Report of the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India

ON

DISTRICT JAMMU

For the year ended 31 March 2011

Government of Jammu and Kashmir

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Preface


1. This Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India contains the results of Audit of Jammu district in Jammu and Kashmir. The Report has been prepared for submission to the Governor of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 151(2) of the Constitution of India.

2. The Audit involved a review of the significant socio-economic developmental programmes implemented in the district during 2006-11. The audit was conducted by a test-check of records of the Chief Planning Officer, the Deputy Commissioner, Departmental Heads of Education, Health, Rural Development, Urban Development, Forest, Public Health Engineering, Power, Roads and Buildings, Irrigation, Tourism and Police Departments. Implementation of developmental programmes subsequent to March 2011 has also been commented upon wherever necessary.

3. The Audit has been conducted in conformity with the Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

JAMMU DISTRICT HAVING TEHSIL AND VILLAGE BOUNDARIES



Source: www.jammu.gov.in

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

To provide an effective delivery system so that the benefits envisaged under various programmes undertaken by the Government percolate down to the people, the Government of India made public participation mandatory vide 74th Amendment Act, 1992 to the Constitution of India by empowering local governments at District, Block and Gram Panchayat level so as to elicit their views in plan formulation by their active participation and to inculcate in them a sense of ownership. As the Panchayati Raj System has not been fully implemented in the State due to non-enactment of the 74th amendment to the Constitution of India by the State Legislature, the involvement of these agencies is negligible and the decisions in the implementation of any programme in the Districts is taken at the district level by District Development Boards (DDB) headed by the Chief Minister of the State/ Senior Cabinet Minister constituted for the purpose comprising the District Development Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Chief Planning Officer and elected representatives of the district. It was in this context that district centric approach towards these aspects was thought imperative to assess the impact of various socio-economic developmental activities on various sectors undertaken in the district and to bring out shortcomings in achievement of the laid down targets along with significant positives.

Substantial funds to the tune of ₹ 2880.03 crore were allocated during 2006-2011 to social, economic and general sectors by the State Government and also by the Government of India (GOI) through flagship programmes (Centrally Sponsored Schemes-CSS). Most of the funds provided through CSS are released directly by the GOI to the executing agencies instead of routing the same through the budget of the State Government to avoid loss of time in release of funds. Audit was conducted during August 2010 to April 2011 of different sectors like Education, Medical, Public Health (PHE), Sanitation, Rural Development, Forest, Tourism etc. to ascertain the impact of various programmes undertaken during 2006-07 to 2010-11 by State Government and the Government of India (GOI). The audit findings have been discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Planning

A long term Perspective Plan based on inputs from stakeholders to have an integrated approach for development of the District had not been formulated with the result the critical gaps in developmental activities remained unattended. The District Administration plays little or no role in execution or monitoring of the centrally sponsored schemes.

(Paragraph: 3.1)

Recommendations

A long term and well integrated plan may be formulated so that benefits are provided to all the beneficiaries of the District through development schemes. District

administration should be made responsible for monitoring the implementation of programmes of the schemes and initiating mid-course corrections wherever necessary.

Social Services

Health

Acute shortage of doctors to the extent of 41 per cent (i.e., shortage of 52 against the requirement of 128 doctors) and 53 per cent in para-medical staff (i.e. shortage of 732 against the requirement of 1380 para-medical staff), lack of essential equipment and machinery, poor utilization of available infrastructure had adversely impacted the delivery of health care services to the population of 15,26,406[1] of the district forcing them to go to private hospitals in and outside the State. Bed occupancy in SMGS Hospital was too high compared to the available bed strength and ranged between 98 and 155 *per cent*. Col. Sir R.N. Chopra Nursing Home was poorly utilized as out of available 80 rooms, only 16 rooms were properly occupied and the balance 64 rooms either closed or allotted to the doctors as their personal rooms resulted in loss of revenue of ₹ 1.08 crore on account of room rent and surgery charges. There was no scientific disposal of biological waste in the government hospitals of the District.

Non-formulation of Annual Action Plans during 2006-10 defeated the basic objective of the National Rural Health Mission to decentralize planning and implementation arrangements. Utilization of funds was not efficient even though unspent balances which ranged between 21 and 56 *per cent* during 2006-11, had come down considerably in 2010-11 due to preparation of Annual Action Plan for the year 2010-11. Three out of five test-checked blocks didn't have any Community Health Centre (CHC). Test checked Primary Health Centres (PHCs) and Sub-Centres (SCs) of five sampled blocks lacked basic health care and infrastructural facilities despite the fact that a significant sum of ₹ 24.08 crore had been spent on strengthening the health care facilities in the District during 2006-11. Lack of infrastructure facilities had deprived the rural population of the envisaged healthcare benefits with the result a majority of the rural population had to move to urban areas for better treatment. Despite adequate strength of Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs), the position of institutional deliveries and immunization was not up to the mark. Out of 57,503 cases of pregnancy registered in the test-checked blocks, only 35,669 deliveries had been registered by the department.

(Paragraph: 5.1)

Recommendations

Steps may be taken to fill up the vacancies of doctors and other para-medical staff in the Government hospitals in the District. Effective steps need to be taken to procure essential equipment and machinery in right earnest and efficiently utilize them. Steps may be taken to establish a scientific bio-medical waste management system in

[1] As per Census 2011.

accordance with Bio-Medical Waste (Management & Handling) Rules, 1998 in the Government hospitals of the District.

A long term Perspective Plan may be formulated so that facilities under National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) can be provided in a scientific way. Infrastructure facilities in the rural areas need to be upgraded so as to arrest the outflow of patients to urban areas. Immunisation and maternal health care facilities need to be strengthened and the performance of ASHAs reviewed to make them effective instruments of change.

Education

Impact of the *Sarva Shiksha Abhyaan (SSA)* was dismal as the enrolment of children in the age group of 6 to 14 years in these schools had decreased. Due to non-formulation of annual action plans as per the requirement, huge balances had remained unspent. Incorrect reporting of utilisation certificates to GOI was an area of concern. The enrolment of children in the age group of 6 to 14 years had decreased from 80,433 in 2006-07 to 66,943 in 2010-11. Despite heavy expenditure on maintenance and repair, the number of schools requiring repair was on the rise. Academic performance in schools was marred by delayed and defective issue of textbooks and poor amenities. Out of 643 works taken up during 2006-10; only 565 works had been completed as of March 2011. Despite spending ₹ 4.02 crore on maintenance of assets during 2006-11, the classrooms requiring major and minor repairs showed an increasing trend from 598 to 650 during four years time. 1,02,849 books (value: ₹ 0.33 crore) of various subjects of class 1st to 8th were issued during 2006-11 in eight zones in excess of actual enrolment of students. The implementation of the mid-day meal programme was deficient in terms of utilization of food grains allocated by Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution Department (CAPD) and those lifted by the Zonal Education Officers (ZEOs). Out of 1060 kitchen-sheds targeted for completion during 2008-11, 666 kitchen-sheds had been constructed at a total cost of ₹ 5.70 crore as of March 2011 though money for the purpose was available. The funds provided were not fully utilized and the scheme had failed to arrest the dropout rate of students.

(Paragraph: 5.2)

Recommendations

Immediate steps need to be taken to cheek the dropout rate from the Government schools. Formulation of Annual Action Plans should be on realistic basis. The actual expenditure needs to be reported to GOI. Textbooks need to be issued on time and on need basis. Full allocation of food grains need to be lifted under Mid-Day Meal Scheme. Action needs to be taken to reconcile the food grains actually lifted and transportation cost should be recovered from CAPD.

Water Supply and Sanitation

The department did not have any perspective or annual action plans for providing potable water. Water supply schemes in rural areas were not prioritized and instances of funding new schemes when old schemes were lying incomplete were rampant. Out of 85 schemes taken up under Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) during 2003-07 to be completed within the envisaged period of one year to three years, 19 (22 *per cent*) schemes were incomplete as of March 2011. Taking up of ineligible schemes and cost and time overruns in completion of schemes were issues of great concern. Out of 133 schemes under execution during 2006-11, only 75 had been completed during the period and the balance 58 schemes remained incomplete due to insufficient funds. The faulty planning and poor controls over implementation resulted in time-overrun of two to six years and cost-overrun of ₹ 11.35 crore in 23 schemes. The department had not collected revenue on account of water charges resulting in loss of revenue of ₹ 0.63crore as of March 2011 to the public exchequer. The delivery as well as the quality of public hygiene and sanitation services was grossly inadequate.

(Paragraph: 5.3 and 5.4)

Recommendations

The department may prioritize water supply schemes based on proper assessment of needs and execute them efficiently. Funds may be provided in such a manner that new schemes are not taken up before the completion of ongoing schemes. Steps may be taken to regularise or disconnect illegal electricity connections. The arrears in water connection charges may be recovered immediately. Sanitation facilities may be provided and upgraded through efficient utilization of funds available under various schemes and an effective system of waste management in urban areas should be ensured.

Economic Services

Road sector

The District Rural Road plan indicating the entire existing road network in the District and the core network was not prepared. Lack of planning and coordination among executing agencies existed due to non-preparation of District Rural Road Plan (DRRP) indicating the entire existing road network in the District, as a result two roads were taken up under two different schemes for which the work was taken under Prime Minister Grameen Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) during the year 2008-09 had already been taken up by the Roads and Bridges Department of the State during 2002-03 and 2006-07 and construction work thereof was completed during 2007-08 and 2010-11. This led to misutilisation of ₹ 1.88 crore incurred on these two roads under PMGSY as of March 2011. The department had failed to provide road connectivity to all the habitations in the District and 95 villages involving 178 habitations remained unconnected. The construction work of 17 road projects was commenced without

availability of land indicated defective planning by the department resulted in unproductive road work of ₹ 44.85 crore and depriving the general public of the intended benefits besides, blockage of funds. Out of 48 works taken up during 2004-09, 17 works (42 *per cent*) had not been completed as of March 2011 even after a lapse of five to 30 months. The upgradation work of three ineligible road projects were taken up under Prime Minister Grameen Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) in contravention of programme guidelines resulted in avoidable expenditure of ₹ 21.91 crore was incurred on ineligible road projects as of March 2011.

(Paragraph: 6.1)

Recommendations

A long term District Rural Road Plan may be formulated to complete the road works in time and duplication of taking up of same roads should be stopped. Before taking up of construction works, land should be acquired in time in order to avoid obstructions of road works.

Rural Development

The data relating to houses constructed under *Indra Awas Yojna (IAY)* has not been maintained; as a result the number of houses constructed under IAY could not be ascertained. There was under-utilisation of funds which effected achievement of targets under the Yojana.

Under Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005 (MNREGA), the Annual Works Plans did not flow from the Perspective Plan. The provision of providing 100 days employment to unskilled labour could not be met due to inadequate formulation of work plans. MNREGA funds of ₹ 0.12 crore were diverted for payment of wages to daily wagers, payment of telephone bills, POL etc. Unemployment allowance was also not provided to unemployed job card holders as envisaged in the scheme. The department had not taken up all the works approved for execution and out of 6,852 approved works, only 5,708 (83 *per cent*) works were taken up for execution during 2007-11. There was shortfall in completion of works. Under Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY), the department failed to spend full amount and unspent balance swelled from ₹ 0.37crore in 2006-07 to ₹ 1.01 crore at the close of 2010-11. As a result, the coverage of Below Poverty Line (BPL) families was poor. The infrastructure put under Model village programme was not put to use rendering the investment unfruitful.

(Paragraph: 6.2)

Recommendations

The data base of houses constructed should be maintained properly. Efforts should be made to increase the number of works to ensure 100 days employment to the unskilled labour. Unemployment allowance needs to be provided to unemployed

labour. Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) should be implemented efficiently.

Power

The transmission and distribution losses continued to be very high. Energy losses in the District had exceeded the maximum of 15 *per cent* by 20,580.62 lakh units during 2007-11 which translated into commercial loss of ₹ 486.58 crore. All the connections were not metered as only 1,56,650 connections (67 *per cent*) out of 2,34,537 connections had been metered in the District as of March 2011. Due to overloaded receiving stations, the quality and quantity of power was inadequate which led to power shut downs. Some of the test checked schemes of the Agriculture/Irrigation Department revealed that these schemes were framed on the basis on unrealistic data.

(Paragraph: 6.5)

Recommendations

Effective measures should be taken to reduce the transmission and distribution losses. Full metering of consumers need to be undertaken immediately. The receiving stations need to be upgraded for better power quality and availability.

Irrigation facilities

Utilisation of irrigation potential of completed schemes ranged between 60 and 82 *per cent* only. Priority was not accorded to completion of ongoing schemes and new schemes were taken up. As a result, there was cost escalation of ongoing schemes rendering them incomplete. Nine out of 26 works taken up during 2007-10 witnessed a cost escalation from ₹ 10.94 crore to ₹ 21.77 crore. Non-completion of the schemes affected 6450 hectares of land despite spending of ₹ 29.42 crore on these schemes.

(Paragraph: 6.6)

Recommendations

Irrigation potential should be utilized efficiently. Ongoing schemes should be completed first before taking up the execution of new schemes.

Urban development

Tardy implementation of Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) and Integrated Housing and Slum Development Programme (IHSDP) programmes adversely affected the possibility of completion of other phases of the programme. Non-implementation of Solid Waste Management Programme in the towns compelled all the Municipal Committees to dump garbage/solid waste in open space, on river bank, nallahs etc. putting the human health at risk, besides polluting the nearby water bodies.

(Paragraph: 6.7)

Recommendations

Effective steps need be taken to complete the ongoing projects expeditiously so that the beneficiaries reap the intended benefits. Comprehensive Action Plan should be evolved for effective solid waste management to save water bodies from pollution.

Forests

Performance of the departmental nurseries was dismal. The survival rate of plants planted during 2006-11 was very low as out of 5,60,885 plants planted during 2006-11 only 3,14,180 (56 *per cent*) plants survived. Despite spending ₹ 1.69 crore during 2006-10, there was no reduction of degraded area and it remained static at 2,557 hectares. The outstanding dues of ₹ 56.07 crore on account of non-recovery of compensation for forest land transferred to various agencies for non-forestry purpose and ₹ 6.13 crore on account of non-recovery of royalty from the user agencies had accumulated to unmanageable extent. Compensation for the land transferred to other agencies had not been received. Against 1,883.23 hectares of forestland diverted during the period 1991-92 to 2010-11 for non-forest purposes, no land was brought under forest cover.

(Paragraph: 6.9)

Recommendations

Necessary measures should be taken to improve the performance of the departmental nurseries by controlling the mortality rate of the plants and to recover the outstanding dues on account of royalty and compensation for forest land transferred to various agencies for non-forestry purpose.

Tourism

The development of Rughunath Bazar taken up under the Heritage Projects has been tardy. The developmental activities in Jammu have not been commensurate with the increased flow of tourists during the last few years visiting both Kashmir and Mata Vaishnodevi shrine at Katra.

(Paragraph: 6.10)

Recommendations

Developmental projects should be taken up in a phased manner to make Jammu District tourists spot.

General Services

Police

Police infrastructure was inadequate to meet the requirement of the department. Mobility of police stations was poor which affected response time of the personnel to reach the crime spot immediately. Crime cases pending investigation had increased substantially ranging from 1107 cases in the year 2007 to 4158 cases in the year 2011 as a result the law and order situation in the Jammu District is alarming. Traffic management especially at intersection where the axle load was high was not up to the mark causing increase in the death, disabilities and hospitalization cases.

(Paragraph: 7.1)

Recommendation

Adequate infrastructure should be ensured to make policing efficient.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

District Jammu derives its name from the city of Jammu which was founded by Raja Jamboo Lochan in the 14th century BC. The District with an area of 3097 sq km is bounded in the north and north east by the Tehsils of Reasi in Udhampur District, in the east and south east partly by Tehsil Ramnagar of Udhampur District and partly by Tehsil Billawar of Kathua District, in the south and south west by Kathua District and Sialkote District of Rawalpindi (Pakistan) and in the north west by Tehsil Nowshara of District Rajouri and parts of the District Bhimber now under the occupation of Pakistan. The District falls in the Himalayas. As per Census 2011, Jammu District is most populous District of the State with provisional population of 15,26,406 (12.16 *per cent* of the population of the State) with 53.15 *per cent* of them residing in rural areas. The literacy rate in the District is 83.89 *per cent* which is higher than the State average of 68.74 *per cent* and National average of 74.04 *per cent*. The District comprises four Tehsils and eight blocks covering 297 *panchayats* with 771 inhabited and 88 uninhabited villages (Census 2001).



View of Jammu City


1.1 Administrative set up

The District Development Board (DDB) is an apex body at the District level for approval/finalization of Annual Plans for development of the District. The DDB of Jammu is headed by the Chief Minister. District Development Commissioner (DDC), Additional Deputy Commissioner, Chief Planning Officer; MLAs of all constituencies of the District and Sectoral/Departmental Heads are the members of the DDB. The respective Sectoral Heads co-ordinate and implement various socio-economic and development programmes. The Deputy Commissioner is assisted by the

Additional District Development Commissioner and Chief Planning Officer in preparation of plans.

The administrative set up of the District Development Board is shown in Chart-I:

CHART-I



CHAPTER 2: AUDIT FRAMEWORK

2.1 Scope of Audit

The District Centric Audit of Jammu was conducted between August 2010 and April 2011 covering the period from April 2006 to March 2011 by test-check of records of the Chief Planning Officer, the Deputy Commissioner, Departmental Heads of Education, Health, Rural Development, Urban Development, Forest, Public Health Engineering, Power, Roads and Buildings, Irrigation, Tourism and Police Departments. Besides, various development programmes initiated by the State and the GOI for upliftment of the standards of living of people of the District was assessed by test-check of records of various[1] executing agencies.

2.2 Audit objectives

The objectives of audit were to assess whether:

- the planning process for different programmes was adequate and effective;
- the management of finances was efficient and as per extant rules;
- the implementation of developmental programmes and projects was efficient, economical and result oriented;
- targets were achieved and had resulted in desired outcomes; and
- adequate monitoring mechanism in the implementation of schemes was in place and was effective.

2.3 Audit Criteria

Audit findings were benchmarked against the following audit criteria:

- Annual Action Plans of the District;
- Guidelines of various programmes implemented in the District; and
- State financial rules.

2.4 Audit Methodology

An entry conference was held (September 2010) with the Deputy Commissioner and other functionaries of the District wherein objectives, criteria and scope of audit were

[1] CPO Jammu, ACD Jammu, BDOs (6), CEO Jammu, ZEOs (8), CMO Jammu, BMO (5), Urban Hospitals (3) Executive Engineers (PHE: 3; Power: 4; Irrigation: 2, PMGSY), District Panchayat Officer, Director Local Bodies, Chief Executive Officer, Jammu Urban Development Agency (JUDA), DFO (3) and SSP Jammu

discussed. Audit was conducted by reviewing the records of 43 implementing units (out of 60 units) of 13[2] development related sectors on the basis of geographical region of the District. Audit also surveyed 38 villages, 61 schools and 41 Health Centres physically to assess the impact of the process of development. An exit conference was held (September 2011) with the Deputy Commissioner, Jammu. The responses of the Departmental officers have been incorporated in the report at appropriate places.

2.5 Acknowledgement

The Indian Audit & Accounts Department would like to record its appreciation for the co-operation extended by the District administration during the conduct of audit.

[2] Social sector: Education, Health, Public Health Engineering, Sanitation; Economic Sector: Roads, Energy, Irrigation, Rural Development, Urban Development, Employment, Forest, Tourism General services : Home

CHAPTER 3: PLANNING

3.1 District Policy and Planning

The Constitution of India (74th Amendment Act, 1992) mandates establishment of a District Planning Committee (DPC) to consolidate plans prepared by the Panchayats and Municipalities in the District and to prepare a draft development plan for the District. The chairman of the DPC is to forward the Development Plan, as recommended by the DPC, to the State Government.

It was seen in audit that the District Planning Committee (DPC) had not been constituted due to non-enactment of the 74th amendment of the Constitution of India by the State Legislature. In the absence of the DPC, the developmental works in various sectors under the District Plan had been identified by the concerned departments on need-basis in consultation with the members of the DDB. The works programmes prepared for inclusion in the District plans are approved by the DDB headed by the Hon'ble Chief Minister.

The following points were observed.

- No any role was played by the District administration in the execution of Centrally Sponsored Schemes and State Plan Schemes. These were planned and finalised by the concerned Administrative Departments and executed by the Sectoral Heads.
- No long-term perspective plan for the development of the District was found to have been formulated.

Conclusion

A long term Perspective Plan based on inputs from stakeholders to have an integrated approach for development of the District had not been formulated with the result the critical gaps in developmental activities remained unattended. The District Administration plays little or no role in execution or monitoring of the centrally sponsored schemes.

Recommendations

- A long term and well integrated plan may be formulated for the effective implementation of the developmental schemes in the District.
- District administration should be made responsible for monitoring the implementation of programmes of the schemes and initiating mid course corrections wherever necessary.

CHAPTER 4: FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

To undertake development activities in the District, funds are allocated through the State Budget and also to the implementing agencies directly from the Government of India (GOI) for execution of various socio-economic programmes.

The position of allocation/release of funds and expenditure incurred during 2006-11 in respect of 15 departments under Social Services (three departments), Economic Services (11 departments) and General Services (one department) is detailed in table-1.

Table 1

(₹in crore)

Name of the Department	*Funds provided*	*Expenditure incurred*
Social Sector		
Health	303.90	293.35
Education	487.85	476.91
Public Health Engineering	461.56	452.99
Economic sector		
Rural Development	95.66	86.58
Roads and Buildings	353.81	351.11
Power	353.53	344.71
Irrigation	253.44	251 81
Forest	74.46	71.69
Horticulture	13.73	13.46
Animal Husbandry	5.43	5.37
Sheep Husbandry	8.87	8.37
Fisheries	5.27	5.21
Handloom	2.94	2.85
Industries	38.56	37.97
Others[3]	19.06	18.14
General Sector		
Home	401.96	395.69
Total	2880.03	2816.21

(Source: Departmental Records)

Thus, out of the total provision of ₹ 2880.03 crore, an expenditure of ₹ 2816.21 crore (98 *per cent*) was incurred on various programmes by these departments. However, the expenditure so booked by the sectoral officers does not reflect correct picture as it

[3] Local Bodies, Sericulture and Cooperative

had treated entire amount released to subordinate authorities as expenditure on its release where as funds were lying unutilised with subordinate offices. Such instances could be seen wherever the financial management of specific programmes or schemes are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

Further analysis showed that three departments had expended funds between 51 and 86 *per cent* as administrative charges during the period under review which is far in excess of the expenditure incurred on development works as shown in table-2.

Table 2

(₹ in crore)

Name of the department	*Total expenditure*	*Developmental expenditure*	*Administrative expenses (Percentage)*
Education	476.91	73.33	403.58 (85)
Health	293.35	144.13	149.22 (51)
Forest	71.69	10.04	61.65 (86)

(Source: Departmental Records)

The administrative expenditure in Education and Forest Department was abnormally high at 86 *per cent*.

Conclusion

Though overall fund utilisation seemed satisfactory, the expenditure booked by sectoral officers did not reflect true picture as the entire amount released to subordinate offices is treated as expenditure where as money was lying unutilised with subordinate officers. The expenditure incurred on administration was also higher.

Recommendations

- A system should be put in place which reflects true position of actual expenditure incurred on the implementation of the schemes/programmes after funds are released to the concerned implementing agencies.

- Efforts should be made to bring down administrative charges to the bare minimum so that more emphasis is laid on developmental programmes.

CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL SERVICES

Given the fact that human development indicators such as access to education, health, provision of drinking water and sanitation facilities (rural and urban) etc. have a strong link with eradication of poverty, the GOI and the State Government have prioritised these sectors by providing large funds through Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS). A total allotment of ₹ 1253.31 crore made on Social Services during 2006-11by the Government is indicative of the efforts of the Government regarding up-liftment of the masses. Some of the important departments viz. Health, Education and Public Health Engineering department were test-checked in audit. The critical gaps noticed during audit which obstructed the achievement of the goals set for these sectors are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

5.1 HEALTH

The Chief Medical Officer (CMO) Jammu functioning under the Health and Family Welfare Department is responsible for providing healthcare services to the people of the District. To improve the health status of the people in the District, healthcare services are provided through a network of seven Government hospitals and 26 private hospitals/nursing homes. In addition to this, healthcare services in the rural areas of the District are delivered through a network of seven Community Health Centres (CHCs), 29 Primary Health Centres (PHCs) and 194 Sub-Centres (SCs). To ascertain the efficiency of delivery of services in the health sector, records of three hospitals in Jammu city and three CHCs, 14 PHCs and 32 SCs of five blocks were test-checked in audit. The important points noticed as a result thereof are discussed below under Urban health-care and Rural health-care separately.

