₹6 crore released to the Corporation*
[83] *Kolkata Municipal Corporation, Kolkata Improvement Trust, Fire Services*
[84] *Simple interest at the rate of 10 per cent on ₹5 crore for the period from March 2006 to November 2009 comes to ₹1.88 crore*

authorities resulted in idling of expenditure of ₹ 1.84 crore, while expenditure of ₹ 78.37 lakh[85] became infructuous. Besides, the State Government incurred a liability of penal interest of ₹ 1.88 crore. The objective of creation of modern export infrastructure facilities for the flower market was not achieved.

The FPI&H Department stated (August 2011) that a lot of time and effort had gone into mobilizing different agencies for obtaining clearances; moreover, prospect of starting the project work at the site has brightened as the ambience around the market has improved. The structure constructed for temporary relocation of the vendors is partially being utilized for storing goods. It was further added that fresh proposal for the project has been sent to the GoI Ministry for reconsideration. Notwithstanding the reply, the fact remains that the Department and the Corporation failed to resolve the issue of relocation of vendors for more than four years leading to cancellation of the project by GoI.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

3.4.7 Delay in construction of a bus stand

Even after lapse of 10 years from its initiation, a bus stand at a popular tourist destination (Digha) remained a non-starter resulting in idle expenditure of ₹ 1.08 crore, besides frustrating the intended benefits to commuters concerned.



Incomplete Central Bus Stand at Digha (October 2011)



Incomplete terminus building (October 2011)

Digha Sankarpur Development Authority[86] (Authority) under Urban Development (UD) Department decided (October 2000) to construct a Central Bus Stand at Digha to reduce traffic congestion and parking problem in the lone vehicular road of Digha and thereby arrest road accidents. The land identified for construction belonged to Digha Development Scheme (DDS) under Development and Planning (D&P) Department. The Authority had neither got the title of the land transferred in its name, nor obtained necessary permission from the D&P Department before commencement of the work. The Authority started the work in July 2001 at an estimated cost of ₹ 35.54 lakh through an agency "A" with the target of completion by January 2002. Subsequently, the Authority enhanced (March 2003) the scope of work[87] and signed (November 2004) a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the same agency "A" for construction of the bus stand within 24 months in Public Private Partnership model at an estimated cost of ₹ 1.90 crore.

[85] *Licence fee and other taxes paid up to February 2010*

[86] *Known as Digha Development Authority prior to September 2003*

[87] *Incorporating therein construction of boundary wall, stalls, bus-bay, bus terminal building, rest room, bathing units, lavatory complex, convenience shops, etc.*

However, considering non-transfer of title of the construction site from D&P Department, UD Department cancelled (May 2005) the MoU and the work was stopped. Before stoppage of work, the Agency had completed works[88] worth ₹ 60.09 lakh (as of May 2005) against which full payment was released by March 2008.

Subsequently, the UD Department notified (December 2006) the merger of DDS with Authority transferring all its assets and liabilities to the latter. The work of construction of the Bus Stand was re-started in April 2007. As of December 2010, eight works[89] of construction for ₹ 1.36 crore were executed in piecemeal manner against which ₹ 1.08 crore[90] was paid (including ₹ 60.09 lakh paid earlier) up to January 2011. Slow progress of the work was attributed (July 2010) by the Executive Officer (EO) of the Authority to funds constraints. The EO further intimated (July 2011) that absence of any permanent EO and non-holding of any board meeting for near about one year had also delayed matters. Meanwhile, the bus stand was formally inaugurated in November 2010 for use.

Scrutiny of the records of the Authority along with joint physical verification of the site, however, revealed (June 2011) that in spite of formal inauguration, the bus stand remained unused with construction works of south boundary wall, balance works for 36 stalls, finishing work of the first floor of terminal building and remaining part of concrete pavement were yet to be completed. Due to non-commencement of operations of the bus stand, the objective of solving the acute parking problem and minimising traffic congestion in the lone vehicular road in Digha was not achieved. The local police authority expressed concern (May 2011) over increased traffic congestion in Digha, which is supported by continuing trend in occurrence of accidents. The Authority in its reply (October 2011) stated that the bus operators were unwilling to use the bus stand for non-construction of bus bays, etc and non-introduction of one way traffic movement through a bye pass road (Northern bye- pass), which would provide inward traffic to the bus stand. The Authority also acknowledged the requirement of widening and strengthening of the bye-pass road, before putting the bus stand in use.

Thus, after 10 years from initiation of construction work and more than eight years from finalisation of composite plan, the Central Bus Stand at Digha, a popular tourist destination, remained a non-starter with idle investment of ₹ 1.08 crore. Resultantly, traffic congestion in Digha remains a matter of concern as continuing trend of accidents constitutes definite risk to human life.

The matter was referred to Government in July 2011; reply had not been received (November 2011).

---

[88] *namely, earth filling, morrum boulder spreading, surface drain and civil works for 36 stalls*

[89] *Construction of Ground floor terminal Building (phase-I), Construction of Bathroom, changing room with toilet facilities, Construction of tourist reception centre with lounge and left luggage room and tourist information centre, Land Development with two side Barbed wire fencing, Construction of Ground floor terminal building (phase-II), Sinking of shallow tube well 100 mm dia, Construction of 1st floor phase-I (structured works) terminal building, Patch repairing of bus bay by Bats and Moorum*

[90] *₹2.17 lakh in 2002-03, ₹17.82 lakh in 2003-04, ₹20 lakh in 2006-07, ₹28.78 lakh in 2007-08, ₹7.65 lakh in 2008-09, ₹1.45 lakh in 2009-10 and ₹31.10 lakh in 2010-11*

3.4.8 Undue financial aid to contractor

The main objective of the PPP project remained unachieved. Besides, KMDA could not avail the competitive rate due to change in land use pattern after acceptance of bid and also extended undue aid of ₹ 2.57 crore by under valuing the rate of land.

Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (KMDA) invited (March 2005) expression of interest for development of Kolkata Logistic Hub at Kona, Howrah under Public Private Partnership (PPP). With a view to relocate the wholesale trading from the heart of the city the project envisaged construction of logistic services such as truck parking, wholesale trading, warehousing and residential accommodations for the site and ancillary staff. After evaluating the bids a consortium[91] was selected (October 2005) for implementation of the project on 106.35 acres of land (approximately) on 99 years' lease in consideration of ₹ 103 crore. Audit scrutiny revealed irregularities in the transaction as well as deviations in project objectives as detailed below:

- Development agreement (November 2005) executed between the two parties *inter alia* stipulated that the parties would undertake a joint survey immediately after signing the agreement to assess the quantum of land actually handed over. In case the total area of the land was found to be more or less than 106.35 acres, the consideration amount would be adjusted accordingly. Audit scrutiny revealed that 108.43[92] acres of land was found during the joint measurement and the same was handed over (November 2006) to the consortium in consideration of ₹ 103.41 crore. KMDA charged only ₹ 0.41 crore for additional 2.08 acres (108.43 acre minus 106.35 acre) of land handed over to the agency against ₹ 2.01 crore[93] calculated at the agreed rate. Thus, undervaluation of land rate in contravention of the agreement rendered in an undue benefit of ₹ 1.6 crore to the consortium.

- KMDA had no policy on transfer of land to the allottee where constructional activities were prohibited. However, since 1999, KMDA was charging 50 *per cent* of the existing land premium in respect of any land falling under high tension zone where no construction was permitted. Scrutiny revealed that an additional land of 2.0173 acres surrounded by the allotted land (108.43 acres) was also handed over (November 2006) to the agency free of cost as there was an underground IOC pipeline where no construction activities were allowed. Subsequently, the Pricing Committee of KMDA resolved (June 2008) that the principle of pricing pattern for the land falling under high tension zone would be adopted in

[91] *Havelock Properties Limited a consortium comprising of Unitech Limited, Salim Group, Jurong Consultants Private Limited and Universal Success Enterprises Limited.*
[92] *73.6451 acre in the north parcel and 34.7843 acre in the south parcel which are half a km apart*
[93] *₹ 103 crore/106.35 X2.08*

respect of land over gas pipelines. Thus, KMDA could have generated additional revenue of ₹ 0.97 crore[94] had the Pricing Committee taken the resolution before handing over the land (2.0173 acres) free of cost.

- Contract agreement of the PPP envisaged construction of temporary residential accommodation for shopkeepers and truck drivers and permanent residential accommodation for workers/supporting staff along with commercial activities in the entire south parcel of the land. In case of any deviation, the KMDA would have the right to cancel the agreement. Scrutiny, however, revealed that after acceptance of the bid, KMDA allowed the change in land use pattern of the south parcel of the land and approved (December 2007) the master plan for development of four clusters each consisting of six 15 storeyed high rise residential towers on the entire south parcel of the land. First phase of construction of 12 towers has been at the completion stage.



Residential high-rise in the South Parcel

The construction of high rise building for residential accommodation, which was no way related to the project objective. The possibility of undue benefit extended to the consortium cannot be ruled out as the Department could not avail the competitive rate due to change in the land use pattern after acceptance of the bid.



Only completed warehouse in North Parcel



Condition of truck parking bay

- On the north parcel of the land only one warehouse has been constructed out of proposed 16 after more than four and a half year of handing over of the land to the consortium. Other proposed activities related to wholesale and retail trading, commercial and ancillary facilities and truck parking

[94] *50 per cent of (103.00 crore/106.35) X 2.013*

have not yet been commenced. The only warehouse constructed was of single storeyed against the provision of three storeyed warehouse.

The bid document envisaged that the timeline for the project implementation and monitoring mechanism should be laid down in the lease agreement. KMDA, however, did not provide any timeline for completion of the project in the agreement which encouraged the developer to pace the work as per their convenience, frustrating the major objectives of the project. KMDA did not enforce submission of bank guarantee for delay in work of the consortium as per agreement.

In reply, Chief executive Officer, KMDA stated (June 2011) that the delay in implementation of the project was primarily due to economic recession. The reply was, however, not tenable because knowing fully well of the recession, the consortium proposed (December 2007) for six warehouses and completed the construction of residential towers. Besides, as per the lease agreement the lessee was to commence the construction within six months from the approval (September 2008) of the building plans.

Thus, the main objectives of the PPP to facilitate relocation of the wholesale trading from the heart of Kolkata city remained largely unachieved and restricted to construction of private luxurious flats.

The matter was referred to the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department in June 2011; the reply has not been received (November 2011).

BACKWARD CLASSES WELFARE DEPARTMENT

3.4.9 Idle expenditure on SC/ST Hostels

Three hostels for SC/ST students remained non-functional for three to nine years due to deficient planning and non-recruitment of staff, leading to unproductive expenditure of ₹ 1.07 crore on their construction and furnishing.

The Backward Classes Welfare (BCW) Department decided (December 1999) to set up hostels for accommodation of Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) students under a Centrally sponsored scheme[95]. According to the guidelines issued by BCW Department (December 1999) to all district level authorities[96], Project Officer cum District Welfare Officer (PO cum DWO) was the nodal authority to receive and process applications for setting up SC/ST hostels in the respective district. Proposals for setting up of hostels were to be examined by a district level committee[97], convened by PO cum DWO on the basis of total SC/ST

[95] *Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Hostels for SC Girls and Boys, since renamed as Babu Jagjivan Ram Chatrawas Yojana with effect from January 2008; fifty* per cent *of the cost was to be received as Central assistance*

[96] *Project Officers cum District Welfare Officers (POs cum DWOs) of each district*

[97] *PO cum DWO is the Convenor of the Committee; other members being District Inspector (Primary), DI (Secondary) and a nominee of District Magistrate.*

population in the block/mouza concerned, list of schools to be attended by the students of the hostels and their location, distance from proposed hostel, transport arrangements, etc. As of April 2011, in 19 districts, 63 SC/ST hostels were constructed under the Scheme.

Mention was made in paragraph 4.5.1 of Civil Audit Report for the year 2005-06 regarding non-functioning of two Central Hostels[98] (CHs) in North 24 Parganas District. The Department, in reply, stated (May 2007) that arrangements were being made to make the hostels functional by July 2007. Audit scrutiny (April and July 2011) of the records of the Commissioner, BCW Department, however, revealed that one of those hostels (at Bongaon, North 24 Parganas) has not started functioning as of July 2011, owing to non-availability of students.

Scrutiny (April and July 2011) further showed that three hostels for SC/ST students in two districts[99] including the one at Bongaon in North 24 Parganas, constructed between June 2002 and June 2008, have not started functioning as of July 2011 since their construction. In two cases (Kurseong and Bongaon), concerned PO cum DWO intimated (July 2011) that they had not received any proposal for setting up of the hostels and no assessment of availability of students, availability of schools, locational and communicational factors, etc. was done by them. In the third case, proposal was initiated by the Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad directly to the Department. In all three cases, PO cum DWO intimated that they had not been involved at any stage of setting up of hostel. Details of Government expenditure in these hostels and reasons for their non-functioning are as under:

Table No. 3.3 Expenditure incurred and reasons for non-functioning of the hostels

(Rupees in lakh)

Name of the hostels	Constructed for (bed capacity)	Date of completion	Cost of construction	Cost of furniture/ utensils	Reasons for non-functioning
Bongaon CH, North 24 Parganas	Scheduled Castes girls (60)	June 2002	16.81*	1.58	• Locational disadvantage as the hostel was situated at the far end of the town in a low lying area with problem of water logging. • Lack of interest among students • Non-posting of staff;
Kurseong CH, Darjeeling	Scheduled Tribe girls (60)	June 2008	62.43	9.73	• Problem of approach road, which had not been considered before construction. The road has, however, been constructed in March 2010; • Non-posting of staff.
North Bengal Medical College CH, Darjeeling	Scheduled Castes girls (80)	March 2004	16.18	nil	• The hostel was occupied by the students of North Bengal Dental College and taken back in July 2010; • The hostel needs repairs for making it habitable; • No staff has been recruited.
Three CHs in two districts			**95.42**	**11.31**	**Total: ₹ 1.07 crore**

* *inclusive of repairing cost of ₹0.63 lakh*

[98] *At Kalinagar and Bongaon*

[99] *Chanchal CH in Malda district, Asansol CH in Bardhaman district, Bongaon CH in North 24 Parganas district and Kurseong CH and NBM College SCG in Darjeeling district.*



SC/ST Hostel at Bongaon, 24 Parganas (North) (August 2011)



No approach road in SC/ST Hostel at Kurseong, Darjeeling (August 2011)

Thus, due to deficient planning leading to inaccessibility of hostels/hostels being situated in remote locations, non-availability of staff; and unauthorised occupation, three SC/ST hostels constructed and furnished at an expenditure of ₹ 1.07 crore remained non-functional for three to nine years.

The matter was referred to Government in June 2011; reply had not been received (November 2011).

AGRICULTURE (MARKETING) DEPARTMENT

3.4.10 Avoidable loss under support price scheme

Lacunae in the Government order coupled with delay of the Department in communicating its decision to BENFED regarding disposal of potato led to avoidable loss of ₹ 5.59 crore in five districts under potato support price scheme 2008.

To protect the interests of the farmers in the State as a result of large production of potato in the season of 2008, the Agriculture Department (Marketing Branch) decided, through a Government order of March 2008, to operationalise a 'support price scheme' for immediate redressal of the anticipated distress sale of potatoes. Under this scheme the Department sanctioned and released ₹ 30 crore (₹ 20 crore in March 2008 and ₹ 10 crore in April 2008) in favour of the West Bengal State Co-operative Marketing Federation Limited (BENFED)[100] as interest free working capital loan for procurement of potato from common farmers at the rate of ₹ 250 per quintal. No condition for repayment of this loan by BENFED was, however, laid down in the sanction orders. The orders operationalising the scheme were silent about modalities of procurement of potato and their disposal, neither was it clear whether further Government order was necessary to allow BENFED to dispose off the potatoes.

[100] *State level apex body of the Primary Agriculture Marketing Societies*

Accordingly, BENFED procured (April 2008) 8.28 lakh quintals of potato from farmers of ten districts[101] through primary level Co-operative Societies and stored the procured potato in cold storages at an expenditure of ₹ 25.03 crore.

BENFED, after three months from introduction of the scheme, moved only in June 2008 the Agriculture Marketing Department for issue of instructions regarding disposal of potato. The same was pursued by another communication in August 2008. The Agriculture Department, after 49 days from the date of first communication from BENFED, clarified (August 2008) that BENFED had to take its commercial decision to dispose of the potato based on market price. BENFED disposed (between August 2008 and January 2009) off the potato through sale of bonds[102] at ₹ 9.64 crore (average rate ₹ 117.27 per quintal) thereby incurring a loss of ₹ 15.39 crore. BENFED submitted (March 2009) an utilisation certificate and requested Government for remission of loan liabilities to the extent of ₹15.32 crore[103] and deposited (August 2009) ₹ 14.61 crore in Government account. The decision of the Government regarding remission of ₹ 15.32 crore was awaited (October 2011).

Scrutiny (April-May 2011) of the records of five[104] district offices of BENFED (out of ten) and the Directorate of Agricultural Marketing revealed that 7.74 lakh quintals of potato procured in these districts under the scheme was disposed of between August 2008 and January 2009 at prices ranging between ₹ 30[105] and ₹ 160[106] per quintal generating a sale value of ₹ 9.06 crore. Scrutiny further revealed that in June 2008, when BENFED moved the Government for instruction for disposal, the average monthly bond price in five districts was in the range of ₹ 165.88 and ₹ 202.50 per quintal. Had the Department clarified its stand in the original GO to state that BENFED had to take commercial decision in disposing off the potato, BENFED would have sold the potatoes on time which would have led to generation of sale proceeds of ₹ 14.65 crore (based on the average bond price of June 2008) and thereby minimising the loss by ₹ 5.59 crore ***(Appendix 3.8).***

Agricultural Marketing Directorate stated (July 2011) that as no specific guidelines were formulated by the Department for procurement operation, BENFED had prepared their own guidelines to implement the scheme. The Department also endorsed the reply, which indicates laxity of the Department in determining policy and modalities of such price support scheme for ensuring proper co-ordination among the Departments and various agencies.

---

[101] *Bankura, Birbhum, Bardhaman, Cooch Behar , Dakshin Dinajpur, Hooghly, Howrah, Jalpaiguri, Paschim Medinipur and Murshidabad.*

[102] *The cold storages, on receipt of potato, issue Cold Storage Receipts (referred as Bond) to the owner of the potato. The owner of the potato may sell the bond to others. Anyone who purchases the bond will have the ownership of the potato stored in the cold storage. Agricultural Marketing Directorate records the price of bond, at which they are sold/purchased, from time to time.*

[103] *After adjusting ₹ 0.07 crore receivable as compensation for damaged potato in Murshidabad*

[104] *Bankura, Bardhaman, Birbhum, Hooghly and Paschim Medinipur*

[105] *Sale price in Birbhum in December 2008*

[106] *Sale price in Hooghly in November 2008*

Thus, absence of modalities for support price scheme and lacunae in the Government order coupled with delay of the Department in communicating its decision to BENFED led to avoidable loss of ₹ 5.59 crore (approximate) in five districts under potato support price scheme 2008.

BENFED while reiterating the absence of clear departmental directives on this issue, intimated (June 2011) that it was not feasible to find buyers of cold storage receipts in June as potatoes stored in cold storage are released in late July/August. The same is not acceptable as test check showed that cold storages in Hooghly started releasing potato in the first week of May 2008. Further, it was evident from the records of Agriculture Marketing Officers of the districts that buyers of bonds were available even in June 2008.

It was further argued by BENFED that given the regulatory framework and social accountability of its functioning, BENFED could not practice speculation for harnessing higher sale price of potato. While appreciating the reply, the point still remains that after safeguarding the potato-growers against distress sale of their produce, efforts should have been made to protect the interest of Government by minimizing the quantum of loss involved in the process. Moreover, the department had acknowledged this fact since BENFED had been advised belatedly to take action for disposal of potato, in keeping with commercial interests.

Chapter 4: Chief Controlling Officer based Audit

WATER RESOURCES INVESTIGATION & DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

4 Functioning of Water Resources Investigation & Development Department

Executive Summary

Water Resources Investigation and Development Department (WRIDD) of the Government of West Bengal is responsible for planning, conservation, development, utilisation and management of water resources in sustainable manner for both the surface and groundwater in the Minor Irrigation (MI) sector. The Department plays a pivotal role in ensuring assured irrigation for agriculture by bringing more and more cultivable land under assured irrigation with minimum time and investment. The Chief Controlling Officer based audit of WRIDD was conducted to assess the performance of the Department during the period 2006-11. Audit observed some areas of concern relating to institutional, compliance and programme implementation, which affected the performance of the Department and call for Government attention.

- With a view to reduce excessive stress on ground water the 11th Five Year Plan envisaged special emphasis on utilisation of surface water for creation of MI potential. The Department, however, continued to depend more on ground water for creation of Irrigation Potential (IP) in disregard to the plan proposal.

- Vacancies in key posts and inadequate infrastructure of the State Water Investigation Directorate (SWID) adversely affected implementation of West Bengal Ground Water Resources Act, 2005. The laboratories were not properly equipped to analyse the chemical parameters effectively due to non-availability of modern instruments, non-functional equipments and irregular supply of chemicals/testing kits. None of the laboratories was equipped for testing of heavy metals, inorganic and organic pesticides, virological and bacteriological analysis of water samples.