5.1.1. Urban Healthcare

The Government Medical College Hospital, SMGS Hospital and District Hospital Gandhi Nagar, are the premier hospitals of the Division which cater to the needs of not only patients from District Jammu but patients from all parts of the Jammu province that come here in the hope of better healthcare facilities. SMGS Hospital, Jammu, however, looks only after gynaecology and obstetrics, paediatrics, ENT and dermatology cases of the District. Audit observed that the bed occupancy in the two hospitals (Govt. Medical College and Gandhi Nagar Hospital) was optimum during 2006-11 but the occupancy in SMGS Hospital was too high compared to the available bed strength and ranged between 98 and 155 *per cent*.

Test-check of records and visits to the hospitals revealed the following:

- To overcome the occupancy overload in the hospital, a 200-bed hospital for children with facilities for ICU and paediatric surgery was constructed (2008-09) at a cost of ₹ 19.28 crore in the premises of SMGS Hospital. However, the newly constructed block had not been made fully functional as of April 2011.

Audit observed that out of six wards functioning in SMGS hospital, two wards (4 and 15) comprising 48 beds had been shifted to the ground floor of the new block leaving the other two storeys of the building unoccupied and the paediatric surgery cases were still being referred to the GMC Hospital, Jammu.



Non functional new Paediatric Block in SMGS Hospital



Closed ward in Old Paediatric block in SMGS Hospital

The Medical Superintendent SMGS Hospital, Jammu stated (January 2011) that the newly constructed block would be made fully functional only after the appointment of

the required staff. Creation of infrastructure without making provisions for staff indicated lack of proper planning by the Government resulting in denial of better healthcare facilities to child patients given that the bed occupancy of the children block ranged between 98 and 155 *per cent* during 2006-11.

- To provide better/affordable clinical services to the patients on payment basis and to increase the revenue of the Government, a five storey Col. Sir R.N. Chopra Nursing Home comprising 80 rooms was established (December 1989) within the premises of GMC hospital.
- Audit noticed that the nursing home was poorly utilized with only 16 rooms on the first floor properly occupied and the balance 64 rooms either closed or allotted to the doctors as their personal rooms. Non-utilization of 64 rooms deprived the patients of the intended benefits besides causing a minimum annual revenue loss of ₹ 1.08 crore to the Government on account of room rent and surgery charges.



Non functional floor of Col. R.N. Chopra Nursing Home

The Medical Superintendent, GMC Hospital, Jammu stated (February 2011) that the nursing home could not be utilized to the optimum capacity due to shortage of manpower.

- To upgrade GMC Hospital, Jammu and make it on par with AIIMS, New Delhi, the construction work on a super-speciality block was taken up (2006-07) under *Pradhan Mantri Swastha Suraksha Yojna* (PMSSY) at an estimated cost of ₹118.14 crore (approved: ₹ 115.00 crore) for completion by October 2010. Construction started belatedly in October 2007; as a result, the date for completion of various components were extended to November 2011 and the project cost

revised upwards by an amount of ₹ 19.81 crore. Audit observed that 10 machines[4] (cost: ₹ 7.30 crore) procured during December 2009 to December 2010 in anticipation of completion of the building had remained uninstalled. Procurement of machinery much before the completion of the project entailed the risk of the machines not functioning properly when needed due to prolonged disuse and for want of warranty coverage, and also indicated lack of co-ordination amongst various agencies engaged in the execution of the project.

The Accounts Officer (AO), Government Medical College, Jammu stated (January 2011) that the machinery would be installed on completion of the super-speciality block. The reply may be viewed in the light of the fact that the completion of construction work of the building would be completed by the extended date (November 2011) was remote, as the progress of completion of various components of the project ranged from three and 100 per cent.

Machinery/Equipment Management

Non-availability of essential equipment/machinery:

Availability of proper equipment is a must in a hospital and procurement of the latest machinery in consonance with fast changing technology is essential. During scrutiny of records, Audit came across various instances where the equipment indented by the respective wings of the GMC Hospital had not been procured as detailed in table-3.

Table 3

Statement showing the depart-wise machinery/equipment indented but not procured

Department	Machinery/Equipment required	No	Period since demanded	Impact
Cardio Thoracic and Vascular Surgery (CTVS)	Heat Cooling Machine	1	More than three months	Open-heart surgery not conducted in the last three months. Waiting list of open-heart surgery already one and half year, likely to increase further
	Ventilator	2		
Orthopaedics	C-arm	2	November 2006	Timely care could not be provided to the number of patients and they had to wait for 3 to 4 weeks for surgery
	C-arm compatible Tube	3		
	Cutting, drilling and reaming system	1		
	Fracture Table	2		
Surgery	Instrument stand 5 ft. length and 3 ft. broad	1	October 2007 to February 2010	Adversely impacted general surgery
	Endoscopy unit set	1		
	Laparoscopy sets	3		
	Pulse Oximeters (Portable)	3		
	Ventilator adult	2		

[4] (1) Flat panel digital cardiac cath-lab single/mono-plane, (2) Multipara monitor, (3) Pulse oximeter, (4) Anaesthesia machine, (5) Multi-para meter beside monitors with central monitoring system, (6) Ventilator portable, (7) Ventilators high end (ICU), (8) ECG machine 12-lead, (9) Neuro-endoscopy system complete, (10) Surgical Microscope for Neurosurgery.

Department	Machinery/Equipment required	No	Period since demanded	Impact
	Ventilator Paediatric	2		
	Ultrasonic cutting and Coagulating set	1		
Ophthalmology	Phacoemulsification unit	1	February 2010	Adversely impacted eye surgery and eye-cure facilities to the patients.
	Operating Microscope	1		
	A-B scan with printer	1		
	Digital Fundus Camera	1		
	GYC-1000 green Laser	1		
	Fumigators with OT	2		
	Direct Ophthalmoscope	4		
	Indirect Ophthalmoscope	4		
	Motorised OT Table	1		
	Autorefructo – Keratometer	2		

(Source: Records of various wings of GMC Hospital)

Non-availability of essential equipment in the hospital was one of the reasons for wait listed patients requiring surgery in the normal course and of long period of waiting ranging between one month and 18 months.

The reply of the Medical Superintendent, GMC Hospital that the equipment required in various departments could not be procured due to non-availability of approved rate contract indicates a defective purchase system.

Utilization of available equipment/machinery:

Further, instances of expensive machinery and equipment not being put to prudent use were also noticed in audit:

- To detect exposure in vertical, horizontal and oblique position and to perform all skeletal and chest radiography, the HLL Life Care Ltd. (a GOI Enterprise) procured Digital Radiography System 1000 MA from M/s Cure Medical Equipment Pvt. Ltd. Chennai at a cost of US $ 2,04,500 under *Pradhan Mantri Swastha Suraksha Yojna* (PMSSY) during November 2009. The machine was installed in GMC hospital during September 2010 after a gap of 10 months. On installation, the HOD, Department of Radio Diagnosis noticed that the machine was outdated. It was also seen that it had an obsolete CCD based detector system instead of flat detector system as indicated in NIT. As such, the machine was not capable of performing digital chest radiography. Further, the machine supplied had no vertical stand required for carrying out digital chest radiography. Thus, due to the sub-standard supply and incomplete Digital Radiography machine, the machine could not be made functional even after a lapse of 14 months which deprived the patients of the intended benefits of the machine.

The Principal, GMC, Jammu stated (January 2011) that the State Government had been approached to take up the matter with the Ministry of Health, GOI to take necessary action against the firm.

- To meet oxygen requirement of 29.16 cum/hour in GMC Hospital Jammu including quantity required for filling of cylinders, the microprocessor-based oxygen plant was installed at a cost of ₹ 1.55 crore in November 2009. The project report of the plant envisaged production of medical grade oxygen free of cost as it was produced from natural air. As such, the investment of ₹ 1.55 crore on installation of the plant would be recovered within 4 years as an average amount of ₹ 0.35 crore would be saved annually which would otherwise be incurred on procurement of oxygen from open market. Records, however, showed that the hospital procured oxygen for ₹ 0.16 crore from open market during March 2010 to March 2011 despite installation of the plant. It clearly defeated the purpose of making a large investment of ₹ 1.55 crore on installation of plant.

The Medical Superintendent GMC Hospital stated (January 2011) that oxygen was procured on the requirement of Executive Engineer, Mechanical Division to keep a buffer stock to meet any eventuality. The reply was not acceptable as adequate stock of empty cylinders has to be maintained so that they could be filled by medical grade oxygen and there should be no need to procure oxygen from open market.

Manpower Management

As the healthcare facilities are provided to the patients through medical and para medical staff, there is a direct relationship between availability of manpower and performance of the hospital in providing healthcare facilities to the patients. The position of sanctioned staff, men-in-position and vacancy position in the test-checked hospitals is tabulated in table-4:

Table 4

(In number)

Name of Hospital	Sanctioned strength	Actually working	Vacancy (*per cent*)
GMC Hospital	1428	781	647 (45)
SMGS Hospital	798	389	409 (51)
Govt. Hospital Gandhi Nagar	218	128	90 (41)

(Source: Departmental Records)

The significant shortage of manpower ranging between 41 and 51 *per cent* in such a vital sector particularly of doctors (41 *per cent*[5]) and para-medical staff (53 *per cent*[6]) is representative of the casual approach of the Department in providing adequate health services to the population of the District. On this being pointed out, the Superintendent Hospitals stated that the matter had been taken up with the higher authorities for posting of adequate staff.

[5] 76 against the requirement of 128 doctors

[6] 648 against the requirement of 1380 para-medical staff

From the details furnished by seven private hospitals/nursing homes, it was noted that the manpower in six of them was inadequate to cope with the workload. The shortages in these facilities had been filled by engaging 29 visiting doctors of the Government Hospitals of the District which made the matter worse for both an overstrained Government Hospital and these facilities.

Bio-Medical Waste (BMW) disposal

Bio-Medical Waste is required to be treated and disposed off in accordance with schedule-I and in compliance with the standards prescribed in schedule-V of the Bio-Medical Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1998, Ministry of Environment and Forest. Inefficient handling of waste can lead to epidemics and a toxic atmosphere on account of infectious needles, blades, glass places, etc.

The quantity of BMW generated in the test-checked hospitals varies from 1.5 to 2.5 Kg/bed/day in the inpatient departments and averages 0.4 kg/patient/day in outpatient departments. Based on this the quantum of bio-medical waste generated in GMC Hospital, SMGS Hospital and Government Hospital, Gandhi Nagar are as tabulated in table-5.

Table 5

Nomenclature	Waste generation per patient per day (In kg)	Average number of patients	Total waste generated per day (In kg)	Total waste generated per year (In tons)
GMC Hospital				
(IPD)	2.500	718	1795	655
(OPD)	0.400	997	398.80	146
SMGS Hospital				
(IPD)	2.00	646	1292.00	472
(OPD)	0.40	871	348.00	127
Government Hospital Gandhi Nagar				
(IPD)	1.50	27	40.50	15.00
(OPD)	0.40	633	253.20	92.00

(Source: Departmental Records)

Besides, incinerators were not equipped with Air Pollution Control Device which rendered it ineffective. Records and physical examination showed that there had been inefficient waste management as indicated from the findings detailed below:

- There are no established rules, regulations or BMW management policy.
- Plastic wastes such as tubing, catheters, intravenous sets, etc., were not shredded by the medical and para-medical staff as envisaged in the BMW (Management and Handling) Rules 1998.
- There was no system of colour-coding for segregating different kinds of BMW or proper equipment for its handling.
- Prescribed temperature and pressure were not ensured while incinerating BMW.



Outdated incinerator at GMC Jammu



Bio-Medical Waste of GMC dumped in residential area

In Government Hospital Gandhi Nagar, all BMW were dumped in pits in the absence of any equipment for proper disposal. The Medical Superintendent SMGS Hospital stated (January 2011) that in future instructions would be issued to the Bio-Medical Waste Management Committee for strict adherence to the rules framed under BMW Rules. The Medical Superintendent GMC Hospital stated (February 2011) that the treatment of bio-medical waste (BMW) was being done as per norms. Audit evidence (photographs) collected during visit to wards, disposal site, etc., however indicated that the contention of the Medical Superintendent GMC Hospital was not true.



Bio-Medical Waste dumped in open in Government Hospital Gandhi Nagar Hospital

In contrast, all the seven test-checked private hospitals of the District save for Acharya Shri Chander College of Medical Sciences and Hospital, Sidhra, which had adequate infrastructure for disposal of solid, plastic and liquid bio-chemical waste of its own; collected waste in colour-coded bins and sent it to bio-medical waste plant at Pathankot, Punjab. This reflected of the casual approach of Government hospitals in the District towards this important aspect of health care management.

Conclusion

Acute shortage of doctors and paramedical staff, lack of essential equipment and machinery and poor utilization of available infrastructure had adversely impacted the delivery of health care services to the population of the District forcing them to go to private hospitals in and outside the State. Absence of scientific disposal of biological waste in the Government hospitals of the District is an issue of great concern.

Recommendations

- Steps may be taken to fill up the vacancies of doctors and other paramedical staff in the Government hospitals in the District.
- Effective steps need to be taken to procure essential equipment in right earnest and efficiently utilize them.
- Steps may be taken to establish a scientific bio-medical waste management system in accordance with BMW (Management & Handling) Rules, 1998 in the Government hospitals of the District.

5.1.2. National Rural Health Mission (NRHM)

In order to provide accessible, affordable, accountable, effective and reliable healthcare facilities in rural areas and reduce Infant/Maternal Mortality Rate, the GOI launched National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in April 2005. For the purpose, rural areas of the District were divided into seven[7] blocks. Records of five Block Medical Officers (BMOs), three CHCs out of seven, 14 PHCs and 32 SCs out of 29 PHCs and 194 SCs respectively were examined in audit. Following points were noticed:

Planning and Project Formulation

The NRHM envisages carrying out of preparatory studies viz. mapping of services, household surveys and facility surveys at village, block and District levels. The Mission (hereinafter) further envisages preparation of perspective plan as well as Annual District Action Plans by aggregating the Block Health Action Plans prepared in all blocks on the basis of household and facility surveys.

Records showed that the District level Perspective Plan (PP) had not been implemented notwithstanding the fact that the same had been prepared (December 2007). As a result, the achievement of goals set in the plan had not been ensured. Further, records showed that the District Annual Plans had never been prepared except for the year 2010-11; instead, the Mission had been implemented through the State annual plans prepared at the State level. Non-formulation of District level annual plans defeated the basic objective of the Mission to decentralize planning and implementation arrangement to ensure that need-based and community-owned District health action plans become the basis for interventions in the sector.

The CMO stated (June 2011) that Perspective Plan was implemented as per the directions of the GOI and annual plans were prepared at the District level after consolidating Block Health action plans. The reply was not acceptable as the Perspective Plan was not implemented as verified during audit and AAPs except for 2010-11 could not be produced before Audit when called for.

Financial Management

The Annual Plans had never been prepared at the District level during 2006-10, thus the State Health Society (SHS) released funds without assessing the actual requirement leading to large unspent balances ranging between 21 and 56 *per cent* during 2006-11. The unspent balance as on March, 2011 had come down considerably to 21 *per cent* due to preparation of District annual action plan for the year 2010-11. It clearly indicated that the actual requirement of funds at the District level could not be assessed due to non-formulation of need-based and community-owned District Health Action Plans and due to release of funds on the basis of State Annual Plans prepared at the state level.

[7] Bishnah, Sohanjana, R.S. Pura, Kot Bhalwal, Akhnoor, Pallanwalla and Dansal

The details of funds released under NRHM by the GOI and expenditure incurred during 2006-11 is given in table-6.

Table 6

(₹in crore)

Year	Opening balance	Funds released	Total availability	Expenditure	Closing balance (Percentage)
2006-07	0.29	1.73	2.02	0.89	1.13 (56)
2007-08	1.09[8]	2.49	3.58	1.84	1.74 (49)
2008-09	1.74	5.54	7.28	4.75	2.53 (35)
2009-10	2.53	9.01	11.54	6.04	5.50 (48)
2010-11	5.82[9]	7.50	13.32	10.56	2.76 (21)
Total				24.08	

(Source: Cashbook of District Health Society)

The Chief Medical Officer attributed (June 2011) accumulation of huge unspent balances to stoppage of Janani Suraksha Yojna (JSY) during 2008-10, non-utilisation of untied funds released for sub–centres operating in rented buildings and to delay in appointment of staff under the Mission.

The following significant points were also noticed.

- Four[10] Block Medical Officers had spent Annual Maintenance Grant (AMG), untied funds and corpus funds of ₹ 16.45 lakh on procurement of office furniture, invertors, batteries, air conditioners, transformers, etc. during 2007-11 in violation of the guidelines. The BMOs (Bhalwal, Dansal and Sohanjana) stated (February/July 2011) that these funds were utilised on procurement of equipment and furniture due to non- providing of separate funds by the Government. The reply was not acceptable as the programme guidelines specifically indicated the components on which these funds were to be utilised and it indicated poor control and monitoring mechanism on utilization of funds.
- AMG of ₹ 4.50 lakh was released during 2007-09 to six PHCs, operating in rented accommodation, in violation of the Mission guidelines. The BMO Bhalwal stated (March 2011) that the AMG released in such cases was due to non- issuance of any instructions from the higher authorities. The BMO Dansal stated (April 2011) that AMG to PHC Chibba was released directly by the State Health Society. The BMOs, however, stated that the release of AMG in such cases had already been stopped.

Manpower management

Huge shortages afflicted the health centres of the District. The manpower position (sanctioned *vis-a-vis* personnel-in-position) in the District is given in table-7.

8 Opening Balance of ₹ 1.09 crore during 2007-08 was taken after finalization of accounts by the Chartered Accountant.

9 The difference of ₹ 0.32 crore in closing balance of 2009-2010 and opening balance of 2010-2011 was due to non-finalization of accounts by the Chartered Accountant

10 R.S Pura, Kot Bhalwal, Sohanjana and Dansal

Table 7

Particulars	Sanctioned posts	Men-in-position	Shortage (per cent)
Doctors	451	372	79 (18)
Para-medical staff	818	565	253 (30)

(Source: Departmental Records)

The Deputy Director Health Services, Jammu stated (June 2011) that all the vacant posts had been referred to the Government for filling up.

Infrastructure

Mission guidelines provide for a CHC for every 1,00,000 population, one PHC for a population of over 30,000 and one sub-centre for a population of over 5,000.

Scrutiny of records showed that the number of CHCs, PHCs and SCs in the District were not in accordance with the prescribed norms, as shown in table-8, even after a lapse of more than five years of the Mission being in operation.

Table 8

Centres	As per Norms	Position as on 01 April 2006	Position as on 31 March 2011	Shortage
CHC	13	5	7	6
PHC	44	24	29	15
SC	260	198	194	66

(Source: Departmental Records)

Three out of five test-checked blocks didn't have any Community Health Centre (CHC). Consequently, the people of the area had to cover large distances to avail of heath care services provided through a CHC.

A physical inspection of three CHCs, 14 PHCs and 32 SCs of five blocks of the District revealed critical gaps in infrastructure, as given in table-9, despite availability of adequate funds under NRHM.

Table 9

Particulars	Sub-Centres	PHCs	CHCs
Number of Health centres test checked	32	14	3
Centres housed in private buildings	14	3	Nil
Non-availability of separate utilities for Men & Women	26	9	Nil
Non-availability of operation theatre	NA	12	Nil
Non-availability of labour rooms	32	7	Nil
Non-availability of waiting rooms	32	9	Nil
Non- availability of provision of water supply	19	2	Nil
Non- availability of provision for electricity	06	Nil	Nil
Non-availability of provision for standby power	32	11	Nil
Non-availability of sewerage facilities	NA	1	Nil
Non-availability of Bio-medical waste disposal facility	NA	14	3
Non-availability of Telephone facility	32	7	Nil

Non-availability of accommodation for staff	NA	9	Nil
Non availability of Laboratory	NA	7	Nil
Non availability of Emergency/Casualty room	NA	11	Nil

(Source: On the spot physical inspection by Audit; NA: Not applicable)



Sub-Centre operated in shop



Dilapidated condition of SC Badyal Qazian



BMW Disposal in open at PHC Kot Bhalwal



BMW Disposal in open at CHC RS Pura



Well maintained sub centre Begha



Well maintained ward in CHC RS Pura



Well maintained ward in CHC RS Pura

Basic health care services in most of the inspected health centres were found severely lacking as shown in table-10.

Table 10

Particulars	Number of centres where services were not available		
	SCs	PHCs	CHCs
Total number of health centres	**32**	**14**	**3**
Deliveries	32	7	-
24×7 Deliveries	NR	9	-
Inpatient services	NR	8	-
New born care	32	10	-
X-rays facilities	NR	13	-
Facility for internal examination of Gynaecological condition	NR	12	-
Family Planning	NR	12	-
Blood Storage facility	NR	NR	3
ECG facility	NR	NR	-
Ultra sound facility	NR	NR	-

(Source: On the spot physical inspection by Audit) (NR- Not required)

Evidently, the test checked PHCs and SCs of five sampled blocks lacked basic health care and infrastructural facilities despite the fact that a significant sum of ₹ 24.08 crore had been spent on strengthening the health care facilities in the District during 2006-11. Of equal concern was the fact that no gynaecologist/lady doctor was yet posted in any of the test-checked PHCs and that none of sub-centres was visited by the doctors (except in block RS Pura) even once a month.

The Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Jammu did not accept the audit contention and

was of the opinion that all the facilities were available at the health centres up to the sub-centre level. The reply was not acceptable in view of the fact that lack of facilities as pointed out by Audit is based on physical verification of the health care centres. Collateral support to audit contention is lent by the fact that a significant number of people of the areas (five blocks) had opted for other government hospitals/private nursing homes for deliveries as tabulated in table-11.

Table 11

Year	Total institutional deliveries	Deliveries conducted at Health centres (Percentage)	Deliveries conducted at			
			Private Nursing Homes	SMGS Hospital, Jammu	District Hospital, Jammu	Army Hospital, Jammu
2006-07	2963	139 (5)	60	1640	35	-
2007-08	4770	392 (11)	402	1782	-	-
2008-09	10211	735 (7)	1892	4550	4	62
2009-10	9903	1248 (13)	1589	5052	118	62
2010-11	7822	1919 (25)	464	3745	165	217

(Source: Departmental Records)

The performance of the test-checked health centres was quite dismal as-only five to 25 *per cent* of the total deliveries in the blocks were conducted in the District health centres during 2006-11. The considerable increase of deliveries in health centres during 2010-11 was due to increase in deliveries in CHC R. S. Pura (62 *per cent*) attributable to recently upgraded infrastructure and health care facilities there.

Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) (10 *per cent* in each test checked block) interviewed by the audit party stated that the people of the rural area opted for SMGS/District hospital for deliveries due to non-availability of ultra-sound facilities, blood facilities, services of gynaecologists, transport facilities, facility of various tests such as, Human Immunodeficiency Virus(HIV), etc. in the blocks.

5.1.3. Janani Suraksha Yojna (JSY)

The *Janani Suraksha Yojna (JSY)* was introduced (April 2005) under the Mission to reduce maternal and neo-natal mortality by encouraging pregnant women to have an institutional delivery rather than domiciliary delivery. Under this programme all the pregnant women irrespective of age and number of existing children, are entitled to cash compensation. The position of JSY registered and delivery cases registered in five test-checked blocks of the District during 2006-11 is tabulated in table-12.

Table 12

Year	Total JSY registered	Total deliveries registered
2006-07	6004	2963
2007-08	10936	4770
2008-09	15820	10211
2009-10	14523	9903
2010-11	10220	7822
Total	57503	35669 (62 *per cent*)

(2006-07: R.S Pura and Dansal only; 2007-08: RS Pura, Dansal & Bhalwal only)
(Source: Physical progress report of JSY)

From the above, it is evident that out of 57503 cases of pregnancy registered in the test-checked blocks, only 35669 deliveries had been registered by the department. The balance 21834 registered pregnant cases had neither been traced nor had the department any information about them. The chances of foetus killings after illegal determination of sex could not be ruled out in such cases. On this being pointed out, the CMO stated that the variation was due to registration of cases more than once as no fool proof system was available with the department to curb it.

Accredited Social Health Activists

The main role of the Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) is to track pregnant women till delivery. The Mission guidelines provide for one ASHA in every village with population of 1000 souls. Out of the requirement of 974 ASHAs as per Mission guidelines, the department had engaged only 881. The ASHAs were paid honorarium on case-basis out of the funds released under '*Janani Suraksha Yojna'*.

Domiciliary Delivery

A benchmark of 90 *per cent* institutional deliveries by 2010 and 100 *per cent* institutional deliveries by 2012 was set in the District Health Action Plan (DHAP) 2005-12.

The position of institutional and domiciliary deliveries in the five test-checked blocks during 2006-11 is tabulated in table-13.

Table 13

Year	Total JSY registered	Details of deliveries available with the blocks (Percentage)	Institutional deliveries (Percentage)	Domiciliary deliveries (Percentage)
2006-07	6004	2963[11] (49)	1874 (63)	1089 (35)
2007-08	10936	4770 (44)	3538 (74)	1232 (25)
2008-09	15820	10211 (64)	7241 (71)	2970 (29)
2009-10	14523	9903 (68)	8071 (82)	1832 (18)
2010-11	10220	7822 (77)	6510 (83)	1312 (17)

(Source: Physical progress report of JSY)

As can be seen from table-13, the cases of institutional deliveries (ID) have shown an encouragingly increasing trend from 63 *per cent* in 2006-07 to 83 *per cent* in 2010-11. The benchmark of 90 *per cent* IDs had not, however, been achieved. To achieve the target of 100 *per cent* IDs by 2012 as envisaged in the District Health Action Plan, the Government needs to review the performance measurement and incentive system employed for making intervention through ASHAs more effective.

The CMO in his reply refuted the figures shown by Audit stating that the figures did not corroborate with the departmental figures. The reply needs to be seen in the light

[11] The figures for 2006-07 pertain to Block R.S Pura and Dansal and figures for 2007-08 pertain to RS Pura, Dansal and Kot Bhalwal Blocks

of the fact the figures adopted by Audit are based on the information furnished by the test-checked Block Medical Officers.

Incentive to Mother Beneficiaries

The Mission guidelines envisage incentive of ₹ 1400 to the rural mother for opting for institutional delivery at Government health centres. Records showed the incentive had not been paid to all the mother beneficiaries who had opted for institutional deliveries as shown in table-14.

Table 14

Year	Total institutional deliveries in the District	Cases of Incentive paid (Percentage)
2007-08	16457	860 (05)
2008-09	10541	449 (04)
2009-10	12041	6519 (54)
2010-11	10782	9515 (88)

(Source: Physical progress report of JSY)

The position in respect of four out of the five test-checked blocks is shown in table-15.

Table 15

Block	Period	Total institutional deliveries	Incentive paid to mother beneficiaries
Dansal	2006-11	6132	1408
Kot Bhalwal	2007-11	4036	2415
Pallanwalla	2008-11	4572	2103
Sohanjana	2008-11	3744	1981

(Source: Physical progress report of JSY)

JSY had thus not been implemented in letter and spirit as 46 to 96 *per cent* of the mother beneficiaries could not be provided incentives as envisaged in the guidelines during 2007-10. Even though the matters had improved considerably in this regard, funds available for the purpose to the extent of ₹ 0.56 crore had not been utilized as shown in table-16.

Table 16

(₹ in lakh)

Year	Opening balance	Funds released	Total available	Expenditure	Closing balance
2007-08	NA	NA	NA	27.71	NA
2008-09	NA	NA	NA	24.65	36.38
2009-10	36.38	255.60	291.98	118.64	173.34
2010-11	163.21	50.43	213.64	158.03	55.61

(The closing balance of 2009-10 does not match with the OB for 2010-11 due to non-finalisation of the accounts by the CA. Source: Receipt and payment accounts for the respective years)

The position of allotment for the years up to 2008-09 was not available with the department as component-wise allotments were not being made by the Government.

The CMO while accepting the observation stated (June 2011) that the coverage of fewer beneficiaries was due to the funding of the scheme in the later part of 2006-07 and stopping of incentives by the GOI during 2007-08. The reply was not based on

facts as unspent funds at the close of 2008-09 and 2009-10 were of the order of ₹ 0.36 crore and ₹ 1.73 crore which could have been utilised for payment to mother beneficiaries.

5.1.4. Immunization

The benchmark for vaccination of children in five years was set in the District Health Action Plan (DHAP) 2005-12 as tabulated in table-17.

Table 17

Indicator	Goals set (in per cent)			
	2007-08	*2008-09*	*2009-10*	*2010-11*
Increase complete immunisation of children	50	60	75	90

(Source: Chief Medical Officer/DLHS data)

Records showed that complete immunisation of children was far below the goals set by the department in the DHAP as indicated in table-18.

Table 18

Year	Vaccinations (Percentage)				
	BCG (Birth)	*Hepatitis-B 3rd dose (2½ month)*	*DPT 3rd dose (3½ month)*	*OPV 3rd dose (3½ month)*	*Measles (9 month)*
2007-08	38638	Nil	36616 (95)	36853 (95)	28868 (75)
2008-09	37840	21321 (56)	29932 (79)	29913 (79)	28547 (75)
2009-10	37297	23797 (64)	30261 (81)	30517 (82)	28973 (78)
2010-11	35981	17522 (49)	25999 (72)	25999 (72)	24583 (68)
Total	149756	62640 (42)	122808 (82)	123282 (82)	110971 (74)

(Source: Chief Medical Officer/DLHS data)

Though the targets fixed in the DHAP for the years 2007-10 had been achieved, except for Hepatitis-B vaccination during 2007-08, yet the number of children receiving other vaccinations had shown a declining trend with the age of the children. However, the goal of achieving 90 *per cent* vaccination during 2010-11 had failed as only 49 to 72 *per cent* of the children had been immunised during the year. The shortfall in immunisation has to viewed in the backdrop of the fact that sufficient numbers of ASHAs had been engaged by the department in the District to track children for vaccination up to the full immunisation stage, and, as such, the role of AHSAs needed to be reviewed and necessary corrective actions taken to enhance the efficacy of interventions through ASHAs.

Further, the performance in regard to vaccination of Hepatitis-B (at Birth), Hepatitis B1 (at six weeks) and DPT-1 (at 6 weeks) and DPT-2 (at 2½ months) could not be ascertained in the absence of maintenance of records at the District level.

The Block Medical Officers (BMOs) Bhalwal, Sohanjana and Pallanwala attributed (March/July/August 2011) non-vaccination of all the children to inadequate supply of vaccines. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that 20 out of 42 ASHAs of four test-checked blocks interviewed by the audit attributed low vaccination to inadequate availability of vaccines at sub-centres. 12 ASHAs either stated that some

people vaccinated their children from private outlets or did not registered their comments.

5.1.5 Training

The Mission guidelines envisage imparting of regular training to the medical staff to update their skills. Records showed that the District authorities had not evolved a proper system to upgrade the skills of the health personnel. As a result, training had not been imparted to all the health personnel posted in the District under NRHM as tabulated in table-19.

Table 19

Name of training	Manpower	2008-09		2009-10		2010-11	
		Target	*Ach*	*Target*	*Ach*	*Target*	*Ach*
SBA for SN	69	2	Nil	2	2	NA	2
SBA for LHV/ANM	248	2	Nil	2	2	NA	2
RTI/STI for ANM/LHV/SN	ANMs- 248 SNs - 69	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
IMNCI for LHV/ANM/AWW	248	Nil	Nil	48	Nil	Nil	Nil
Alternative Methodology in IUD for MOs/SN/LHV	MOs – 35 SNs – 69	Nil	Nil	10	10	Nil	Nil
Alternative Methodology in IUD for ANMs	248	3	3	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil

SBA – Skilled birth attendance; RTI/STI – Reproductive Tract infection; STI – Sexually Transmitted Infection; IMNCI – Integrated Management of Neonatal and Childhood Illness; IUD – Intrauterine Contraceptive Device
SN – Staff Nurse; ANM - Auxiliary Nurse Midwives; LHV – Lady Health Visitor; AWW – Anganwadi Workers; MO – Medical Officer

From the above, it is evident that no training was imparted to the medical officers and para-medical staff for up-gradation of their skills despite adequate provision having been made in the perspective plan prepared by the District Health Society.

The improvement in health indicators due to interventions of the NRHM could not be ascertained due to lack of data/survey since 2004.

Conclusion

Non-formulation of annual action plans during 2006-10 defeated the basic objective of the NRHM to decentralise planning and implementation arrangements. Utilisation of funds was not efficient even though unspent balances had come down considerably in 2010-11 due to preparation of Annual Action Plan for the year 2010-11. Lack of infrastructure facilities had deprived the rural population of the envisaged healthcare benefits with the result a majority of the rural population had to move to urban areas for better treatment. Despite adequate strength of ASHAs the position of institutional deliveries and immunization was not up to the mark.

Recommendations

- A long term Perspective Plan may be formulated so that facilities under NRHM can be provided in a scientific way.

- Infrastructure facilities like labour rooms, operation theatre, laboratories etc., need to be provided/upgraded in CHCs, PHCs and SCs in the rural areas so as to arrest the outflow of patients to urban areas.

- Immunisation and maternal health care facilities need to be strengthened and the performance of ASHAs reviewed to make them effective instruments of change.

5.2 Education

Education is one of the most important indicators of social progress of a nation. Both the State and GOI have been spending enormous funds on increasing enrolment, retention and quality of education at the elementary level. The overall scenario of education in the District is discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Schools scenario

Data provided by the Chief Education Officer (CEO), Jammu revealed that the number of primary and upper primary schools (up to standard VIII) had increased from 1056 during 2006-07 to 1512 during 2010-11. With the increase in the number of schools, the strength of teachers had also increased from 4562 during 2006-07 to 5666 during 2010-11 as given in table-20.

Table 20

Particulars	*2006-07*	*2010-11*
Number of Schools	1056	1512
Number of Teachers	4562	5666
Number of Children enrolled	80433	66943

(Source: SSA/Departmental Records)

However, the enrolment of children in the age group of 6 to 14 years in these schools had decreased from 80433 in 2006-07 to 66943 in 2010-11 despite implementation of Mid-day Meal Scheme, which envisaged enhancement of enrolment, retention and attendance of children.

In eight[12] (out of 14) test-checked Zonal Education Officers (ZEOs), the percentage of dropout students ranged between 4 and 36 during 2006-2010 as given in table-37 at page 40.

[12] *Gandhi Nagar, Jammu, Akhnoor, Bhalwal, R.S Pura, Marh, Dansal and Jourian*

Availability of trained teachers

Teachers posted in schools should be trained so that they can impart quality education to the students. Data provided by the CEO revealed that the percentage of teachers trained to the total number of teachers posted in primary and upper primary schools had varied between 65 and 91 as indicated in table-21.

Table 21

Year	*Primary Schools*			*Upper Primary Schools*		
	Total No. of teachers	*No. of trained teachers*	*Percentage*	*Total No. of teachers*	*No. of trained teachers*	*Percentage*
2006-07	2969	1954	*66*	1593	1247	*78*
2007-08	1727	1127	*65*	3215	2288	*71*
2008-09	2530	1641	*65*	3318	3030	*91*
2009-10	2600	1721	*66*	3525	3195	*91*
2010-11	2924	2223	*76*	2742	2211	*81*

(Source: SSA/Departmental Records)

The CEO Jammu stated (July 2011) that the untrained teachers are being deputed for B.Ed. training in a phased manner. It was further stated that limited number of teachers are deputed every year as per the seniority and availability of seats in Government B.Ed. College.

Infrastructure

Other than qualified and trained teachers proper infrastructure is a critical input for quality education. Audit, however, observed that this aspect had not been given due attention by the department as cases of inadequate infrastructure were noticed during the course of audit. The position obtained in this regard as of 31March 2011 is shown in table-22.

Table 22

Nomenclature	*March 2007*	*March 2011*
Number of Schools without Accommodation	140	179
Number of Schools having one room	55	55
Number of Schools having two rooms	342	415
Number of Schools having more than two rooms	250	402

(Source: SSA/Departmental Records)



Children studying in open GMS Daskal



Dilapidated Conditions of class rooms in GPS Upper Thather



GPS Lower Dhounthly Housed in a Kutcha Hut



Govt. Middle School Prwah Block Marh



Government Middle School upper Jagati



ZEO Akhnoor operated in newly constructed building for Primary School Akhnoor

Added to the problem of inadequate infrastructure was the position of inadequate basic amenities at a majority of elementary schools in the District as detailed in table-23.

Table 23

No. of Schools	Amenities available in schools (in number)									
	Toilets	Girls toilets	Drinking water	Access Ramp	Boundary Wall	Play-ground	Kitchen shed	Electricity	Furniture for students	Computer
1512	481	507	1340	359	814	879	617	469	1092	121

(Source: SSA/Departmental Records)

As can be seen, a significant number of schools did not have toilets, access ramps, electricity, drinking water facility, boundary walls, kitchens and playgrounds.



Unhygienic kitchen shed in GMS Gujjar Nagar



Unhygienic kitchen shed in GPS Lower Dhounthly

Audit further noticed that although 456 new schools had been opened in the District during 2006-11 covering *inter alia* 28 villages which had no school until 2005-06, the District still had 101 villages (out of total 771 inhabited villages[13]) that had no school or EGS at all. This indicated that the department had not prioritized its resources towards optimum utilization.

Cases of housing of more than one school in the same premises also came to notice of audit. In six cases, two to four schools had been functioning in the same building as tabulated in table-24.

Table 24

Name of the school where housed	Name of the schools housed
Boys Primary school Julaka Mohalla	1. Middle School Boys Primary School Julaka Mohalla 2. Middle School Dhountally 3. Primary School Mastgrah 4. Primary School Pacca Danga
Middle School Old Janipur	1. Middle School Old Janipur 2. Primary School Pandoks Colony 3. Primary School Old Janipur
Girls Middle School New Plot-II	1. Middle School New Plot-II 2. Primary School Shivalikpuram
High School Janipur	1. High School Janipur 2. Primary School Lakar Mandi
Middle School Pul Tawi	1. Middle School Pul Tawi 2. Primary School Dogri Mohalla 3. Primary School Nehar
Middle School Kachi Chawni	1. Middle School Kachi Chawni 2. Primary School Dhountly

(Source: SSA/Departmental Records)

Housing of a number of schools in the same building was indicative of non-seriousness of the District administration/Department in accommodating all schools in separate buildings as it was bound to impact imparting of education to children by interference of the activities of one school with the other. Besides, by not providing the school in the area for which it has been sanctioned defeats the very purpose of running the school. The ZEO, Jammu stated that the schools had been accommodated in the same building due to non-availability of separate accommodation for each school. The reply should be viewed in the light of the fact that in one of the schools visited (Boys Primary School, Julaka Mohalla), only seven rooms were catering to the needs of 23 classes of four schools to the detriment of providing quality education to the children studying in these schools.

Student teacher ratio

As per the norms (1981) prescribed by the Government, one teacher for average enrolment ranging between 10 and 40, two teachers for 41 and 60 and three teachers for 61 and 90 students are to be posted in the schools. Besides, under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan (SSA) guidelines, at least two teachers are to be posted in one

[13] As per census 2011 the District has 771 inhabited villages.

primary school and one teacher for every class in the Middle schools are required to be posted. Though the overall scenario regarding student teacher ratio was optimum and stood at 1:12, yet 138 schools of eight test-checked zones out of 14 zones had one and 19 teachers in excess of the norms fixed. The total excess staff on this count worked out to 294 teachers. It was also seen that the strength of teachers was high in schools situated within the city limits. Also, 18 out of 138 schools were running with less than five students per teacher. The department had neither taken any action whatsoever to reduce the strength of teachers in such schools or merge such schools with those falling in the vicinity of the school. The CEO, Jammu stated (August 2011) that rationalisation of staff as per enrolment would be ensured in future.

Details collected from 43 private schools showed that the teacher–student ratio in two schools Shakti Shiksha Kendra Higher Secondary School, Marh and Holy Cross Convent High School, R.S Pura was 1:46 and 1:53 respectively which was less than the prescribed norm of 1:40. The CEO, Jammu who was required to see that the norms were not flouted had not taken any action in this regard till (August 2011) it was pointed out by audit.

Flagship Programmes

With a view to universalising elementary education, enhancing enrolment, retention, attendance and also improving nutritional levels among children two flagship programmes, viz. *Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan (SSA)* and Mid-day Meal Scheme (MDM), were introduced by the GOI. The status of implementation of the programmes in the District is discussed below.

5.2.1 Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan (SSA)

Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan (SSA) was launched (2000-01) by the GOI to universalize elementary education and ensure that all children complete five years of primary schooling by 2007 and eight years of elementary schooling by 2010. The main components of the programme include opening of new primary schools, construction of additional classrooms and other amenities, provision of free textbooks to all the children, etc. In the District, the programme, however, commenced from 2002-03. Review of the scheme in the District brought the following points to the fore.

Formulation of Perspective Planning

The SSA guidelines envisage preparation of Perspective Plan (PP) based on the data collected through household survey, baseline studies and micro planning exercise, etc. To ascertain the fact and to have a look at the important factors involved in formulation of the PP, audit called for a copy of the PP. The Chief Education Officer, Jammu did not furnish the same as it was stated to be not available though reportedly formulated. The basis of preparation of Annual Works Plan and Budget for each year in the absence of copy of PP in the District office could not be established.

Financial Management

The position of funds received and expenditure incurred during the period 2006-11 is shown in table-25.

Table 25

(₹ In crore)

Year	Opening Balance	Funds received	Total availability of funds	Expenditure	Closing Balance
2006-07	2.47	15.90	18.37	15.34	3.03
2007-08	3.03	14.47	17.50	16.03	1.47
2008-09	1.47	10.94	12.41	11.48	0.93
2009-10	0.93	24.73	25.66	25.12	0.54
2010-11	0.54	29.53	30.07	29.42	0.65
Total	8.44	95.57	104.01	97.39	6.62

(Source: Information furnished by CEO)

Evidently, the department had not spent the funds in full released to it for implementation of the programme. In addition thereto, the position of unspent balance of funds under the programme lying with 14 Zonal Education Officers (ZEOs) of the District during 2006-11 is indicated in table-26.

Table 26

(₹In crore)

Year	*2006-07*	*2007-08*	*2008-09*	*2009-10*	*2010-11*
Unspent balance	7.75	11.19	9.18	13.36	16.25

(Source: Information furnished by CEO)

As can be seen, the unspent balances had shown an increase from ₹ 7.75 crore at the close of March 2007 to ₹ 16.25 crore ending March 2011.This indicates that the requirement of funds by the department for implementation of the programme had not been assessed properly. The Chief Education Officer, Jammu stated (August 2010) that the unspent balances lying with the ZEOs related to the arrears on account of the 6th Pay Commission which had not been paid. The reply of the CEO was not acceptable as the State Government had drawn a roadmap for payment of arrears which worked out to ₹ 10.49 crore and had to be paid in instalments up to 2015. Retention of huge unspent balances in view thereof was, *prima-facie,* irregular.

Incorrect reporting of expenditure

Records showed that the Utilization Certificates (UCs) furnished to the GOI did not depict the true picture of the expenditure incurred during 2006-11 as funds released to the ZEOs were booked as expenditure by the CEO Jammu. Due to the wrong reporting of the expenditure figures to the GOI, the amount of unspent balances lying with the ZEOs swelled from ₹ 7.75 crore in 2006-07 to ₹ 16.25 crore at the close of the financial year 2010-11. By virtue of this the GOI does not stop the release of funds or impose cuts on future releases. The CEO stated (August 2010) that the actual expenditure would be reflected in the UCs in future.

Implementation and performance

For providing infrastructure facilities to the children, the GOI provided ₹ 26.77 crore for construction of new school buildings for primary schools, upper primary schools, additional class rooms, etc. under the SSA during 2006-11. The position of buildings taken up for construction and their status is shown in table-27.

Table 27

Year	Targets					Achievements				
	Primary schools	*Upper Primary schools*	*Additional Class Rooms (ACRs)*	*Block Resource Centres (BRCs)*	*Cluster Resource Centres (CRCs)*	*Primary schools*	*Upper Primary schools*	*ACRs*	*BRCs*	*CRCs*
2006-07	35	31	139	-	-	35	31	139	-	-
2007-08	127	-	-	-	-	123	-	-	-	-
2008-09	118	3	-	-	-	107	3	-	-	-
2009-10	19	-	171	-	-	8		119	-	-
2010-11	35	-	117	-	5	-	-	-	-	-
Total	334	34	427	-	5	273	34	258	-	-

(Source: SSA/Departmental Records)

The SSA guidelines envisage completion of school buildings in two to six months. Records showed that out of 643 works taken up during 2006-10; only 565 works had been completed as of March 2011. 78 works (12 *per cent*) were still incomplete despite a lapse of periods ranging between 12 and 36 months. Out of 157 works (primary schools 35, ACRs 117 and CRCs 5) sanctioned during 2010-11, only 25 works (Primary school: 1, ACRs 24) had been taken up for execution and the remaining 132 works had not been taken up as of March 2011 for want of plans. Non-completion of the works deprived the students of adequate infrastructural facilities despite sufficient funds having been provided during the period. The Chief Education Officer Jammu attributed (August 2010) delay in completion of school buildings to court cases, disputes, non-availability of land and also to non-posting of Assistant Engineer in the District.

Maintenance of Schools

As per SSA guidelines, schools up to three classrooms and more than three class rooms were to be provided school maintenance grant upto a maximum of ₹ 4000/- and ₹ 7500/- per school per year respectively. The norms were revised (2008-09) to ₹ 5000/- and ₹ 10,000/- per school per year respectively. Records showed that eight test-checked ZEOs had not followed the norms and released school maintenance grant in excess of the prescribed limit which had led to excess release of school maintenance grant of ₹ 0.34 crore during 2006-10. The ZEOs stated (August 2010) that the grants were released on the instructions of the CEO. They, however, stated that these would be avoided in future.

The position of funds spent on school maintenance and number of classrooms requiring repairs in 14 Zones of the District during 2006-11 is tabulated in table-28.

Table 28

Year	*Allotment for maintenance (₹in lakh)*	*Utilization of school maintenance grant (₹in lakh)*	*No. of class rooms requiring minor repairs*	*No. of classrooms requiring major repairs*
2006-07	61.10	57.92	338	260
2007-08	71.20	40.67	358	251
2008-09	139.65	131.85	346	272
2009-10	90.70	83.21	364	271
2010-11	95.40	88.30	319	331
Total	458.05	401.95		

(Source: Information furnished by ZEOs)

It could be seen that despite spending ₹ 4.02 crore on maintenance of assets during 2006-11, the classrooms requiring major and minor repairs showed an increasing trend from 598 to 650 during five years time. This indicated that either the funds had not been released as per the requirement or had not been utilised efficiently. The CEO stated (June 2011) that the number of classrooms requiring repairs could not be brought down due to utilisation of maintenance grants on repairs of furniture and white washing and also non-provision of sufficient funds required.

Text Books

Programme guidelines envisage issue of textbooks to the students of class-I to class-VIII free of cost. The textbooks required in the District are purchased by the J&K, Board of School Education (BOSE) on the requisition of the CEO.

Certain significant points that were noticed in audit are detailed hereunder.

Delayed issue of books

Textbooks are required to be issued to the students on or before the start of the session in April so that their academic performance is not hampered. Test-check of eight ZEOs revealed that textbooks were issued to the students after delays ranging from one to seven months from the start of the session as shown in table-29.

Table 29

Year	Period of issue of text books by the J&K BOSE to the ZEOs	Period of issue of text books by the ZEOs to the schools
2006-07	May to July	May to November
2007-08	May to September	April to January
2008-09	April to September	May to November
2009-10	April to June	April to September
2010-11	January to August	April to September

(Source: Records of stores/stocks of ZEOs)

The ZEOs[14] attributed (August 2010) the delays to late issuance of books by Board of School Education (BOSE).

Issue of Books without Requirement

Records of seven out of eight test-checked ZEOs showed that BOSE had not issued the textbooks to the ZEOs as per actual enrolment of students in the schools of the zones. As a result, a large number of students had not received textbooks for one or more than one subject as per details given in table-30.

Table 30

(In number)

Academic year	Name of Zone (Range)						
	Gandhi Nagar	*Jammu*	*Bhalwal*	*Akhnoor*	*Marh*	*Dansal*	*Jourian*
2007	34 to 818	-	102 to 1442	54 to 442	-	26 to 372	60 to 452
2008	6 to 947	-	541	110 to 895	4 to 435	6 to 134	12 to 601
2009	53 to 633	58 to 760	50 to 901	-	31 to 498	20 to 229	60 to 590
2010	42 to 742	10 to 675	385 to 848	56 to 570	350 to 421	14 to 770	3 to 563

(Source: Information furnished by ZEOs)

Not issuing of the adequate number of books was indicative of the casual approach of BOSE/ZEOs which deprived a huge chunk of the students of the essential material required for education. The ZEOs[15] stated (August 2010) that BOSE had issued insufficient books of certain subjects for various class with the result all the students did not get books on all the subjects. The CEO accepted (July 2011) the observation and stated that it was due to issuance of insufficient books by the BOSE. The reply was not acceptable as the CEO was to ensure that complete set of books were provided to all the students.

Issuance of books in excess

Records of eight ZEOs showed that 1,02,849 books (value: ₹ 0.33 crore) of various subjects of class 1st to 8th were issued during 2006-11 to the Zones in excess of actual enrolment of students. As a result, these books were lying either in the Zonal Offices or in the schools. Excess procurement had thus led to misutilisation/ blocking of funds of ₹ 0.33 crore. The Zone wise position of books issued in excess of enrolment and value thereof is tabulated in table-31.

Table 31

Name of Zone	Excess *(In number)*	Amount (₹)
Akhnoor	14672	438992
Bhalwal	11542	308580
Gandhi Nagar	7975	284270
Jammu	9268	190517
Dansal	10399	328893
RS Pura	10399	312792
Jourian	6444	217141
Marh	32150	1171110
Total	102849	3252295

(Source: Information furnished by ZEOs)

14 Akhnoor, Gandhi Nagar, Bhalwal, Jourian and Dansal

15 Akhnoor, Gandhi Nagar, Bhalwal, Jammu, Dansal

The ZEO Akhnoor stated that BOSE issued textbooks of certain subjects in excess of requirement. It clearly indicates that actual requirement was not assessed by the CEO Jammu/BOSE before procurement of textbooks. The CEO, however, stated (July 2011) that the ZEOs had been directed to lift books as per the enrolment. The reply was not acceptable as the CEO was required to ensure actual enrolment while placing requisition with the BOSE.