- Internal control mechanism of the Department was found deficient. There was no departmental manual for guidance of the officers and staff in carrying out their duties and for exercising internal control over the activities of the Department.

- Water rates fixed were not in commensurate with the operation and maintenance cost. Further, water rate of ₹ 9.50 crore remained unrealised.

- During 2006-11, 11990 MI schemes having command area 1.08 lakh ha handed over to unregistered beneficiary committees. Despite huge investment in these schemes the Department did not put an effective mechanism in place for maintenance and monitoring of the schemes to ensure optimum utilisation of created potential.

- Deficiencies in procurement, storage and accounting of materials were noticed. Material was procured in excess of requirement which resulted in piling of surplus materials for years.

- Utilisation of irrigation potential of government operated MI schemes ranged between 29 *per cent* and 37 *per cent* during the period 2006-10 due to defunct schemes, reduction of designed command areas by habitation, insufficient maintenance and irregular power supply. The Department did not take effective step to revitalise the defunct schemes.

- Lack of seriousness in implementation of the Act was noticed as permits were not obtained from SWID prior to installation of 3705 groundwater based MI schemes by Water Resources Development Directorate (WRDD). Workshops on mass awareness were conducted only in eight districts during the first five years of implementation of the Act.

4.1 Introduction

Agriculture is the primary occupation in West Bengal which contributes about 20 *per cent* of the Net State Domestic Product. About 70 *per cent* of the population are dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. Minor Irrigation (MI) has played a pivotal role in boosting agricultural production in the State by bringing more and more land under assured irrigation round the year. MI schemes[1], which require less investment and low maintenance cost are more acceptable to the farmers. The ultimate gross potential of MI schemes in the State has been assessed at 44.34 lakh hectares (ha) against 26.83 lakh ha through Major and Medium Irrigation (MMI) Schemes[2]. Total Irrigation Potential (IP) created[3] upto 2008-09 was 38.99 lakh ha (72 *per cent*) under MI schemes against 15.76 lakh ha (28 *per cent*) under MMI project.

The MI Schemes from both the surface water and groundwater are executed and operated by the Water Resources Investigation and Development Department (WRIDD). The Department is responsible for planning, conservation, development, utilisation and management of water resources in sustainable manner in the MI sector. The Government introduced 'West Bengal Ground Water Resources Management, Control and Regulation (WBGWR) Act, 2005' for conservation and management of groundwater, which is also implemented by the Department.

4.2 Organisational structure

The Department is headed by a Secretary who is the Chief Controlling Officer (CCO). There are two Directorates viz Water Resources Development Directorate (WRDD) and State Water Investigation Directorate (SWID), four

[1] *Irrigation schemes having command area up to 2000 ha*
[2] *Irrigation schemes having command area more than 2000 ha*
[3] *As per Economic Review 2009-10, published by Bureau of Applied Economics & Statistics, Development & Planning Department, Government of West Bengal.*

Command Area Development Authorities[4] (CADA) and two undertakings namely West Bengal State Minor Irrigation Corporation Limited (WBSMICL) and West Bengal Agro-Industries Corporation Limited (WBAICL) under this Department ***(Appendix 4.1)***.

The function of WRDD is mainly to develop existing potential of water resources available in the State for irrigation through construction and maintenance of MI schemes[5] utilising groundwater by Agri-Irrigation (AI) divisions as well as surface water by Agri-Mechanical (AM) divisions. This Directorate also takes up various surface water diversion schemes, digging of water harvesting tanks, drip, sprinkler and hydram schemes.

The SWID carries out investigation and assessment of surface water and groundwater resources in the State. The WBGWR Act, 2005 and the Rules made thereunder are implemented through SWID. It also provides technical assistance in respect of feasibility of MI structures including augmentation of water resources through various conservative/ artificial recharge measures.

The Command Area Development & Water Management (CADWM) Programme was started from 1974-75 in Kangsabati, Mayurakshi and Damodar Valley Projects and from 1999-2000 in Teesta Irrigation Project. The primary objective of CADWM Programme was to bridge the gap between the irrigation potential created through the canal network of the major irrigation schemes and the area actually irrigated to make the best use of the available land and water resources to increase agricultural production.

4.3 Audit objectives

The audit was conducted to examine the overall functioning of the Department and to assess whether

- the planning process and the manpower management was effective; infrastructure and monitoring mechanism was adequate;
- the financial rules, orders and the procedures in budget preparation were complied with;
- the operation & maintenance of the created schemes and material and store management were efficient;
- the service delivery in terms of execution and utilisation of MI schemes and implementation of the WBGWR Act, 2005 were effective.

4.4 Audit criteria

The audit findings were benchmarked against the following criteria:

- National Water Policy 2002

[4] *Teesta CADA, Damodar Valley CADA, Kangsabati CADA and Mayurakshi CADA*

[5] *Heavy Duty Tube Wells (HDTW), Medium Duty Tube Wells (MDTW), Low Duty Tube Wells (LDTW) and Shallow Tube Wells (STW) in the ground water sector and Major RLI, Midi RLI, Mini RLI, Check Dams etc in the surface water sector*

- West Bengal Ground Water Resources (Management, Control and Regulation) Act, 2005 and the Rules made thereunder
- Command Area Development and Water Management Programme Guidelines
- Accelerated Irrigation Benefits Programme (AIBP) Guidelines, Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) Guidelines
- Instructions issued by the Government of West Bengal (GoWB) and the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR)
- West Bengal Financial Rules, West Bengal Treasury Rules 2005 and the Central Public Works Accounts Code

4.5 Audit scope, methodology and sampling procedure

The functioning of the Department was reviewed during the period from 2006-07 to 2010-11 between February and June 2011 covering the Department, WRDD and SWID. The records of 30 out of total 66 divisions in seven sample districts[6] of the State (***Appendix 4.2***) were test checked. Before commencing the scope, objectives and criteria of audit were discussed with the Secretary and the other officers of the Department in an entry conference (March 2011). The audit findings were also discussed (October 2011) in an exit conference. The Department sent a written response to the draft report in November 2011. The views of the Department had been suitably incorporated in this report.



The audit methodology involved collection of documentary evidence, field visits by the audit teams, photographs and interactions with farmers/ beneficiaries of the schemes at the grass root level.

Audit findings

4.6 Institutional arrangements

With the objective of augmenting the existing irrigation potential as well as to create additional potential and to investigate and assess water resources, a well defined institutional arrangement of the Department is required. Efficient planning based on reliable and current database, proper allocation of budgetary and human resources, effective internal controls and monitoring etc. ensure efficient functioning of the Department. Audit scrutiny revealed some deficiencies in the institutional arrangements as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

[6] *Bankura, Bardhaman, Dakshin Dinajpur, East Medinipur, Jalpaiguri , Kolkata and Nadia*

4.6.1 Planning

For effective implementation of the MI schemes and the WBGWR Act, 2005 the Department was required to prepare a Five year plan, which was to be staggered into Annual Action Plans (AAPs), based on current data base of ground water and surface water resources, achievement of creation and operation of MI schemes already planned/taken up etc. The deficiencies noticed in audit are discussed below:

4.6.1.1 Fourth Minor Irrigation Census Report

Planning (2006-11) was based on data base of 3rd MI Census of 2000-01

Rationalisation of MI statistics was launched in 1986-87 by Government of India to build a comprehensive and reliable database of number of MI structures created and potential utilised through these schemes. Accordingly, an all India census of MI structures was to be conducted on quinquennial basis.

Audit observed that the 3rd MI Census with the reference year 2000-01 was published in December 2003. The 4th MI census (2006-07) taken up in July 2007 was scheduled to be published by June 2010. However, a draft State level report has been prepared only in October 2011. Thus the plans (2006-11) prepared by the Department was based on the database of 3rd MI Census.

The Director, SWID stated (July 2011) that the field work was delayed due to shortage of manpower. Validation work suffered due to discrepancy of data and rechecking of data upto village level which took much time.

4.6.1.2 District profile and estimation of dynamic ground water resources

District profiles and District plans were not prepared even after six years of enactment of the WBGWR Act

As per section 9 of the Act, SWID was to prepare district wise profile of ground water resources and district plan for conservation, maintenance and utilisation of ground water for every five year period. However, scrutiny revealed that district profiles and district plans were not prepared for any of the districts in the State as of October 2011 even after six years of enactment of the Act.


As per National Water Policy, 2002, the groundwater resources should be re-assessed periodically. Estimation of dynamic groundwater resources in West Bengal was made in March 2004 by SWID jointly with Central Ground Water Board (CGWB). Out of total 341 blocks in the State, ground water assessment was made in respect of 269 blocks excluding 72 saline infested blocks (59 in the coastal area and 13 in northern hilly region). Fresh estimation of dynamic ground water resources in the State was made in 2008-09. The Report of the latest estimation was not finalised as of July 2011. Lack of comprehensive and current data adversely affected the planning and execution of the MI schemes. Further, Section 7 (3) of the Act provided issuance of permits for sinking of new tube wells after scrutiny of the application forms in terms of quantity and quality of ground water. Audit noticed that due to non availability of latest assessment data, the SWID had to follow the categorisation of block as per estimation of ground water resources done in March 2004 while issuing permits for sinking of new tube wells. The possibility of over exploitation of ground water in some areas can not be ruled out and the whole exercise of issuing permits for sinking of new tube wells based on assessment of ground water availability was rendered infructuous.

4.6.1.3 Deficiencies in planning

Plans were prepared without obtaining inputs from the field offices

The Five year plan (2007-12) and the Annual plans for the years 2006-07 to 2010-11 were prepared by the Department based on data of 3rd MI census. The plans prepared by the Department were based on top down approach as necessary inputs were not obtained from the field offices. Besides, the targets were fixed in the Five Year Plans and Annual plans on lump sum basis without any details and proper analysis of the previous years' achievement/shortfall. The Department, in reply, stated (November 2011) that the Annual plans were prepared after considering achievements in the previous year. The reply was, however, not tenable as the targets were fixed by the Department unrealistically during 2006-11 despite huge shortfalls in the previous year (as discussed in para 4.8.1).

As per assessment of dynamic ground water resources conducted in March 2004, 38 blocks out of 341 blocks in the State were categorised as '**Critical**' and '**Semi-critical**' because of significant decline of water level. With a view to reducing excessive exploitation on ground water, 11th Five Year Plan (2007-12) envisaged special emphasis on utilisation of surface water through implementation of River Lift Irrigation (RLI) schemes, construction of water harvesting tanks, surface flow MI schemes and some new schemes such as drip, sprinkler and hydram.



Audit scrutiny revealed that 26.48 lakh ha and 12.05 lakh ha irrigation potential was created through ground and surface water resources respectively in the State up to 2010-11. During 2006-11 WRDD created 10812 ground water based MI schemes having command area of 73359 ha and handed over those to the beneficiary committees whereas only 1178 surface based MI schemes having command area of 34717 ha were created and handed over during the same period. Further, only five sprinkler irrigation structures have been created during this period. Similarly, SWID undertook only 34 pilot schemes like construction of percolation tank and roof top rain water harvesting for artificial recharge in drought prone districts and semi/critical blocks of which only 28 were completed as of March 2011. Thus, the Department continued to depend more on ground water for creation of Irrigation Potential in disregard to the plan proposal.

Department continued to depend more on ground water for creation of Irrigation Potential

The Department in reply (November 2011) accepted the need for expanding the infrastructure for capturing of rain water for economic use and stated that adequate steps would be taken towards increasing the water use efficiency in irrigation prior to putting ban on ground water extraction.

4.6.1.4 Lack of preliminary survey and investigation in selection of schemes

Inadequate survey and investigation resulted in dropping of 131 MI schemes after approval

Irrigation schemes were required to be taken up after carrying out detailed survey of availability and requirement of water considering hydrological, environmental and ecological aspects of the schemes. As per guidelines for issue of water availability certificate for RLI schemes, SWID was required to consider data of three years to assess the sustainability of the water sources.

The proposals of the new schemes are investigated by the departmental engineers for preparation of the techno feasibility reports after obtaining clearance of availability of required water from SWID. The list of feasible schemes is submitted to District Site Selection Committee (DSSC) for approval. Approved schemes are taken up by the Department for execution under fund from Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF), Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme (AIBP) and State Plan.

The Department took up 14,046 schemes under RIDF-VIII to RIDF-XV and AIBP-Phase-I during 2002-10 of which 131 schemes having an estimated cost of ₹ 22.31 crore were dropped after approval ***(Appendix 4.3).*** Further, sites of 102 MI schemes under RIDF projects[7] were subsequently changed which resulted in delay in completion.

The Department attributed (November 2011) non-availability of suitable aquifer, change of river courses and dried up water sources as reasons for dropping of the schemes after approval. Scrutiny, however, revealed that SWID considered the water availability data of a particular date against the prevailing norms of three consecutive years before issuing water availability certificate towards installation of RLI schemes. Thus, adequate survey and investigations were not conducted before submission of proposals for construction of the MI schemes.

4.6.2 Manpower Management

Huge vacancies in key posts affected the performance and service delivery of the Department

The performance of any organisation and efficient implementation of programmes depends on availability of qualified and trained manpower. Audit scrutiny revealed that the Department did not carry out assessment of its manpower requirement, taking into account the present and future needs to fulfil its objectives. There were vacancies in key posts including 93 Assistant Engineers, 230 Sub-Assistant Engineers, 329 Mechanic/Draftsman/Surveyor and 3326 operators ***(Appendix 4.4)*** which affected the performance and service delivery, maintenance of important records, monitoring of handed over schemes, reconciliation of electric bills etc. The Department replied (November 2011) that assessment of man-power requirement was underway, taking into account of the future needs and exact competencies.

Further, as per departmental guidelines, transfer of an officer or staff shall be on expiry of five years of service at a particular place. In 11 test checked divisions, it was noticed that 50 employees out of 160 employees remained posted in the same division for a period in excess of five years in violation of

[7] *RIDF-X, XI, XII and XIII*

departmental guidelines ***(Appendix 4.5).*** Periodical change of posting of officers and staff is essential as it provides an opportunity to personnel to acquire working knowledge in all sphere of the functioning of the Directorates.

Induction training was not imparted to the newly recruited Assistant Engineers

The Assistant Engineers posted in sub-divisions under WRDD have to perform the functions of Drawing and Disbursing Officers (DDOs). Therefore, induction training to newly recruited Assistant Engineers is essential for discharging the duties of DDOs and also for day-to-day technical work. Scrutiny of records of the WRDD, however, revealed that 71 Assistant Engineers were recruited during 2006-11 through West Bengal Public Service Commission. However, no training was imparted to make them aware of their duties and responsibilities before posting to different field units just after recruitment. In the exit conference the Secretary, WRIDD admitted (October 2011) the audit observation.

4.6.2.1 Idling of drilling units in SWID

Unfruitful expenditure of ₹ 7.53 crore towards pay and allowances of idle staff of Drilling Divisions

Four Drilling divisions[8] along with 15 sub-divisions under the Drilling circle of SWID were created (1975) with the objective to investigate and explore the ground water resources through drilling of tube-wells. However, no exploratory drilling work was conducted by the divisions after June 2000. As a result, man and machineries engaged with the drilling work remained idle since then. Not only work of drilling exploratory tube-wells has been suspended but also installations of MI schemes were hampered due to non-availability of rig machines. Conditions of the existing rig machines and other machineries under those divisions had deteriorated to a great extent requiring thorough overhauling, major repairing and replacement of major spare parts. A proposal for revival of the Drilling Units at an estimated cost of ₹ 63.70 lakh was submitted (December 2009) by the Director, SWID. The Department neither took any action to repair the drilling machineries nor deployed 25 idle staff including 11 technical staff engaged in those divisions elsewhere for their gainful utilisation. Consequently, expenditure of ₹ 7.53 crore incurred (during 2006-11) on pay and allowances[9] of the idle staff was unfruitful. The Department stated (November 2011) that the exploration works of drilling was being outsourced presently and the Drilling circle would be wound up gradually. The idle staff were being transferred to the other divisions in a phased manner.

4.6.3 Inadequate infrastructure of SWID

WBGWR Act, 2005 provides for creation of three tiers of authorities i.e. State Level Ground Water Resources Development Authority (SLA) as the Apex body, Corporation Level Ground Water Resources Development Authority (CLA) for the Kolkata Municipal Area and District Level Ground Water Resources Development Authorities (DLA) for each of the 18 districts for implementation of the WBGWR Act, 2005. Accordingly, SWID has been declared as the functional organ of the SLA. The Director, SWID has been made (September 2005) the ex-officio Chairman of the SLA and the Superintending Geologist of the Geological Circle of SWID is the

[8] *Drilling Divisions No. I, II, III and IV at Medinipur, Bardhaman, Krishnagar and Jalpaiguri respectively*

[9] *Salaries, wages, travelling expenses and medical reimbursement*

Inadequate infrastructure and manpower badly hampered implementation of the WBGWR Act, 2005

Member-Secretary of the SLA and CLA. The office of the Superintending Geologist has been made the Secretariat of the SLA and the CLA. Nine existing Geological sub-divisions along with nine newly created were assigned to the task of DLA to cover all the districts. However, required manpower was not deployed for proper functioning of the sub-divisions.

After enactment of the WBGWR Act, 2005 the work load of the Geological Wing of SWID has increased manifold like issuance of permit and certificate of registration, conduct mass awareness programme, preparation of district profile etc. Scrutiny, however, revealed that the work of issuance of 'Permits' and 'Certificate of Registration', preparation of pre and post monsoon depth of water level maps, project completion report of ground water level monitoring and preparation of district profiles on ground water resources were hampered badly due to inadequate infrastructure and manpower as discussed in paragraph 4.8.2. In reply to audit queries, the Senior Geologists of the three test checked Geological Divisions[10] stated that infrastructural facilities like office space, inspection vehicle and adequate manpower had not been provided to perform the functions of DLA. Scrutiny also revealed that the Geological Information System software and Remote Sensing software were not available with the Geological Divisions which affected up-dation of Hydro geological reports and maps.

4.6.3.1 Inadequate infrastructure of laboratories

Poor infrastructure affected the testing of water samples as envisaged in the Act

Qualitative assessment of ground water resources of the State through periodical analysis, study and review of the physical, chemical, bacteriological and viorological qualities was to be conducted by the laboratories under SWID. Audit scrutiny revealed that prior to enactment of the WBGWR Act, 2005, there were five[11] Chemical and Hydrological laboratories under SWID for monitoring the quality of ground water. To strengthen the Chemical Wing of SWID eight[12] new laboratories were sanctioned in September 2006 out of which three[13] laboratories could not be made functional (June 2011) due to non-deployment of manpower. There was also shortage of manpower[14] both skilled and un-skilled in the existing laboratories. The laboratories were not in a position to analyse chemical parameters effectively due to non-availability of modern instruments[15], non-functional instruments ***(Appendix 4.6)*** and irregular supply of chemicals/testing kits. Records of Central Laboratory, SWID revealed that in absence of modern instruments, impurities like arsenic and iron were tested by test kits which did not produce accurate results. Further, none of the laboratories in the State was equipped for testing of heavy metals, inorganic and organic pesticides, virological and bacteriological analysis of water samples as envisaged in the Act. The Department stated (November 2011) that upgrading the testing capabilities of the laboratories

[10] *Geological Division-I (Bankura), Geological Division-II (Bardhaman) and Geological Division-IV (Jalpaiguri)*
[11] *Central Laboratory, Kolkata, Regional Chemical Laboratories at Berhampore, Bardhaman, Jalpaiguri and Medinipur,*
[12] *Barasat, Coochbehar, Diamond Harbour, Jalpaiguri, Krishnagar, Malda, Purulia and Suri*
[13] *Coochbehar, Dinajpur and Purulia*
[14] *14 vacancies out of 26 sanctioned posts of Chemist, Assistant Chemist and Laboratory Attendant.*
[15] *Atomic Absorption Spectrophotometer for detection of arsenic, UV visible Double beam Spectrophotometer for iron, fluoride*

would be done under the forthcoming West Bengal Accelerated Development of Minor Irrigation Project (WBADMIP).

4.6.4 Internal Controls and Monitoring

Monitoring at various levels of governance provides assurance of the reliability of reporting in the Department. Besides, these controls enable the Department to identify the key problem areas, constraints and managerial needs for the improvement in policy formulation, allocation of resources and setting of performance standards. Audit observed the following:

4.6.4.1 Departmental Manual not prepared

Departmental Manual *inter alia* stipulates rules and regulations, procedures, instructions, responsibility structures, control mechanisms and prescribed formats and periodicity of report returns to be submitted to the appropriate authorities and also provide guidelines for execution of schemes/projects. This is essential for guidance of the officers and staff in carrying out their duties and also for exercising proper internal control over activities of the Department.

Scrutiny revealed that the Department issued administrative orders and guidelines on its various functions. However, the Department had not prepared any Departmental Manual till date (November 2011). Audit observed that there was no clear cut demarcation of functional responsibility at various levels, laid down procedures of monitoring of groundwater level, collection and preservation of water samples, procedures of testing of different parameters of ground and surface water for irrigation purposes.