The syllabus framed by the CEO, Jammu did not contain Dogri as a subject for 1st and 2nd standard during 2007-11. Records showed that 32201 books valued at ₹ 0.06 crore had been issued to the eight test-checked ZEOs. This injudicious purchase by the CEO through BOSE had resulted in irregular expenditure of ₹ 0.06 crore. The CEO stated (July 2011) that the ZEOs were directed to implement Dogri in class 1st and 2nd. The reply may be viewed in the light of the fact that the syllabus did not prescribe Dogri as a subject for these classes. Besides, the records of such directions were not produced to audit.

5.2.2. Mid-day Meals Programme

To enhance enrolment, retention, attendance and simultaneously improving nutritional level among children, the National Programme of Nutritional Support to primary education was launched by the GOI during 1995. The scheme was extended to upper primary education in 2007-08.

Allocation and Expenditure

The details of year-wise budget allocation and expenditure incurred are given in table-32.

Table 32

(₹ in crore)

Year	*O.B*	*Allocation*			*Expenditure*			*C.B*	*Percentage Utilization*
		GOI	*State share*	*Total*	*GOI*	*State share*	*Total*		
2006-07	NA	1.51	0.52	2.03	1.37	0.51	1.88	0.15	93
2007-08	0.15	1.98	0.84	2.97	1.86	0.69	2.55	0.42	86
2008-09	0.42	4.77	1.01	6.20	3.21	0.37	3.58	2.62	58
2009-10	2.62	2.56	2.77	7.95	2.31	2.71	5.02	2.93	63
2010-11	2.93	3.10	3.17	9.20	3.00	3.00	6.00	3.20	65

(Source: Information furnished by CEO)

The percentage utilisation of funds was poor and the under-utilization had led to accumulation of unspent balances of ₹ 3.20 crore at the close of March 2011. This indicated poor financial management which affected the programme adversely as given in the succeeding paragraphs.

- Out of 1060 kitchen-sheds targeted for completion during 2008-11, 666 kitchen-sheds had been constructed at a total cost of ₹ 5.70 crore as of March 2011 though money for the purpose was available. Inaction on the part of the department had resulted in swelling of unspent balances to ₹ 1.03 crore at the close of March 2011 as can be seen from table-33.

Table 33

(₹ in crore)

Year	Amount sanctioned	Targets	Expenditure incurred as of March 2011	Closing Balance	Achievement
2008-09	2.95 (GOI)	491	1.92	1.03	320(65)
2009-10	2.08 (State)	346	2.08	1.03	346(100)
2010-11	1.70 (State)	223	1.70	1.03	-

(Source: Information furnished by CEO)

The CEO Jammu stated (April 2011) that poor utilisation of funds were due to untimely release of funds. In this connection, it could be seen that ₹ 1.03 crore out of the funds allotted during the year 2008-09 was available with the Government which could have been released to achieve the targets.

Loss of Central Assistance

As per the programme guidelines, transportation cost of food grains paid by the State Government was to be subsidized by the GOI to the extent of ₹ 100 per quintal. Quarterly claims, after verification by nodal agencies, were to be submitted to the GOI by the 15th of month following the quarter. Records showed that for lifting of 61,416 quintals of food grains in 2002-11, the transportation cost had not been reimbursed by the GOI due to non-submission of claims. This had led to a loss of central assistance of ₹ 0.61 crore. The CEO Jammu stated (April 2011) that the Assistant Director, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution Department (CAPD) refused to provide the requisite transportation claim bills. The reply was not tenable as the records showed that the Assistant Director, CAPD Jammu had raised the carriage bills against the CEO during November 2007 and March 2009.

Reconciliation of food grains

Reconciliation of figures regarding lifting of food-grains from CAPD was to be carried out with the department. Audit observed variation between the figures of lifting of food-grains provided by the CEO and that accounted for by CAPD in its books is tabulated in table-34.

Table 34

(In quintals)

Year	Issued by CAPD	Lifted by the department	Excess (+) Less (-)
2006-07	10,107.80	9,513.38	(-) 594.42
2007-08	10,576.42	8,843.58	(-) 1732.84
2008-09	10,202.99	9,495.84	(-) 707.15
2009-10	13,821.88	14,190.26	(+) 368.38
2010-11	12,570.00	13,210.13	(+) 640.13

(Source: Information furnished by CEO)

The difference between the two sets of figures for the period 2006-11 was 2,026 quintals. No reconciliation had been conducted so far and the possibility of pilferage could not be ruled out.

The CEO Jammu stated (April 2011) that ZEOs were directed to reconcile the figures with the Tehsil Supply Officers concerned to arrive at the factual position.

Lifting and utilization of food grains

Food grains required by department for implementation of the MDM scheme are provided by the Consumer and Public Distribution Department through its outlets. The position of allocation of food grains by the GOI, lifting and utilization of food grains by the Chief Education Officer (CEO) Jammu during 2006-11 is given in table-35.

Table 35

(In quintals)

Year	Opening balance	Allocation	Lifting	Utilization	Closing Balance
2006-07	318.16	12517.86	9513.38	9419.85	307.85[16] (3)
2007-08	307.85	11679.70	8843.58	8837.18	314.25 (3)
2008-09	314.25	15010.90	9495.84	8756.90	1053.19 (11)
2009-10	1053.19	17675.80	14190.26	13490.86	1752.59 (12)
2010-11	1752.59	15123.53	13210.13	13274.80	1687.92 (11)
Total		72007.79	55253.19	53779.59	

(Source: Information furnished by CEO)

As can be seen, against the allocation of 72,007.79 quintals during 2006-11 the CEO Jammu had lifted only 55,253.19 quintals (77 *per cent*) which however had not been utilized in full and the shortfalls had ranged between three and 12 *per cent*. The CEO Jammu stated (April 2011) that the department had lifted food grains under the Mid-day Meal scheme as per the enrolment.

As per the MDM guidelines, 100 gm of food per day is to be served on an average to the primary school children and 150 gm per day to each upper-primary student. It was, however, noticed that meals were not served to the students on all working days with the result that the quantum of food to be served to the students per day on an average, in eight of the 14 test-checked zones during 2006-10, was not in consonance with the norms prescribed under the scheme guidelines as indicated in table-36.

Table 36

Zone	Range of quantum of food served*(In grams)*	
	Primary	Upper Primary*
Authorised Scale of foodgrains	*100 gm per day*	*150 gm per day*
Gandhi Nagar	61-81	74-114
Jammu	38-82	81-112
Akhnoor	60-83	82-114
Bhalwal	59-85	86-126
Dansal	45-74	72-102
R.S.Pura	77-94	118-120
Marh	59-85	82-110
Jourian	66-91	85-128

** Introduced in Upper Primary from September 2008 (Source: Information furnished by ZEOs)*

[16] The closing balance of 2006-07 was distributed accordingly, due to creation of new District Samba

As can be concluded, 38-94 gm of food per day only was served on an average to the primary school children and 72-128 gm was served to upper-primary students against the prescribed norms. It was also seen meals had not been served to the children in Gandhi Nagar Zone for two months[17], Jammu Zone for five months[18] and Aknoor Zone for five months[19]. This was indicative of very poor implementation of the programme.

The CEO Jammu attributed (April 2011) non-serving of meals to students on all the working days to non-availability of food grains in CAPD godowns. The CEO's reply was contradictory as he had earlier stated that the food grains had been lifted as per enrolment. In Audit's opinion implementation of the Mid-day Meal Programme in the District had been deficient and efforts were necessary to utilize fully the food grain lifted as well allocated.

Despite spending huge amount through various CSSs which envisaged retention of children in schools, huge dropouts ranging from four to 36 *per cent* were noticed in the eight test-checked zones in the District as detailed in table-37.

Table 37

Zone	No. of children of Primary/upper primary level during 2006-07 to 2009-10	No. of children of primary/upper primary level during 2007-08 to 2010-11	Dropout of students (percentage)
Gandhi Nagar	10586 (Primary & Upper Primary Level)	6730	3856 (36)
Jammu	7005 (Primary & Upper Primary Level)	6720	285 (4)
Akhnoor	4132 (Primary Level)	3406	726 (18)
Bhalwal	6926 (Primary level)	5247	1679 (24)
R.S Pura	4839 (Primary & Upper Primary level)	4389	450 (9)
Marh	3160 (Primary level)	2947	213 (7)
Dansal	8147 (Primary & Upper Primary level)	6867	1280 (16)
Jourian	3685 (Primary level)	3289	396 (11)

(Source: Information furnished by ZEOs)

As can be seen, the dropouts were minimum in Jammu zone whereas these were very high at 36 *per cent* in Gandhi Nagar Zone. This shows that even the CSSs had little impact on retention of children in the schools. At no point of time had the department conducted an exercise to ascertain the reasons for the huge drop-outs.

In reply, the ZEOs (Akhnoor, Bhalwal and Jourian) stated that the dropouts were due to migration of students to private schools. However, the ZEO, Jammu attributed

[17] April 2006 and May 2008
[18] April, May 2008 and February to April 2009
[19] April 2006, April 2007 and January to March 2009

(August 2010) it to migration of labour class to other states as most of the enrolment belonged to that class. The reply was not acceptable as the department was supposed to create a congenial atmosphere with adequate infrastructure in the schools to hook children so that the dropouts could be brought to bare minimum. The dropouts, in the opinion of Audit, are attributable to non-utilisation of funds allotted to the ZEOs which prevented it from creation of adequate infrastructure, provision of amenities and improper implementation of MDM programme which would allure students.

Performance of Students

An exercise conducted by Audit showed that the performance of students in the examination conducted by Board of School Education (BOSE) was very poor inspite of availability of well-qualified teachers in the schools. The pass percentage of students in government schools was very low as compared to private schools operating in the District as indicated in table-38.

Table 38

Year	Schools	Hr. Secondary Part-II			High School (10th)			Middle School (8th)		
		Appeared	Passed	Pass per cent age	Appeared	Passed	Pass per cent age	Appeared	Passed	Pass per cent age
2006-07	Govt. Schools	11399	4664	41	5273	2289	43	12766	9955	78
	Private Schools	5204	3105	60	13656	10002	73	18006	17342	96
2007-08	Govt. Schools	9736	4315	44	4912	2228	45	9548	7599	80
	Private School	4451	2921	66	11830	8944	76	14860	14391	97
2008-09	Govt. Schools	10439	4141	40	5954	2312	39	9196	6699	73
	Private School	5023	3302	66	12373	9221	75	14265	13581	95
2009-10	Govt. Schools	9836	4427	45	6374	2455	39	9523	8064	85
	Private School	5420	3649	67	12748	9084	71	14718	14274	97

(Source: Data collected from results gazettes of BOSE)

As can be seen in table-38, the figures of pass percentage of students in Government schools was precariously placed between 39 and 45 *per cent* in the classes excluding upper primary schools for which the examinations were held during 2006-10 and was in utter contrast to the results of the private schools and there seemed no improvement in the figures over the years. The schools have not been able to compete with the private players in the fray despite the fact that the Government schools had well-qualified teachers drawing a minimum salary of ₹ 20,000 pm and the teachers in the private were being paid wages in the range of ₹ 900 to ₹ 7,500 pm for the similar job. At no point of time had the CEO/Government looked into these aspects including payments being made by the private schools to its teachers. It was only after being pointed out that the CEO, Jammu took up (August 2011) the issue of payment of

meagre salary to the teachers which was less than the wages being paid to the daily-wagers in the State, with the President, Private Schools Association, Jammu.

Audit also came across cases where none of the students appearing in the examination had passed and very high number of schools had shown a dismal picture and the results were less than 40 *per cent* as shown in table-39.

Table 39

Year	Higher Secondary Part-II					High School (10th)				
	Total Schools	*Range of result (%age)*				*Total Schools*	*Range of result (%age)*			
		0	*1-25*	*26-40*	*>40*		*0*	*1-25*	*26-40*	*>40*
2006-07	58	Nil (0)	13 (22)	21 (36)	24 (41)	165	4 (2)	33 (20)	34 (21)	94 (57)
2007-08	53	Nil (0)	12 (23)	16 (30)	25 (47)	159	9 (6)	35 (22)	28 (18)	87 (55)
2008-09	56	Nil (0)	16 (29)	21 (38)	19 (34)	168	14 (8)	42 (25)	44 (26)	68 (40)
2009-10	62	Nil (0)	13 (21)	22 (35)	27 (44)	169	12 (7)	50 (30)	38 (22)	69 (41)

(Source: Data collected from results gazettes of BOSE)

An analysis of the data shows 53 to 66 *per cent* and 43 to 60 per cent of the Higher Secondary and High Schools respectively had below 40 per cent results during 2006-10. Also, two to eight *per cent* of the high Schools had nil results. Action taken against the staff for this had not been taken.

No benchmark had, however, been provided by the Department for the teachers to meet the requirements and in the absence thereof no action was taken against the teachers of the schools which had shown poor results. Reasons for poor performance of Government schools, though called for, were not intimated. To ascertain the reasons for dismal performance of the Government schools, Audit called for the data from the CEO and noticed that the facilities of science laboratories and libraries vital for the academic performance of the students had not been provided in a majority of the Government schools. The position of availability of laboratories and libraries in the private schools was quite good as verified by audit on spot. The position of High schools and Higher Secondary Schools having no science laboratories and libraries is tabulated in table-40.

Table 40

Type of Schools	Number of Schools	Science Laboratory	Bio-Science Laboratory	Physics Laboratory	Chemistry Laboratory	Computer Laboratory	Library
High Schools	108	80	-	-	-	-	67
Higher Secondary Schools	62	-	19	22	21	22	9

(Source: Information furnished by CEO)

The CEO stated (July 2011) that steps had been taken for establishment of science laboratories in the schools in a phased manner.

Conclusion

Impact of the Sarva Shiksha Abhyaan (SSA) was dismal as the enrolment of children in the age group of 6 to 14 years in these schools had decreased. Due to non formulation of annual action plans as per the requirement, huge amount of balances had remained unspent. Incorrect reporting of utilisation certificates to GOI was an area of concern. Despite heavy expenditure on maintenance and repair, the number of schools requiring repair was on the rise. Academic performance in schools was marred by delayed and defective issue of textbooks and poor amenities. The implementation of the mid day meal programme was deficient in terms of utilization of food grains allocated by CAPD and those lifted by the ZEOs. The funds provided were not fully utilized and the scheme had failed to arrest the dropout rate of students.

Recommendations

- Immediate steps need to be taken to check the dropout from the Government schools by ensuring improvement in infrastructure facilities.
- Annual action plans should be formulated on realistic basis.
- The actual expenditure needs to be reported to GOI.
- Textbooks need to be issued on time and on need basis.
- Full allocation of food grains need to be lifted under Mid Day Meal Scheme. Action needs to be taken to reconcile the food grains actually lifted and transportation cost to be recovered from CAPD.

5.3. Water Supply

Public Health Engineering Department is entrusted with implementation, augmentation and maintenance of various schemes funded by GOI and the State Government for providing potable water to the habitations of the District.

As per data made available to audit, 75 schemes were in operation feeding 606 habitations (out of 619) in the District. The position of habitations Fully Covered (FC), Partially Covered (PC) and Not Covered (NC) during 2006-11 is given in table-41.

Table 41

Year	Total Habitations	Habitations Fully Covered (FC)	Habitations Partially Covered (PC)	Habitations Not Covered (NC)
2006-07	612	154	424	34
2007-08	617	218	368	31
2008-09	617	265	321	31
2009-10	617	342	258	17
2010-11	619	373	233	13*

*(*Dansal Block: Villages Kangrial, Batallehar, Simble Lair, Gulshera, Degir/Salura, Karal, Charangal; R. S Pura Block: Villages Dewangarh Camp, Chak Harni, Chak Shain, Sultanpur, Bhatiyari; Marh Block: Village Gujjar Basti Kullian, Source: Information provided by the Divisions; The figures exclude the position of areas falling under PHE, Akhnoor;)*

The position of coverage of habitations has been by and large satisfactory; efforts would, however, continue to be needed to bring down the NC habitations from 13 to nil. Two main schemes, Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) and Minimum Needs Programme (MND), were test-checked in audit to evaluate the ground position. The results are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

5.3.1 Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP)

'Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP)' is a flagship programme launched by GOI which mandates that priority be given to the habitations having no safe source or habitations 'Not Covered' or 'Partially Covered'.

Planning

For proper implementation of a programme, annual action plans incorporating all the rural schemes requiring construction, augmentation and renovation are required to be formulated for completion in a time-bound manner by way of preparation of a Perspective Plan (PP). All the annual action plans which should pave way for taking up of the works in a particular year should flow from the PP. Records showed that no perspective plan or annual action plans was prepared to cover the habitations which were Not Covered (NC) or Partially Covered (PC).

By not formulating PP nor prioritizing habitations under the scheme led the administration to cover habitations in urban areas which were *abinitio* ineligible for benefits under the programme as discussed below.

Non-prioritization of incomplete schemes

Details collected from the department revealed the status of implementation of schemes under ARWSP as shown in table-42.

Table 42

On-going as on 1 April 2007	Taken up during 2007-10	Total	Completed during the period	Incomplete as on 31 March 2011
85	48	133	75	58

(Source: Information provided by the Divisions))

Priority was to be accorded to completion of left-over/abandoned schemes over new ones to ensure their timely completion. Records showed that out of 85 schemes taken up under the programme during 2003-07 to be completed within the envisaged period of one year to three years, 19 (22 *per cent*) schemes were incomplete as of March 2011. Non-completion necessitated revision of the cost estimates of these 19 schemes to ₹ 46.95 crore which resulted in escalation of their cost by ₹ 16.18 crore. Instead of ensuring completion of these schemes, the department took up 48 new schemes at an estimated cost of ₹ 58.17 crore during 2007-10 for completion within one to two years and test check showed that only nine (19 *per cent*) such schemes had been completed as of March 2010. Non-completion of a large number of schemes due to non-prioritization denied the provision of adequate drinking water to 164 habitations and was an outcome of inadequate planning and poor execution of schemes.

Selection of ineligible schemes

As per the programme guidelines, the schemes under ARWSP were meant for rural habitations. Records showed that 12 water supply schemes (estimated cost: ₹ 19.86 crore) taken up (2003-09) under the programme had covered areas falling under the municipal limits notified by the Jammu Municipal Corporation and an expenditure of ₹ 15.38 crore had been incurred (March 2010) thereon. The Executive Engineer, PHE City Division-I, Jammu stated (November 2010) that the schemes covering urban areas were selected due to pressing needs of drinking water in these areas. The reply is not tenable as ARWSP was exclusively meant for rural areas, and this amounted to diversion of funds of ₹ 19.86 crore.

Time and cost overruns

Out of 133 schemes under execution during 2006-11, only 75 had been completed during the period and the balance 58 schemes remained incomplete due to insufficient funds. Provisions of funds for new schemes when old schemes were incomplete was because of faulty planning and poor controls over implementation and resulted in time over-run of two to six years and cost over-run of ₹ 11.35 crore in 23 schemes as detailed in ***(Appendix-I)***.

The Executive Engineer, PHE, City Division-I and Rural Division stated (April 2011) that the schemes could not be completed in time due to non release of sufficient funds.

5.3.2. District Plan Schemes

The District Development Board (DDB) approved, during 2003-11, 48 rural water supply schemes for augmentation in the District under Minimum Needs Programme (MNP) financed by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD)/Life Insurance Corporation (LIC).

Planning

To have a reliable and sufficient water management system in the District, a detailed plan was to be formulated so that the water supply schemes could be taken up for

execution in a phased manner and the schemes prioritised for optimising results. It was, however, noticed that no such mechanism was in place in the District and instead the schemes were identified by the sectoral officers as per local demands which were finally approved by the DDB for execution by the department.

Programme implementation

Out of 48 schemes approved by the Board, 32 schemes (estimated cost: ₹ 13.18 crore) were taken up under the programme during 2003-06 for completion within one to three years. Records showed that only 20 schemes were completed and the remaining 10 schemes[20] (estimated cost: ₹ 5.22 crore) had not been completed as of March 2011. It was also noticed that schemes were converted under phase-II (2009-10) without completing their phase-I and meagre funds were spent after converting these schemes into phase-II during 2009-11 as indicated in table-43

Table 43

(₹in crore)

Number of schemes	Estimated cost	Date of start	Expenditure as of March 2010	Number of schemes converted into phase-II	Estimated cost	Expenditure (2009-11)
10	5.22	2003-04 to 2005-06	4.66	10	13.33	0.14

(Source: Information provided by the Divisions))

The schemes were converted into phase-II after completing various components of the schemes in the range between nil to100 *per cent* which indicated poor planning. The poor planning can be gauged from the fact that instead of ensuring the completion of already delayed schemes, the department had taken up 16 more schemes at an estimated cost of ₹ 7.78 crore during 2009-11 for completion within one to two years. Records showed that none of the schemes had been completed so far depriving the people of 68 habitations[21] of adequate water supply.

Other Audit Findings

Mismanagement of the Network

Section 15 of the Water Supply Act 1963 envisages that no person shall at any time, without the permission of the prescribed authority, make or cause to be made, any connection with any pipe in contravention of this Act. Records of the department showed that out of the total of 2,25,664 households, 1,27,339 households had been provided private water connections as of March 2011. It was also seen in audit that 9,870 domestic illegal connections had been regularised by the department ending March 2011. The consumers had been fined only ₹ 360 per connection for regularisation instead of the minimum ₹ 1,000 per connection as provided under Section 29 of the Act. By not penalising such consumers to the extent provided in the Act, the public exchequer had suffered a loss of ₹ 0.63crore.

[20] One scheme transferred to *Swajaldhara* programme and one scheme to ARWSP.

[21] In Dansal, Marh, Kot-Bhalwal and Vijaypur blocks

Misutilisation of funds

To provide drinking water to the people of 153 habitations of the District, 2,497 shallow hand pumps were installed at a cost of ₹ 1.63 crore in seven blocks during 2003-08 under *Swajaldhara* programme. To improve water supply, the GOI released grants under the 12th Finance Commission for maintenance of these hand pumps.

Audit check showed that the Rural Development Department (RDD), to whom the grants were released, instead of utilizing the funds for maintenance of the installed hand pumps, diverted them to construct 318 *water tanks* in seven blocks of the District at a cost of ₹ 1.05crore during 2004-08. The position regarding the functionality of the already installed hand pumps had not been assessed.

Water Quality

Two water testing laboratories, viz. Sitlle and Boria Filtration Plants, are functioning in the District and another 23 are proposed (September 2010) at sub-divisional level. Records showed that no norms had been fixed by the department for lifting and testing of water samples which were being lifted either randomly or on the basis of complaint. The departmental records and water testing records of Government Medical College and Hospital Jammu showed that out of 115 samples collected by the department/local health authorities, during 2010-11, 48 were found unfit for drinking purposes due to presence of faecal e-coli in water. The Executive Engineer stated that remedial measures by way of chlorination, rectification of leakage of pipes, de-silting of water sources and bleaching powder treatment at storage level had been taken to make water fit for drinking purposes.

As per the information supplied by CMO, Jammu, there were 1,63,994 cases of water borne diseases (Diarrhoea: 1,52,545; Typhoid: 10,316 and Viral Hepatitis: 1,133) reported in the District during 2006-10. Absence of norms for testing water quality and attendant measures for dealing with reported deteriorations in a systematic manner in the District was an issue of great concern.

5.4 Sanitation

Individual health and hygiene is largely dependent on adequate availability of drinking water and proper sanitation. Consumption of unsafe drinking water, improper disposal of human excreta, unclean surroundings, and unhygienic practices of food handling and lack of personal hygiene are the major causes of water borne diseases. The municipal committees, other local bodies and Rural Development Department (RDD) are mandated with the job of ensuring sanitation in the District.

5.4.1 Rural Sanitation

Rural Development Department is entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring rural sanitation in the rural areas of the District and the activities related thereto are carried out by the District Panchayat Officer (DPO) through Block Development Officers (BDOs). Audit scrutiny of the records of District Panchayat Officer (DPO), Jammu revealed as under:

As per the baseline survey conducted in August 2006, the sanitation coverage in the rural areas of the District is tabulated in table-44.

Table 44

Number of Household			Household without Latrines			Women Sanitary Complex	
APL	BPL	Total	APL	BPL	Total	3	
1,42,800	51,340	1,94,140	1,13,373 (79)	48,725 (95)	1,62,098 (83)		
Schools			Schools without Latrines			Anganwadi Centres	
Govt.	Private	Total	Govt.	Private	Total	Total	Without Latrines
1,237	636	1,873	909 (73)	321 (50)	1,230 (66)	2,039	2,039

(Source: Project report/Progress report of total sanitation campaign)

To provide adequate sanitation in rural areas, a Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) project was approved for Jammu District at an estimated cost of ₹ 7.15 crore during 2003-04 which was revised to ₹ 23.75 crore during 2006-07 for completion in four years with the following objectives:

- To bring about an improvement in the general quality of life in the rural areas.
- To accelerate sanitation coverage in rural areas.
- To meet the demands for sanitation facilities through awareness creation and health education.
- To cover schools/Anganwadis in rural areas with sanitation facilities and promote sanitary habits among students.
- To eliminate open defecation to minimise risk of contamination of drinking water sources and food.
- To convert dry latrines to pour flush latrines.