The Department stated (November 2011) that the orders and guidelines were issued time to time to bring uniformity in practices and procedures. In the exit conference the Secretary, WRIDD stated that the Financial and Technical Manuals prepared under WBADMIP would be followed in the Department. The Department also stated that a manual for preparation of Scheme Development and Management Plan was under preparation.

4.6.4.2 Annual inspection of field units

Prescribed Annual inspections of Divisions and Sub-divisions not conducted

Periodical inspection by the departmental officers is an important and effective tools to ensure proper functioning of the field units. Rules 161 and 162 of WBFR provides that Superintending Engineers (SEs) and Executive Engineers (EEs) were required to conduct annual inspection of divisions and sub-divisions under their respective control.

Audit scrutiny, however, revealed that 21 out of 24 test checked divisions[16] were not inspected by the concerned SEs and 66 sub-divisions out of 81 (under the 24 test checked divisions) were not inspected by the concerned EEs during 2006-11. Thus, the compliance by the divisional and sub divisional officers with the prescribed rules, procedures and instructions and also maintenance of important records and registers were not ensured by the SEs and EEs.

[16] *20Divisions of WRDD and 4 Divisions of SWID*

The Department stated (November 2011) that instructions have been issued to ensure regular inspection of the field units and submission of reports to the Department for necessary evaluation.

4.6.4.3 Non-maintenance of important registers/records

Important records like Instruction Book, Assets Register and Survey Report Register not maintained

Para 26.2 of Central Public Works Departmental Manual provides for maintenance of site instruction book by the contractor to note down instructions issued from time to time by the departmental authority during site visits. The book should be submitted to the division along with the final bill to monitor whether the instructions issued were followed by the contractors. Scrutiny of records, however, revealed that site instruction books were not issued to the contractors in 19 test checked divisions ***(Appendix 4.7).***

As per Government order (June 2006) all administrative departments including their field offices are required to maintain Assets Register with immediate effect. WBFR also stipulates that each divisional officer will keep a register of all immovable Government property including land and buildings within his division. Scrutiny revealed that 15 test checked divisions ***(Appendix 4.7)*** did not maintain Assets Registers. As a result, the management was unaware of the actual status of the assets at their disposal, encroachment, if any, and their safe custody. Further, Survey Report Register and Theft case file were also not maintained by 13 and 12 test checked divisions respectively. The Department stated (November 2011) that records would be maintained as per Public Works Department Rules.

4.6.4.4 Absence of Internal Audit

Internal audit is an important tool for the management to ascertain the accuracy and effectiveness of the internal control mechanism. There was no separate internal audit wing in the Department. Internal audit wing of the Finance Department also did not conduct any audit in any of the test checked divisions during 2006-11. In reply, the Department stated (November 2011) that the proposal to create a separate internal audit wing was in active consideration.

4.6.4.5 Response to Government audit

Periodical inspection of the field units of the Department is conducted by the Audit team to test check the transactions and verify the maintenance of the important accounts and records as prescribed in the rules and procedures. The irregularities noticed in the inspections are followed up with the inspection reports (IRs) incorporating irregularities detected during the inspection. IRs are issued to the heads of offices inspected with copies to the next higher authorities for taking prompt corrective action and report their compliance to us.

It was, however, noticed that out of the IRs issued between April 2006 and March 2011, 180 paragraphs relating to 57 IRs remained outstanding as of March 2011 ***(Appendix 4.8)*** for want of comments of the Government, non-regularisation of expenditure etc. Further, 90 paragraphs related to 46 IRs issued between April 1984 and March 2006 remained outstanding.

Meetings of the Audit committee, comprising the Secretary of the Department and representatives of the Finance Department and the officials from the office of the Accountant General (Receipt, Works and Local Bodies Audit), West Bengal could be held in only six occasions[17] during 2006-11 for expeditious settlement of the outstanding paragraphs and IRs.

Lack of response to audit observations depicted lack of proper accountability mechanism on the part of the Department. The Department stated (November 2011) that a special drive to settle the outstanding paragraphs would be undertaken.

4.7 Compliance Issues

4.7.1 Budget and financial reporting

Control over budget and expenditure is essential for optimal utilisation of limited resources to achieve the objectives. The shortcomings noticed in control over preparation of the budget and expenditure thereof are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs:

4.7.1.1 Preparation of budget

Budgets were prepared without obtaining inputs from field offices

One of the basic tenets of efficient financial management is preparation of realistic budget. West Bengal Budget Manual stipulates that budget estimates are to be prepared by the Chief Engineer (CE) and to be submitted by 1 November to the Secretary, WRIDD who will in turn submit the same to the Finance Department by 1 December of each year. For this purpose, the EEs of the working divisions are to submit their budget estimates to the SEs by 15 September each year and the SEs are to prepare circle-wise budget estimates and submit the same to the CE by 1 October each year.

Contrary to the provision, budget estimates were prepared by the CE-I of WRDD in consultation with the other CEs of WRDD, Director of SWID and Administrator of Teesta CADA[18] and Managing Director of WBSMICL and submitted the same to the Secretary, WRIDD after a delay of 90 to 120 days during 2006-11.

Scrutiny revealed that the circles and divisions of WRDD did not prepare any budget estimate during 2006-11 for submission to the higher authorities. Similarly, the circles of SWID prepared annual budget estimates during 2006-10 without any inputs from the divisions and submitted the same after a delay of 3 to 86 days, as detailed in ***(Appendix 4.9)***. Three circles[19] did not furnish the budget estimates for 2010-11 at all while the Geological circle submitted the budget estimates after a delay of 190 days for the year.

Thus, the budget was prepared without of inputs from the lower formations as required under the Budget Manual. This was indicative of laxity in budgetary control by the Department. The Department stated (November 2011) that the

[17] *17.03.2006, 21.07.2009, 17.09.2009, 11.12.2009, 28.09.2010 and 08.12.2010*
[18] *Administrator Teesta, CADA in the rank of Chief Engineer is administrative head of all the four CADAs*
[19] *Surface Water Investigation Circle, Investigation Planning & Design Circle and Drilling Circle*

procedure for preparation of the budget would be streamlined from 12th Five year Plan period.

4.7.1.2 Budget provision and expenditure

Budget provision for the Department was made under grant No.-55-Water Resources Investigation and Development consisting of seven[20] Major Heads of accounts. However, most of the funds were provided under the four[21] major heads of accounts related to MI and Command Area Development. During 2006-11 budget provisions *vis-à-vis* actual expenditure and savings in respect of these four heads of accounts, covered under the Audit, were as shown in table below.

Table: 4.1 Budget allotment and actual expenditure during 2006-11 *(Rupees in crore)*

Year	Original Budget provision (voted)		Revised Budget provision (voted)		Expenditure (voted)		*Savings(-)/Excess (+) in respect of original budget provision*		*Percentage of savings(-)/ excess(+)*	
	Revenue	Capital	Revenue	Capital	Revenue	Capital	*Revenue*	*Capital*	*Revenue*	*Capital*
2006-2007	277.56	93.69	313.62	60.51	276.97	32.17	*(-) 0.59*	*(-) 61.52*	*(-) 0.21*	*(-) 66*
2007-2008	311.11	117.81	310.74	96.01	282.93	74.39	*(-) 28.18*	*(-) 43.39*	*(-) 9*	*(-) 37*
2008-2009	326.34	154.52	320.18	132.41	284.81	136.92	*(-) 41.53*	*(-) 17.60*	*(-) 13*	*(-) 11*
2009-2010	426.38	192.10	390.27	147.10	379.53	124.26	*(-) 46.85*	*(-) 67.84*	*(-) 11*	*(-) 35*
2010-2011	472.48	430.50	442.49	135.45	NA	82.24	NA	*(-) 348.26*	NA	*(-) 81*

(Source: Budget Publication No.24 and VLC data)
NA: Not available

There were savings ranging from 11 to 81 *per cent* **in the Plan Heads of the budget during 2006-11**

It is evident from the above table that savings under capital heads ranged between 11 to 81 *per cent* during the period 2006-11. Despite persistent savings, the reasons for non-finalisation were not investigated and excessive funds continued to be provided. During the year 2006-07, the entire budget provision of ₹ 40 crore on implementation of MI schemes under RIDF XI remained unutilised. During the year 2007-08, ₹ 11.99 crore and ₹ 19.17 crore provided for implementation MI schemes under RIDF-XI and RIDF-XII respectively was not utilised. During the year 2009-10, ₹ 6 crore for AIBP schemes and ₹ 14.79 crore for WBADMIP were not utilised at all. Savings in WBADMIP was due to dropping of the concept of work in pilot districts.

Persistent savings under capital heads indicated unrealistic budget formulation.

Further, as per Budget Manual savings/anticipated savings are required to be surrendered well in advance before the closing of the financial year to the Finance Department for effective utilisation in the areas where there is shortage of funds. However, we observed that despite persistent savings, no fund was surrendered during 2006-11. As a result, the funds lapsed.

Scrutiny also revealed that WRDD incurred expenditure of ₹ 1.20 crore on deep tube well irrigation during 2006-07and ₹ 10.35 crore on development of

[20] *2401-Crop Husbandry, 2408-Food, Storage and Warehousing, 2551-Hill Areas, 2702-Minor Irrigation, 4702-Capital outlay on Minor Irrigation, 2705-Command Area Development and 4705-Capital outlay on Command Area Development*
[21] *2702-Minor Irrigation, 4702-Capital outlay on Minor Irrigation, 2705-Command Area Development and 4705-Capital outlay on Command Area Development*

water bodies during 2007-08 without budget provision in contravention of the Budget Manual.

The Department stated (November 2011) that savings in capital head was mainly due to late release of fund, delay in execution of schemes, election embargo, delay in approval of AIBP schemes etc. Further, excess fund could not be surrendered before closing of the financial year as those were received at the very fag end of the financial year.

4.7.2 Compliance with financial laws, regulations and rules

For sound financial administration and financial control, it is essential that expenditure conforms to the financial rules, regulations and orders issued by the competent authority. This not only prevents irregularities, misappropriation and frauds, but also helps in maintaining good financial discipline. Instances of non-compliance with rules and regulations noticed in audit are discussed as under:

4.7.2.1 Rush of expenditure

As per Rule 389 A of WBFR, rush of expenditure particularly in the closing month of the financial year is regarded as a breach of financial regularity. Scrutiny of records of 23 divisions[22] out of 30 selected divisions revealed that 31 to 50 *per cent* of the expenditure was incurred by the divisions in March during 2006-2011 as evident from table below:

Table 4.2 Expenditure in March during 2006-2011 *(Rupees in crore)*

Year	Total expenditure	Expenditure in March	Percentage of expenditure in March
2006-2007	57.26	28.85	50
2007-2008	79.49	28.81	36
2008-2009	84.45	39.65	47
2009-2010	86.55	34.87	40
2010-2011	65.75	20.23	31

(Source: compiled from records of test checked divisions)

Late release of funds resulted in rush of expenditure in March during 2006-11

Further, scrutiny of records revealed that the funds released by the Directorates through Letter of Credit (LOC) to these divisions during the last month of the financial year ranged between 18 to 45 *per cent* of the total fund released during the respective financial year. Fifty one *per cent* to 98 *per cent* LOC released in March was issued after 15th March every year. Release of funds by the Directorates at the fag end of the year was the main reason for rush of expenditure. Thus uniform flow of expenditure during the year, a primary requirement of budgetary control, was not followed indicating deficient financial management. The Department stated (November 2011) that maximum fund was utilised at the end of the financial year as works were usually executed during November to March of the year as per availability of sites.

[22] *Out of 30 selected divisions 24 divisions were entitled to receive LOC, Tamluk (AM) Division did not furnish any information.*

4.7.2.2 Non-reconciliation of issue of cheques and remittances

In 14 out of 24 test checked divisions CTIs and CTRs were in arrear for periods more than five years

In terms of Para 22.3.1 of Central Public Works Accounts Code, public works divisions are required to furnish to the Accounts Office details of cheques drawn, cheques encashed and balance of cheques remaining uncashed in Form-51 "schedule of settlement with treasury"-Part-II, duly supported with "Certificate of Treasury Issues" (CTIs) provided by the Treasury Officer. Similarly, the divisions are also to furnish "schedule of settlement with treasuries" in Form-51-Part-I, duly supported with Form-50 "Consolidated Treasury Receipts" (CTRs) showing therein the amount remitted to the treasuries, amount acknowledged by the treasuries and balance remaining unacknowledged at the end of each month. It was, however, noticed that out of 24 test-checked divisions having cheque drawing power, in 14 divisions[23] CTIs and CTRs were in arrear for the period prior to 2006-11. As regular reconciliation gives the opportunity of timely detection of irregularities like missing credit, bounced cheques, misappropriation of departmental receipts, fraudulent drawal of funds etc., absence of reconciliation leaves the scope of such irregularities.

As per provisions of the WBGWR Rules 2006, any user desiring to sink a tubewell is required to deposit the application fee in the treasury and submit a copy of the treasury challan to the DLA/CLA in support of payment of application fee. Scrutiny of records of three Geological divisions[24] under SWID revealed that there was no system of cross verification of the copy of the treasury challan with the records of the treasury, leaving the scope of submission of fake challans. The Secretary, WRDD in the exit conference (November 2011) accepted the audit contention of non-reconciliation of amount remitted to Treasury/Bank and assured to take necessary steps in this regard.

4.7.2.3 Lapsed deposits not credited to the government account

West Bengal Treasury Rules, 2005, provides that all deposits or balances in excess of ₹ 25 unclaimed for more than three complete accounting years after the year of deposit should be credited to the Government account as 'lapsed deposit'. In 15 test checked divisions[25] of WRDD, security deposits amounting to ₹ 28.11 lakh deducted from the agencies up to March 2008 and remained unclaimed for more than three years had not been credited to Government account as 'lapsed deposit' as of March 2011, in violation of the above provision. The Department accepted (November 2011) that the unclaimed amount is to be deposited in the Government account as a lapsed deposit.

---

[23] *Bankura (Agri Irrigation), Bankura (Agri Mechanical), Bankura (AI) Investigation & Planning, Bardhaman (AI), Balurghat (AI), Jalpaiguri (AM), Jalpaiguri (AI), Kalyani (AM), Kalyani (AI), Kangsabati (AI) CAD, Kolkata (AM) Resources, Krishnagar (AM), Krishnagar (AI)-II and Tamluk (AM)*

[24] *Geological Division-I/ Bankura, Geological Division-II/ Bardhaman and Geological Division-IV/Jalpaiguri*

[25] *15 test check working Divisions which deduct security deposists from contractors' bills viz. Bankura (AM), Bankura (AI), Bardhaman (AM), Bardhaman (AI), Balurghat (AM), Balurghat (AI), Jalpaiguri (AM), Jalpaiguri (AI), Kalyani (AM), Kalyani (AI), Krishnagar (AM), Krishnagar (AI)-I, Krishnagar (AI)-II, Tamluk (AM) and Tamluk (AI)*

4.7.3 Lack of control over collection of water rates

Water rates did not commensurate with operation and maintenance cost. Further, water rates of ₹ 9.50 crore remained unrealised as of March 2011

As per National Water Policy (2002), water charges should be fixed in such a way so that the operation and maintenance charges are covered for sustainability of the created assets. Scrutiny, however, revealed that in 15 test checked divisions of WRDD which operated and maintained MI schemes, water rates actually realised was 31 *per cent* to 43 *per cent* of the operating cost of the schemes during the period 2006-10. Water rates for supply of irrigation water through MI schemes under the State Government were last revised in July 2003. Thus, the water rate fixed by the Department did not commensurate with the actual operation and maintenance cost of the MI schemes.

Further, realisation of water rates against supply of irrigation water from the MI installations of WRDD are being done by the different Block Development Officers (BDOs) in the State. The beneficiaries were to deposit water rates in advance to the BDOs for availing irrigation facilities. On production of the prepaid receipt issued by the BDOs, operators of the schemes record the same in their log book and release water accordingly. Scrutiny, however, revealed that water rates amounting to ₹ 9.50 crore remained unrealised as of March 2011 ***(Appendix 4.10)***. In reply, the EEs stated (March to June 2011) that water rates were collected by the concerned BDOs and they had no control over collection of water rates. However, the fact that the BDO functioned as a mere collector and imposition of water rates and release of water for irrigation after verifying paid challans were the responsibilities of the concerned divisions of the WRDD. There was no coordination between the divisions and BDOs in this regard. The poor collection, in comparison to the amount due, was indicative of inadequate control and monitoring by the WRDD.

The Department stated (November 2011) that necessary steps would be taken to augment collection of revenue.

4.7.4 Maintenance of created assets

4.7.4.1 Departmental MI schemes

The status of MI schemes[26] in the state remaining defunct during 2006-11 is shown in the table below:

Table 4.3:-Year-wise permanently and temporarily defunct MI schemes with command area

Year	Permanently defunct		Temporary defunct		Total	
	No. of MI schemes	Command area (Ha)	No. of MI schemes	Command area (Ha)	No. of MI schemes	Command area (Ha)
2006-07	2200	32962	712	22522	2912	55484
2007-08	2280	33098	726	22458	3006	55556
2008-09	2407	34560	686	24162	3093	58722
2009-10	2380	33266	665	26572	3045	59838
2010-11	2363	35558	712	29508	3075	65066

(Source: Information furnished by WRDD)

[26] *Heavy Duty Tube Well/Deep Tube Wells, Medium Duty Tube Well, Low Duty Tube Well, Shallow Tube Well and Major River Lift Irrigation schemes*

From the above, it was evident that 0.55 lakh ha to 0.65 lakh ha land remained un-irrigated during the period 2006-11. When enquired by Audit, the division replied (March to June 2011) that the schemes remained defunct due to various reasons like theft, ingression of saline water, flood, scarcity of water, change of river course, local disputes, lack of interest of the farmers, non-payment of water taxes, inadequate discharge of water and choking of tube wells. During 2006-11, only 226 temporary and permanent MI schemes[27] were revitalised at a cost of ₹ 21.27 crore against 304 schemes taken up for revitalisation. Thus, on an average, 61 schemes were taken up annually for revitalisation during 2006-11 which was only 2 *per cent* of the average number of defunct MI schemes. The Department neither took any steps to revitilise the schemes nor declared the schemes to be written off and utilised the machineries and pipes elsewhere. It indicated that the Department did not take effective steps to revitalise the schemes. In the exit conference the Secretary, WRIDD stated that permanent defunct schemes would either be revitilised or written off.

Defunct schemes were not revitalised for utilisation of Irrigation Potential

4.7.4.2 Handed over schemes

As per RIDF guidelines and departmental notifications, MI schemes on completion are to be handed over to the concerned Gram Panchayat (GP)/ Panchayat Samity (PS) for subsequent handing over to the Beneficiary Committees (BCs) for operation and maintenance. Cost of operation and maintenance including payment of electricity bills is to be borne by the BCs concerned. However, all the assets of "handed over schemes" would continue to be owned by the Department. The concerned divisional engineers are responsible for looking after the assets without infringing upon the management initiative of the BCs and also for imparting technical know-how including training to the beneficiaries on how the installations to be handled and maintained properly so as to yield optimal benefit to all the concerned. Further, the divisional engineers are required to obtain necessary feedback on performance of such handed over schemes and prepare a comprehensive report for submission to the CE, WRDD.

Upto 2010-11, WRDD handed over 38599 MI schemes having command area of 2.86 lakh ha to the BCs through the respective GPs for operation and maintenance. Out of this, 11990 schemes having command area of 1.08 lakh ha were handed over to the unregistered BCs during 2006-11. The Department have no data regarding number of registered BCs. Raising of electricity bill in respect of the MI installations and payment thereof become a constant issue as the assets were handed over to the unregistered beneficiary committee. Besides, proper management of the asset and its operation and maintenance is affected as no accountability can be fixed upon any member of the BCs under any Act due to non-registration. Scrutiny of 15 test checked divisions of WRDD revealed the followings:

11990 Minor Irrigation Schemes having command area of 1.08 lakh ha was handed over to the unregistered beneficiaries during 2006-11

[27] *HDTW/DTW, MDTW, LDTW AND STW*

There was no effective mechanism to monitor the performance of the handed over schemes

- Regular feedback reports on performance of the handed over schemes in the test checked WRDD divisions were not obtained except in Bardhaman (AM) division where 10 handed over schemes costing ₹ 1.71 crore out of 50 (as of March 2011) remained non-functional for the period ranging from two to seven years due to lack of interest of the farmers. No action was taken by the Department to utilise the created IP. Thus, in absence of any feedback, the Department was unaware of the status of the handed over schemes. Further, training was also not imparted to the beneficiaries in none of the test checked divisions.

- During joint inspection (February to June 2011) of the handed over schemes in five divisions[28] by the audit team with the departmental engineers, seven schemes[29] out of 14 inspected were found defunct due to theft of electrical accessories, non-payment of electricity bills to West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Corporation Limited (WBSEDCL), failure of tube wells etc. The BCs were unable to bear the cost of major repair works such as redrilling of HDTW, replacement of choked pipelines etc. They were also facing difficulties in procuring different types of spare parts from the local market.



Defunct handed over scheme-Hansadanga, Block-Krishnagar-II (Nadia)



Defunct handed over scheme-Bandghatri Block-Kalna-I (Bardhaman)

In August 2011, the Department issued a notification 'Operation and Management Rules for Minor Irrigation schemes'. The said notification provide for formation of Management Committee, its registration, its functions and management of created assets. The Rules, however, did not address the issues like obtaining regular feedback reports, revival of the defunct schemes, training etc. as discussed in the previous paragraphs. Thus, the sustainability of the handed over schemes under RIDF could not be ensured.