The estimated outlay of ₹ 23.75 crore was to be shared by GOI (₹ 15.51 crore), the State Government (₹ 5.27 crore) and the beneficiaries (₹ 2.97 crore). Scrutiny of records in Audit revealed that against share of ₹ 15.51 crore, the GOI had released (2004-05, 2007-08 and 2010-11) ₹ 5.42 crore, the State Government (2004-11) ₹ 2.25 crore and the beneficiary share was ₹ 0.40 crore (2004-11).

The position of funds released and expenditure incurred during the period 2006-2011 under the scheme is shown in table-45.

Table 45

(₹In lakh)

Year	Funds released			Expenditure incurred		
	GOI including interest	State	Beneficiary	GOI	State	Beneficiary
Opening balance	*32.36*	*14.48*	*0.00*			
2006-07	0.00	0.00	1.18	3.44	0.00	1.18
2007-08	228.74	21.48	2.29	23.70	21.48	2.29
2008-09	0.61	51.70	5.11	140.12	51.70	5.11
2009-10	0.42	45.60	6.00	42.84	45.60	6.00
2010-11	175.09	45.62	17.32	201.37	59.87	17.32
Closing balance				*25.75*	*0.23*	

(Source: Project report/Progress report of total sanitation campaign)

From the above, it is seen that the release of funds from the GOI had been inconsistent, as it was negligible during the years 2006-07, 2008-09 and 2009-10, which was due to non-submission of utilisation certificates in the prescribed proforma by the State Government in time. This hampered timely completion of the project. Besides, matching share of the State had also not been released in time as a result of which the envisaged improvement in the sanitary condition of people of the District even after a lapse of six years had not improved much as is brought out in table-46.

Table 46

Household Latrines for BPL			*School Latrines*		
Target	**Achievement**	***Shortfall***	***Target***	***Achievement***	***Shortfall***
50950	8191	42759 (84)	2607	2056	551 (21)
Anganwadi Centres			***Sanitary Complex***		
Target	***Achievement***	***Shortfall***	***Target***	***Achievement***	***Shortfall***
36	24	12 (33)	300	37	263 (88)

(Source: Project report/Progress report of total sanitation campaign)

The position brought out in table-46 shows that very little had been done to provide sanitation facilities to the rural population. The dismal position of sanitation coverage in the rural areas of the District had led to prevalence of water and sanitation related diseases as per details given in table-47.

Table 47

Year	Diarrhoea	Typhoid	Viral Hepatitis	Total
2007	40832	1127	469	42428
2008	36520	1784	220	38524
2009	37606	2101	58	39765
2010	37587	5304	386	43277

(Source: Information collected from District health authorities)

5.4.2. Urban sanitation

To address the problem of sanitation and public health in the urban areas of the District, Jammu Municipal Corporation (JMC) is entrusted mainly with the responsibility of providing sanitation and public health facilities to the people of 71 wards falling within the municipal area.

Waste Management

As per Municipal Solid Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000, every municipal authority, within its territorial area, is responsible for collection, storage, segregation, transportation, processing and disposal of municipal solid wastes.

Collection

About 300 metric tonne of municipal waste/garbage generated daily in 71 municipal wards is collected by the Corporation from various collection points for disposal. Scrutiny of records revealed that no proper mechanism existed to handle and dispose of the wastes in accordance with the provisions of the Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules 2000 where under such waste are to be treated scientifically so as to avoid threat to human health and surrounding environment. Waste collection schedules for different areas had to be notified as required under rules, which was not done by the Corporation.

Segregation/Storage/Transportation

Under Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules 2000, the Corporation was required to establish and maintain storage facilities in such a way that these did not create unhygienic and insanitary conditions. Storage bins were to be painted green for bio-degradable, white for recyclable and black for other wastes.

Audit noticed that the Corporation had not made adequate arrangements in this regard. The wastes were being dumped either in open spaces or common bins at a few places. Most of the waste was not being put in the bins provided and instead had been found dumped in open sites near public places along main road and streets. Also different colour bins for biodegradable, recyclable and other wastes had not been provided. In the absence of notified time schedules for clearance, the storage bins were found over-

flowing and in un-hygienic conditions. Waste was found scattered all around the bins with stray animals moving around such bins as can be seen from the photographs below:





Garbage lying scattered on road

The rules also provide for use of covered vehicles for transportation purposes as it should not be visible to public or exposed to open environment.

Audit noticed that the Corporation was not equipped with such facilities and waste was transported in uncovered vehicles.

The Chief Accounts Officer (CAO) stated (February 2010) that the vehicles were covered with tarpaulin after loading of garbage. The reply is not based on facts as is evident from the photographs taken by the audit party during the review period.



Open vehicle Garbage collection and carriage

Processing and disposal

Management of municipal solid waste requires that municipal authorities adopt suitable technologies to make use of waste to minimize the burden on landfill by various means such as bio-degrading through composting, vermi-composting or anaerobic digestion, recycling or reuse. No such processing facilities had been adopted in the District.

Although a decision (July 2008) to set up a waste treatment plant had been taken by the Governing body of the Corporation, authorisation to set up waste processing and disposal facility units is yet to be obtained. The CAO stated (December 2010) that

conversion of solid waste into energy has been conceived by JMC and in this connection tenders had been invited for preparation of a Detailed Project Report.

Hospital/Hazardous waste

Biomedical Waste (Management and Handling) Rules 1998 envisage proper collection, treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes at authorised places by the occupier[22] of these wastes. The Corporation had not identified hazardous waste producing units and was unable, thus, to ensure proper collection, treatment and disposal of such wastes and prevent their adverse impact on environment and public health. Further, there was no system of handling hospital waste/garbage which was collected and disposed off by the Corporation manually.

The Corporation stated that it did not have enough funds to collect or dispose of the waste on scientific lines and that it had taken up (August 2009) the matter with the Government.

Health activities

Provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and rules made thereunder provide for frequent inspection of units dealing with manufacture, storage or sale of food articles, lifting of food samples by Food Inspector for subsequent analysis and maintenance of records of all inspections made and action taken by him in performance of his duties including seizure of stock, etc. Against nine sanctioned posts of Food Inspectors, only four were in position (March 2012).

Audit noticed that no systematic records were maintained in respect of the inspections conducted or the premises visited by the Food Inspectors. Details furnished to audit revealed that out of 1,174 food samples lifted during 2005-10, 156 (13 *per cent*) were found adulterated. Further, decisions in respect of the prosecution initiated against 161 dealers framed for adulteration were pending (March 2010) in the Municipal Court.

Further, none of the 3,388 milk samples collected by Municipal Veterinary Officer (MVO) and tested at milk testing laboratory of the Corporation for milk fat and milk solids conformed to prescribed parameters. Instead of initiating prosecution against milk vendors/dealers whose samples were found below the prescribed parameters, the MVO merely imposed penalty on them, which was in contravention of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

Also, no proper mechanism had been devised by the Corporation to prevent sale of adulterated food. Details/comments offered on samples referred to Public Analyst were not made available to audit.

On this being pointed out in audit, the Corporation stated that no targets for lifting of the food articles for sample checking had been fixed. The reply has to be seen in the

[22] As per the rules 'occupier' in relation to any institution generating bio-medical waste, means a person who has control over that institution and/or its premises.

light of the fact that the number of food samples lifted for check was too insignificant to exercise proper check over the sale/consumption of adulterated food.

From the above, it is evident that the Corporation has not discharged its duties for collection, segregation, storage, transportation, processing and disposal of Municipal wastes in accordance with the rules. Also, the Corporation had not exercised adequate check on units dealing with manufacture, storage or sale of food articles to the satisfaction of the general public as indicated by survey conducted by an NGO commissioned by Audit.

Satisfaction levels

With a view of assessing public opinion on general functioning and quality of services provided by the Corporation an Audit Survey was conducted in 15 out of 71 wards of the Corporation. Survey questionnaires were issued to 1000 household by Audit through a Non-Government Organization (NGO) for obtaining their remarks.

The opinions of the general public about various activities undertaken by the Corporation are categorised as shown in table-48.

Table 48

Activity	Percentage	
	Yes	No
Is there a fixed garbage collection time schedule	20	80
Are the Wards provided with bins for collection of garbage	30	70
Are the Wards provided with green yellow and black bins	2	98
Is the garbage/waste dumped on road sides/streets and open spaces/vacant residential plots	78	22
Is the garbage lifted in covered vehicles	20	80
Is the garbage collected manually or mechanically	Manual 74	Mechanical 26
Do the persons associated with collection of garbage / filth wear hand gloves, masks special shoes/uniforms etc.	2	98
Do Sanitary Inspectors visit garbage collection units	20	80
Are Awareness programmes held for educating the civil society to segregate waste / garbage before dumping it in bins	0	100
Is lighting system provided in a planned manner	20	80
Are food samples lifted for adulteration test from food stores/eat points located within the ward	20	80
Is the milk sold being tested on spot	10	90
Are the encroachments removed immediately	5	95

(Source: Audit survey data)

Conclusion

Public Health Engineering Department did not have any perspective or annual action plans for providing potable water. Water supply schemes in rural areas were not prioritized and instances of funding new schemes when old schemes were lying incomplete were rampant. Taking up of ineligible schemes and cost and time overruns in completion of schemes were issues of great concern. The department had not collected revenue on account of water charges resulting to loss of revenue. The delivery as well as the quality of public hygiene and sanitation services was grossly inadequate.

Recommendations

- The department may prioritize water supply schemes based on proper assessment of needs and execute them efficiently.
- Funds may be provided in such a manner that new schemes are not taken up before the completion of ongoing schemes.
- Steps may to be taken to regularise or disconnect illegal electricity connections. The arrears in water connection charges may be recovered immediately.
- Sanitation facilities may be provided and upgraded through efficient utilization of funds available under various schemes and an effective system of waste management in urban areas should be ensured.

CHAPTER 6: ECONOMIC SERVICES

Economic services includes infrastructure such as provision of all weather roads, adequate electricity for household, industrial and irrigation needs, railway connectivity, air services and reliable communication facilities. Expenditure on economic services includes all such expenditure that promote directly or indirectly the production capacity of an economic unit. In the Economic Sector, activities under Roads, Rural Development, Power, Irrigation, Urban Development, Urban Employment and Forest etc., were taken up for review. Audit findings are discussed hereunder:


6.1 Roads

Road connectivity is one of the foremost inputs for ensuring access to and flow of goods and services smoothly across various parts of the District. Proper road connectivity promotes employment opportunities for all and also helps in creating conditions conducive to sustainable poverty reduction. The Public Works Department is entrusted with the job of providing connectivity through building of roads and maintenance thereof in the District.

Road Connectivity

The position of roads maintained in the District at the start of the review period and as of March 2011 is depicted in chart-II.

CHART II



Evidently, the District had made a satisfactory progress in the construction of roads as the total roads in the District increased by 71 *per cent* from 2182.79 km at the end of

March 2006 to 3731.94 km at the end of March 2011. Despite satisfactory progress in the District, the main concern was that 95 villages involving 178 habitations remained unconnected (August 2011).

6.1.1. Prime Minister Grameen Sadak Yojana (PMGSY)

The GOI launched (December 2000) a Centrally Sponsored Scheme named PMGSY to provide connectivity by way of all-weather roads to eligible unconnected habitations in rural areas in such a way that all unconnected habitations with a population of 1000 souls and above are covered in three years by the year 2002-03 and all unconnected habitations with a population of 250 persons and above are covered by the end of Tenth Plan period (2007).

Status of providing of road connectivity to the habitations of the District as of August 2010 is shown in table-49.

Table 49

Population norm	Habitations	Habitations connected	Habitations yet to be connected	Shortfall (Percentage)
With over 1000 people	18	13	05	28
With over 500 people	52	35	17	33
With over 250 people	83	16	67	81
Total	153	64	89	58

(Source: Information provided by EE,PMGSY, Jammu))

The Government had not been able to provide road connectivity to 89 unconnected habitations even after a lapse of four years of the completion of 10th plan period as envisaged in the programme guidelines, due to poor implementation of the programme as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Planning

The District Rural Road Plan (DRRP), indicating the entire existing road network in the District and the core network identifying the roads required to assure each eligible habitation with a basic access (single and weather road connectivity) to essential social and economic services, was required to be prepared. Records showed that DRRP had not been prepared by the Public Works Department (Roads & Bridges) and as a result the entire existing and the required road network to be constructed in the District could not be ascertained.

However, a core network indicating that 126 roads were required which would provide connectivity to unconnected habitations had been prepared. In the absence of DRRP, the roads taken in the core network could not be taken as authentic. Due to non-preparation of the DRRP and taking up of roads on the basis of the core network alone, there was always a possibility of duplication in taking up of works. Two such cases came to notice of Audit where the works of providing road connectivity to villages under PMGSY taken up during the year 2008-09 had already been taken up by the R&B Department during 2002-03 and 2006-07 under District Plan and

construction work thereof was completed during 2007-08 and 2010-11. Expenditure of ₹ 1.88 crore had been spent thereon as of March 2011 as tabulated in table-50.

Table 50

District Plan				PMGSY				
Name of road project	**Length (in Km)**	**Year of start/ year of completion**	**Exp.**	**Name of road project**	**Length (in Km)**	**Year of start**	**Exp.**	**Habitation connected**
Construction of road from Barui to Kandi	3	2006-07/ 2010-11	84.41	Construction of road from Barui to Gargal	3	2008-09	102.79	500 – Gargal 1000 – Kandi
Construction of road from Pargwal to Deora via Rangpur Pindi	4	2002-03/ 2007-08	81.20	Construction of road from Pindi to Deora	2.54	2008-09	84.77	250 – Chak Phagwari Pindi 250 – Tagwal 500 – Deora

(Source: Information provided by EE,PWD, Jammu))

This led to misutilisation of ₹ 1.88 crore incurred on these two roads under PMGSY as of March 2011 which could have been utilized on other roads. The Executive Engineer PMGSY Jammu stated (September 2010) that the road works had been taken up for execution entirely in the interest of the general public. The reply should be seen in the light of the fact that the guidelines of the programme provides for connecting habitations which had not been provided all weather connectivity.

Financial Management

The position of funds received and expenditure incurred during the period 2006-07 to 2010-11 is tabulated in table-51.

Table 51

(₹in lakh)

Year	Opening Balance	Funds received	Total	Expenditure incurred	Closing Balance
2006-07	Nil	252.00	252.00	246.64	5.36
2007-08	5.36	624.00	629.36	617.38	11.98
2008-09	11.98	1772.76	1784.74	1535.21	249.53
2009-10	249.53	3185.32	3434.85	3424.52	10.33
2010-11	10.33	2637.39	2647.72	2377.52	270.20
Total		8471.47		8201.27	

(Source: Information provided by EE,PMGSY, Jammu))

Implementation

The position of construction of road projects taken up and completed during the period 2004-05 to 2008-09 is tabulated in table-52.

Table 52

(₹in crore)

Year	Phase	No. of works taken up	Sanctioned cost	Works completed
2004-05	III	3	4.99	3
2005-06	-	-	-	-
2006-07	IV	7	14.10	4
2006-07	V	4	4.18	4
2007-08	-	-	-	-
2008-09	VI	31	48.32	19
	Upgradation works	3	29.26	-
Total		48	100.85	30

(Source: Information provided by EE,PMGSY, Jammu))

As can be seen from the above, out of 48 works taken up during 2004-09, 17 works[23] (42 *per cent*) had not been completed as of March 2011 even after a lapse of five to 30 months ***(Appendix-II)*** from the due date of completion due to involvement of Forest and private land and confirmed by the Executive Engineer, PMGSY, Jammu in his reply (September 2010).

The programme guidelines provided for submission of proposals for those works only where the road alignment was free from encumbrances and a certificate to that effect was required to be submitted with the proposals. Taking up of road projects without availability of land indicated lack of proper planning of the department and incorrect reporting to the GOI while submitting the proposal. As a result, ₹ 44.85 crore spent (March 2011) on part construction of 17 road projects proved to be unproductive. This indicated defective planning on the part of department.

Ineligible Projects

As per the programme guidelines, up-gradation of the existing roads was to be permitted under PMGSY in those Districts where all the eligible habitations had been provided all-weather connectivity. Records, however, showed that upgradation work of three roads was taken up under the programme during 2008-09 in contravention of programme guidelines despite the fact that 89 habitations of the District had yet to be provided road connectivity. Records showed that an expenditure of ₹ 21.91 crore had been incurred on these ineligible road projects as of March 2011 which could had been utilized on providing roads to the unconnected habitations. The Executive Engineer PMGSY Jammu stated (September 2010) that upgradation of roads were taken up to benefit the population of the area. The reply was not acceptable as in all such cases prior approval of the grant sanctioning authority should have been obtained.

[23] One road work from village *Panjgirian* to *Seri Kallan* could not be taken up due to stay by the Hon'ble High Court of J&K

Conclusion

The District Rural Road plan indicating the entire existing road network in the District and the core network was not prepared. There was lack of planning and coordination among executing agencies existed due to non-preparation of District Rural Road Plan (DRRP), as a result duplication of work of two roads were taken up under two different schemes. The department had failed to provide road connectivity to all the habitations in the District. The construction work of 17 road projects was commenced without availability of land indicated defective planning by the department. The upgradation work of three ineligible road projects were taken up under (PMGSY) in contravention of programme guidelines.

Recommendations

- A long term District Rural Road Plan may be formulated to complete the road works in time and duplication of taking up of same roads should be stopped.
- Before taking up of construction work, land should be acquired in time in order to avoid obstructions of road works.

6.2 Rural Development

Rural Development Department plays a key role in the overall development of rural areas by implementation of various Centrally Sponsored Schemes and State Plan Schemes. To provide various facilities to the rural population in housing, employment, infrastructure development, etc., three flagship schemes viz. Indira Awaas Yojna (IAY), Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) and Swaran Jayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojna (SGSY) were launched by the Govt. of India (GOI) besides creation of Model Villages, Management of Constituency Development fund, etc. These three schemes were test-checked in audit. The main findings are discussed below.

6.2.1. Indira Awas Yojna

The *Indira Awas Yojna* (IAY) - a centrally sponsored scheme was launched (1985-86) in the District for construction/up-gradation of dwelling units of SCs/STs, freed bonded labourers and people living Below Poverty Line (BPL) in rural areas by way of providing them lump-sum financial assistance. As per BPL census (2002-07) conducted by the Rural Development Department, the position of BPL families, families which were homeless, and the families having *Kutcha* houses in the District is tabulated in table-53

Table 53

(In number)

Total coverable families	*Houseless*	*Kutcha*
41906	4320	21607

(Source: Information provided by RDD/AC Development, Jammu)

Records showed that the data relating to the houses constructed since the beginning of the scheme had neither been maintained at the apex level nor in any of the test-checked blocks of the District. As a result, the number of houses constructed under the IAY could not be ascertained. In such an eventuality, the chances of multiple assistances being availed by the same beneficiary could not be ruled out. In reply, it was stated that the efforts to construct the database of houses constructed since the inception of the scheme would be made.

Financial Management

The position of funds released and expenditure incurred under IAY during the period 2006-11 is shown in table-54.

Table 54

(₹ In crore)

Year	Opening balance	Funds released		Total availability	Expenditure incurred	Closing balance
		Centre	State			
2006-07	0.03	2.70	0.65	3.38	3.10	0.28
2007-08	0.28	2.22	0.90	3.40	2.59	0.81
2008-09	0.35[24]	8.37	1.15	9.87	5.56	4.31
2009-10	4.31	6.92	5.30	16.53	13.66	2.87
2010-11	2.94[25]	10.61	1.39	14.94	11.42	3.52

(Source: Information provided by RDD/AC Development, Jammu)

Evidently, the utilisation of funds has not been up to the mark which had led to increase of unspent balances from ₹ 0.03 crore in March 2006 to ₹ 3.52 crore in March 2011. The accumulation of unspent balances have been mainly due to the inability of the department to achieve the targets laid down in the annual plans of the department as can be seen from table-55.

Table 55

(In number)

Year	Targets*	Taken up	Achievement	Shortfall (*Percent*)
2006-07	2131	1801	1561	27
2007-08	1295	1284	945	27
2008-09	5371	2986	1087	80
2009-10	10649	6995	3159	70
2010-11	9305	7297	3755	60

*(Source: Information provided by RDD/AC Development, Jammu, * Include the closing balance of the previous years.)*

[24] The difference was due to the creation of new District Samba

[25] The difference was due to the transfer of IAY additionality fund to IAY normal fund

The details indicate that despite availability of sufficient funds, works had not been taken up to the targeted extent and those taken up had also not been completed. The shortfall *vis-a vis* the targets laid down during 2006-11 ranged between 27 and 80 *per cent*. The Block Development Officers (BDOs) attributed poor achievement to release of funds at the end of the year. The reply was not acceptable when seen from the fact that the unspent balances of the previous year clubbed with the releases during the year were sufficient to meet the requirement of a particular year. This was indicative of poor management of funds. This is substantiated by the following.

- Test-check of records of six blocks showed that 170 beneficiaries to whom assistance of ₹ 0.41 crore was provided during 2006-10 for construction/up-gradation of houses did not figure in the BPL survey list (2002) conducted by the Department. Similarly, 72 beneficiaries having *pucca* houses had also been provided assistance of ₹ 0.20 crore during 2006-10. This indicated faulty selection of beneficiaries which was in violation of the basic objective of the scheme.
- The reply of the BDOs that the assistance under IAY was provided after detailed survey of houses of the beneficiaries was not correct in view of the details given above. It was, however, assured that such beneficiaries would be disallowed in future.
- As per scheme guidelines, assistance upto ₹ 12,500 revised to ₹ 15,000 (in 2009-10) was to be provided to the beneficiaries for upgradation for conversion of semi *pucca* houses to *pucca* houses. Audit of six test-checked blocks showed that 213 beneficiaries of the District having semi-*pucca* houses were provided assistance of ₹ 25,000 to ₹ 35,000 instead of rates at which assistance was to be provided for up-gradation of houses during 2006-10. Providing of assistance in excess of norms fixed by the GoI for upgradation of houses led to excess payment of ₹ 0.33 crore.
- The BDOs attributed this to the faulty survey of BPL population.
- Records showed that 390 beneficiaries of eight test-checked blocks of the District abandoned construction after receipt of the first instalment of assistance. Non-completion of houses rendered the expenditure of ₹ 0.56 crore incurred on these constructions during 2006-10 unfruitful besides defeating the basic objective of the scheme to provide housing facility to rural BPL families.

The BDOs stated that final assistance had not been released in these cases due to unsatisfactory progress of work. The reply should be seen in the light of the fact that Department failed to utilise the full allotment of funds as a result of which the main purpose of the scheme to provide completed houses to the beneficiaries was defeated.

Allotment of Houses

As per the guideline of the Scheme, houses constructed under the assistance by the beneficiaries were to be formally allotted to the beneficiaries. Audit check, however, showed that formal allotment had not been made in any of the cases. The BDOs stated that no such instructions had been received from higher authority. It was, however, stated that efforts would be made for maintenance of data/records of houses constructed since inception of the scheme.

6.2.2. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act

The main objective of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005 (MNREGA) is to enhance livelihood security in rural areas by providing at least 100 days of guaranteed wage employment in a financial year to every household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work. The scheme was launched in the District during September 2007.

Planning

A key indicator of success of the scheme is time-bound implementation which requires advance planning. The basic aim of the planning process is to ensure that the District plan is prepared well in advance to offer productive employment on demand. For this purpose, the guidelines envisage preparation of District perspective plan to provide inputs for Annual Work Plan of the District. The aim is to identify all types of MNREGA works that should be encouraged in the District and the potential linkages between these works for providing long term employment generation and sustained development.

Though the perspective plan of District had been prepared, yet the annual work plans were prepared on the basis of the projected works/up-to-date inputs of the Block Development Officers as approved by the District Development Commissioner, Jammu. This implied that the annual plans did not flow from the perspective plan. This not only defeated the preparation of perspective plan but was also violated the guidelines.

Formulation of Annual Works Plan (AWP)

The guidelines envisage that while preparing the development plan, the number of works/ projects in shelf in a village should be more than the estimated demand so that employment could be provided to the workers for the time and duration they want for which job cards were to be issued to the willing workers. Records showed that Annual work plans except for the year 2007-08 did not provide sufficient provisions for providing at least 100 days of guaranteed wage employment as indicated in table-55.