The Department stated (November 2011) that necessary replacement of the infrastructure would be made after survey of the handed over schemes.

[28] *Bardhaman (A-I), Kalyani (A-I), Krishnagar (A-I) division-I, Jalpaiguri (A-I) and Jalpaiguri (A-M) division*

[29] *Bandghatri HDTW under Bardhaman (A-I) Division, Kasthadanga DTW and Jalkar Bhomra-II under Kalyani (A-I) Division, Hansadanga DTW under Krishnagar (A-I) Division-I, Madhya Khagrabari Mini RLI and Uttar Khagrabari-I Mini RLI under Jalpaiguri (A-M) Division and Khrija Berubari STW (E) under Jalpaiguri (A-I) Division*

4.7.5 Material and store management

A sound system of stores management involves planning of purchase requirements, efficient and economic procurement, control over issue, timely and proper accounting and safe physical custody of stores. Audit noticed the following deficiencies in inventory management as discussed below:

4.7.5.1 Deficiency in accounting of stores

Material-at-site accounts, Bin Cards and Priced Store Ledger were not maintained

A large part of the estimated cost of MI Schemes is the material cost. Audit scrutiny of 15 test checked divisions[30] of WRDD revealed that no Suspense Head for 'Stock' was operated and expenditure incurred on procurement of material was booked directly to the respective scheme head or maintenance head. As per CPWA Code, material-at-site accounts for every individual work was required to be maintained when expenditure was directly booked against the final head of accounts. Scrutiny revealed that none of the test checked divisions maintained material-at-site accounts. As a result, value of excess materials of a particular scheme remained unutilised in the store and the booked expenditure of the work remained inflated. However, store ledgers were maintained in sub-divisional stores for keeping account of the quantity of the materials. "Bin Cards" and "Price Store Ledger" showing quantity and value of material were also not maintained and as such value of material available with the Department could not be ascertained in audit.

As per Rule 244 of WBFR, material which is no longer required in the work should be disposed off by transfer or sale. However, it was seen in audit that proper account of surplus/unserviceable/obsolete stores were not maintained in any of the test checked divisions. In absence of such mechanism, total value of such stores in the Department and their disposal could not be ascertained in audit.

4.7.5.2 Excess procurement

Rule 101 of WBFR provides that procurement of stores should be made in the most economical manner in accordance with the requirement. Accordingly, requirement of material is to be assessed on the basis of the detailed project reports prepared after proper survey and investigation of individual schemes.

Material worth ₹ 6.63 crore lying unntilised in Resources Division

Funds for the procurement of material were directly provided to the Resources Divisions[31]. Material procured by these divisions was to be kept in their sub-divisional stores and should be lifted by the working divisions from those stores as per requirement. Audit scrutiny revealed that materials worth ₹ 6.63 crore procured for RIDF-X to XIII between December 2005 and November 2008 were lying unutilised (January 2011) in the sub-divisional stores of Kolkata (A-M) Resources Division, due to non-lifting of materials by the working divisions. The materials were not lifted as the schemes were dropped subsequently.

[30] *Appendix-4.2 (except Bankura I & P Division, Bardhaman I & P Division and Kolkata (A-M) Resources Division)*
[31] *Kolkata (A-M) Resources Division and Malda (A-M) Resources Division*

Surplus materials worth ₹ 2.41 crore remained unutilised for three to seven years

Audit scrutiny further revealed that in seven divisions[32] out of 15 test checked working divisions[33] of WRDD, surplus materials viz. submersible pumps, UPVC[34] pipes, GI[35] pipes etc. worth ₹ 2.41 crore procured for implementation of the MI schemes in between March 2004 and November 2007 were lying unutilised as of March 2011. The surplus materials were not transferred to other divisions even after lapse of three to seven years. The possibility of these stores becoming obsolete could not be ruled out. Audit scrutiny revealed that materials for implementation of MI schemes were procured on the basis of estimates of model schemes. This resulted in accumulation of surplus materials in the stores of the working divisions.

The Department considering the cascading effect of such stockpiling and the resultant wastage and loss of materials in store, issued (September 2011) an order which *inter alia* stipulated a time frame to prepare an inventory of the serviceable materials in the stock, issue on the basis of 'First in First Out method', disposal of damaged stock as per Government guidelines. The said order, thus, corroborates our audit contention that procurement of material was not in accordance with requirement.

4.7.5.3 Physical verification of stores

Annual physical verification of stores was not conducted despite theft of materials worth ₹ 55.93 lakh

As per Rule-137 of WBFR, divisional officers should conduct annual physical verification of the material at least once a year by an independent officer. Scrutiny, however, revealed that none of the 15 test checked divisions[36] of WRDD conducted annual physical verification of stores regularly. In nine test checked divisions material worth Rs 55.93 lakh were stolen during 2006-11 from different godowns and schemes sites. Although FIRs were lodged with the Police authorities, final investigation reports had not been received as of March 2011. No action had been initiated by the Department as of March 2011 to investigate the cases and fix up the responsibilities. Thus, in absence of regular physical verification of stores and incidence of theft of store materials pilferage of more materials could not be ruled out. The Department stated (November 2011) that necessary instructions in this matter had already been issued. However, the reply was not tenable as the instructions issued (September 2011) were for preparation of only an inventory of excess material accumulated in the stores for disposal.

---

[32] *Bankura (A-I), Bardhaman (A-I), Kalyani(A-I), Balurghat (A-I), Krishnanagar (A-I), Jalpaiguri (A-I) and Tamluk (A-I)*

[33] *Appendix-4.2 (except Bankura I & P Division, Bardhaman I & P Division and Kolkata (A-M) Resources Division)*

[34] *Unplasticised Polyvinyl Chloride*

[35] *Galvonised Iron*

[36] *Appendix-4.2 (except Bankura I & P Division, Bardhaman I & P Division and Kolkata (A-M) Resources Division)*

4.7.5.4 Absence of adequate infrastructure for storage of materials

As per Rule-109 of WBFR, the divisional officer is responsible for proper arrangements for the custody of stores and for their protection from deterioration and fire.

Scrutiny, however, revealed that huge quantity of material viz UPVC pipes with fittings, strainers, generators etc. was kept in open in stack yard/ office compound for years together which resulted in rapid deterioration. Also, chances of pilferage could not be ruled out. As per view of the Committee of CEs of WRDD (2005) for procurement of pipes, UPVC pipes attain brittleness in three to six months due to exposure of ultraviolet rays of sun. In spite of the observance of the Committee, huge quantities of UPVC pipes alongwith fittings were kept in open as is evident from the following picture:



Diesel Engines kept in open in the compound of WRIDD Administrative Building, Jalpaiguri



PVC pipes and iron strainer in open compound of WRIDD Administrative Building, Jalpaiguri

The Department stated (November 2011) that efforts had been taken in this regard.

4.7.6 Reconciliation of electricity bills for payment

Accumulation of huge financial liability due to non-reconciliation of electricity bills. Further, rebate of ₹ 3.14 crore could not be availed due to delay in payment of electricity bills

WRDD decided (June 2005) to pay energy bills centrally with effect from October 2005 for running of the MI installations in respect of all the divisions against the consolidated monthly claims of WBSEDCL. Subsequently, the Department decided (January 2006) to pay *adhoc* 70 *per cent* of the amount claimed initially and thereafter the balance 30 *per cent* would be paid after reconciliation of the bills by the concerned sub-divisional offices. On receipt of reconciliation statements, WRDD was to send the same to WBSEDCL for confirmation so that payment of balance amount could be made.

Scrutiny of records of 15 test checked divisions of WRDD revealed that as of March 2011 four divisions did not submit any reconciliation statement to WRDD. In respect of other 11 divisions reconciliation was pending for the periods ranging from April 2009 to October 2010, as detailed in ***Appendix 4.11.***

Further, no reconciliation statement was submitted by WRDD to WBSEDCL for confirmation. *Adhoc* payment of ₹ 4.15 crore was paid (March 2010) to WBSEDCL against the accumulated balance of ₹ 34.77 crore pertaining to the period from October 2005 to November 2009. The lackadaisical approach in reconciliation of the electricity bills resulted in accumulation of huge financial liability. Audit scrutiny further revealed that WRDD even delayed the payment of 70 *per cent* of the claims. As a result, it could not avail the rebate of ₹ 3.14[37] crore on electricity bills for the months from October 2005 to March 2011.

The Department stated (November 2011) that the timelines for reconciliation of electricity bills by the division has been prescribed.

4.8 Programme Implementation

4.8.1 Implementation of schemes by WRDD

Activities of WRDD is mainly limited to creation of different MI structures viz Heavy Duty Tube Wells[38] (HDTW), Medium Duty Tube Wells[39] (MDTW), Low Duty Tube Wells[40] (LDTW) and Shallow Tube Wells (STW) utilising ground water and RLI schemes utilising surface water. The Directorate also undertakes various surface water diversion schemes, digging of water harvesting tanks, revitalisation of defunct schemes, conversion of diesel operated schemes to electric operated schemes etc.

During the period 2006-11, WRDD undertook construction of 11287 MI schemes under seven RIDF programmes and AIBP at an estimated cost of ₹ 515.87 crore for covering 1.12 lakh ha of command area as shown in table below:

Table 4.4: Details of RIDF and AIBP schemes taken up during 2006-11

Programme & Year of commencement	Estimated Cost (Rupees in crore)	Total number of schemes	Targeted command area (in ha)	Target date of completion	Number of schemes completed (%)	Command area covered (in Ha) (%)	Expenditure incurred (Rupees in crore)
RIDF-XII (2006-07)	80.93	2589	32209	31.03.09	2052 *(79)*	18332 (57)	68.50
RIDF-XIII (2007-08)	83.90	1208	14334	31.03.10	630 *(52)*	7788 (54)	66.01
RIDF-XIV Ph-I (2008-09)	6.61	33	1526	31.03.11	6 *(18)*	448 (29)	3.05
RIDF-XIV Ph-II (2008-09)	63.38	691	9454	31.03.11	238 *(34)*	5702 (60)	35.75
RIDF-XIV (PH-IV) (2008-09)	80.16	2372	17526	31.03.12	1492 *(63)*	10130 (58)	38.28
RIDF-RIDF-XV (2009-10)	84.79	1286	11402	31.03.12	3	120 (1)	32.71
RIDF-XVI (Ph-I) (2010-11)	106.07	3076	23107	31.03.14	0	0	0
AIBP (PH-I) (2007-08)	10.03	32	2487	31.03.09	23 *(72)*	1740 (70)	8.13
	515.87	**11287**	**112045**		**4444**	**44260**	**252.43**

(Source: Records of WRDD)

[37] *Amount payable within due date= ₹ 173.68 crore, amount payable after due date= ₹ 176.82 crore*
[38] *HDTW-discharge capacity 200 cubic meter per hour with CCA of 40 Ha*
[39] *MDTW- discharge capacity 100 cubic meter per hour with CCA of 20 Ha*
[40] *LDTW- discharge capacity 30 cubic meter per hour with CCA of 4-6 ha*

As of March 2011, only 4444 schemes (39 *per cent*) out of 11287 schemes undertaken were completed and 0.44 lakh ha of command area was covered against the target of 1.12 lakh ha while expenditure incurred was ₹ 252.43 crore (49 *per cent*). Besides, 1170 different MI schemes under core sector were completed during 2006-2011.

Shortfall in creation of irrigation potential ranged between 14 *per cent* and 38 *per cent*

Audit observed also revealed shortfalls in achievement of irrigation potential against the targets set for the years 2006-07 to 2010-11 as detailed in table below:

Table 4.5: Targeted Irrigation potential *vis a vis* Achievement

Year	Irrigation Potential			Percentage shortfall
	Target	Achievement	Shortfall	
	(figure in Ha)			
2006-07	33561	20663	12898	38
2007-08	32260	24235	8025	25
2008-09	57717	49590	8127	14
2009-10	66490	44985	21505	32
2010-11	84870	NA		

(Source: Information furnished by WRDD)

Blocking of fund of ₹ 12.77 crore paid to WBSEDCL towards energisation of 703 MI schemes

Audit observed that shortfall in creation of targeted IP was due to dropping of 131 sanctioned schemes (discussed in paragraph 4.6.1.4), delay in completion of works evident from **Table 4.4** above and non-energisation of completed MI schemes. As of January 2011, 703 schemes under RIDF-VIII to RIDF-XIV having a command area of 5544 ha remained non-energised though payment of ₹ 12.77 crore was made to WBSEDCL as service connection charges. Thus, the amount invested in the schemes including the amount paid to WBSEDCL remained blocked and the benefit of providing irrigation could not be extended to the beneficiaries.

In reply to an audit query the CE/WRDD stated (January 2011) that shortfall in creation of irrigation potential was due to non-energisation, Panchayat election, revision of schedule of rates, non-availability of schemes from tribal and draught prone areas under AIBP, receipt of administrative approval and financial sanctions at the fag end of the financial year etc. The Department also stated (November 2011) that regular persuasion was being done with WBSEDCL from the Directorate for energisation. However, Audit observed that ₹ 12.77 crore was still lying with the WBSEDCL.

4.8.1.1 Under utilisation of irrigation potential created

Only 29 *per cent* to 37 *per cent* of the created potential was utilised during 2006-11

Utilisation of Irrigation Potential (IP) of Government operated MI schemes in the State during the period 2006-10, ranged from 29 *per cent* to 37 *per cent* as shown in **Table 4.6**. The CE, WRDD stated (August 2011) that the reasons for shortfall in utilisation of IP were defunct schemes, reduction of designed command areas by habitation, inadequate maintenance, irregular power supply, unwillingness of cultivators etc. The Department did not have any

information regarding utilisation of IP of 38599 handed over MI schemes having CCA of 2.86 lakh Ha.

Table 4.6: Irrigation potential created *vis a vis* utilisation during 2006-11

Year	Irrigation Potential created	Irrigation Potential utilised	Percentage of utilisation
	(in ha)		
2006-07	606056	218895	36
2007-08	604840	224963	37
2008-09	601696	177125	29
2009-10	604188	184436	31

(Source:- Information furnished by WRDD)

In view of the above the Department needs to take necessary steps for maintenance and revitalisation of both permanent and temporary defunct schemes for optimum utilisation of the created IP.

4.8.1.2 Use of ground water in the quality affected areas

1044 MI structures were installed in the Arsenic and Fluoride affected blocks during the period 2006-11

Scientific studies revealed that lowering of water table have a direct relationship with arsenic contamination in water and its adverse effect on agricultural products. Out of 19 districts in the State, 12 are affected with fluoride or arsenic. Scrutiny revealed that there were 19012 government operated ground water based MI schemes in 124 blocks of 12 districts affected with arsenic or fluoride. In three test checked arsenic or fluoride affected districts[41], 1044 MI structures were installed in the affected blocks of the districts during the period 2006-11, leaving human beings and cattle exposed to the risk of arsenic/fluoride contamination from consumption of agricultural products in those affected areas. The Department stated (November 2011) that there was no restriction in using arsenic/fluoride contaminated water in agriculture, however, safe and deeper aquifer was being harnessed in the arsenic affected blocks. The reply was, however, not tenable as SWID decided (April 2009) not to install tube well in arsenic and fluoride affected areas in case of West Bengal Accelerated Development Minor Irrigation Project.

4.8.1.3 Non-conversion of diesel operated schemes

Operation and maintenance (O&M) of electric operated schemes is more economical, convenient and environment friendly than that of diesel operated schemes. The O&M of diesel operated schemes on the other hand involved lots of hazards like carriage and storage of highly inflammable High Speed Diesel and lube-oil. The Budget proposal of WRIDD of 2009-10 is also emphasised conversion to electrified schemes to cut down the escalating operation cost. The CE, WRDD also opined (June 2008) that non-plan expenditure towards procurement of diesel and lubricants exceeded the budget allocation due to constant escalation of the price of diesel and lubricants. Scrutiny, however, revealed that 1483 (44 *per cent*) out of 3366

[41] *Arsenic affected district: Nadia, Fluoride affected districts: Bankura and Dakshin Dinajpur*

departmentally operated River Lift Irrigation (RLI) schemes remained diesel operated as of March 2011. During 2006-11, WRDD had taken up 161 MI schemes for conversion at an estimated cost of ₹ 14.43 crore, of which only 48 MI schemes could be converted to electric operated scheme at a cost of ₹ 12.66 crore.

Blockage of service connection charge of ₹2.22 crore due to delay in energisation of schemes

Scrutiny of records in three test checked divisions[42] revealed that 41 out of 99 diesel operated RLI schemes taken up for conversion into electric ones during 2006-11 could not be converted due to non-receipt of service connection from WBSEDCL though ₹ 1.48 crore was paid during February to March 2009 as service connection charges. The schemes were being operated by diesel as of May 2011. Scrutiny revealed that 15 RLI schemes under Balurghat (AM) Division taken up during 1994-95 could not also be converted as of May 2011 due to the same reason, despite payment of ₹ 74 lakh to the WBSEDCL in March 1999.

During 2006-11, the Department incurred an expenditure of ₹ 3.09 crore towards carriage, storage and security on procurement of HSD oil and lubricants. Scrutiny further revealed that in six [43] out of seven test checked Agri Mechanical Divisions, 2.26 lakh litre of HSD oil worth ₹ 77.97 lakh was diverted for running government vehicles and office generators unauthorisedly.

4.8.2 Functioning of State Water Investigation Directorate

4.8.2.1 Implementation of WBGWR Act, 2005

SWID acts as the functional organ of the SLA for implementation of WBGWR Act, 2005. The main functions of the SLA are as follows:

- To review quantitative and qualitative analysis of ground water,
- To manage the ground water resources including issue of certificate for ground water extraction,
- To initiate a policy to conserve the ground water resources by way of recharging, replenishing, recycling etc. and
- To create mass awareness regarding conservation and management of ground water.

A review of the functioning of the SWID, as enshrined under the Act, revealed the following:

- ***Periodical quantitative and qualitative monitoring of Ground water***

SWID monitors block-wise depth of ground water level and its fluctuation throughout the State in four seasons[44] of a year through a net work of 2082

[42] *Balurghat (AM) Division-57, Kalyani (AM) Division-14 and Krishnagar (AM) Division-28*
[43] *Balurghat (AM), Bankura (AM), Bardhaman (AM), Jalpaiguri (AM), Krishnagar (AM) and Tamluk (AM)*
[44] *Pre monsoon (April); Monsoon (August); Post monsoon (November) and Winter (January)*

Permanent Hydrograph Stations (PHSs). The data so collected are processed and fluctuation of water level is estimated. Scrutiny, however, revealed that periodical monitoring of water level was not done regularly for all the PHSs in the test checked districts except Jalpaiguri due to 72 PHSs remaining defunct, inaccessible sites etc. as shown in ***Appendix 4.12.*** As a result, proper monitoring of ground water level and its fluctuation could not be ensured.

Reduce Level Survey of PHSs not completed in four out of seven selected districts

Further, "Reduced Level Survey" for detection of elevation from the "Mean Sea Level" for all PHSs is necessary for determining ground water flow direction and for estimation of ground water resources. In absence of such survey, contour maps of ground water table cannot be prepared. Scrutiny of records revealed that "Reduced Level Survey" had not been completed in Bankura, Bardhaman, Dakshin Dinajpur and East Medinipur out of seven selected districts.

Block-wise water samples are also collected twice[45] a year from the existing PHSs or from nearby wells and analysed at the laboratories of SWID. In addition to routine monitoring of chemical quality of ground water arsenic and fluoride contamination were also tested. Scrutiny of records of four test checked laboratories[46], however, revealed that none of these laboratories conducted testing of samples as per the parameters envisaged in the WBGWR Act, 2005 as discussed in paragraph 4.6.3.1. The Senior Chemist/Chemist of these laboratories stated that qualitative analysis of the ground water could not be done as per the WBGWR Act, 2005 due to irregular supply of chemicals/ testing kits, lack of modern instruments, non-functional instruments, shortage of manpower.

- ***Mass Awareness Programme***

Mass awareness workshops were not conducted in eight out of 18 districts during the first five years of implementation of WBGWR Act, 2005

As per the WBGWR Act, 2005 the SLA was required to create mass awareness and encourage interaction between modern technologies and age-old practices of ground water conservation and management by harnessing traditional knowledge and dovetailing such traditional knowledge with modern technologies. Audit scrutiny revealed that only eight mass awareness workshops in eight[47] district headquarters out of total 18 districts had been conducted up to March 2011 to make people aware about the ground water quality, quantity and necessity of its conservation. As a result, the objective to sensitise the mass regarding the problems and conservation of ground water was not fully achieved.

- ***Slow progress in respect of issuance of permits and Certificates of Registration***

The WBGWR Act, 2005 stipulates obtaining permit from SLA/DLA/CLA against payment of prescribed fees for extraction of ground water by mechanical means. The WBGWR Rules, 2006 also provides that all existing MI installations constructed for extraction of ground water prior to the date of

[45] *In pre-monsoon (April) and post-monsoon (November)*
[46] *Central laboratory, Kolkata, Regional laboratories at Bardhaman, Krishnagar and Jalpaiguri*
[47] *Birhbum, Bardhaman, Dakshin Dinajpur, Hooghly, Malda, Murshidabad, Paschim Medinipur and Purba Medinipur*

enactment (August 2005) of the Act shall have to be registered within six months with effect from August 2006. The deadline was subsequently extended up to July 2011.