Table 55

Year	Total job cards issued	To provide 100 days of guaranteed wage employment		Actually proposed in AWPs		Under coverage of Mandays as per AWPs/ *(per cent)*
		Mandays required to be proposed	Fund required	Mandays proposed	Funds proposed	
		(In number)	*(₹ in lakh)*	*(In number)*	*(₹ in lakh)*	
2007-08	10,355	10,35,500	724.85	10,35,500	724.86	Nil
2008-09	22,045	22,04,500	1543.15	12,85,700	899.98	9,18,800 (42)
2009-10	31,752	31,75,200	2222.64	6,80,800	476.95	24,94,400 (79)
2010-11	39,090	39,09,000	4299.90	15,01,900	1651.86	24,07,100 (62)

(Wage rate: 2007-10 @ of ₹ 70 per day; 2010-11 @ of ₹ 110 per day; (Source: Information provided by RDD/AC Development, Jammu)

From the above, it is clear that annual work plans did not include sufficient provisions for generation of providing at least 100 days of guaranteed wage employment under the programme. Non-achievement of even the curtailed targets in successive years during the period 2007-11 is highlighted in the subsequent paragraphs.

The Assistant Commissioner (Development), Jammu stated (January 2011) that the action plan was framed on the basis of budget ceiling fixed by the administrative department and previous year's achievement. The reply points out to the fact that the programme failed to provide guaranteed wage employment of at least 100 days in a year as envisaged under the programme due to failure to make sufficient provision, thereby depriving the opportunity of providing 100 days of guaranteed wage employment to the needy.

Financial Management

The position of funds released and expenditure incurred during 2007-11 is shown in table-57.

Table 57

(₹ in crore)

Year	Opening balance	Funds released		Total availability*	Expenditure incurred	Closing balance
		Centre	*State*			
2007-08	Nil	11.74	1.09	12.83	4.51	8.32
2008-09	8.07	Nil	1.20	9.27	5.87	3.40
2009-10	3.56	8.21	0.77	12.54	9.25	3.29
2010-11	3.29	28.44	1.85	33.58	17.44	16.14

(Includes balance instalments of pervious years and interest thereon; Source: Information provided by RDD/AC Development, Jammu;)*

It could be seen from table-57, the opening balance for the year 2008-09 and 2009-10 do not tally with the closing balance of the previous years. The Assistant Commissioner (Development) Jammu stated (January 2011) that the variation of ₹ 0.25 crore between closing balance of the year 2007-08 and opening balance of 2008-09 was due to bifurcation of the District. It was further stated that the opening

balance of ₹ 3.56 crore during 2009-10 was adopted as per figures adopted by the Chartered Accountant and as per the instruction conveyed by the Directorate office.

Further, the table shows that utilisation of funds under MNREGA was poor. Poor utilisation of funds led to accumulation of unspent balance of ₹ 16.14 crore at the end of March 2011.

Diversion of funds

The MNREGA guidelines prohibit utilization of programme funds on activities/items not relating to the programme. Records showed that MNREGA funds of ₹ 0.12 crore were incurred on payment of wages to daily wagers, payment of telephone bills, POL, air fare[26], hotels charges etc. during 2007-10 thereby adversely affecting the programme. The Assistant Commissioner (Development) Jammu stated (September 2010) that these funds were utilized out of programme funds due to non-release of funds by the State Government for this purpose.

Employment Generation under MNREGA

Improper formulation of annual work plans coupled with poor utilization of MNREGA funds adversely affected the basic objective of the scheme to provide wage employment for at least 100 days during 2007-11 as is clear from table-58.

Table 58

Year	Total Job card holders registered	Job card holders who demanded and provided employment	Total man days to be generated for 100 days wage employment	Total man days generated	Percentage shortfall in employment
2007-08	10,355	9,568	9,56,800	3,83,700	60
2008-09	22,045	11,867	11,86,700	4,93,700	58
2009-10	31,752	18,893	18,89,300	5,45,960	71
2010-11	39,090	19,086	19,08,600	9,00,100	53

(Source: Information provided by RDD/AC Development, Jammu)

Evidently, the department provided wage employment to job cardholders, who demanded employment, ranging from 29 to 47 days only annually during 2007-11. It defeated the basic objective of the scheme to provide wage employment for at least 100 days during the year. The Assistant Commissioner Development, Jammu attributed (January 2011) the shortfall in providing employment of at least 100 days to the low rate of labour per diem. It was seen that annual provision of works was far less than required which would have guaranteed the 100 days wage employment to the workers who demanded the work which is discussed below:

Unemployment Allowance

Under MNREGA guidelines, unemployment allowance is required to be paid by the State Government if a worker has applied for work but is not provided employment within 15 days from the date on which work is requested.

[26] To entitled officers between Jammu and Srinagar

The details of job cardholders who demanded employment and those who were provided employment for 100 days during 2007-10 is shown in table-59.

Table 59

Year	JC holders who demanded employment	JC holders provided employment for 100 days	Shortfall in JC holders entitled for unemployment allowance
2007-08	9568	25	9543
2008-09	11867	17	11850
2009-10	18893	Nil	18893
2010-11	19086	60	19026

(Source: Information provided by RDD/AC Development, Jammu) (JC: Job Card holder)

Under the provisions of the scheme all the job card holders appearing in the last column of table-59 were entitled to receive unemployment allowance. Records, however, showed that no unemployment allowance was granted to the eligible card holders. This shows that adequate efforts had not been made by the implementing agencies for ensuring effective implementation of the scheme.

The Assistant Commissioner (Development), Jammu stated (January 2011) that the concerned blocks had not demanded any funds for payment of unemployment allowance. The reply was not acceptable, Assistant Commissioner being responsible for monitoring the implementation of the programme should have ensured that the BDOs include in their annual plans to meet the expenses on such payments. By not doing so, the department had failed to provide the envisaged allowance to the needy.

Execution of works

The position of works approved, works taken up and works completed during the period 2007-11under MNREGA is shown in table-60.

Table 60

Year	Works approved	Works taken up*	Works completed	Works incomplete
2007-08	866	570	135	435 (76)
2008-09	1549	1163	669	494 (42)
2009-10	1290	1648	1144	504 (30)
2010-11	3147	2327	1645	682 (29)
Total	6852	5708	3593	

*(*Includes the closing balance of the previous year; Source: Information provided by RDD/AC Development, Jammu)*

As can be seen, the department had not taken up all the works approved for execution and out of 6,852 approved works, only 5,708 (83 *per cent*) works were taken up for execution during 2007-11. Out of 5,708 works taken up for execution, only 3,593 (63 *per cent*) had been completed as of March 2011. This was indicative of poor implementation of the scheme. Thus, creation of durable assets for strengthening livelihood of rural poor was not ensured to the Desired level.

The Assistant Commissioner (Development), Jammu stated (January 2011) that as the programme was a continuous process, the incomplete works during the particular year were taken up for completion during the next financial year. By not taking up all the approved works for execution the department was not able to provide 100 days employment to the beneficiaries.

Payment of wages

As per the provisions of programme guidelines, Muster Rolls (MRs) in the prescribed format with a unique identity number are to be issued by the Programme Officers of the blocks to the Gram Panchayats / executing agencies.

Review of 32 test-checked *panchayats* showed the following discrepancies:-

- Stock registers of Muster Rolls at block level indicating date of receipt of Muster rolls from ACD office, date of issue of Muster Rolls, Muster Roll numbers, name of work for which issued, designation of official receiving Muster Rolls had not been maintained in six test checked blocks.
- No unique number was given to the work mentioned in the MRs.
- The Muster Rolls were not countersigned by the inspecting officers in token of having inspected the work.

Improper maintenance of Muster Rolls is fraught with risk of embezzlement.

Also, as per the guidelines the disbursement of daily wages is required to be made on a weekly basis or in any case not later than a fortnight after the date on which works was done. In the event of any delay in payment of wages, workers are entitled to compensation as per provisions of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 which are to be borne by the State Government. Records showed that wages earned by 1397[27] workers employed on 142 Muster Rolls in 33 test-checked *panchayats* were paid after *delays of eight to 155 days* beyond the prescribed period. No compensation was, however, paid on the delayed payments.

The Block Development Officers while accepting the fact assured (October/ November 2010) that the provisions of the programme guidelines would be followed in future.

6.2.3. Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY)

The objective of SGSY is to bring poor families (*Swarozgaris*) either individual or self-help groups above the poverty line in three years by providing them income-generating assets through a mix of bank credit and Government subsidy. It would mean ensuring that the family has a monthly net income of at least ₹ 2,000 (BPL). Under the scheme, applications received from the beneficiaries are scrutinized by the DRDA authorities and those found in order are forwarded to the banks/financial institutions for providing loans. Following points were noticed:

[27] The figures of worker employed in respect of Marh and Satwari Blocks not available

Financial Management

The position of funds released and expenditure incurred under SGSY during the period 2006-11 is tabulated in table-61.

Table 61

(₹In lakh)

Year	Opening balance	Funds released		Total availability	Expenditure	Closing balance
		Centre	State			
2006-07	9.57	24.40	46.89	81.68	72.29	9.39
2007-08	9.39	21.80	70.72	102.26	89.67	12.59
2008-09	12.59	25.00	77.18	115.59	106.21	9.39
2009-10	9.39	25.00	113.61	149.37	145.41	3.95
2010-11	3.95	116.17	36.66	156.78	150.69	6.09

(Source: Information provided by DRDA, Jammu)

As is clear from above, the Project Officers failed to spend the full allocation. Besides, the position of unspent balance of funds under the programme lying with five[28] test-checked blocks of the District during 2006-11 is shown in table-62.

Table 62

Year	Unspent balance (₹ in lakh)
2006-07	37.24
2007-08	51.20
2008-09	80.55
2009-10	74.58
2010-11	100.67

(Source: Information provided by DRDA, Jammu)

From the above, it is clear that the Project Officer, DRDA Jammu and the BDOs had not utilized the programme funds fully. As a result, unspent balance swelled from ₹ 37.24 lakh in 2006-07 to ₹ 100.67 lakh at the close of 2010-11. Huge unspent balances indicated poor financial management which ultimately deprived the beneficiaries of the intended benefits of the programme as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs:-

Implementation

A review of the scheme brought to the fore poor coverage of BPL families during 2006-11, as per details tabulated in table-63.

Table 63

Name of the Block	Total BPL families	Covered (*per cent*)
Bishnah	3584	188 (5)
Akhnoor	10397	200 (2)
Khour	6539	137 (2)
Satwari	2264	106 (5)
Marh	3494	192 (5)

(Source: Departmental Records)

[28] Bishnah, Akhnoor, Khour, Satwari and Marh

As can be seen just two to five *per cent* of the identified families had been covered in five test-checked blocks. Records also showed that physical verification of the covered beneficiaries had not been conducted by any of the implementing agencies for ascertaining whether the beneficiaries had actually set up the intended units by assessing their functional health for gainful employment.

The position of cases sponsored and units sanctioned and subsidy disbursed during 2006-11 is shown in table-64.

Table 64

Year	Cases sponsored	Cases sanctioned	Cases disbursed	Subsidy disbursed (₹ in lakh)
2006-07	222	89 (40)	76 (85)	10.38
2007-08	505	217 (43)	168 (77)	17.64
2008-09	461	216 (47)	166 (77)	17.17
2009-10	666	367 (55)	248 (68)	24.60
2010-11	412	228(55)	165 (72)	16.16

(Source: Departmental Records)

From the above, it is clear that the percentage of cases sanctioned to the cases sponsored was very low and ranged between 40 and 55 *per cent* during 2006-11. Records also showed that subsidy had not been disbursed in respect of 15 to 32 *per cent* of sanctioned cases during the period despite availability of sufficient funds with the department.

As per guidelines of SGSY, emphasis was to be laid on the group approach under which the rural poor are to be organized into Self Help Groups (SHGs). The position of establishment of SHGs and disbursement of subsidy to SHGs in five test-checked blocks during 2006-11 is shown in table-65.

Table 65

Number of SHGs formed since inception of the programme	Numbers of SHGs to whom subsidy disbursed (*Percent*age)	Amount of subsidy (₹ in lakh)
259	50 (19)	47.39

(Source: Departmental Records)

Though, 259 SHGs had been formed yet subsidy had been disbursed to only 50 (19 *per cent*) SHGs which was indicative of the poor performance of the department. The Block Development Officers[29] attributed (October/November 2010) poor coverage to rejection of majority of cases by the banks. The reply was not tenable as the department had to take the matter with the banks in advance regarding the number of cases to be sanctioned during a particular year.

Monitoring

The department had not monitored the programme through field visits and physical verification of assets as well as the progress of the *Swarozgaries* with regard to their income generation though envisaged in the guidelines. Further, no periodical

[29] Bishnah, Akhnoor, Khour, Satwari and Marh

evaluation study through reputed institutions and organizations to study the impact of the implementation of the programme was ever conducted.

Creation of Model Villages

To arrest migration of rural population to urban areas by improving quality of life in rural areas through integrated development such as providing basic minimum services, improvement in productivity, alleviating poverty and providing minimum employment opportunity, the concept of creating model villages in each Rural Development Block was approved under Prime Minister Reconstruction Programme (PMRP).

As per scheme guidelines, sanction was accorded (February 2005) to constitute an Expert Group/Committee to prepare a need-based action plan in consultation with *Gram Panchayats*. The plan was to be recommended by the District Development Commissioner to the project sanctioning committee headed by the Director, Rural Development Department. It was, however, seen that the expert group was not constituted for construction of model villages in the District but plans were prepared by the Block Development Officers, Executive Engineer, Rural Engineering Wing and the Assistant Commissioner (Development) Rural Development Department. Moreover, the plan was not recommended by the District Development Commissioner. Eight villages were identified in the District for creation of model villages at a cost of ₹ 1.20 crore per village.

Records and physical visits of six test-checked model villages[30] created in six blocks of the District revealed the following discrepancies.

- Shop lines (21 shops) in 5 test-checked blocks were constructed during 2006-10 at a cost of ₹ 0.21 crore for providing means of livelihood to the local educated and unemployed youth. It was seen that not even a single shop had been allotted as of October 2010 rendering ₹ 0.21 crore unfruitful.
- A visit to test-checked model villages by the audit team revealed that the facilities of completed community centres in four test-checked model village had not been provided to the people of the area due to non-inauguration / non-handing-over of the centres to villagers of these centres rendering ₹ 0.71 crore unfruitful.
- Rural Information Centres (RICs) in six test-checked model villages could not be made functional due to non-availability of trained manpower. This rendered the expenditure of ₹ 0.33 crore incurred on construction of these RICs unfruitful.
- All the 15 solar lights installed in each test-checked model villages were non-functional rendering ₹ 0. 27 crore wasteful.

[30] Gigrial (Khour), Bandhwal (Akhnoor), Allah (Bishnah), Gaink (Bhalwal), Bhour (Satwari) and Akalpur (Marh)

- The children's parks in five test checked blocks were in bad condition, except the one in Khour, thereby rendering ₹ 0.14 crore spent on their construction unfruitful.
- The condition of lanes/drains constructed in these model villages is very good but sanitation programme in those model villages has totally been ignored despite inclusion of this component in the action plan as improvement in overall sanitations of the model villages was treated as a thrust area by the project sanctioning committee.

<table>
<tr><td>  </td><td> 
</td></tr>
<tr><td>Non-functional computer centre at Model village Allah</td><td>Non-functional shopping complex at village Gaink Bhalwal</td></tr>
<tr><td>  </td><td> 
</td></tr>
<tr><td>Non-functional community facility centre at Model village Akal Pur</td><td>Non-functional shopping complex at Model village Bandhwal</td></tr>
<tr><td>  </td><td>  </td></tr>
<tr><td>Defunct functional park at Model Village Allah</td><td>Defunct children park at Model village Bandhwal</td></tr>
</table>

The Block Development Officers stated (October/November 2010) that the necessary steps would be taken to make the facilities functional

6.3 Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS)

Jammu District is a part of Jammu – Poonch parliamentary constituency which includes Poonch, Rajouri and Samba districts. The Deputy Commissioner Jammu is the nodal officer for release of funds under MPLADS to Jammu District. The position of funds released and expenditure incurred under MPLADS during 2006-11 is tabulated in table-66.

Table 66

(₹In crore)

Year	Opening balance*	Funds released	Total available	Expenditure (*Percentage*)	Closing balance
2006-07	5.22	Nil	5.22	2.88 (55)	2.34
2007-08	2.42	6.00	8.42	5.45 (65)	2.97
2008-09	3.06	7.00	10.06	8.26 (82)	1.80
2009-10	1.87	2.00	3.87	1.61 (42)	2.26
2010-11	2.31	2.00	4.31	3.13 (73)	1.18

(: Variation due to the inclusion of interest earned; Source: Departmental Records)*

Utilisation of funds was not satisfactory and ranged between 42 and 82 *per cent* which was much below the state average of 89.61 *per cent* and national average of 91.32 *per cent.* This adversely affected the development of the constituency.

The Chief Planning Officer, Jammu stated (May 2011) that the implementing agencies would be instructed to expedite completion of the ongoing works to improve utilization of funds.

Incorrect reporting

Audit check showed that ₹ 18.21 crore were reflected in the utilization certificates issued to the GOI as expenditure incurred on various developmental works during 2006-10. It was seen in audit that MPLADS funds of ₹ 0.84 crore had been lying as unutilized with the implementing agencies showing that the funds released to various implementing agencies were treated as expenditure and reflected in the utilization certificates as having been utilized. The Chief Planning Officer Jammu stated (May 2011) that the utilization certificates had been furnished on the basis of audit report of the Chartered Accountant. The reply was not convincing as the utilization certificates should indicate the actual utilization of funds.

Records relating to works sanctioned under MPLADS revealed the following discrepancies:

- Audit check showed that the department sanctioned various works of construction of library and main auditorium building, gyms, computer rooms at various private schools, purchase of computers for private schools, maintenance works, after incurring ₹ 0.33 crore thereon though proscribed under the programme guidelines.

The Chief Planning Officer Jammu stated (May 2011) that utmost care would be taken while sanctioning the works under the scheme in future.

- Test check of the records of Assistant Commissioner (Development), Jammu showed that 104 works approved (estimated cost: ₹ 1.42 crore) under MPLADS during the period 2003-09 for which ₹ 0.84 crore had been released had not been taken up for execution as of August 2010 even after a lapse of more than 18 months to 6 years. Not taking up of works for execution, besides reflecting poor implementation, the schemes adversely impacting the development of the District.

  The Chief Planning Officer Jammu stated (May 2011) that the matter had been taken up with the Assistant Commissioner Development (ACD), Jammu to ascertain the factual position.

- As per guidelines, only those works are to be taken up for execution under the scheme which can generally be completed within one year. Test-check of the records of the ACD, Jammu showed that 131 works taken up for execution (estimated cost: ₹ 2.01 crore) under the scheme during 1997-98 to 2008-09 had not been completed as of August 2010 due to non-release of balance funds required for completion of the works. This rendered the expenditure of ₹ 1.13 crore incurred on these incomplete works unfruitful.

  The Chief Planning Officer Jammu stated (May 2011) that the matter had been taken up with the ACD, Jammu to ascertain the factual position.

6.4 Constituency Development Scheme (CDS)

Under the Constituency Development Scheme (CDS), each MLA/MLC is entitled to get works executed in his constituency to the extent of ₹ 0.35 crore revised (2009-10) to ₹ 0.50 crore kept at the disposal of the District Administration by the State Government. The position of funds released and expenditure incurred during 2006-11 is tabulated in table-67.

Table 67

(₹in crore)

Year	Opening balance	Funds released	Total funds available	Expenditure	Closing balance
2006-07	2.51	8.40	10.91	6.74	4.17
2007-08	4.17	7.70	11.87	6.05	5.82
2008-09	5.82	7.70	13.52	5.96	7.56
2009-10	7.56	11.00	18.56	8.09	10.47
2010-11	10.47	11.00	21.47	9.88	11.59

(Source: Departmental Records)

Utilization of funds had been poor which can be gauged from the fact that the unspent balances had increased from ₹ 4.17 crore in 2006-07 to ₹ 11.59 crore in 2010-11. Further, records showed that ₹ 2.93 crore had been lying with the implementing agencies which indicated poor financial management. It was also seen that the District

Administration had not maintained records properly nor reconciled the unspent balances with the treasury. As a result, the two sets of figures shown by the department and that worked out by audit were at variance. Against ₹ 11.59 crore worked out by audit, the department placed the unspent balance at ₹ 8.07 crore showing a net variation of ₹ 3.52 crore.

The Chief Planning Officer Jammu stated (May 2011) that the revised statement after reconciling figures would be furnished separately.

Records of details of works sanctioned under CDS revealed the following discrepancies:

- Records showed that the department sanctioned works such as religious places, private hospitals, purchase of books for the library of Bar Association, maintenance works, etc. in violation of guidelines. The department released ₹ 0.59 crore for the execution of these works during 2007-08 to 2009-10.

  The Chief Planning Officer Jammu stated (May 2011) that utmost care would be taken while sanctioning works under the programme in future.

- 315 works approved by the DDC during 1999-2000 to 2008-09 at an estimated cost of ₹ 3.04 crore, for which an amount of ₹ 2.98 crore were released, had not been taken up as of August 2010 even after a lapse of 18 months to 10 years. Not taking up of the works adversely impacted the implementation of the scheme as well as developmental works.

  The Chief Planning Officer, Jammu stated (May 2011) that the factual position would be intimated to audit after receipt of report from the Assistant Commissioner (Development), Jammu.

- The guidelines envisage that only those works be taken up for execution under the scheme which can generally be completed within one year. Records showed that 149 works taken up for execution at an estimated cost of ₹ 1.84 crore under the scheme during the period 1997-98 to 2008-09 by the 25 members (MLAs: 13, MLCs: 12) had not been completed as of August 2010 due to non-release of balance funds. This rendered the expenditure of ₹ 1.14 crore incurred on these in-completed works unfruitful.

  The Chief Planning Officer Jammu stated (May 2011) that the factual position would be intimated to audit after receipt report from Assistant Commissioner (Development) Jammu.

Television and DTH Receiver Sets

The Government of India (*Prasar Bharti*) supplied (March 2008) ten thousand TV sets (LG Make) and DTH Receiver sets to the State Government for installation at various[31] centres where DD terrestrial signal was



[31] Anganwadies, Government Schools, Health centres, village panchayats, cooperative societies etc.

not being captured. Test check of six BDOs revealed that 240 TV sets and DTH receiver sets allotted to these blocks had not been installed even after a lapse of more than 3 years. Non-utilization of the equipment deprived the people of the remote areas of the entertainment facilities. Besides, the equipments were seen damaged due to prolonged storage as verified physically by the visiting audit team.

The Additional Commissioner, Jammu stated (April 2011) that the matter had been taken up with the Deputy Commissioner for immediate installation of TV and DTH system. The reply regarding non-installation of TV sets and DTH system for the last three years reflected the general apathy of department to initiate welfare measure for rural population.



Un-utilised TV sets at Marh

Results of survey

Physical visit to 38 villages by the audit team showed a lot of gaps in provision of basic facilities such as, electricity, drinking water, health, education etc. to all the rural areas. Despite significant spending under different programmes initiated by the State and the GOI, the results were not encouraging as can be seen from the details given in table-68.

Table 68

Number of villages visited:		**38**			
Facilities	***Status***				
Electricity	(i)	Duration of Electric Supply	(a)	Full 24 hours	Nil
			(b)	Between 12 & 24 hours	33
			(c)	Less than 12 hours	5
	(ii)	Street Lighting	(a)	Yes	Nil
			(b)	No	36
			(c)	Yes but not functional	2
Drinking water	(i)	Duration of Drinking water supply	(a)	No supply	7
			(b)	Daily supply	18
			(c)	After 3 to 7 days	6
			(d)	No timing	7
	(ii)	Quality of water*	(a)	Good	28
			(b)	Not potable	5
Health	(i)	Sub-Centres	(a)	Yes	15
			(b)	No	23
	(ii)	Primary Health Centres	(a)	Yes	5

Number of villages visited:		**38**			
Facilities	***Status***				
			(b)	No	33
	(iii)	Community Health Centres	(a)	Yes	2
			(b)	No	36
Education	(i)	Primary Schools	(a)	Yes	38
			(b)	No	Nil
	(ii)	Middle Schools	(a)	Yes	36
			(b)	No	2
	(iii)	High Schools	(a)	Yes	12
			(b)	No	26
	(iv)	Hr. Secondary Schools	(a)	Yes	9
			(b)	No	29
Availability of Lanes/drains			(a)	Yes	13
			(b)	No	9
			(c)	Partially available	16
Ration depot			(a)	Yes	32
			(b)	No	6
LPG outlet			(a)	Yes	5
			(b)	**No**	33

*(Source: Audit Survey data, *: No response from five villages on the issue)*

Conclusion

The data relating to houses constructed under Indra Awas Yojna (IAY) has not been maintained; as a result the number of houses constructed under IAY could not be ascertained. There was under-utilisation of funds which effected achievement of targets under the Yojana. Under MNREGA, Annual plans did not flow from the Perspective Plan. The provision of providing 100 days employment to unskilled labour could not be met due to inadequate formulation of work plans. MNREGA funds were diverted for payment of wages to daily wagers, payment of telephone bills, POL etc. Unemployment allowance was also not provided to unemployed job card holders as envisaged in the scheme. The department had not taken up all the works approved for execution during 2007-11. There was shortfall in completion of works. Under Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY), the department failed to spend full amount and unspent balance swelled from ₹ 0.37 crore in 2006-07 to ₹ 1.01 crore at the close of 2010-11. As a result, the coverage of BPL families was poor. The infrastructure put under Model village programme was not put to use rendering the investment unfruitful.