The status of issue of permits and certificates of registration during 2006-11 was as detailed in the table below:

Table 4.7: Permits and Registration issued during 2006-11

Year	Permit issued during the year	Certificate of registration issued during the year
2006-07	52	18
2007-08	1739	3202
2008-09	2102	6664
2009-10	2801	5496
2010-11	3746	8355
Total	**10440**	**23735**

(Source: Records of SWID)

3705 ground water based MI schemes were installed without obtaining permits from SWID

Thus, 10,440 permits were issued in the State up to March 2011 after verification of 18677 applications against 28,583 received. Out of eight test checked A-I divisions, three[48] divisions did not obtain any permit from the respective DLAs prior to execution of 1603 new ground water based MI schemes during 2006-11. Jalpaiguri (AI) division obtained only 216 permits against 2318 MI schemes constructed during the period ***(Appendix 4.13)***.

Only five *per cent* of the existing MI schemes were registered during 2006-11

Progress of issuance of "Certificate of Registration" was very poor despite extension of deadline for five years. Only 23735 MI installations had been registered *(*five *per cent* only*)* up to March 2011 against the total number of 5,06,972 tube wells as per the 4th MI Census data (2006-07). In four[49] test checked divisions registration of Government operated MI schemes as well as the handed over schemes constructed prior to enactment of the Act was not done.

In reply to an audit query, the Director, SWID stated (July 2011) that the main constraint for poor progress in registration was lack of manpower at DLAs and non-awareness amongst the users.

The Secretary, WRIDD in the exit conference stated (November 2011) that last date of extension up to July 2011 had been expired and Government Order had been issued to do away with the process of registration. The Department, however, failed to furnish the said order subsequently though called for.

Thus, the main objective of the WBGWR Act, 2005 to manage, control and regulate indiscriminate extraction of ground water in the State was frustrated.

[48] *Balurghat (AI) Division, Bankura (AI) Division and Tamluk (AI) Division*
[49] *Balurghat (AI) Division, Bankura (AI) Division, Jalpaiguri (AI) Division and Tamluk (AI) Division*

4.8.3 Activities of Command Area Development Authorities

In West Bengal, IP of four major river valley projects was created by the Irrigation and Waterways Department but the CADWM programme in the command area of these river valley projects was implemented by the Department through four CADAs. Fifty *per cent* cost is borne by the GOI with the condition that the beneficiary farmers should contribute 10 *per cent* of the cost and the balance 40 *per cent* is to be borne by the State Government.

4.8.3.1 Shortfall in utilisation of created Irrigation Potential

The components of the CADWMA Programme are Survey, Planning, Design, On-farm development (OFD) works including construction of field channels and reclamation of water logged areas etc. CADAs, however, concentrated its activities on construction of field channels to bridge the gap between the created and utilised Culturable Command Area (CCA). Year-wise targets and achievement in respect of coverage of CCA as informed by the CADAs, are shown in Table below:

Table 4.8: Targets and achievement of CADAs during 2006-11

Year	Target (in Ha)	Achievement (in Ha)	Shortfall (in Ha)	Shortfall percentage
2006-07	6600	3599.75	3000.25	45
2007-08	6600	2437.25	4162.75	63
2008-09	9930	6741.00	3189.00	32
2009-10	11600	8206.00	3394.00	29
2010-11	9200	2488.10	6711.90	73

(Source : Information furnished by CADAs)

Only 27 to 71 *per cent* of the targeted command area of the CADA could be achieved

From the above table it was evident that there was shortfall in achievement ranging between 29 *per cent* and 73 *per cent* during 2006-11.

Scrutiny of records of two test checked divisions[50] of CADAs revealed that out of 435 field channel schemes taken up during 2006-11, only 267 schemes were completed, 131 schemes were ongoing and 37 schemes were dropped.

The concerned EEs stated (April and May 2011) that the schemes were dropped mainly due to reluctance of agencies to continue the work, non-approval of revised estimate and land problem. The progress of the works was also affected due to intermittent fund flow.

Further, as per the CADWM Programme guidelines, properly planned, aligned and designed field channels should be constructed from outlet in such a manner that the entire command area of the outlet is connected by field channels for efficient utilisation of irrigation water. Scrutiny of records of Damodar Valley CAD division revealed that 53 schemes were declared completed or abandoned midway during 2006-11 even though the executed

[50] *Kangsabati CAD Division, Bankura and Damodar Valley CAD Division, Bardhaman*

lengths of lined (pucca) and unlined (kuchcha) field channel were 26 *per cent* and 48 *per cent* less than the estimated lengths respectively. As a result, 1401 ha of command area against the target of 6489 ha could not be covered by construction of field channels. The EE, Damodar Valley CAD Division stated that non-achievement of targeted length was mainly due to land dispute and poor infrastructure of Gram Panchayats (GPs) through which works were executed. The reply is not acceptable as the problems should have been foreseen before taking up the field channel schemes. Besides, despite large investment shortfall in creation of field channels deprived the targeted beneficiaries.

4.8.3.2 Participatory Irrigation Management

Operation and maintenance of the schemes could not ensured as the PIM ACT was not enacted in the State

MoWR (GoI) circulated (1998) a model Act to be adopted by the State Legislatures for enacting new Irrigation Acts/amending the existing Irrigation Acts for facilitating "Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM)". It was necessary for active involvement of users for equitable distribution of irrigation water, maintenance of distribution network, payment of water charges and checking of unauthorised irrigation. However, no such Act was enacted in West Bengal as of November 2011. As per the guidelines of CADWM, formation of Water Users Associations (WUAs) was mandatory for each scheme involving the beneficiaries. The WUAs were to be registered for monitoring of distribution of water in the field channels and maintenance of the schemes handed over to them. As per information furnished by CADAs, only 293 WUAs were registered out of 547 formed as of March 2010, as shown in the table below:

Table 4.9: CADA-wise Water User's Association formed and registered

Sl. No.	Name of CADA	Number of Water Users' Association (as of 31.03.2010)			
		Formed	Registered under Co-operative Act	Registered under W.B. Societies Act	Total registered
1	KCADA	233	5	175	180
2	DVCADA	64	17	34	51
3	MCADA	70	9	41	50
4	TCADA	180	6	6	12
Total		**547**	**37**	**256**	**293**

(Source: Information furnished by CADAs)

As the State did not enact PIM Act, one time functional grant of ₹ 1000 could not be provided to any of the WUAs so as to enable them to operate and maintain the schemes. Audit Scrutiny revealed that in one test checked division[51] 25 schemes out of 207 handed over schemes were inoperative due to lack of maintenance. In the absence of any effective mechanism for maintenance of the handed over schemes, longivity of investment could not be assured.

The Department stated (November 2011) that a draft bill on PIM was being formulated.

[51] *Kangsabati CAD Division*

4.8.3.3 Collection of beneficiaries' contribution

With a view to make the water users more involved with the CADWM programme, the GoI has decided that 10 *per cent* of the cost of construction of field channels will be collected as contribution from the water users before execution of the work and formally incorporate the same in the accounts.

Scrutiny revealed that mandatory contributions from beneficiaries were not collected by the two test checked CAD divisions prior to execution of the schemes. Responsibility of realisation of the contributions was passed on to the Pradhans of the GPs through which works were executed. In the tender agreements it was mentioned that 10 *per cent* of the value of the works would be realised by the GPs from the water users. Payment limited to 90 *per cent* of the work value was made to the Pradhans by the divisions and booked in the accounts. Thus, violating the guidelines the contributions from WUAs were not incorporated in the accounts. Moreover, in absence of any record in the divisions it could not be ascertained whether the contributions were actually collected from the water users.

Meanwhile, the Department recommended (November 2011) to the MoWR, GoI to waive 10 *per cent* beneficiary contribution against land donated by the farmers and manual labours.

4.9 Conclusion

The objective of development of irrigation potential and its utilisation was not achieved to the desired extent due to inherent deficiencies in planning, execution and monitoring. Planning was not based on updated data and targets were fixed without any input from field offices. The Department continued to depend more on ground water in disregard to the Eleventh Five year plan (2007-12) proposal. Adequate survey and investigations were not carried out before taking up of schemes. Created IP could not be utilised optimally due to existence of defunct schemes. Utilisation of irrigation potential of handed over schemes was not monitored. Internal control measures were not strictly followed. Non-observance of budgetary procedure resulted in under-utilisation of funds. There were deficiencies in procurement, storage and accounting of materials. Implementation of WBGWR Act, 2005 by the SWID hampered due to inadequate infrastructure as well as human resources and lack of mass awareness. Without ensuring the sustainability of created assets and putting effective mechanism for their maintenance, MI schemes were handed over to unregistered beneficiary committees. Utilisation of created IP of major irrigation projects through CADWM programme suffered due to slow progress and non enactment of suitable Participatory Irrigation Act.


4.10 Recommendations

- ***The Department needs to prepare plans based on the updated data and feedback of performance from the implementing formations and fix realistic targets.***

- ***The Department needs to redirect its strategies to reduce excessive dependence on ground water resources, especially in arsenic and fluoride affected districts.***

- ***The Department should give special emphasis to revitalise the defunct schemes for optimum utilisation of the created irrigation potential. The Department also needs to address on the major issues like operation, maintenance and sustainability of the handed over schemes.***

- ***SWID is to be equipped with modern equipments and infrastructure to ensure effective implementation of the WBGWR Act, 2005.***



(SUDARSHANA TALAPATRA)
Principal Accountant General (Audit)
West Bengal

Kolkata
The

Countersigned



(VINOD RAI)
Comptroller and Auditor General of India

New Delhi
The

Appendix 2.1.1

(Refer paragraph 2.1.4, page 16)

Statement showing amounts parked under different schemes

Name of the Scheme	Authority with whom parked	Amount parked (Rupees in crore)
NRHM-RKS	DHFWS	0.38
NRHM-Flexipool	DHFWS	0.16
NRHM-Civil Works	DHFWS	0.84
SSA-Civil Works	DPO, SSA	1.41
SSA-Text Book Grant	DPO, SSA	0.94
ICDS-Construction of AWCs	State Nutrition Strategy and Monitoring Unit	4.11
SGSY-Infrastructure	PSs-Balurghat, Kumarganj and Harirampur	0.90
ARWSP	PHED Divisions- Raiganj and Malda	2.43
Total		**11.17**

(Source: Records of district and block functionaries)

Appendix 2.1.2

(Refer paragraph 2.1.5.1.2 page 17)

Statement of year-wise and component-wise fund position during 2006-07 to 2010-11 (Rupees in lakh)

Name of Programme	Opening Balance	2006-07		2007-08		2008-09		2009-10		2010-11		2006-11		Closing Balance
		Receipt	Expenditure	Receipt	Expenditure	Receipt	Expenditure	Receipt	Expenditure	Receipt	Expenditure	Receipt	Expenditure	
NRHM additionalities	3.00	272.03	37.51	289.22	26.20	146.09	59.31	260.21	163.40	740.39	362.96	1707.94	649.38	1058.56
RCH	83.96	152.14	40.54	180.78	98.91	300.69	230.84	452.51	331.58	423.06	276.38	1509.18	978.25	530.93
Immunisation	8.98	67.47	37.19	32.02	45.16	58.05	45.44	46.38	46.72	77.79	51.94	281.71	226.45	55.26
RNTCP	0.00	23.92	23.92	26.89	24.28	35.69	34.29	35.41	35.88	33.73	31.25	155.64	149.62	6.02
NVBDCP	1.45	14.89	4.02	5.40	11.29	12.11	8.83	22.18	12.15	17.58	19.52	72.16	55.81	16.35
NPCB	0.26	8.26	8.25	11.05	9.90	13.54	11.22	11.27	7.75	21.29	18.92	65.41	56.04	9.37
NLEP	0.00	8.62	7.62	7.22	7.53	5.95	6.00	7.23	6.33	7.08	8.23	36.10	35.71	0.39
IDSP	0.00	10.58	00	1.00	4.63	0.23	4.65	3.16	3.25	00	1.19	14.97	13.72	1.25
HSDI	120.00	385.62	4.47	272.48	5.43	34.65	78.67	271.18	38.67	00	341.36	963.93	468.60	495.33
Others (Main)	42.47	44.12	7.65	4.60	0.50	00	3.15	1.29	20.07	27.13	3.76	77.14	35.13	42.01
Total	**260.12**	**987.65**	**171.17**	**830.66**	**233.83**	**607.00**	**482.40**	**1110.82**	**665.80**	**1348.05**	**1115.11**	**4884.18**	**2668.71**	**2215.47**

(Source: Records of DHFWS, Dakshin Dinajpur)

Appendix 2.1.3

(Refer paragraph 2.1.5.1.3, page 18)

Statement showing non-availability of infrastructure facilities in health centres

Sl. No.	Particulars	Number of centres where service was not available		
		CHCs	PHCs	SCs
1	Total number audited	3	6	12
2	Without a building	Nil	Nil	Nil
3	Having Government building	Nil	Nil	6
4	Building in dilapidated condition	Nil	Nil	Nil
5	Separate utilities for men & women	3	6	12
6	OPD rooms/cubicles	Nil	Nil	6
7	OT/minor operation theatre	Nil	6	Not applicable
8	Labour rooms	Nil	5	Not applicable
9	In patient services	Nil	6	Not applicable
10	Full complement of beds (six to ten beds in PHC & 30 beds in CHC) was not available	3	6	Not applicable
11	Separate ward for male/female not present	Nil	6	Not applicable
12	Waiting rooms for patients.	1	5	12
13	24-hours emergency services	Nil	6	Not applicable
14	24-x7 delivery services	Nil	5	12
15	Laboratory services.	3	6	Not applicable
16	X-ray	3	6	Not applicable
17	Bloods storage	3	6	Not applicable
18	Medical store	Nil	6	12
19	Required number of Vehicles/ambulance	Nil	6	12
20	Citizen's charter displayed prominently in local language.	3	6	11
21	Water supply	Nil	Nil	11
22	Sewerage facility	Nil	Nil	11
23	Medical waste disposal facility.	Nil	6	12
24	Electricity connection or power supply	Nil	Nil	4
25	Stand by power supply/generator.	Nil	6	12
26	Telephone connection	Nil	6	12
27	Computer	Nil	6	12
28	Accommodation facilities for attendants of admitted patients.	3	6	Not applicable

(Source: Records of test checked Health Centres)

Appendix 2.1.4

(Refer paragraph 2.1.5.1.3, page 19)

Statement showing status of construction of Sub-centre buildings **(Rupees in lakh)**

Name of block	Category	Year	Sanction for construction (in number)	Fund received for construction (in number)	Fund received	Fund disbursed	UC received	Unspent as on 31.3.11	Number completed	Number functional	Number completed but not functional	Under construction	Construction not started
Balurghat	G.P Hqr.	06-07	3	3	15.00	15.00	12.25	2.75	3	3	0	0	0
		07-08	3	3	25.50	25.50	8.50	17.00	1	1	0	1	1
	Non-GP	06-07	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		07-08	3	3	25.50	25.50	12.54	12.96	1	1	0	2	0
Hili	G.P Hqr.	06-07	3	3	15.00	15.00	12.49	2.51	3	3	0	0	0
		07-08	1	1	8.50	8.50	6.90	1.60	1	1	0	0	0
	Non-GP	06-07	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		07-08	1	1	8.50	8.50	8.25	0.25	1	1	0	0	0
Kumarganj	GP Hqr.	06-07	3	3	15.00	15.00	7.32	7.68	3	3	0	0	0
		07-08	3	3	25.50	25.50	11.58	13.92	3	3	0	0	0
	Non GP	06-07	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		07-08	3	3	25.50	25.50	12.75	12.75	3	2	1	0	0
Tapan	GP Hqr.	06-07	3	3	15.00	15.00	12.33	2.67	3	3	0	0	0
		07-08	3	3	25.50	25.50	9.37	16.13	1	0	1	2	0
	Non-GP	06-07	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		07-08	3	3	25.50	25.50	12.75	12.75	2	2	0	1	0
Gangarampur	GP Hqr.	06-07	3	3	15.00	15.00	12.48	2.52	3	3	0	0	0
		07-08	4	4	34.00	34.00	16.67	17.33	2	2	0	2	0
	Non GP	06-07	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		07-08	3	1	8.5	8.5	4.25	4.25	1	1	0	0	0
Banshihari	GP Hqr.	06-07	2	2	10.00	10.00	7.50	2.50	2	2	0	0	0
		07-08	2	2	12.75	12.75	4.25	8.50	2	2	0	0	0
	Non GP	06-07	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		07-08	3	3	21.25	21.25	8.50	12.75	2	2	0	1	0
Kushmandi	GP Hqr.	06-07	4	4	20.00	20.00	12.50	7.50	3	3	0	1	0
		07-08	3	3	25.50	25.50	16.98	8.52	3	3	0	0	0
	Non GP	06-07	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		07-08	3	3	25.50	25.50	17.00	8.50	2	1	1	1	0
Harirampur	GP Hqr.	06-07	3	3	15.00	15.00	8.50	6.50	3	1	2	0	0
		07-08	4	4	25.50	25.50	8.50	17.00	2	0	2	1	1
	Non GP	06-07	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		07-08	2	2	17.00	17.00	8.50	8.50	2	0	2	0	0
Total			**68**	**66**	**460.00**	**460.00**	**252.66**	**207.34**	**52**	**43**	**9**	**12**	**2**

(Source: Records of DHFWS, Dakshin Dinajpur)

Appendix 2.1.5

(Refer paragraph 2.1.5.1.5, page 20 and 21)

(A) Statement showing position of institutional deliveries in the District and sampled CHCs

	Year	No. of pregnant women registered	No. of institutional deliveries	No. of cash beneficiaries of institutional deliveries	Short fall in institutional deliveries	Percentage of shortfall to registered women
Dakshin Dinajpur	2006-07	35453	10226	592	25227	71
	2007-08	32560	11086	2839	21474	66
	2008-09	31882	13825	4702	18057	57
	2009-10	31643	13588	7378	18055	57
	2010-11	31997	15280	8982	16717	52
	Total	**163535**	**64005**	**24493**	**99530**	
Sampled CHCs	2006-07	6369	2258	231	4111	65
	2007-08	7484	2968	346	4516	60
	2008-09	8027	3462	1127	4565	57
	2009-10	8658	3693	1404	4965	57
	2010-11	9191	4238	1408	4953	54
	Total	**39729**	**16619**	**4516**	**23110**	

(Source: Records of District Health and Family Welfare Society, Dakshin Dinajpur and sampled CHCs)

(B) Statement showing the target and achievement in various terminal methods of family planning:

Year	Target of sterilisation	Achievement			
		Vasectomy	Tubectomy including Laproscopy	Total	Percentage of shortfall
2006-07	4642	7	822	829	82
2007-08	5550	514	3227	3741	33
2008-09	8001	737	3898	4635	42
2009-10	5681	439	3844	4283	25
2010-11	6247	134	4687	4821	23

(C) Statement showing Target and Achievement of full immunization of children up to one year of age

Year	District			State		
	Target	Achievement	*Shortfall (per cent)*	Target	Achievement *(per cent)*	*Shortfall (per cent)*
2006-07	35125	30430	13	1735923	1436249	17
2007-08	37570	29443	22	1799464	1474786	18
2008-09	35571	27951	21	1737187	1229126	29
2009-10	32687	26491	19	1739780	1398783	20
2010-11	32423	26044	20	Not Available	Not Available	--

(Source: Records of District Health and Family Welfare Samity, Dakshin Dinajpur and State Health and Family Welfare Samity)

Appendix 2.1.6

(Refer paragraph 2.1.5.1.6, page 21)

Statement showing position of cataract surgeries performed in Dakshin Dinajpur

Year	Target	Performance of cataract operations in Government sector		Performance of cataract operations by NGO		Performance of cataract operations by private practitioners		Total cataract operations (*percentage against target*)
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	
2006-07	4000	985	47.06	985	47.06	123	5.88	2093 (52)
2007-08	4000	745	34.73	1180	55.01	220	10.26	2145 (53)
2008-09	4000	671	30.99	1493	68.96	1	0.05	2165 (54)
2009-10	4000	411	21.48	1502	78.52	0	0	1913 (48)
2010-11	4000	756	31.65	1633	68.35	0	0	2389 (60)
Total	**20000**	**3568**	**33**	**6793**	**64**	**344**	**3**	**10705 (54)**

(Source : Records of District Health & family welfare Samity)

Appendix 2.1.7

(Refer paragraph 2.1.5.2.3 (c), page 24)

Statement showing status of civil works

Item	Target as per AWP	Achievement			
		Number of works for which funds released	Works completed (*per cent*)*	Works in progress	Works not taken up (per cent)
New School Building	26	0	0 (0)	0	0
Additional Class Rooms	3220	3009	1868 (62)	506	583 (19)
Cluster Resource Centre	60	60	59 (98)	1	0
Drinking Water Facility	1	1	0 (0)	1	0
Toilet Facility	28	28	4 (14)	2	22 (79)
Ramp with Handrail Facility	0	0	0	0	0
Circle Resource Centre	1	1	0 (0)	0	1 (100)
Girls Toilet	165	165	145 (88)	16	4 (2)
Boundary Wall	71	112	90 (80)	9	13 (11)
Major Repair	73	73	8 (11)	65	0
Kasturba Gandhi VY	2	2	0 (0)	2	0
Total:	**3647**	**3451**	**2174** (63)	**602**	**623 (18)**

(Source: Records of DPO, Dakshin Dinajpur)

**on number of works for which funds released*

Appendix 2.1.8

(Refer paragraph 2.1.5.2.3 (c), page 25)

Statement showing audit observations on Civil Works in test checked schools

Sl No	Name of School	Audit Observation
1	**Gopalganj F P School under Kumarganj North Circle**	Out of the funds for four ACRs, three were constructed. Two ACRs were as per stipulated size and the third was bigger in size, which is being utilized for cultural activities. One ACR is used as class room and the other is used for running of nursery school without obtaining permission from SSA authority.
2	**Bahadurpur F.P. School under Banshihari Circle**	Though fund of ₹ 1.80 lakh for construction of ACR was withdrawn from bank in December 2007, expenditure details were not maintained and ACR remained incomplete. One incomplete room was used as class room for Class I to Class IV. Class room does not have cemented floor, plastered wall, doors and windows. Students were being seated on the mud floor
3	**Pundari High School under Banshihari Circle**	Two ACRs were to be built on the first floor of the school. However the estimates and drawing did not take into consideration the staircase. Consequently, plan was changed without obtaining approval of District technical wing and one ACR with staircase had been constructed instead of two ACRs. No mark was made on the wall as SSA aided ACR
4	**Rajua F.P. School under Balurghat West Circle**	One ACR constructed in 2007-08 was being used as office room.
5	**Khidirpur F.P School under Sadar Circle**	One ACR was to be built on the first floor of the school. However, the estimates and drawing did not take into consideration the staircase. Consequently, ACR remained incomplete, as part of the funds were utilised for construction of stair case.