Recommendations

- The data base of houses constructed should be maintained properly.
- Efforts should be made to increase the number of works to ensure 100 days employment to the unskilled labour. Unemployment allowance needs to be provided to unemployed labour.
- Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) should be implemented efficiently.

6.5 Power

For upgrading the standards of life and economic development, the availability of quality power plays an important part. It was heartening to know that all the villages (770) of the District had been electrified. In view of this, the main role of the department was to provide quality electricity to the consumers by augmentation of the Receiving Stations/Sub-stations and improvement of the transmission lines etc. Besides, the department had to take necessary measures to check transmission and distribution losses/pilferage and by identify illegal connections so as to improve the overall power scenario in the District which would translate into providing quality power and increase revenue.

A review of the sector revealed the following:

Transmission and Distribution Losses

Central Electricity Authority regulations stipulate 15 *per cent* as maximum energy loss in a system, and losses above 15 *per cent* should be treated as commercial losses. Departmental data placed the Transmission & Distribution (T & D) and AT&C losses in the range between 43 and 45 *per cent* during 2007-11. Audit check also showed that energy losses in the District had exceeded the maximum of 15 *per cent* by 20,580.62 lakh units (LUs) during 2007-11 which translated into commercial loss of ₹ 486.58 crore and corresponding loss of Excise Duty of ₹ 110.93 crore as tabulated in table-69.

Table 69

Particulars	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11
Energy available for Sale (LUs)	16,133.56	16,018.85	18,531.67	20,419.66
Energy sold (LUs)	9,144.11	8,741.06	10,352.33	11,620.05
Energy Losses (LUs) (*per cent*)	6,989.45 (43)	7,277.79 (45)	8,179.34 (44)	8,799.61 (43)
Energy losses in excess of (LUs) 15 *per cent*	4,569.42	4,874.96	5,399.58	5,736.66
Average cost of energy purchased (₹)	2.087	1.950	2.699	2.622
Cost of loss in excess of 15 *per cent* (₹ in lakh)	9,536.38	9,506.17	14,573.47	15,041.52
Sale value at Minimum rate (₹ in lakh)	11,195.08	11,943.65	13,228.97	14,054.82
Loss of ED @ 22 *per cent* (₹ in lakh)	2,462.92	2,627.60	2,910.37	3,092.06

(Source: Departmental Records)

Energy losses had increased from 6,989 LUs to 8,799 LUs during the last four years which was indicative of the fact that no special measures had been taken by the Government to check the unabated energy losses.

The Executive Engineer, Electric Maintenance and Rural Electrification (EM&RE) Divisions[32] stated (January/February 2011) that improvement of LT and HT network alongwith augmentation of capacity of distribution transformers was required to be taken up to reduce T&D losses. The reply could be seen in the light of the fact that major losses were due to illegal connections and non-installation of energy meters in the District as shown in table-70.

Table 70

Number of households (Survey conducted by Rural Dev in 2006. and JMC)	Number of Domestic connections	Number of commercial establishment (Labour Commissioner Records)	Number of Commercial connections
2,25,664	1,87,016	49,277	35,896

(Source: Departmental Records)

The above figures showed existence of huge illegal household and commercial connections in the District which was bound to affect the T&D losses with consequent reduction in revenue losses. At the minimum rate of tariff and connection fee when applied to these connections (Household: 38,648; Commercial: 13,381), the department is put to a loss of ₹ 2.75 crore as connection fee and annual revenue loss of ₹ 31.57 crore as electric charges.

The Chief Engineer (CE), EM&RE, Jammu attributed (June 2011) the gap between the registered domestic connections and the existing households in the District to non-electrification of various houses in the rural areas. The reply may be viewed in the light of the fact that the electric department had declared the District as fully electrified. Regarding commercial connections, the CE stated that the shops in rural areas had not applied for connections as they open their shops only during day time. The reply was not acceptable as electricity is also being utilised during day time especially during summer.

Metering

Metering of all the installations/consumers was essential in view of the increasing T&D losses. The records showed a dismal picture of metering in the District as on 31 March 2011 despite the fact that the J&K Electricity Regulatory Authority had fixed 31st December 2009 as target date for 100 *per cent* metering across consumer categories. Notwithstanding the target dates fixed only 1,56,650 connections (67 *per cent*) out of 2,34,537 connections had been metered in the District as of March 2011.

[32] EM&RE Division-I, Division-II, and Division-III

The Chief Engineer, EM&RE, Jammu stated (July 2011) that metering of all the installations/consumers could not be done due to non-availability of latest technology energy meters. It was further stated that the metering process would be completed in the District in near future as delivery of energy metres had been received in store of Procurement and Material Management (P&MM) wing of the department.

This showed that the department had failed to introduce a comprehensive metering programme across all the consumer categories which could reduce the overall losses.

Quality and Quantity of Energy

In view of 100 *per cent* electrification of the District, the main role of the department was to ensure quality of power supply to the consumers. Audit check showed that against the peak power load of 256.28 MVA, the installed capacity of receiving stations was only 203.50 MVA in twenty four 33/11 KV receiving stations ***(Appendix-III)*** thereby, denying the consumers quality energy as the overloaded Receiving Stations led to frequent interruptions of power supply and poor voltage regulation especially during summer.

The Executive Engineer, STD-II, Jammu stated (November 2010) that the action plan to augment/upgrade and creation of new receiving stations is under process for distribution of load from over loaded stations to the new stations

Unrealistic Rural Electrification Schemes

Under a project report formulated for energizing 3200 irrigational pump sets, five schemes were taken up at an estimated cost of ₹ 23.31 crore by the Department financed by the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) during 2008-09. Test check of records of the Executive Engineer, EM&RE Division, Jammu showed that the project would become profitable after 25 years which led the whole project being unviable as the projection were made without consultation with the Agriculture Department and formulated on the basis of unrealistic data.

Records showed that the installed capacity of receiving stations, from where energy was to be supplied, had not been augmented despite the fact that necessity of augmentation of these receiving stations was projected in the Detailed Project Report. It was also seen that, against the 1667 pump sets shown as energized during 2008-11, only 42 pump sets had been incorporated in the revenue realization records. Despite having been energized, no revenue had been collected from the owners of 1625 pump sets.

The Executive Engineer (EE), EM&RE Division-III, Jammu stated (February 2011) that the schemes were taken up only after approval by Techno Economic Committee of the Department. The EE also stated that the development of sub-transmission network was taken up separately under system improvement schemes. The reply should be seen in the light of the fact that 1667 pump sets had been energized without augmentation of the sub-transmission network. The fact remains that the EE had not

sought the views of the Agriculture/Irrigation Department before formulation of the projects which was essential as the agriculture produce and provision of irrigation facilities fall under the ambit of these departments.

Conclusion

The transmission and distribution losses continued to be very high. All the connections were not metered. Due to overloaded receiving station, the quality and quantity of power was inadequate which led to power shut downs. Some of the test checked schemes were framed on the basis on unrealistic data.

Recommendations

- Effective measures should be taken to reduce the transmission and distribution losses. The receiving stations need to be upgraded for better power quality and availability.
- Full metering of consumers need to be undertaken immediately.

6.6 Irrigation

The irrigation and flood control department is entrusted with the job of providing assured irrigation facilities to cultivable/cultivated land in the State by construction, renovation, modernization and maintenance of irrigation *canals/channels/khuls/lifts* etc. A majority of the schemes executed by the department were funded by the GOI.

Utilisation of Irrigation potential created

The position of irrigation potential created and that utilised in respect of irrigation schemes operational in the District is tabulated in table-71.

Table 71

(In hectares)

Mode of irrigation	No. of schemes	Ultimate irrigation potential	Potential created (Percentage)	Potential utilised
Major / Medium Irrigation	3[33]	72168	62802 (87)	51259 (82)
Minor Irrigation	30[34]	7076	5622 (79)	3401 (60)

(Source: Departmental Records)

The potential created in respect of major/medium irrigation schemes was encouraging and was around 87 *per cent* of the ultimate irrigation potential and utilisation of potential created was 82 *per cent*. In case of minor irrigation schemes, the potential created and utilisation of potential created ranged between 79 *per cent* and 60 *per cent*

[33] Gravity: 2; Lift: 1

[34] Gravity: 3; Lift: 27

respectively. The Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division, Akhnoor attributed (November 2010) poor utilization of irrigation potential to urbanization, non-development/levelling of land by the farmers and non-availability of sufficient funds for maintenance of channels.

Non Prioritization of incomplete schemes

As a general rule, priority is required to be accorded to the completion of ongoing schemes to ensure their completion in time and to contain cost escalation. Test-check of the records of the EE, Irrigation Division, Akhnoor showed that instead of completing the old and ongoing schemes, the department took up new schemes leading to non-completion of ongoing schemes as indicated from table-72.

Table 72

Year	Opening Balance	Schemes taken up	Completed	Ultimate Irrigation Potential (in Hectares)	Estimated cost	Revised cost	Escalation of cost
					(₹ in lakh)		
2007-08	-	3	Nil	400	191.70	257.00	65.30
2008-09	3	9	Nil	2231	1109.48	1919.51	810.03
2009-10	12	14	Nil	3819	2734.23	-	-

(Source: Progress Report)

The department had taken up new schemes every year instead of completion of the schemes in hand. As a result, 26 schemes (estimated cost: ₹ 40.35.crore) taken up for execution during 2007-10 for completion within two years, had not been completed as on March 2011 necessitating the revision of costs. Due to this, nine out of 26 works witnessed a cost escalation from ₹ 10.94 crore to ₹ 21.77 crore. Non-completion of the schemes affected 6450 hectares of land despite spending of ₹ 29.42 crore on these schemes. Evidently, lack of proper planning in selection and completion of schemes has been the main factor leading to this scenario which exposed the programme to the risk of thin spreading of resources and consequential delay in completion of these schemes.

The EE, Irrigation Division, Akhnoor stated (November 2010) that the schemes were taken up on the recommendations of the Ministers/MLA's. The fact remains that non-completion of a single scheme out of 26 schemes taken up during 2007-10 indicated bad planning. The dismal position of planning can be gauged from the fact that out of 26 schemes taken under AIBP, nine schemes estimated to cost ₹ 10.94 crore had been revised to ₹ 21.77 crore within periods ranging between 18 and 30 months of their sanction. Incidentally, all the revised DPRs submitted for approval and funding had been rejected by Central Water Commission and the issue of funding the projects as stated (November 2010) by the EE had been taken up with the State Government.

It was also seen in audit that in all the revised nine DPRs framed, the department had reduced the cost-benefit-ratio (CBR) when compared to that included in the original ones. On the basis of the data available in the DPRs, the actual CBR worked out by audit was less than 'unity' in eight out of nine cases and in that eventuality the

possibility of approval of the schemes by Government seems remote. The EE stated (November 2010) in reply that the factual position would be ascertained.

Conclusion

Utilisation of irrigation potential of completed schemes ranged between 60 and 82 *per cent* only. Priority was not accorded to completion of ongoing schemes and new schemes were taken up. As a result, there was cost escalation of ongoing schemes rendering them incomplete.

Recommendations

- Irrigation potential should be utilized efficiently.
- Ongoing schemes should be completed first before taking up the execution of new schemes.

6.7 Urban Development

For the development of seven[35] towns in the District having Municipal Committees, the GOI introduced 'Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT)' and 'Integrated Housing and Slum Development Programme (IHSDP)' which were test-checked in audit. The important audit findings are discussed below:

Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme

The scheme was launched (2005-06) by the GOI to improve infrastructural facilities and to help create durable public assets and quality-oriented services in cities and towns and also promote planned integrated development of towns and cities. The duration of the scheme was for seven years beginning 2005-06. The programme was, however, implemented in the District during 2007-08. The programme was planned to be taken up under three phases as tabulated in table-73.

Table 73

Phase	Town selected	Estimated project cost
Phase-1st	Akhnoor	₹ 8.65 crore
Phase-2nd	Khour	₹ 10.19 crore
Phase-3rd	Bishnah, Arnia, Jourian, RS Pura, Gho Manhasan	DPR under preparation to the extent of ₹ 25 crore each

(Source: Detailed Project Report)

Akhnoor town of the District was included in the Phase-I of the programme during 2007-08 and ₹ 4.29 crore had been released/spent on the project ended March 2011.

35 Akhnoor, Arnia, Bishnah, Gho-Manhasan, Jourian, Khour and R.S Pura

The position of works taken up under the scheme and status of the schemes as on date is tabulated in table-74.

Table 74

(₹In lakh)

Name of component	Estimated cost	Allotted cost	Expenditure incurred	Status
Construction of 3 link roads	47.84	47.84	23.92	Completed but not handed-over by the contractors due to non-payment of balance amount of ₹ 23.92 lakh
4 Nallah walling/ deep drains	483.00	372.53	279.89	3 Nallahs completed and 1 Nallah still incomplete. Work done liabilities of ₹49.81 lakh.
Construction works of 5 Lanes, drains and allied works of town	168.39	119.20	69.16	Works incomplete due to non-availability of Bitumen and funds.

(Source: Progress Report)

The tardy progress in implementation of the programme in the town was attributed (November 2010) by the Director Urban Local Bodies, Jammu to non-release of funds by the State Urban Infrastructure Development Agency (SUIDA) as per the approved project cost. It was also stated that the completed works could not be handed-over to the concerned departments due to non-release of the final instalment of the payment.

In view of the department's inability to complete even Phase-I of the project, the possibility of completion of the projects under the remaining phases (II&III) by 2012, as envisaged in the project, is remote.

Integrated Housing and Slum Development Programme (IHSDP)

To provide adequate shelter and basic infrastructure facilities to the slum dwellers of the identified urban areas, the Govt. of India launched (2005-06) a scheme for development of slums. In Jammu District, the scheme was planned to be taken up under two phases. Khour town was taken up (2008-09) in the 1st phase with an estimated project cost of ₹ 4.53 crore and five[36] other towns were to be completed in the second phase at a cost of ₹ 13.59 crore. The position of works taken up in Khour town under the scheme and the status of each work with expenditure thereon is detailed in table-75.

Table 75

Name of component	Project cost (₹ in lakh)	Time for completion (in years)	Expenditure incurred (₹ in lakh)	Status
Housing and Shelter upgradation (313)	350.56	2	140.70	112 raised up to plinth level, 200 above plinth level and 1 complete as a model
Construction of roads and lanes	54.54	2	27.88	Partially completed due to non-release of funds
Construction of drains	18.30	2	9.606	Partially completed due to non- release of funds
Electrification/street lights	2.03	2	1.05	Incomplete
Community centre	22.52	2	Nil	Land not identified

(Source: Departmental Records)

[36] R.S Pura, Jourian, Arnia, Bishnah, Gho Manhasan

As seen from table-75, no work has been completed as a result of which the beneficiaries, for whom the construction of 313 dwelling units was taken up, were forced to live in unfavourable weather conditions as the beneficiaries had dismantled their existing *Kaccha* houses.

The Director, Urban Local Bodies attributed (November 2010) non-completion of various IHSDP to non-release of the balance funds by the Government despite submission of the utilization certificates.

Photographs of incomplete houses in Khour Town under ISHDP





Tardy implementation of the programme is bound to affect completion of the phase-II of the programme which had not been taken up for execution as of March, 2011.

Construction of Bus stand at Khour

On the demand of people of Khour, the Director Urban Local bodies Jammu submitted (2008-09) to Government a project report for development of bus stand and allied works including terminal building and shopping complex at an estimated cost of ₹ 2.11 crore. The Government released (2008-09) ₹ 36 lakh to the Municipal Committee Khour for R&M filling, shingling, metalling and premixing under 'Urban Transport Scheme' and ₹ 40 lakh (March 2010) to Deputy Commissioner, Jammu for acquisition of land. The funds had not been utilized as of October 2010 due to non-identification of land. Release of ₹ 0.36 crore without acquisition of land indicated poor financial management which led to blocking of funds of ₹ 0.36 crore for 24 months, thereby depriving the people of Khour of the facility of a bus stand.

The Director Urban Local Bodies Jammu stated (November 2010) that the funds of ₹ 0.36 crore would be utilised after transfer of land from revenue authorities as the final award was under process with the Deputy Commissioner Jammu.

Solid Waste Management

The solid waste management programme envisages proper treatment of solid waste like garbage, plastic bags, iron scrap, domestic waste and conversion into bio-degradable compost manure for further use for farming purposes and consequent generation of income, besides reducing choking of pipes. The 12th Finance Commission envisaged service delivery of solid waste management services in urban areas. For this purpose, the guidelines of 12th Finance Commission envisage preparation of Comprehensive Action Plan for implementation of solid waste management including composting and waste to energy programmes.

Scrutiny of the records of the Director, Urban Local Bodies (ULB), Jammu showed that though the proposals/DPRs for the solid waste management had been submitted by the Municipal Committees, only plans proposing requirement of vehicle/equipment were submitted by it to the Government. As a result, the ULB received ₹ 0.45 crore only against the allocation of ₹ 0.92 crore. Further, the department could utilize ₹ 0.29 crore only out of the available funds on procurement of Autos and Tippers etc. The non-release of balance funds of ₹ 0.46 crore by the GOI was due to poor utilization of funds as well as non-submission of utilization certificates.

The Director Urban Local Bodies Jammu stated (October 2010) that the Municipal Committee of Jammu Division could not bear the huge expenditure out of their meagre income to construct solid waste management plant for disposal of refuse. The reply was not tenable as the funds were to be released for solid waste management by the GOI under the 12th Finance Commission Award which would not affect the meagre finances of the Committees. This indicated shoddy planning for implementation of programme.

Due to non-implementation of solid waste management as per guidelines of 12th Finance Commission, all the seven Municipal Committees of the District continued to dump garbage/solid waste in the open as indicated in table-76.

Table 76

Municipal Committee	Production of Municipal Solid Waste		Dumping Area
	(Qtls. per day)	*(Tons per year)*	
Akhnoor	60	2190	On the banks of Chenab river
Bishnah	30	1095	Aik Nallah
Jourian	10	365	Trotti Nallah
Khour	20	730	Open Land outside the town
RS Pura	55	2007	In Tawi near Badyal Brahmana
Gho Manhasa	8	292	Land fill
Arnia	6	219	Pond near Bus stand and Aik Nallah

(Source: Departmental Records)

The dumping of Municipal wastes in open space, on river bank, *nallahs*, etc. polluted the nearby water bodies.

Also, to treat the solid waste like garbage, plastic bags, iron, scrap, domestic waste for conversion into bio-degradable compost manure for farming purposes, the construction of solid waste plant at Akhnoor was taken up (2007-08) under UIDSSMT at an estimated cost of ₹ 1.65 crore in 2007-08. The work could, however, not be started due to unsuitability of the land identified for the purpose. The alternate land is still unidentified by the department.

Test check of the records of the Director, Urban Local Bodies, Jammu showed that the executing agency National Building Construction Corporation (NBCC) procured vehicles and equipment costing ₹ 0.41 crore during 2008-09 and handed them over (February, 2009) to the Municipal Committee Akhnoor. The vehicles/equipment had been parked in the open space and could not be made functional due to non-availability of operators/drivers. Procurement of vehicles/equipment before completion of the plant led to blocking of ₹ 0.41 crore which was indicative of faulty planning of the department. The Director Urban Local bodies Jammu stated (November 2010) that the factual position would be communicated to audit after receipt of full facts of the case from the Executive Officer, Municipal Committee, Akhnoor and NBCC.

Photographs of the dumping area of two Municipal Committees visited by the Audit Party.



Garbage disposal at the bank of river Chenab by MC Akhnoor



Garbage disposal in open(Aik Nallah) by MC Bishnah



Garbage disposal in open by MC Jourian



Garbage disposal in open by MC Khour



Vehicles / equipment parked in open without being put to use



Vehicles / equipment parked in open without being put to use

Conclusion

Tardy implementation of UIDSSMT and IHSDP programmes adversely affected the possibility of completion of other phases of the programme. Non-implementation of Solid Waste Management Programme in the towns compelled all the Municipal Committees to dump garbage/solid waste in open space, on river bank, nallahs etc. putting human health at risk, besides polluting the nearby water bodies.

Recommendations

- Effective steps need to be taken to complete the ongoing projects expeditiously so that the beneficiaries reap the intended benefits.
- Comprehensive Action Plan should be evolved for effective solid waste management to save water bodies from pollution.
- Proper planning and monitoring of schemes should be ensured.

6.8 Urban Employment

Swarna Jayanti Shahri Rozgar Yojna (SJSRY)

Poverty alleviation is one of the major goals of economic planning. To achieve this goal, the GOI launched (December 1997) '*Swarna Jayanti Shahri Rozgar Yojna* (SJSRY)' after subsuming the ongoing urban poverty alleviation schemes / programmes. The main objective of the programme is to provide gainful employment to the urban unemployed or under-employed through setting up of self-employment ventures or provision of wage employment. Besides, the Prime Minister's Reconstruction Plan (2004-05) for J&K, *inter alia*, includes provision of self employment opportunities for urban unemployed persons.

The two major components of SJSRY such as Urban Self Employment Programme (USEP) and Urban Wage Employment Programme (UWEP) were reviewed in audit. The major audit findings are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

6.8.1. Urban Self-Employment Programme (USEP)

The USEP focuses on providing assistance to individual urban poor beneficiaries for setting up self employment ventures and micro-enterprises. The programme envisages coverage of urban population below poverty line (BPL) as defined by the Planning Commission from time to time. The scheme was introduced in the District in 1997-98.

Planning

For ensuring effective and purposeful implementation of the programme, the guidelines of USEP envisage conducting of house to house survey for identification of genuine beneficiaries, with focus on slums and low-income settlements. Records

showed that no such surveys were conducted for mapping or marking out thrust areas. In the absence of any surveys, selection of the beneficiaries was done on the basis of an affidavit obtained from the beneficiaries affirming their BPL status and income certificate from gazetted officers. In the absence of surveys and details of economic status of beneficiaries, proper identification of targeted beneficiaries could not be established. A general review of 130 assisted cases revealed that in 90 cases (69 *per cent*) assistance had been extended to ineligible persons as indicated below:-

(i) 82 beneficiaries with 'Above Poverty Line' ration cards had been provided assistance under the programme.

(ii) 79 beneficiaries had been provided assistance for expansion / enhancement of the existing business under the programme.

Providing of assistance to ineligible beneficiaries was evidence of defective implementation of the programme. Non-coverage of deserving persons under the scheme may be due to inadequate advertisement and publicity campaign of the programme by the department. Record showed that provisions of the programme had been advertised in the local newspaper only once. Also, no seminars or workshops were conducted during 2006-09.

The Chief Executive Officer, JUDA stated (April 2011) that the beneficiaries had been identified on the basis of reports submitted by the field staff and sanctioned on the basis of income certificate duly attested by gazetted officers. The reply was not tenable in the light of the fact that the provisions of programme guidelines had not been adhered to. However, he stated that the matter regarding disbursement of assistance to the beneficiaries having a business, would be looked into and avoided in future.

Implementation

The implementation of the programme (USEP) was not satisfactory with regard to the targets fixed and number of beneficiaries benefited as can be seen from table-77.

Table 77

Year	Targets	No. of cases sponsored	No. of cases sanctioned	No. of cases rejected/returned by banks or pending	Loans and subsidy disbursed (in Numbers)
2007-08	219	NA	NA	NA	2 (Nil)
2008-09	475	641	123 (19)	418	123 (26)
2009-10	140	205	93 (45)	112	93 (66)
2010-11	79	121	40(33)	81	40(51)

(Source: Progress Report)

Achievement of targets fixed for setting up of employment units was poor and ranged between 'Nil' and 26 *per cent* during 2007-09. The achievement (66 and 51 *per cent*) of targets during 2009-10 and 2010-11 was due to reduction of targets by 71 and 44 *per cen*t from the targets of previous year. Further, the percentage of sanctioned cases to the number of sponsored cases was very low and ranged between 19 and 45.

The Chief Executive Officer JUDA stated (April 2011) the targets could not be achieved due to non-approval of action plan by the higher authorities in time. Further, the Officer stated that a large number of sponsored cases could not be sanctioned for want of funds.

6.8.2. Urban Wage Employment Programme (UWEP)

The urban wage employment component of the programme was designed to provide wage employment to the BPL beneficiaries within the jurisdiction of urban local bodies by utilizing their labour for construction of socially and economically useful public assets. The works to be executed were to be community centres, storm water drains, roads, night-shelters, kitchen sheds in primary school under mid-day meal scheme and other community requirements like parks, solid waster management facilities etc.

Records of the programme revealed the following discrepancies:-

(i) No surveys had been conducted by the Community Development Societies (CDS) to draw up a list of available basic minimum services in their areas and identifying missing basic services as envisaged in the guidelines. In the absence thereof, basis for selection of works could not be ascertained as construction of lanes and drains only had been undertaken.