(Source: Audit observations made during inspection of Schools)

Appendix 2.1.9

(Refer paragraph 2.1.5.3.3 page 30)

Statement showing the requirement of food materials (as per fixed scale) and actual consumption in the AWCs—short/excess consumption

Project	Year	Requirement of food materials as per fixed scale		Actual consumption in the centre		Short(+)/Excess(-) consumption	
		Rice	Dal	Rice	Dal	Rice	Dal
Harirampur	2009-10	2256.55	873.80	1477.20	632.38	(+) 779.35	(+) 241.42
	2010-11	2582.16	998.33	2717.04	884.58	(-) 134.88	(+)113.75
Kumarganj	2009-10	2133.60	820.63	1731.96	650.00	(+) 401.64	(+) 170.63
	2010-11	2394.92	926.22	1645.79	624.19	(+) 749.13	(+) 302.03
Balurghat (R)	2009-10	2060.53	801.03	2145.28	881.40	(-) 84.75	(-) 80.37
	2010-11	1892.32	718.34	2170.09	941.96	(-) 277.77	(-) 223.62

(Source: records/MPRs made available from the local office)

Appendix 2.1.10

(Refer paragraph 2.1.5.5.1, page 35)

Statement showing details of target and achievement under IAY

Year	Opening balance		Target for the year		Total target		Number of houses completed	
	Construction	Upgradation	Construction	Upgradation	Construction	Upgradation	Construction	Upgradation
2006-07	225	112	2410	1205	2635	1317	2548	1274
2007-08	87	43	2876	1905	2963	1948	2011	1202
2008-09	952	746	7814	Nil	8766	746	3619	Nil
2009-10	5147	-	8107	Nil	13254	Nil	4584	Nil
2010-11	8670	-	5598	Nil	14268	Nil	9586	Nil
Total	**15081**	**901**	**26805**	**3110**			**22348**	**2476**

(Source: Records of ZP, Dakhsin Dinajpur)

* *The P&RDD decided in June 2008 not to take up the upgradation work till achieving the target of new construction.*

Appendix 2.1.11

(Refer para 2.1.6.1.1.(a), page 38)

Statement showing some instances of inordinate delay in completion of PMGSY road construction works in Dakshin Dinajpur

Name of the Road	Package Number	Length (km)	Date of awarded work	Stipulated date for completion of work	Status of the road work
Krishnacharan to Nikharpara	WB-18/67	3.7	July 2009	July 2010	As of May 2011, physical progress was up to 30 *per cent*. PIU stated (March 2011) that the though stipulated time for the construction had expired, no work programme was received from the contractor and no technical representative had been deputed at the site. The awarded cost of work was ₹1.57 crore. No expenditure had been incurred yet on the work by the Authority
Chandipur to Baldu Road	WB-18/ 113	4.5	September 2009	September 2010	As of May 2011, physical progress was up to 10 *per cent*. In April 2011, the PIU stated that neither any work programme was received from the contractor, nor was any labour/ camp/ machines/ technical person found at work-site. The awarded cost of work was ₹1.92 crore. No expenditure had been incurred yet on the work by the Authority.
Mollajimore to Kardahaghat (Part of Mollajimore to Chak Sathihar)	WB-18/45	6.40	March 2008	March 2009	As of June 2011, the work remained incomplete. The PIU attributed this to construction of two bridges by the other establishment. Against the awarded cost of ₹2.51crore, expenditure of ₹1.80 crore had been incurred.
Tapan to Nababhangar	WB 1832	5.50	November 2006	November 2007	The work was completed in April 2010 after delay of 894 days. Awarded cost of work was ₹ 2.46 crore against which expenditure of ₹2.40 crore was utilised.
Batun to Kutubpur	WB 1833	4.80	November 2006	November 2007	The work was completed in October 2009 after delay of 708 days. Awarded cost of work was ₹ 2.19 crore against which expenditure of ₹2.10 crore was utilised.
Ujirpur to Goldhara	WB 1833	2.80	November 2006	November 2007	The work was completed in September 2009 after delay of 673 days. Awarded cost of work was ₹ 1.22 crore against which expenditure of ₹1.17 crore was utilised.

(Source: Monthly Progress Report and relevant records made available from the PIU, PMGSY-Dakshin Dinajpur)

Appendix 2.1.12

(Refer paragraph 2.1.6.1.1 (b) page 38)

Statement showing extra expenditure incurred by the PIU due to non-adherence to compaction rate of WBSRDA schedule by the consultant

Package Number	Grade	Volume in Cum	Compaction Rate provided in tender document (Rupees/ Cu.m)	Compaction Rate as per WBSRDA Schedule (Rupees/ Cu.m)	Differential Rate (Rupees/ Cu.m)	Amount involved (Rupees)	Percentage below DPR at which tender was awarded.	Avoidable Payment (Rupees)
WB-18/30	Gr-II	738.64	424.31	113.56	310.75	229532.38	5.50	216908.10
	Gr-III	738.62	419.84	113.56	306.28	226224.53	5.50	213782.18
WB-18/31	Gr-II	941.27	424.31	113.56	310.75	292499.65	6.75	272755.92
	Gr-III	941.27	419.84	113.56	306.28	288292.18	6.75	268832.46
WB-18/32	Gr-II	1569.95	424.31	113.56	310.75	487861.96	5.51	460980.77
	Gr-III	1569.94	419.84	113.56	306.28	480841.22	5.51	454346.87
WB-18/33	Gr-II	2138.64	424.31	113.56	310.75	664582.38	20.33	529472.78
	Gr-III	2138.64	419.84	113.56	306.28	655022.66	20.33	521856.55
WB-18/34	Gr-II	1423.13	403.74	113.56	290.18	412963.86	17.99	338671.66
	Gr-III	1423.13	400.52	113.56	286.96	408381.38	17.99	334913.57
WB-18/35	Gr-II	1687.50	386.53	113.56	272.97	460636.88	9.10	418718.92
	Gr-III	1687.50	384.75	113.56	271.19	457633.13	9.10	415988.52
WB-18/36	Gr-II	1395.18	413.38	113.56	299.82	418302.87	12.99	363965.33
	Gr-III	1395.14	409.66	113.56	296.10	413100.95	12.99	359439.14
WB-18/37	Gr-II	1192.23	440.34	113.56	326.78	389596.92	21.37	306340.06
	Gr-III	1195.17	434.83	113.56	321.27	383972.27	21.37	301917.40
WB-18/38	Gr-II	1443.75	450.18	113.56	336.62	485995.13	15.07	412755.66
	Gr-III	1443.75	444.02	113.56	330.46	477101.63	15.07	405202.41
WB-18/40	Gr-II	675.00	451.67	113.56	338.11	228224.25	24.76	171715.93
	Gr-III	675.00	445.34	113.56	331.78	223951.50	24.76	168501.11
WB-18/41	Gr-II	371.44	424.31	113.56	310.75	115424.98	20.99	91197.28
	Gr-III	371.40	419.84	113.56	306.28	113752.39	20.99	89875.76
TOTAL		**27156.29**	**9285.71**			**8313895.1**		**7118138.38**

Appendix 2.1.13

(Refer paragraph 2.1.6.2.2 (a), page 44)

Statement showing actual receipt of funds *vis-à-vis* labour budget during 2006-07 to 2010-11

(Rupees in crore)

Year	Status of labour budget	Estimated expenditure as per labour budget	Actual receipt during the year	Percentage of actual receipt against estimated expenditure
2006-07	No labour budget was prepared			
2007-08	Approved late	81.79	2.49	3.04
2008-09	Signed by the District Programme Co-ordinator	39.65	11.34	28.60
2009-10		29.74	33.41	89.02
2010-11	Unsigned as of July 2011	44.07	33.11	75.13
Total		**195.25**	**80.35**	**41.15**

Appendix 2.2.1

(Refer paragraph 2.2.10.3, page 70)

Statement showing outstanding dues from different departments in connection with deposit works executed by SJDA during the period from 2006-07 to 2010-11

Sl. No.	Name of the works	Actual cost of the work	Amount deposited by the Departments	Amount due from the Departments.
		(Amounts in Rupees)		
1	Automatic Traffic Signal, Siliguri	504535	1220	503315
2	B Pharma College, Jalpaiguri	1870865	1086360	784505
3	DI Fund Market, Matigara	2523390	2500000	23390
4	Renovation of Himul Administrative Building.	265246	10500	254746
5	Government College at Himanchal Vihar	48155702	45445183	2710519
6	Polytechnic Boys Hostel (Electrification) at Shantinagar	11555698	2778647	8777051
7	Government Polytechnic College	6445230	2113000	4332230
8	Mirik College	7711493	7519752	191741
9	Government Polytechnic College	19835217	697360	19137857
10	Government Library- Himanchal Vihar	2361524	2148000	213524
11	SP Office Building, Jalpaiguri	3187008	1544200	1642808
12	Roof Trus including other work at ITI Hostel (Residual)	74650	0	74650
13	Regional Food Testing Laboratory	1801428	1375189	426239
14	Police Station at Falkata (Residual)	1521092	0	1521092
15	Widening Road Milan Mor to Gulma Tea Estate	6621072	2392572	4228500
16	Swimming Pool, Kanchanjungha Stadium	6869145	6857313	11832
17	District Police Office Building (Residual), Jalpaiguri	23272	0	23272
		121326567	**76469296**	**44857271**

Appendix 3.1

(Refer paragraph 3.1.6, page 81)

Statement showing extra expenditure due to purchase of articles at prices higher than maximum retail price

Sl. No.	Name of DDO	Period of purchase	Extra expenditure (in Rupees)	Illustrative list of articles purchased
1.	SP, Malda	2008-09 to 2010-11 (upto January 2011)	**109746**	Medicines like Capsule Cobadex, Capsule Doxy-I, Tab Deriphylin, Tablet Boromin Forte etc., thin type paper, carbon paper, A3 Xerox paper, etc.
2.	SP, North 24 Parganas	2009-10 to 2010-11 (upto January 2011)	**2378655**	Xerox paper, pencil carbon, gum, correction fluid, pen, room spray, Insecticide spray, etc.
3.	SP, Bankura	2008-09 to 2010-11 (upto January 2011)	**347183**	Mosquito repellant, liquid detergent, Dettol, CFL lamp, soap, room freshner etc.
4.	SP, Paschim Medinipur	2007-08 to 2010-11 (upto October 2010)	**513501**	Dettol, toilet cleaner, mosquito repellant, soap, CFL tube etc.
5.	ADG&IG of Police (IB)	2010-11	**100931**	A4 paper, Cartridge and 4 GB pen drive.
6.	SP, South 24 Parganas	July 2008 to December 2010	**608733**	Mosquito repellant, washing powder, adhesive, room freshner, toilet cleaner, Dettol, soap etc.
7.	SP, Dakshin Dinajpur	2009-10	**12483**	James clips, Xerox paper, alpin, gum, laser toner, candle, etc.
8.	SP, Howrah	2008-09 to 2010-11 (upto July 2010)	**641638**	Xerox papers, pencil carbon, floppy, DVDs, pen-drive, etc.
9.	SP, Nadia	2008-09	**559789**	Xerox paper, Pencil carbon, steel pin, stamp pad, printer cartridge etc.
10.	IG of Police (Trg), PTC, Barrackpore	June 2008 to September 2010	**125348**	Philips bulb, room freshener, Dettol hand wash, toilet cleaner, etc.
11.	SP, Purulia	December 2008 to September 2009	**40295**	DFC Papers (BILT), Photo paper
12.	SP Jalpaiguri	2010-11	**70202**	Antivirus, Pentium IV motherboard, Hard Disk, Dot matrix printer, HP cartridge etc.
13.	SP Hoogly	2010-11	**80244**	Pen drive, black cartridge, colour cartridge, typing paper, alpins, eraz-x etc.
14.	Superintendent, Kolkata Pavlov Hospital,	2010-11	**111301**	Lifebuoy soap, coconut oil, carbon paper, stapler pin, gum, Xerox paper, james clip etc.
Total			**5700049**	

Appendix 3.2

(Refer paragraph 3.3.1. page 88)

Statement showing details of Mismanagement of cash

Sl. No.	Name of the Office	Lapses occurred	Date of Verification by DDO at the instance of Audit	Book balance as per Cash Book on the day of Verification	Cash actually found on Physical Verification	Total Shortage	Unadjusted Vouchers	Unauthorised Advance from Undisbursed Cash	Unexplained Cash / Shortage / Theft / Defalcated
1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*
Finance Department									
1.	Accounts Officer (Finance), Secretariat Contingency, W.B., Writers' Buildings, Kolkata.	i) Bill wise and date wise analysis of closing cash balance at the end of each month not done regularly.	04/05/2011	88310971.21	67168597.58	21142373.63	12109632.13	9032741.50	0
2	Secretary, West Bengal Legislative Assembly, Assembly House, Kolkata.	N/A	12/01/2011	1417940.00	190715.00	1227225.00	0	0	1227225.00 *(Since 2006)*
Health and Family Welfare Department									
3	MSVP, Bankura Sammilani Medical College & Hospital, Bankura.	i) Physical Verification of Cash and issuance of certificate to that effect not done. ii) Bill wise and date wise analysis of closing cash balance at the end of each month not done.	06/08/2010	3599158.33	3561600.45	37557.88	33827.96 *(Since 1994)*	2450.00	1279.92
4	Superintendent, District Hospital, Krishnanagar, Nadia.	i) Physical Verification of Cash and issuance of certificate to that effect not done. ii) Bill wise and date wise analysis of closing cash balance at the end of each month not done.	22/02/2011	394197.00	110510.00	283687.00	83313.00	0	200374.00

Sl. No.	Name of the Office	Lapses occurred	Date of Verification by DDO at the instance of Audit	Book balance as per Cash Book on the day of Verification	Cash actually found on Physical Verification	Total Shortage	Unadjusted Vouchers	Unauthorised Advance from Undisbursed Cash	Unexplained Cash / Shortage / Theft / Defalcated
1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*
5	Superintendent, District Hospital, North 24 Paraganas.	No such irregularities noticed in audit.	04/12/2010	565887.00	530923.00	34964.00	29329.00	5635.00	0
6	Principal, Medical College, Kolkata.	Bill wise and date wise analysis of closing cash balance at the end of each month not done.	05/01/2011	5957477.00	5828037.00	129440.00	129440.00	0	0
7.	Principal, ID & BG Hospital, Beliaghata, Kolkata.	All the financial rules & regulations not followed regularly.	05/01/2011	1105950.00	1043967.00	61983.00	61983.00	0	0
8	CMOH, Coochbehar.	N/A	12/11/2010	112025.00	5446.00	106579.00	0	0	106579.00 *(Since 1997) (Theft)*
9	Superintendent, District Hospital, Howrah.	i) Bill wise and date wise analysis of closing cash balance at the end of each month not done. ii) Entries not attested by DDO.	12/07/2010	152018.00	95153.00[1]	56865.00	7328.00	0	49037.00
10	Superintendent, District Hospital (Sadar), Jalpaiguri.	Physical Verification of Cash and issuance of certificate to that effect not done.	10/09/2010	8101033.25	7214939.00	886094.25	397181.05 *(Since 1987)*	478942.20 *(Since 1987)*	9971.00 *(Since 2002)*
11	MSVP, NRS Medical College & Hospital, Kolkata.	Bill wise and date wise analysis of closing cash balance at the end of each month not done.	04/10/2010	16847788.78	16668535.78	179253.00	0	0	179253.00
12	MSVP, SSKM Hospital, Kolkata.	Bill wise and date wise analysis of closing cash balance at the end of each month not done.	26/10/2010	62538878.26	62487024.73	51853.53	44407.53 *(Since 1978)*	7446.00 *(Since 1978)*	0

[1] *Excluding ₹ 500 in counterfeit note*

Sl. No.	Name of the Office	Lapses occurred	Date of Verification by DDO at the instance of Audit	Book balance as per Cash Book on the day of Verification	Cash actually found on Physical Verification	Total Shortage	Unadjusted Vouchers	Unauthorised Advance from Undisbursed Cash	Unexplained Cash / Shortage / Theft / Defalcated
1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*
13	MSVP, R.G. Kar Medical College & Hospital, Kolkata.	No such irregularities noticed during audit.	09/07/2010	7608623.00	7153649.64	454973.36	0	454973.36 *(Since 1988)*	0
14	MSVP, Calcutta National Medical College & Hospital, Kolkata.	i) Bill wise and date wise analysis of closing cash balance at the end of each month not done.	06/10/2010	3339072.33	3267134.33	71938.00	0	71938.00 *(Since 1985)*	0
15	Superintendent, District Hospital, Berhampore, Murshidabad.	i) Bill wise and date wise analysis of closing cash balance at the end of each month not done. ii) Physical Verification of Cash and issuance of certificate to that effect not done regularly	06/09/2010	502800.75	462908.00	39892.75	39892.75 *(Since 1983)*	0	0
16	Principal, R.G. Kar Medical College, Kolkata.	Physical Verification of Cash and issuance of certificate to that effect not done.	08/10/2010	3146017.56	2833182.02	312835.54	277418.20	28974.46	6442.88
Correctional Administration Department									
17	Superintendent, Presidency Correctional Home, Alipore, Kolkata.	i) Physical Verification of Cash and issuance of certificate to that effect not done. ii) Entries not attested by DDO.	01/10/2010	8982517.67	8430208.64	552309.03	369316.00	84766.69 *(Since 1986)*	98226.34
Home (Police) Department									
18	SP, North 24 Paraganas.	Bill wise and date wise analysis of closing cash balance at the end of each month not done.	03/01/2011	19934026.00	19717276.00	216750.00	0	216750.00	0
19	Dy IG of Police (Training), Police Training College, Barrackpore, North 24 Paraganas.	Entries not attested by DDO regularly.	06/10/2010	169913.23	51972.82	117940.41	0	0	117940.41 *(Since 1989)*

Sl. No.	Name of the Office	Lapses occurred	Date of Verification by DDO at the instance of Audit	Book balance as per Cash Book on the day of Verification	Cash actually found on Physical Verification	Total Shortage	Unadjusted Vouchers	Unauthorised Advance from Undisbursed Cash	Unexplained Cash / Shortage / Theft / Defalcated
1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*
Land and Land Reforms Department									
20	DM, Jalpaiguri	Physical Verification of Cash and issuance of certificate to that effect not done regularly.	04/08/2010	5468514.28	4999100.28	469414.00	0	120961.00	348453.00 *(Since 1988)*
21	DM, Nadia.	Physical Verification of Cash and issuance of certificate to that effect not done regularly.	25/11/2010	212779649.11	212547442.32	232206.79	0	0	232206.79 *(Since 1994)*
22	DM, Uttar Dinajpur.	Retention of heavy cash balance	22/11/2010	1051586.00	929830.00	121756.00	0	121756.00	0
Agriculture Department									
23	Director of Agriculture (Admn.), Uttar Dinajpur.	i) Physical Verification of Cash and issuance of certificate to that effect not done. ii) Bill wise and date wise analysis of closing cash balance at the end of each month not done.	16/12/2010	884477.00	742477.00	142000.00	0	142000.00	0
				452970520.76	**426040629.59**	**26929891.17**	**13583068.62**	**10769334.21**	**2576988.34**

(Source: Statements of physical verification of cash signed by respective DDOs)

Appendix 3.3

(Refer paragraph 3.3.2, page 90)

Statement showing year-wise position of Inspection Reports and Paragraphs pending settlement

Year	Land and Land Reforms		Agriculture		School Education		Technical Education and Training		Public Works		Housing		Total	
	IRs	Paras	IRs	Paras	IRs	Paras	IRs	Paras	IRs	Paras	IRs	Paras	IRs	Paras
1985-1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1
1986-1987	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
1987-1988	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1988-1989	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	2	2
1989-1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1
1990-1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991-1992	1	1	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
1992-1993	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	3	3
1993-1994	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	3	5	6
1994-1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	2	2
1995-1996	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	3	3
1996-1997	1	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	8	12	2	2	13	17
1997-1998	1	1	3	3	-	-	1	1	3	3	1	2	9	10
1998-1999	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	2	2	3	5	6
1999-2000	2	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	5	5	2	2	11	11
2000-2001	3	3	4	5	-	-	-	-	7	8	2	2	16	18
2001-2002	2	2	3	3	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	8	8
2002-2003	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	4	4	4	10	9	15
2003-2004	3	3	2	2	1	1	-	-	14	32	-	-	20	38
2004-2005	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	14	21	7	13	32	45
2005-2006	15	64	8	35	6	6	1	3	5	8	3	15	38	131
2006-2007	28	111	18	42	7	15	4	7	10	17	2	12	69	204
2007-2008	22	95	14	57	13	39	12	45	19	44	5	14	85	294
2008-2009	19	64	9	37	18	78	4	16	25	52	3	9	78	256
2009-2010	39	229	12	47	15	78	18	90	25	46	8	22	117	512
2010-2011	18	144	7	16	16	86	5	31	29	85	5	16	80	378
Total	162	728	88	255	82	309	49	197	179	348	51	128	611	1965
More than 10 years	11	11	13	14	3	3	3	3	31	36	14	17	75	84

Appendix 3.4

(Refer paragraph 3.3.3, page 91)

Statement showing names of the Departments who did not submit Action Taken Notes with number of para/reviews involved

Sl No	Name of the Department	No of Paras/reviews involved				
		Upto 1997-98	Upto 2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	Total
1.	Agriculture	06	08	-	-	08
2.	Animal Resources Development	-	02	-	01	03
3.	Backward Classes and Welfare	01	02	-	-	02
4.	Commerce and Industries	-	01	-	01	02
5.	Co-operation	-	02	01	-	03
6.	Development and Planning	-	-	-	01	01
7.	Finance	04	06	-	01	07
8.	Fisheries	-	02	-	-	02
9.	Food Processing and Horticulture	-	01	-	-	01
10.	Food and Supplies	-	01	-	01	02
11.	Forests	-	03	-	-	03
12.	Health and Family Welfare	26	44	01	02	47
13.	Home (Const. and Elec.)	-	02	-	-	02
14.	Home (Police)	-	08	04	-	12
15.	Home (Political)	01	02	-	-	02
16.	Housing	-	02	01	01	04
17.	Industrial Reconstruction	-	02	-	-	02
18.	Information and Cultural Affairs	-	02	01	-	03
19.	Irrigation and Waterways	26	34	01	01	36
20.	Labour	01	03	-	-	03
21.	Land and Land Reforms	-	01	01	01	03
22.	Mass Education Extension	-	02	-	-	02
23.	Micro & Small Scale Industries and Textiles	-	01	-	-	01
24.	Municipal Affairs	14	21	01	-	22
25.	Panchayats and Rural Development	04	11	-	-	11
26.	Power	-	01	-	-	01
27.	Public Enterprises	-	01	-	-	01
28.	Public Health Engineering	-	01	02	01	04
29.	Public Works					
30.	Public Works (Commissioners for Rabindra Setu)	-	01	-	-	01
31.	Public Works (Roads)	-	06	-	-	06
32.	School Education	-	04	01	-	05
33.	Social Welfare	-	01	-	-	01
34.	Technical Education and Training	-	01	-	01	02
35.	Tourism	-	01	-	-	01
36.	Transport	-	03	-	01	04
37.	Urban Development	-	01	02	02	05
38.	Water Investigation and Development	-	01	-	-	01
39.	Women & Child Development and Social Welfare	02	05	-	-	05
40.	Youth Services and Minorities Development and Welfare	-	01	03	-	04
	Total	85	191	19	15	225

Appendix 3.5

(Refer paragraph 3.3.3, page 92)

Significant recommendations of PAC against which Action Taken Notes were outstanding from Departments

Year of Audit Report with para number	PAC Report number and year	Name of the department(s)	Gist of the Audit Para	Recommendations of PAC
4.3.3 of AR 2003-2004	48th PAC Report 2005-2006	PWD and PWD (Roads)	Payment of price escalation by the Executive Engineers ignoring contract provision led to inadmissible payment of ₹ 5.47 crore to contractors	The department should make due efforts to recover the excess payments on account of price escalation from the contractors as quickly as possible and report to the Committee within six months positively.
4.9 of AR 2001-2001 Vol-I	10th PAC Report 2007-2008	Public Works (Roads)	Though initial technical bid of March 1995 was cancelled and fresh technical bid was opened in August 1996, the EE, 24 Parganas Highway Division paid price escalation with reference to March 1995 (Base month) resulting in excess payment of ₹ 62.29 lakh to the contractor.	The Committee recommended that the department should investigate the matter thoroughly in order to find out the person/persons responsible for excess payment of ₹ 62.29 lakh and recover the same from the contractor.
2.16 of AR 2000-2001 Vol-2	4th PAC Report 2006-2007	Municipal Affairs	Lack of accountability in Kolkata Municipal Corporation.	The Committee recommended that Municipal Affairs department and KMC should undertake a joint enquiry about the financial mismanagement of KMC to identify the persons responsible for the situation and to take punitive actions against them as per the extant rules. The Committee further desired that the department should inform the Committee about the actions taken against the identified persons both in service and/or retired from service.
3.13 of AR 2000-2001 Vol I	9th PAC Report 2006-2007	Finance (Taxation)	Unjustified printing of ungummed and unperforated Entertainment Tax Stamps without considering the willingness of the exhibitors to use such stamps resulted in a loss of ₹ 73.14 lakh towards cost of production and their disposal.	It was recommended that the department should investigate as to why the order for printing of ungummed and unperforated Entertainment Tax Stamps was placed in such a large quantity at a time without recording the reasons behind it and should take actions against the person/persons who would be found responsible in this regard. The Committee also instructed the department to be more careful and rational in dealing with such situations in future.
4.3.3 of AR 2002-2003	15th PAC Report 2007-2008	Public Works (Roads)	Arbitrary recommendation made by the Chief Engineer, Public Works (Roads) Directorate for acceptance of abnormally higher rates than that quoted by the agency in the work of widening and strengthening of Calcutta-Basanti road at 53 KMP to 86 KMP (length 33 Kms) of South 24 Parganas district resulted in undue benefit of ₹ 1.53 crore to the agency	Considering the gravity of the matter, the Committee recommended that the matter be referred without delay to the Vigilance Commissioner for thorough investigation. The Committee also desired that the Commission should be requested to leave no stone unturned to divulge the facts and thereby submit the report within three months.

Source: PAC Reports

Appendix-3.6

(Refer paragraph 3.4.2, page 96)

Statement showing status of unused infrastructure and equipment as of June 2011

(Rupees in lakh)

Name of non-functional Health Centre	Details of work	Date of taking over certificate	Expenditure involved	Reason for non-functioning	Cost of equipment and furniture remaining unused		
					Nature of equipment	Month of receipt	Value
Jalpaiguri							
Barnesh PHC	Construction of 10 bedded Indoor ward	28.02.2008	14.73	Non-deployment of adequate medical personnel	Furniture	September 2008	2.74
					Medical equipment	February 2008	4.13
Mathachulka PHC	Construction of 10 bedded Indoor ward	15.11.2008	14.73	Insufficient medical personnel	Furniture	September 2008	2.84
					Medical equipment	February 2008	4.73
Dhumpara PHC	Construction of 10 bedded Indoor ward	17.05.2006	14.48	Non-deployment of adequate medical personnel	Furniture	November 2007	2.84
					Medical equipment	March 2008	4.73
Kharija Berubari PHC	Construction of 10 bedded Indoor ward	31.10.2008	14.73	Non-deployment of adequate medical personnel	Furniture	November 2007	2.84
					Medical equipment	February 2008	4.27
Maringajhora SC	Construction of building	31.10.2008	4.45	Inaccessibility of the location of the centre; Poor communication, lack of water supply and electricity	Not available		
North Kalamati SC	Construction of building	25.05.2006	4.45	Public agitation against shifting of the existing Sub centre	Not available		
Darjeeling (SMP)							
Lakshman Sing SC	Construction of building	18.08.2005	4.22	Wrong selection of location and poor condition of the building	Not available		
Tarbandha SC	Construction of building	18.08.2005	4.22	Wrong selection of location and poor condition of the building; Local agitation against shifting of existing centre	Not available		
Petki SC	Construction of building	18.08.2005	4.22	Wrong selection of location and poor condition of the building; Local agitation against shifting of existing centre	Not available		

Name of non-functional Health Centre	Details of work	Date of taking over certificate	Expenditure involved	Reason for non-functioning	Cost of equipment and furniture remaining unused		
					Nature of equipment	Month of receipt	Value
C o o c h b e h a r							
Nayarhat PHC	Construction of (i)10 bedded Indoor ward (ii) 1 MO's Quarter (iii) Double Staff Quarter (iv) Pump House	19.05.2007	28.11	Non-deployment of Medical Officers	Furniture	September 2008	2.84
					Medical equipment	March 2008	4.71
Gopalpur PHC	Construction of 10 bedded Indoor ward	19.06.2007	15.28	Health Centre started functioning with effect from 16.06.2009 with the posting of one Medical Officer who was subsequently withdrawn after 3 months, and as a result the Health Centre had to be closed from October 2009 for want of Medical Officer and lack of security	Furniture	Not available	
					Medical equipment	February 2008	1.74
Total			**123.62**				**38.41**

Appendix-3.7

(Refer paragraph 3.4.2, page 96)

Statement showing non-functional Generator installed at Generator Room of Health Centres as of June 2011

(Rupees in lakh)

Name of BPHC/ PHC	Date of taking over of DG Room and supplying of DG set	Value	Reasons for non-functioning
Jalpaiguri			
Dhumpara PHC	17.05.2006	2.30	Health Centres remained non-functional since the date of taking over of the possession and for which the DG Room including Generator could not be put into operation.
Barnesh PHC	28.02.2008	2.43	
Mathachulka PHC	15.11.2008	2.43	
Kharija Berubari PHC	31.10.2008	2.43	
Darjeeling (SMP)			
Phansideswa BPHC	28.08.2005	2.36	Non-availability of operator and fuel.
Bagdogra PHC	28.08.2005	2.33	
Bidhannagar PHC	28.08.2005	2.33	
Batasi PHC	28.08.2005	2.33	
Matigara PHC	28.08.2005	2.33	
Coochbehar			
Nayarhat PHC	19.05.2007	2.32	Non-availability of operator and fuel.
Bamanhat BPHC	19.05.2007	2.32	
Gopalpur PHC	19.06.2007	2.32	
Moradanga PHC	19.05.2007	2.32	
Deocharai PHC	19.05.2007	2.32	
Khetifulbari PHC	19.05.2007	2.32	
Dewanhat BPHC	19.05.2007	2.32	
Sitalkuchi BPHC	26.05.2007	2.59	
Jamaldaha PHC	26.05.2007	2.59	
	Total	**42.69**	

Appendix 3.8

(Refer paragraph 3.4.10, page 114)

Statement showing sale proceeds of potato *vis a vis* expected sale proceeds and approximate avoidable loss.

District	Quantity of Potato sold in quintal	Period of sale	Bond price (per quintal) ranging between	Sale proceeds (Rupees in crore)	Average of Bond price in June 2008 (in rupees)	Expected sale proceeds (Rupees in crore)	Approximate avoidable loss (Rupees in crore)
Hooghly	398277.5	September 2008 to January 2009	₹ 110 and ₹ 160	4.97	198.50	7.90	2.93
Bankura	144690.5	August 2008 to November 2008	₹ 102 and ₹ 124	1.68	179.44	2.60	0.92
Birbhum	64613.5	August 2008 to December 2008	₹ 125 and ₹ 30	0.50	202.50	1.31	0.81
Bardhaman	131255	September 2008 to December 2008	₹ 140 and ₹ 100	1.47	165.88	2.18	0.71
Paschim Medinipur	35059.5	August 2008 to November 2008	₹ 120 and ₹ 126	0.44	188.75	0.66	0.22
Total	**773896**			**9.06**		**14.65**	**5.59**

Appendix 4.1

(Refer paragraph 4.2, page 119)

Organisational structure of Water Resources Investigation and Development Department

Appendix 4.2

(Refer paragraph 4.5. page 120)

Statement showing list of test checked divisions

Sl. No.	Name of the Directorate	Wing	Name of the Division	Function	LOC entitlement
1	WRDD	Agri-Irrigation Wing	Balurghat (A-I) Division	Operation and Maintenance of Govt. owned ground water based MI schemes e.g. Heavy Duty Tube Wells, Medium Duty Tube Wells, Low Duty Tube Wells and Shallow Tube wells and construction of new ground water based MI schemes	Yes
2			Bankura (A-I) Division		
3			Burdwan (A-I) Division		
4			Jalpaiguri (A-I) Division		
5			Kalyani (A-I) Division		
6			Krishnagar (A-I) Division-I		
7			Krishnagar (A-I) Division-II		
8			Tamluk (A-I) Division		
9			Bankura (A-I) Investigation & Planning Division	Preparation of scheme documents after survey and investigation and implementation of surface water based MI schemes e.g. construction of check dam, rain water harvesting tanks etc.	
10			Burdwan (A-I) Investigation & Planning Division		
11		Agri-Mechanical Wing	Kolkata (A-M) Resources Division	Procurement of materials centrally for MI schemes under RIDF, AIBP etc.	
12			Balurghat (A-M) Division	Operation and Maintenance of surface water based Major River Lift Irrigation Schemes and construction of new Major/Midi/Mini River Lift Irrigation Schemes	
13			Bankura (A-M) Division		
14			Burdwan (A-M) Division		
15			Jalpaiguri (A-M) Division		
16			Kalyani (A-M) Division		
17			Krishnagar (A-M) Division		
18			Tamluk (A-M) Division		
19	CADA	Damodar Valley CADA	Damodar Valley CAD Division	Execution of Civil works of CADWM in Damodar river valley command area	
20		Kangsabati CADA	Kangsabati CAD Division	Execution of Civil works of CADWM in Kangsabati river valley command area	
21	SWID	Engineering wing	Hydrological Survey Division, Krishnagar	Implementation of different types of schemes relating to the investigation and development of ground water resources and collection of hydrological data	
22			Surface water Investigation Division No-II, Burdwan		
23			Surface Water Investigation DivisionNo.-III, Krishnagar		
24			Surface water Investigation Division No.-IV, Jalpaiguri		
25			Drilling Division No.-II, Burdwan	Drilling of exploratory tube wells for ground water investigation	No
26			Drilling Division No.-III, Krishnagar		
27			Drilling division No.-IV, Jalpaiguri		
28		Geological wing	Geological Division No.-I, Bankura	Implementation of West Bengal Ground Water Resources Act, 2005 and monitoring of ground water resources	
29			Geological Division No-II, Burdwan		
30			Geological Division No.-IV, Jalpaiguri		

(Source:-Records of WRDD and SWID)

Appendix 4.3

(Refer paragraph 4.6.1.4 page 123)

Statement showing schemes dropped under RIDF and AIBP after approval

Programme	Total number of schemes	Estimated Cost (Rupees in crore)	Number of schemes dropped	CCA (in Ha) of dropped scheme	Estimated cost of the dropped scheme (Rupees in crore)
RIDF-VIII	4002	87.64	14	188	0.97
RIDF-X	561	19.53	1	20	0.07
RIDF-XI	1272	44.31	23	2149	5.10
RIDF-XII	2589	80.93	35	624	3.36
RIDF-XIII	1208	83.90	12	250	1.50
RIDF-XIV	3096	150.15	23	855	5.27
RIDF-XV	1286	84.70	14	480	2.62
AIBP (PH-I)	32	10.03	9	747	3.42
Total	**14046**	**561.19**	**131**	**5313**	**22.31**

(Source:-Records of WRDD)

Appendix 4.4

(Refer paragraph 4.6.2 page 123)

Statement showing position of man power in key posts

Directorate	Post	Sanctioned Strength	Men-in-position as of 31.03.10	Vacancy	Percentage vacancy
WRDD	Assistant Engineer (Agri-Irrigation)	140	92	48	34
	Assistant Engineer (Agri-Mechanical)	87	42	45	52
	Head Estimator	13	7	6	46
	Sub-Assistant Engineer (Civil)	857	763	94	11
	Sub-Assistant Engineer (mechanical)	231	114	117	51
	Sub-Assistant Engineer (Electrical)	30	17	13	43
	Electrical Supervisor	41	23	18	44
	Mechanical Supervisor	52	21	31	60
	Draftsman (Mechanical/ Civil)	57	18	39	68
	Surveyor	249	184	65	26
	Senior Mechanic	54	15	39	72
	Mechanic (M.U.)	152	61	91	60
	Electircian	146	100	46	32
	Operator (DTW/LR)	3377	1507	1870	55
	Operator-cum-mechanic	3627	2273	1354	37
	Operator (SOSTW)	298	196	102	34
	Work Assistant	140	37	103	74
	Assistant Operator	3235	2503	732	23
	Water Transmission	2625	1871	754	29
	Chowkidar (RLI)	2833	198	2635	93
SWID	Senior Geophysicist	2	1	1	50
	Geophysicist	4	0	4	100
	Geophysical Assistant	6	0	6	100
	Geologist	22	13	9	41
	Geological Assistant	27	12	15	56
	Chemist	14	8	6	43
	Assistant Chemist	6	4	2	33
	Lab Assistant	9	0	9	100

(Source:-Records of WRDD and SWID)

Appendix 4.5

(Refer paragraph 4.6.2 page 124)

Statement showing detailed list of staff not transferred during 2006-11

Sl. No.	Name of the Division/ sub-division	Name	Designation	Date from which posted in this Division	No. of years posted in the division (approx)
1	Jalpaiguri (AM) Division	Kalisankar Sarkhel	Draftsman	02-12-1990	20
2		Swapan Chakraborty	UDC	05-04-2005	6
3		Jotish Chandra Das	Driver	24-02-1995	16
4	Burdwan (AI) Division	Utpal Kumar Kundu	Executive Engineer	11-03-2005	6
5		Uday Kumar Jash	UDC	26-08-2002	9
6		Sankar Chandra Das	Typist	05-11-1992	18
7		Tapan Kumar Mondal	Tracer	17-04-1974	37
8		Ashoke Kumar Mondal	Operator(L.R.)	10-02-2003	8
9		Uday Kumar Dalal	Draftsman	19-07-2002	9
10	Krishnagar-II (AI) Division	Smt. Sukti Biswas	Sub-Asstt. Engineer	04-07-2005	6
11		Gouri Sankar Saha Podder	Draftsman	01-12-2004	6
12		Anil Kumar Sarkar	Typist (Gr.I)	16-08-1985	26
13		Nemai Sarbajna	C.C.T.	01-09-1996	15
14	Kalyani (AM) Division	Smt. Kalpana Ghosh	UDC	02-06-2003	8
15		Smt. Parna Choudhury (Mondal)	UDC	12-07-2005	6
16		Sekhar Kumar Dutta	Typist Gr.I	09-02-1987	24
17	Ranaghat (AM) Sub-Division under Kalyani (AM) Division	Subash Chandra Debnath	Surveyor	04-07-2005	6
18		Somnath Pramanik	Electrician	24-01-2001	10
19		Subash Bose	Electrician	03-05-2000	10
20		Rabindra Nath Sen	Mechanic	28-09-2003	8
21		Indu Bhusan Biswas	UDC	12-05-1975	36
22	Hanskhali (AM) Sub-Division under Kalyani (AM) Division	Goutam Dutta	Surveyor	12-08-1996	15
23		Kanai Lal Dutta	C.C.T.	07-09-1983	28
24		Shyamal Dey Sarkar	Mechanic	19-01-1995	16
25	Blaurghat (AM) Division	Pradip Kumar Biswas	C.C.T. Gr.I	08-04-2005	6
26		Chhatra Kanta Barman	Typist Gr.I	11-03-1987	24
27		Sudeb Das	Accounts Clerk	26-11-2001	9
28	Balurghart-I Sub-Division under Balurghat (AM) Division	Prakash Mondal	Asstt. Engineer	02-09-2005	6
29		Shyamal Kumar Pyne	C.C.T. Gr.I	13-01-1987	24
30		Keshab Ch. Bhattacharjee	O. Mechanic	11-01-1995	16
31	Balurghat-II Sub-Division under Balurghat (AM) Division	Sekhar Kumar Sarkar	Asstt. Engineer	12-10-2005	5
32		Aloke Kundu	Surveyor	06-05-1997	14
33		Goutam Kumar Das	Electrician	01-01-1997	14
34	Gangarampur Sub-Division under Balurghat (AM) Division	Sarojini Mardi	Accounts Clerk	08-12-2005	5
35		Avik Kumar Guha	Surveyor	14-02-2003	8
36	Drilling Division-III (SWID) Krishnagar	Samir Kumar Mitra	Asstt. Driller (A)	11-05-1994	17
37		Pradip Kumar Dey	UDC (B)	17-06-1997	14
38		Sankar Kumar Das	Typist Gr.I	05-05-1992	19

Sl. No.	Name of the Division/ sub-division	Name	Designation	Date from which posted in this Division	No. of years posted in the division (approx)
39	Drilling Division-IV (SWID) Jalpaiguri	Santosh Kumar Ganguly	Mechanic (B)	06-02-1996	15
40	SWID Division-III, Krishnagar	Surajit Basu	Sub-Asstt. Engineer	15-07-2005	6
41		Mita Joardar (Chatterjee)	Typist	10-03-1999	12
42	SWID Division-IV, Jalpaiguri	Nikhil Ranjan Dey	Surveyor	11-10-1988	22
43		Nitai Das	Jeep Driver	31-01-1987	24
44	SWID Sub-Division No.IV-A, Jalpaiguri	Sandeep Mondal	Asstt. Engineer	10-08-2005	6
45	Krishnagar-I (AI) Division	Smt. Geeta Das	UDC	01-04-2003	8
46		Naba Kumar Kundu	Typist Gr.-I	22-03-1982	29
47		Smt. Bithika Sarkar	A/cs Clerk	05-05-1994	17
48		Protap Kumar Biswas	Store Keeper	30-10-1980	30
49	Hydrological survey Division, Krishnagar	Tapan Kuamr Bhattacharya	Scientific Assistant (Gr-B)	15-07-2004	7
50		Niranjan Kumar Mollick	Typist	14-12-1987	23

(Source:- Records of test checked divisions and replies)

Appendix 4.6

(Refer paragraph 4.6.3.1, page 125)

Statement showing non-functional instruments in the test checked laboratories

Name of the Laboratory	Name of the instruments	Purpose	Date from which remained inoperative	Effect
Central Chemical & Hydrological Laboratory, Kolkata	P.II. Meter	Acidity/Alkalinity Test	March 2010	Acidity/alkalinity of water samples cannot be measured
	Spectrophotometer	Determination of heavy metals at micro level	May 2007	Presence of heavy metals in water sample cannot be measured.
	Atomic Absorption Spectrometer	Arsenic Testing	1999	Arsenic test done by Arsenic Test Kit
Divisional Chemical & Hydrological Laboratory, Burdwan	Conductivity meter	Determination of Electrical conductivity & TDS	Since long	Electrical conductivity of a solution or salts/ impurities in the water sample cannot be analysed.
	Cyber Scan Ion Meter	Used for measuring pII and fluoride		pH of water samples and presence of Fluoride in water samples cannot be measured
	Spectro Calorimeter	Iron Test		Iron (Fe) test done by Iron Test Kit
	PH meter (pocket)	Acidity/Alkalinity Test		Acidity/alkalinity of water samples cannot be measured
Regional Chemical & Hydrological Laboratory, Jalpaiguri	Flame Photometer	Sodium Potassium etc test	June 2009	Sodium (Na) and Potassium (K) cannot be analyzed.
	Spectro Calorimeter	Iron Test		Iron (Fe) test done by Iron Test Kit
Regional Chemical & Hydrological Laboratory, Paschim Midnapore	Spectro Calorimeter	Iron Test	Since 15 years	Iron (Fe) test done by Iron Test Kit
	Flame Photometer	Sodium Potassium etc test		Sodium (Na) and Potassium (K) cannot be analyzed.
	Incubator	Bacteria Test		Bacteriological Test not done
	Autoclave	Sterillisation		

(Source:-Replies of Chemical & Hydrological Laboratories)

Appendix 4.7

(Refer paragraph 4.6.4.3, page 127)

Statement showing non-maintenance of important registers/records

Sl. No.	Directorate	Name of the Division	Site Instruction Book	Assets Register	Survey Report Register	Theft case file
1	WRDD	Balurghat (A-M) Division	Not maintained	**maintained**	**maintained**	**maintained**
2		Balurghat (A-I) Division	Not maintained	----	Not maintained	Not maintained
3		Bankura (A-I) Investigation & Planning Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained
4		Bankura (A-I) Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained
5		Bankura (A-M) Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained
6		Burdwan (A-I) Investigation & Planning Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	**maintained**	Not maintained
7		Burdwan (A-I) Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	**maintained**	**maintained**
8		Burdwan (A-M) Division	Not maintained	**maintained**	**maintained**	**maintained**
9		Jalpaiguri (A-M) Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained
10		Jalpaiguri (A-I) Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained
11		Kalyani (A-I) Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained
12		Kalyani (A-M) Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	**maintained**	**maintained**
13		Krishnagar (A-I) Division-I	Not maintained	Not maintained	**maintained**	Not maintained
14		Krishnagar (A-M) Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained	**maintained**
15		Krishnagar (A-I) Division-II	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained	**maintained**
16		Tamluk (A-I) Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained	**maintained**
17		Tamluk (A-M) Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained
18	CADA	Kangsabati CAD Division	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained	Not maintained
19		Damodar Valley CAD Division	Not maintained	**maintained**	Not maintained	Not maintained
		Not maintained by divisions (Number)	**19**	**15**	**13**	**12**

(Source:-Replies of the Divisions)

(Note:- out of 30 test checked divisions, information in respect of Site Order Book, Assets Register, Survey Report Registers and Theft Case Files was available for only 19 working divisions)

Appendix 4.8

(Refer paragraph 4.6.4.5, page 127).

Statement showing status of outstanding Inspection reports and paragraphs

Period	No. of Inspection Reports	No. of paragraphs
1984-85 to 2005-06	46*	90**
2006-07	1	1
2007-08	6	15
2008-09	5	15
2009-10	15	48
2010-11	30	101
Total	**103**	**270**

(Source:-Records of the AG (R, W & LBA) West Bengal)

* More than ten year old Inspection Reports- 10 ,
** More than ten year old paragraphs-40

Appendix 4.9

(Refer paragraph 4.7.1.1, page 128)

Statement showing dates of submission of Budget Estimates to SWID

Year	Name of the Circle of SWID	Date of submission of budget estimates to SWID	Delay counted from 1st October
2006-07	Surface Water Investigation Circle	04.01.2006	3
	Investigation, Planning & Design Circle	18.10.2005	17
	Drilling Circle	28.10.2005	25
	Geological Circle	28.09.2005	No delay
2007-08	Surface Water Investigation Circle	26.12.2006	86
	Investigation, Planning & Design Circle	10.10.2006	9
	Drilling Circle	02.11.2006	32
	Geological Circle	27.09.2006	No delay
2008-09	Surface Water Investigation Circle	17.10.2007	16
	Investigation, Planning & Design Circle	04.12.2007	64
	Drilling Circle	12.12.2007	72
	Geological Circle	06.11.2007	36
2009-10	Surface Water Investigation Circle	14.11.2008	44
	Investigation, Planning & Design Circle	12,09.2008	No delay
	Drilling Circle	31.10.2008	30
	Geological Circle	31.10.2008	30
2010-11	Surface Water Investigation Circle	Not submitted at all	
	Investigation, Planning & Design Circle	Not submitted at all	
	Drilling Circle	Not submitted at all	
	Geological Circle	30.03.2011	180

(Source:- Reply of Director, SWID)

Appendix 4.10

(Refer paragraph 4.7.3, page 132)

Statement showing status of unrealised Water Rates

Name of the Division	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11
	(figures in Rupees)				
Tamluk (A-I) Division	3767460.00	2933666.00	2557975.00	2045478.00	NA
Tamluk (A-M) Division	2035606.00	2653168.00	2637115.00	2016169.00	NA
Bankura (A-I) Division	663134.00	462072.00	497548.00	843154.00	NA
Bankura (A-M) Division	710850.00	860848.00	820453.00	1131507.00	NA
Burdwan (A-I) Division	10219602.00	11034587.00	10081826.00	7864747.00	NA
Burdwan (A-M) Division	4939000.00	5306000.00	4262000.00	5015000.00	6306000.00
Kalyani (A-I) Division	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	NA
Kalyani (A-M) Division	NA	112539.00	0.00	0.00	NA
Krishnagar (A-I) Division-I	0.00	49141.00	24281.00	0.00	16320.00
Krishnagar (A-M) Division	33536.00	218739.00	47942.00	89072.00	NA
Krishnagar (A-I) Division-II	198598.00	162791.00	230043.00	125394.00	NA
Jalpaiguri (A-M) Division	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Jalpaiguri (A-I) Division	9068.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Balurghat (A-M) Division	2044841.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Balurghat (A-I) Division	28560.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total	**24650255.00**	**23793551.00**	**21159183.00**	**19130521.00**	**6322320.00**
Grand total					**₹95055830.00**

(Source:- Records of test checked divisions and replies)

(Note:- Out of 30 selected divisions, only 15 working divisions of WRDD engaged in operation and maintenance of Govt. Owned MI schemes from which Water rates were collected)

Appendix 4.11

(Refer paragraph 4.7.6, page 137)

Statement showing status of preparation of reconciliation statement of energy bills of MI schemes

Sl No.	Name of the Division	Reconciliation statement submitted for the period up to	Month in which reconciliation statement submitted
1.	Balurghat (A-I) Division	March 2009	June 2009
2.	Balurghat (A-M) Division	March 2009	November 2009
3.	Bankura (A-I) Division	May 2010	December 2010
4.	Bankura (A-M) Division	March 2010	December 2010
5.	Burdwan (A-I) Division	March 2010	December 2010
6.	Burdwan (A-M) Division	July 2008	December 2010
7.	Jalpaiguri (A-I) Division	March 2009	June 2009
8.	Jalpaiguri (A-M) Division	Reconciliation statement not submitted at all	--
9.	Kalyani (A-I) Division	September 2010	February 2011
10.	Kalyani (A-M) Division	Reconciliation statement not submitted at all	--
11.	Krishnagar (A-I) Division-I	Reconciliation statement not submitted at all	--
12.	Krishnagar (A-I) Division-II	June 2010	September 2010
13.	Krishnagar (A-M) Division	March 2009	December 2009
14.	Tamluk (A-I) Division	September 2010	March 2011
15.	Tamluk (A-M) Division	Reconciliation statement not submitted at all	--

(Source:-Replies of Divisions)

(Note:- Out of 30 selected divisions, only 15 working divisions of WRDD engaged in operation and maintenance of Govt. Owned MI schemes, were required to prepare reconciliation statements)

Appendix 4.12

(Refer paragraph 4.8.2.1 page 142)

Statement showing status of ground water level monitoring through PHS

Name of the district	Year	No of permanent Hydrograph Station in the district	No. of permanent hydrograph stations for which monitoring completed				Reasons for shortfall, if any
			During Pre monsoon	During monsoon	During Post monsoon	During winter	
Bankura	2006-07	130	130	128	124	107	Either due to shortfall of fund or vehicle problem or due to natural calamities
	2007-08	130	127	0	113	113	
	2008-09	130	96	90	98	86	
	2009-10	130	81	98	98	78	
	2010-11	98	61	91	90	79	
Burdwan	2006-07	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	52 PHSs were defunct. Most of the PHSs had been defunct since period prior to 2005
	2007-08	179	109	0	138	109	
	2008-09	179	126	0	109	0	
	2009-10	179	126	143	133	135	
	2010-11	195	138	138	138	135	
Dakshin Dinajpur	2006-07	35	15	15	15	15	14 PHS were defunct
	2007-08	35	15	15	15	15	
	2008-09	35	15	15	15	15	
	2009-10	35	15	15	15	15	
	2010-11	35	15	17	17	18	
East Medinapur	2006-07	231	196	185	197	187	Reasons for short fall not furnished
	2007-08	231	186	73	110	177	
	2008-09	231	180	165	180	180	
	2009-10	231	182	185	186	181	
	2010-11	231	193	194	194	194	
Jalpaiguri	2006-07	66	66	66	66	66	No shortfall
	2007-08	70	70	70	70	70	
	2008-09	70	70	70	70	70	
	2009-10	70	69	69	69	69	
	2010-11	70	69	69	69	69	
Nadia	2006-07	191	186	186	182	181	Defunct PHS-- 2 w.e.f for 2008, 1 w.e.f 2009 and 3 w.e.f 2011 and some sites were inaccessible
	2007-08	191	186	186	173	178	
	2008-09	191	0	181	177	178	
	2009-10	191	179	184	181	186	
	2010-11	191	187	186	185	185	

(Source:- Replies of SWID, four Geological Divisions and Krishnagar Hydrological Survey Division)

Appendix 4.13

(Refer paragraph 4.8.2.1, page 143)

Statement showing non-obtaining of permits for new ground water based MI schemes

Name of the Divisions	No. of ground water based MI schemes completed during 2006-11	No of Permits obtained as of March 2011	No. of ground water based MI schemes completed without obtaining permits as of March 2011
Balurghat (A-I) Division	1511	nil	1511
Bankura (A-I) Division	60	nil	60
Burdwan (A-I) Division	83	83	nil
Jalpaiguri (A-I) Division	2318	216	2102
Kalyani (A-I) Division	80	80	nil
Krishnagar (A-I) Division-I	14	14	nil
Krishnagar (A-I) Division-II	8	8	nil
Tamluk (A-I) Division	32	nil	32
Total	**4106**	**401**	**3705**

(Source: Replies of Divisions)

(Note:- Out of 30 selected divisions, only 8 working divisions of the Agri-Irrigation Wing of WRDD engaged in construction of ground water based MI schemes, were required to obtain permits)

List of Abbreviations

A&C	Adhesive and Chemicals
AAP	Annual Action Plan
ABER	Annual Blood Examination Rate
ACR	Additional Class Room
AI	Agri-Irrigation
AIBP	Accelerated Irrigation Benefits Programme
AM	Agri-Mechanical
ARWSP	Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme
ASHA	Accredited Social Health Activist
ASIDE	Assistance to States for Developing Export Infrastructure and Allied Activities
ATN	Action Taken Notes
AWC	Anganwadi Centre
AWH	Anganwadi Health Worker
AWP&B	Annual Work Plan and Budget
BC	Beneficiary Committee
BCW	Backward Classes Welfare
BDO	Block Development Officer
BENFED	West Bengal State Co-operative Marketing Federation Limited
BIS	Bureau of Indian Standards
BM	Bituminous Macadam
BOO	Build Own Operate
BPHC	Block Primary Health Centre
BPL	Below Poverty Line
BUUSPL	Bengal Unitech Universal Siliguri Projects Ltd
C&AG	Comptroller and Auditor General of India
CADA	Command Area Development Authority
CADWM	Command Area Development & Water Management
CAL	Computer Aided Learning
CCA	Culturable Command Area
CCO	Chief Controlling Officer
CDPO	Child Development Project Officer
CE	Chief Engineer
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CGWB	Central Ground Water Board
CH	Central Hostel
CHC	Community Health Centre
CLA	Corporation Level Ground Water Resources Development Authority
CMOH	Chief Medical Officer of Health
CRPF	Central Reserve Police Force
CTI	Certificate of Treasury Issues
CTR	Consolidated Treasury Receipts
CWSN	Children With Special Needs
D&P	Development and Planning
DDO	Drawing and Disbursing Officer
DDS	Digha Development Scheme
DGS&D	Director General of Supplies and Disposal
DHAP	District Health Annual Plan
DHFWS	District Health and Family Welfare Samity
DI	Director of Industries
DLA	District Level Ground Water Resources Development Authority
DM	District Magistrate

DOTS	Direct Observed Treatment Short Course
DPC	District Planning Committee
DPC Act	Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service Act
DPO	District Project Officer
DRDC	District Rural Development Cell
DSSC	District Site Selection Committee
EDS	Emergency Doctors Service Private Limited
EE	Executive Engineer
EIC	Engineer-in- charge
EIIMS	Eastern India Institute of Medical Sciences and Research Hospitals Limited
EO	Executive Officer
EOI	Expression of Interest
FPI&H	Food Processing Industries & Horticulture
GER	Gross Enrollment Ratio
GoWB	Government of West Bengal
GP	Gram Panchayat
H&FW	Health & Family Welfare
HDTW	Heavy Duty Tube Well
HG	Home Guard
HPCL	Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited
I&CA	Information and Cultural Affairs
IAY	Indira Awas Yojana
ICDS	Integrated Child Development Services
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
IED	Inclusive Education for Disabled
IHHL	Individual Household Latrine
IIPL	Infinity Infotech Parks Ltd
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
IOC	Indian Oil Corporation
IP	Irrigation Potential
IPHS	Indian Public Health Standard
IR	Industrial Reconstruction
IR	Inspection Report
IRC	Indian Road Congress
IRD	Improvement of Riding Quality
IT	Information Technology
JSY	Janani Suraksha Yojana
JU	Jadavpur University
JVC	Joint Venture Company
KGBV	Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya
KKK	Kolkata Kala Kendra
KMC	Kolkata Municipal Corporation
KPT	Kolkata Port Trust
L&LR	Land and Land Reforms
LA	Land Acquisition
LCS	Land Custom Station
LDTW	Low Duty Tube Well
LOA	Letter of Award
LOC	Letter of Credit
LUDCP	Land Use and Development Control Plan
MDTW	Medium Duty Tube Well
MI	Minor Irrigation
MMI	Major and Medium Irrigation
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate

MNRE	Ministry of Non-Conventional Renewable Energy
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MoWR	Ministry of Water Resources
MRCP	Mahananda River Conservation Plan
MRP	Maximum Retail Price
MSS	Mix Seal Surfacing
MSVP	Medical Superintendent cum Vice Principal
MT	Metric Ton
NABARD	National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
NER	Net Enrollment Ratio
NIT	Notice Inviting Tender
NPCB	National Programme for Control of Blindness
NPEGEL	National Programme for Education of Girls at Elementary Level
NRDWP	National Rural Drinking Water Programme
NREGA	National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
NREGS	National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
NRHM	National Rural Health Mission
NVBDCP	National Vector Borne Disease Control Programme
NVF	National Volunteer Force
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
OFD	On-farm development
OPD	Outpatient Department
ORS	Oral Re-hydration Solution
OT	Operation Theatre
OTCM	Official Telephone Operator cum Messenger
P&NES	Power and Non-conventional Energy Sources
P&RDD	Panchayats and Rural Development Department
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PAG	Principal Accountant General
PHC	Primary Health Centre
PHED	Public Health Engineering Department
PHS	Permanent Hydrograph Station
PIM	Participatory Irrigation Management
PIU	Programme Implementation Unit
PMGSY	Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana
PO cum DWO	Project Officer cum District Welfare Officer
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PPS	Population Proportional to Sample
PRB	Police Regulation of Bengal
PS	Panchayat Samiti
PTR	Pupil Teacher Ratio
PUP	Paschimanchal Unnayan Parshad
PWD	Public Works Department
PWRD	Public Works (Roads) Department
PWSS	Piped Water Supply Schemes
RAPL	Rnox Amusement (P) Ltd
RBTW	Rig Bored Tube Well
RE	Rural Electrification
RF	Revolving Fund
RGGVY	Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana
RHS	Rural Household Survey
RIDF	Rural Infrastructure Development Fund
RLI	River Lift Irrigation
RNTCP	Revised National Tuberculosis Control Programme
ROB	Railway Over Bridge

RTCM	Residential Telephone Operator cum Messenger
SC	Scheduled Caste
SC	Sub-Centre
SDBC	Semi Dense Bituminous Concrete
SE/EC	Superintending Engineer, Eastern Circle
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SHC	State Highway Circle
SHG	Self Help Group
SJDA	Siliguri Jalpaiguri Development Authority
SJPA	Siliguri Jalpaiguri Planning Area
SLA	State Level Ground Water Resources Development Authority
SLEPC	State Level Export Promotion Committee
SMC	Stone Metal Consolidation
SMP	Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad
SNP	Supplementary Nutrition Programme
SOR	Schedule of Rates
SP	Superintendent of Police
SSA	Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
SSI	Small Scale Industry
ST	Scheduled Tribe
STP	Sewage Treatment Plant
STW	Shallow Tube Well
SVL	Sanghu Valley (India) Ltd.
SWID	State Water Investigation Directorate
SWM	Solid Waste Management
TLM	Teaching Learning Material
TSC	Total Sanitation Campaign
TT	Tetanus Toxoid
UD	Urban Development
VEC	Village Education Committee
W&S	Widening and Strengthening
WBADMIP	West Bengal Accelerated Development of Minor Irrigation Project
WBAICL	West Bengal Agro-Industries Corporation Limited
WBGWR	West Bengal Ground Water Resources Management, Control and Regulation
WBHB	West Bengal Housing Board
WBIRS	West Bengal Industrial Renewal Scheme
WBM	Water Bound Macadam
WBREDA	West Bengal Renewable Energy Development Agency
WBSEDCL	West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Corporation Limited
WBSMICL	West Bengal State Minor Irrigation Corporation Ltd.
WBSRDA	West Bengal State Rural Development Agency
WBTR	West Bengal Treasury Rules
WRDD	Water Resources Development Directorate
WRIDD	Water Resources Investigation and Development Department
WUA	Water Users Association
ZP	Zilla Parishad