(ii) No groups/associations of identified beneficiaries were framed and works were executed mainly by the contractors/mates in contravention of the programme guidelines which envisage execution of works through beneficiaries. It resulted in part of programme funds being paid as profit to the contractors /mates in violation of guidelines.

(iii) Muster sheets had not been maintained by the implementing agencies but payments had been made on hand receipts in violation of guidelines. As a result, the utilization of funds for providing employment to the urban poor could not be established.

(iv) Mandays had not been generated as per the targets fixed under the programme as tabulated in table-78.

Table 78

(In days)

Year	Target fixed	Mandays generated (percentage)
2006-07	11657	7986 (69)
2007-08	23396	10671 (46)
2008-09	29131	20133 (69)
2009-10	13454	8618 (64)
2010-11	4145	Nil

(Source: Progress Report)

(v) Records showing works taken up under the programme and their status had not been maintained. As a result, the number of works taken up, those completed and actual expenditure incurred could not be ascertained.

The Chief Executive Officer, JUDA stated (April 2011) that the matter would be taken up with the implementing agencies to execute the works by deployment of beneficiaries and to pay wages to the labourers only on muster sheets. The Chief Executive Officer further stated that no instructions had been received from higher authorities for conduct of survey for identification of works and the works were taken up on the basis of the proposals submitted by the Municipal Committees and Jammu Municipal Corporation etc. on the recommendations of the corporators, members of committees, etc. The reply is not acceptable as the CEO and departmental authorities implementing the programme had not taken the trouble to verify the guidelines even after the programme had been in operation for the last 14 years.

6.8.3. Prime Minister's Reconstruction Plan

The Prime Minister's Reconstruction Plan (PMRP), to be implemented during 2004-06, includes provisions of self-employment opportunities for urban unemployed persons. The GOI relaxed (February 2005) the criteria to extend the scheme to other economically weaker sections and low-income group people. The position of financial and physical targets fixed and achievement thereagainst under PMRP is tabulated in table-79

Table 79

Targets/ Achievements	Financial (₹ in lakh)			Physical (In number)		
	Self Employment		*Training*	*Self Employment*		*Number Trained*
	Individual	Groups		Individual	Groups	
Targets	190.80	18.00	34.80	636	60	696
Achievement	130.60	Nil	34.80	451 (71)	Nil	696

(Source: Departmental Records)

Records showed that the self-employment opportunities had been provided to only 451 individual beneficiaries (71 *per cent*) as of March 2011. Further, records showed that no group had been covered under the programme. This indicated poor implementation of the programme as the department had not been able to provide self-employment opportunities to the desired level.

The Chief Executive Officer, JUDA attributed (April 2011) non-achievement of targets fixed under PMRP to non-release of funds by the State Government having been released by the GOI.

Monitoring

The PMRP guidelines envisaged periodical reviews of the programme by the District Level Credit Committee (DLCC) under the chairmanship of Deputy Commissioner and the State Level Sanctioning Committee (SLSC) under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary. The guidelines also envisaged monitoring of implementation of the programme by the State Urban Development Agency (SUDA) under the chairmanship of Minister for Housing and Urban Development Department.

Audit check showed that periodical reviews of the programme had not been conducted either by the DLCC or by the SLSC. Further, the Department had not

conducted any physical verification of the units established under the programme. As a result, the actual number of units functional or otherwise could not be ascertained. The Chief Executive Officer, JUDA stated (April 2011) that the District authorities had not convened any meeting for review of the programme. He, however, stated that physical verification of the units established under the programme had been started from the current financial year.

Conclusion

Programmes guidelines have not been adhered to, thereby depriving the desiring of the intended benefits.

Recommendations

The programme guidelines need be implemented in letter and spirit so that the programme is implemented effectively and the desired benefits accrue.

6.9 Forests

The District spread over a geographical area of about 3097 sq km has a forest area of 767 sq. km (25 *per cent*) against the norm of 1022 sq. km (33 *per cent*) prescribed under National Forest Policy. Out of this, only 1063 hectare (one *per cent*) of forestland had been demarcated so far. Due to non-demarcation of forestland, the land near and around District Jammu especially Jammu city is prone to encroachment by the land grabbers. The Forest department looks after the management of forest areas, evacuation of the unauthorised occupants of forestland, rehabilitation of degraded forest area, etc.

Performance of Departmental Nurseries

To have adequate plantation material to raise plantation in the degraded forest area, the department had developed six[37] nurseries in the District. Records showed that the performance of the departmental nurseries was very poor and the production of plants in these nurseries ranged between 4 and 35 *per cent* as tabulated in table-80.

Table 80

Number of nurseries	Area (In Ha)	Annual Capacity (in number)	Actual Production				
			2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11
6	4.15	9,00,000	34,000 (04)	1,25,075 (16)	2,79,736 (35)	1,97,400 (25)	73,500 (08)

(Source: Departmental Records)

The DFO, Jammu attributed (May 2011) low production to non-availability of sufficient funds.

Survival of Plantation

The position of plantation, their survival and mortality of plants is tabulated in table-81.

[37] Purmandal, Sidhara, Jajjar Kotli, Muthi, Nathal and Jagdambay

Table 81

Year	Plantation	Survived	Mortality (in percent)
	(In numbers)		
2006-07	1,07,500	38,625	68,875 (64)
2007-08	1,12,575	46,270	66,305 (59)
2008-09	79,050	33,170	45,880 (58)
2009-10	88,290	38,645	49,645 (56)
2010-11	1,73,470	1,57,470	16,000(9)
Total	5,60,885	3,14,180	2,46,705(44)

(Source: Departmental Records)

The survival rate of plants planted during 2006-11 was very low as out of 5,60,885 plants planted during 2006-11 only 3,14,180 (56 *per cent*) plants survived. The high degree of mortality of plants led to the amount of ₹ 0.15 crore spent on plantation of 2,46,705 plants becoming wasteful. The reply of DFO, Jammu that the mortality was due to continued dry spells during the last four years was not acceptable as necessary precautions should have been taken by the department to mitigate the problem.

Non-Framing of Grazing Policy

To promote natural regeneration and vegetative growth for restoration of forest cover, it is essential to check unbridled grazing in the forest area. As the forests around Jammu Division are not commercial forests, these are very important from ecological considerations and as such require utmost attention for preservation, conservation and afforestation. In the absence of any firm grazing policy on scientific lines, the biotic pressure on these forests was very heavy not only by the local animals but by the large number of sheep and goats of the *Bakarwals* (tribals), especially during the winter season. This leads to scanty growth of these forests and the actual incidence of grazing in these forests is far beyond the carrying capacity of these forests due to settlement of *Gujjars/Bakerwal* in these forests during the period from October to May every year. The un-restricted grazing not only damages the young growth but also disrupts regeneration of the trees, shrubs and herbs during the Monsoon period. It not only destroys seed source but disrupts the photosynthesis process, besides causing surface soil erosion. To avoid this, a firm grazing policy is required which had not been framed as of March 2011.

Non-Rehabilitation of Degraded Forests

The rehabilitation of degraded forests envisages checking by plantation, construction of check dams, water harvesting structures and natural regeneration. The major items of works undertaken include fencing plantations and other engineering works. Despite spending ₹ 1.69 crore during 2006-10, there was no reduction of degraded area and it remained static at 2,557 Ha.

As per the State Forest Conservation Act-1997, forests were to be raised over degraded area equal to twice the area diverted for non-forest purpose. Further, rules

provide that the possession of forest land diverted for non-forestry purpose should not be handed-over to the user agency till all payments due are deposited. Records showed that against 1,883.23 hectares of forestland diverted (1991-92 to 2010-11) for non-forest purposes, no land was brought under forest cover. Further, possession of land was transferred to the user agencies without clearing the payments from them in contravention of the rules. As a result, an amount of ₹ 56.07 crore was outstanding against various agencies on account of compensation for periods ranging between 6 and 288 months.

The Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) stated (December 2010) that the matter would be taken up with the user-agencies for recovery of the amount and fresh forest areas could not be raised due to non-allotment of funds. The reply was not acceptable as the department should not have, in violation of rules, handed-over the possession till all the payments were deposited by the indenting department.

Royalty

Records showed that royalty of ₹ 6.13 crore was outstanding against the State Forest Corporation (SFC) on account of royalty for handing over of marked volume of timber to it for extraction and sale of timber from 1986-87 to 2009-10.

The DFO intimated (December 2010) that the issue of royalty had remained un-settled with the SFC due to non-acceptance of the rates by the latter on the ground that same were on the higher side.

Forest Damage Cases

The position of illicit felling/damage cases during 2007-08 to 2010-11 is tabulated in table-82.

Table 82

Year	Opening Balance	Additions	Total	Settled	Closing Balance
2007-08	392	29	421	13	408
2008-09	408	36	444	2	442
2009-10	442	96	538	33	505
2010-11	505	23	528	78	450

(Source: Departmental Records)

From the above, it is clear that the incidence of illicit felling and consequently the outstanding damages cases increased year after year. The number of unsettled cases rose from 392 to 450 during 2007-11. This highlighted the apathy on the part of the department in setting the cases.

The DFO stated (December 2010) that the steps would be taken to compound and settled the cases. The increase in the forest damage cases should be seen in the light of the fact that establishment of saw mills within eight Km of the forest area continued to be in operation despite imposition of ban on such establishments by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court. Records showed that 123 out of 178 saw mills operating in the Jammu Forest Division were operated within the prohibited area in contravention of the court orders which facilitated forest damages. The DFO stated (December 2010) that the matter would be taken up with the higher authorities.

Misutilization of funds

Under the 12th Finance Commission Award, works of renovation and repair of fencing, construction of fire line, plantation in gaps/planting of conifers, production and rehabilitation of forests, demarcation of forests, development of infrastructure for field staff etc. were to be taken up. Similarly, under compensatory afforestation scheme under state Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority (CAMPA), most threatened areas were to be treated, maintained and established to compensate the loss of tree cover and to restore the degraded forests to their natural status. Records showed that ₹ 0.11 crore (Urban Forestry Jammu: ₹ 0.09 crore; DFO Jammu: ₹ 0.01 crore) were utilized on procurement of generators, invertors, batteries, erection of transformers, construction works of office complex, air conditioners, furniture etc. in violation of guidelines. Mis-utilization of funds meant for plantation, protection and rehabilitation of forests defeated the purpose of the schemes.

The DFO Urban Forestry Jammu stated (December 2010) that the expenditure was incurred after obtaining approval from the higher authority. The reply is not acceptable as there were no such provisions in the 12th Finance Commission Award for use of the money on activities not related to afforestation. He also stated (December 2010) that the diversion of funds out of CAMPA would be avoided in future.

Setting up of Golf Course

Forest land of 53.3 Hectare in *Bahu* range of Jammu, which falls in the Games Reserve and as such declared as 'Conservation Reserves' under section-36 of the Jammu and Kashmir Protection of Wild Life Act, 1978, was transferred to Tourism Department for setting up of a golf course without obtaining permission from the Central Empowered Committee as per the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India being in violation of J&K Wildlife Protection Act. Besides, as per rules, where the alternate land is not transferred in lieu of forest land, the user agency shall be liable to pay compensation for land as assessed by the revenue authorities and also the compensatory afforestation equal to twice the area diverted.

Audit check of the records of DFO, Jammu showed that the Government orders of May 2006 for transfer of 1066 *kanals* of alternate land were withdrawn in September, 2006. As such, the department did not raise the revised bill on account of compensation of land as assessed by the revenue authorities and also the

compensatory afforestation equal to twice the area diverted i.e. 106.60 Ha. This led to short realisation of ₹ 1.83 crore from the Tourism department.

The DFO, Jammu stated (December 2010) that the revised bill would be raised against the Tourism department.

Conclusion

The performance of the departmental nurseries was dismal as the survival rate of plants planted during 2006-11 was very low. The Department transferred the possession of forest land to various agencies for non-forestry purpose without receiving the payment of royalty and compensation from them. There was no reduction of degraded area as no land was brought under forest.

Recommendations

- Necessary measures should be taken to improve the performance of the departmental nurseries by controlling the mortality rate of the plants.
- Action should be taken to recover the outstanding dues on account of royalty and compensation for forest land transferred to various agencies for non-forestry purpose.

6.10 Tourism

The tourism activities at a particular place are directly related to the arrival of tourists at that place. The more the arrival, the more economic activities get generated and make impact on other sectors also. Tourism generates multiple effects on the service sector such as Agriculture, Horticulture, Poultry and Handicrafts. Besides, tourism provides direct and indirect employment to a large number of people. Jammu & Kashmir is an important tourist destination of the country and has been a place of attraction for tourists since centuries. All the three regions of the State viz; Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh regions attract a large number of tourists. Jammu is the Gateway for tourists in the State as all the tourists coming to the State are to pass through Jammu city. To accommodate the tourists, proper infrastructural facilities has to be in place which is particularly essential in view of influx of a large number of pilgrims who visit Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine at Katra.

Tourist influx

Data produced to audit by the department showed that while as the influx of pilgrims to Jammu had increased from 61 lakh in 2004 to 87.49 lakh in 2010, the tourism had gathered pace in Kashmir valley also which increased from 7.77 lakh tourists to 11.81 lakh during the corresponding period.

Infrastructure

To cater to the housing needs of the pilgrims/tourist, apart from two *bhawans* (residential accommodation), 205 hotels exist in private sector in Jammu city.

Potential and exploitation

Apart from the holy shrine of Mata Vaishno Devi which has been a place of pilgrim attraction for centuries, the State Government took up (2006-07) development of three places (Jhiri, Surinser and Dori Deggar villages) at an estimated cost of ₹ 2.08 crore on which ₹ 1.78 crore had been spent so far (March 2011) under Rural Tourism Scheme/PM Reconstruction Plan as an additional attraction for the pilgrims/tourists.

In addition to the above, the State Government took up (2009-10) the development of the oldest *bazaar (Raghunath Bazaar)* of the city as a heritage project at an estimated cost of ₹ 6.62 crore. The project, *inter alia*, involved face lifting of the *bazaar* and modernization/up-gradation of the overhead power distribution/telephone network for completion in one year. It was seen in audit that the implementation of the programme had been tardy as the departments concerned with the execution of works had spent only ₹ 1.06 crore on the project out of ₹ 2.27 crore released by the State Government up to the close of March 2011.

Conclusion

The development of Rughunath Bazar taken up under the Heritage Projects has been tardy. The developmental activities in Jammu have not been commensurate with the increased flow of tourists during the last few years visiting both Kashmir and Mata Vaishnodevi shrine at Katra.

Recommendation

Developmental projects should be taken up in a phased manner to make Jammu District tourists spot.

CHAPTER 7: GENERAL SERVICES

7.1 Police Department plays an important role in maintenance of law and order in the District. For maintenance of law and order in the District, the department has established 20 police stations which are under the administrative control of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Jammu

The important points noticed as a result of scrutiny of records of the department/physical visit are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

Police Infrastructure

To meet the growing challenges to internal security, particularly in the wake of militancy, the police force required revamping by way of provision of sophisticated arms and adequate infrastructure. To bridge the gap between requirement and availability, the GOI launched a CSS 'Modernisation of Police Force'. Modernization envisaged provision of basic infrastructure like police stations (PSs), Police Posts (PPs), barracks and housing (Upper Subordinates Quarters: USQs and Lower Subordinate Quarters: LSQs) in accordance with the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) norms.

The position of availability of infrastructure against the minimum requirement in the District as per BPR&D norms as on 01 April 2006 and 31 March 2011 is tabulated in table-83.

Table 83

Type of building	Position as on 01.04.2006		Position as on 31.03.2011		Shortfall (Percentage)
	Requirement	Availability	Requirement	Availability	
Police Stations	20	16	25	20	5 (20)
Police out posts	42	20	47	35	12 (26)
Barracks	68	64	72	68	4 (6)
Lower Subordinate Quarters	280	160	480	168	312 (65)
Upper Subordinate Quarters	200	Nil	250	Nil	250 (100)

(Source: Departmental Records)

From the above, it is clear that the police infrastructure was not available in the District as per BPR&D norms as huge shortage of housing infrastructure existed in the District. Against the requirement of 730, the availability of LSQ/USQ was just 168 (23 *per cent*) at the end of March 2011. The reasons for this huge shortage, though called for, were not assigned.

Eight[38] Police Stations of the District were physically surveyed and shortcomings in infrastructure were noticed in three police stations to the extent indicated against each as tabulated in table-84.


[38] Satwari, Bishnah, Pacca Danga, Jajjer Kotli, Nagrota, Domana, Khour and Akhnoor

Table 84

Police Station	Shortcoming noticed	Impact
Bishnah	Residential quarters meant for accommodation of police personnel of the Police Station had been occupied by the police personnel posted outside Bishnah and other Districts.	Present staff of the Bishnah police station deprived of the accommodation
Khour	Residential block was unfit / unsafe for residential purposes	Any mishap could occur.
Nagrota	New police station building completed 5 years back had not been physically handed-over to SSP Jammu	The condition of the building has deteriorated due to its non utilization.



Unsafe residential quarters at Police Station Khour



Unoccupied Police station Building at Nagrota

Further, during visit to these eight police stations, it came to the notice of audit that funds to meet the expenses of diet of persons detained in the police stations had not been made available to in-charge police stations. As a result, the incharge of police stations had to meet such expenses from their own pockets. It clearly indicated that no

proper monitoring system had been evolved by the department to take care of these problems.

Mobility

One of the major thrust areas under MOPF was to increase the mobility of district police to face effectively the challenges to internal security by reducing response time. The position of availability of various types of vehicles with the District police as on March 2011 is tabulated in table-85.

Table 85

Particulars	Heavy vehicles	Medium vehicles	Light vehicles	Motor cycles	Total
Requirement	17	92	170	143	422
Available	13	31	100	39	183
Deficiency	04	61	70	104	239
(percentage)	24	66	41	73	57

(Source: Departmental Records)

Thus, overall deficiency of vehicles in the District was 239 (57 *per cent*). This was bound to effect the functioning of the police personnel. Further, no vehicles had been made available to five[39] police posts and nine[40] border police posts. This indicated non-prioritization of distribution of available vehicles amongst the basic policing units, thereby adversely impacting their mobility which is substantiated by the response time of various police stations.

Response time

Response time is the time lag between the receipt of information about an incident / registering the First Information Report (FIR) and the time the police reaches the site of incident (Ravangi). The position of response time in respect of the eight police stations visited by audit is given in table-86.

Table 86

Police Station	Requirement of vehicles	Actual availability	Number of cases examined	Range of response time
Pacca Danga	13	1	145	5 to 205 minutes
Satwari	10	2	151	5 to 30 minutes
Bishnah	NA	2	211	5 to 90 minutes
Domana	NA	2	320	5 to 90 minutes
Nagrota	3	1	75	5 to 180 minutes
Jajjar Kotli	NA	2	89	5 to 90 minutes
Akhnoor	NA	4	198	5 to 120 minutes
Khour	4	2	118	5 to 50 minutes

(Source: Departmental Records)

39 Police Posts: Hari Market, GMC, SMGS Hospital, Pargwal, Mandir Bahu Fort.

40 Border Police Posts Kirpal Pur, Malla Marore, Sai, Treva, Nari, Chakroi, Chak Agra, Dewan Ghar and Baspur Bangla

The response time of the police station was satisfactory in Satwari police station. The range of response time in other stations was high between five and 205 minutes from the occurrence of an incident. The high response time in the stations was attributable to non-availability of adequate number of vehicles at the disposal of the police stations which hamper their progress in reaching the incident site immediately.

Manpower

The BPR&D norms emphasize the importance of raising manpower in proportion to increase in population. The High Powered Committee of Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), GOI also stressed the need for filling up vacancies on priority basis. The position of sanctioned strength and men in position for all levels of the force as of March 2006 and March 2011 is given in table-87.

Table 87

Rank	Position as on 31.03.2006			Position as on 31.03.2011		
	Post sanctioned	Men in position	Surplus (+) Shortage (-)	Post sanctioned	Men in position	Surplus (+) Shortage (-)
SSP	01	01	-	1	1	-
S.P	05	04	(-) 1	5	5	-
Dy. S.P	09	11	(+) 2	10	12	(+) 2
C.P.O	04	04	-	4	3	(-) 1
P.O	12	09	(-) 3	12	9	(-) 3
S.P.O	03	03	-	5	2	(-) 3
Inspector	20	21	(+) 1	20	16	(-) 4
SI/PSI	76	78	(+) 2	92	82	(-) 10
ASI/PASI	140	110	(-) 30	157	143	(-) 14
HC	525	535	(+) 10	567	536	(-) 31
SGCT	665	636	(-) 29	708	723	(+) 15
Constable	1995	1903	(-) 92	2124	1566	(-) 558
Follower	115	145	(+) 30	119	185	(+) 66

(Source: Departmental Records)

The table shows a dismal position of the department in having adequate staff to meet the growing challenges. The shortage of constables- the basic policing ingredient of the department, had increased from 92 in March 2006 to 558 in March 2011. The reply of the department was awaited.

A physical survey of five police stations by Audit revealed that there was a huge shortage of police personnel as can be seen from table-88.

Table 88

Police Station	Sub Inspector		Asst. Sub Inspector		Head Constables		Constables	
	Sanctioned	Position	Sanctioned	Position	Sanctioned	Position	Sanctioned	Position
Pacca Danga	10	2	12	3	29	6	109	21
Satwari	3	1	5	3	12	7	56	12

Police Station	Sub Inspector		Asst. Sub Inspector		Head Constables		Constables	
	Sanctioned	Position	Sanctioned	Position	Sanctioned	Position	Sanctioned	Position
Jajjar Kotli	1	Nil	3	3	8	7	35	10
Akhnoor	4	1	6	2	13	7	82	20
Domana	1	1	4	6	8	6	42	19

From the above, it is clear that huge shortage of constables, ASIs and SIs adversely affected the performance of the police to control crime in the District.

Crime Rate and Investigation

The position of various types of cases reported, disposed off and those pending completion of investigation as of March 2011 is tabulated in table-89.

Table 89

Year	Back log cases	New cases	Total cases	Cases disposed off	Cases disposed off (*Percent*age)	Cases pending
2007	1038	3516	4554	3447	76	1107
2008	1107	4056	5163	3448	67	1715
2009	1715	4011	5726	2898	51	2828
2010	2828	4266	7094	4555	64	2539
2011	2539	4383	6922	2764	40	4158

(Source: Departmental Records)

While the crime rate in the District was on the increasing trend and increased to 4158 during 2011 from 3516 during 2007, investigation in only 40 to 76 *per cent* of reported crime cases had been completed. The position of crimes in the District during 2007 to 2011 is tabulated in table-90.

Table 90

Nature of crime	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Murder	22	25	18	23	18
Robbery	02	04	04	01	2
Theft	578	824	875	712	876
Rioting	82	202	82	69	56
Kidnapping	52	51	69	81	68
Rape	26	26	29	36	35
Cheating	87	62	102	105	110
Road accidents	1469	1395	1529	1684	1627
Misc. Crimes	1198	1455	1303	1555	1591
Total	3516	4044	4011	4266	4383

(Source: Departmental Records)

Traffic Management

A major change in the economic sector accompanied by a rapid increase in automobiles, etc., and urbanisation has taken place in our country. This phenomenon has led to the increase in the road related accidents. As on date road traffic accidents

are one of the leading causes of death, disabilities and hospitalization with severe socio-economic costs which are not easy to measure.

The main causes of poor traffic management in the District especially in Jammu city are tabulated in table-91.

Table 91

Causes of Poor Traffic Management	Present scenario		Impact
Irrational Transport Policy	Total vehicles (March 09)	3,73,127	Deficiency of public transport on modern lines led to utilization of personal transport causing over-crowding of transport on roads
	Personalized transport (Cars, 2-Wheelers)	3,01,205 (81)	
	Public transport (Buses, Mini-Buses, 3-Wheelers, Taxies)	29,186 (08)	
Disproportionate growth ratio between roads and vehicles	Total vehicles in 2005-06	3,04,305	Overcrowding of roads with vehicles choke the roads
	Total vehicles in 2008-09	3,73,127	
	Roads remained static at 2571 km		
	Density 145 vehicle per km road length		
Commensurate Parking places	Total personalised transport	3,01,205	Private vehicles owners park their vehicles on the roadsides leading to traffic jams
	Parking slots in the city	About 18	
Inadequate vehicle stands	Large number of buses, mini buses, taxies, light vehicles, medium vehicles, auto rickshaws, load carriers permitted to ply on city roads did not have proper stands to park.		Spill over of such vehicles on the main road unauthorisedly caused traffic jams
Non-developmental/non-maintenance of foot path	(i) Most of roads did not have footpaths. (ii) Most of footpaths in the Jammu city either occupied by the shop keepers or vendors.		Big volume of pedestrian traffic diverted on the main roads to add to the traffic jams.
Huge traffic flow at intersections and lack of traffic engineering measures	4-arm intersections	21	Huge traffic jams at intersections
	3-arm intersections	34	
	The average traffic pressure on each intersection comes to around 50,000 vehicles per day. (ii) The city lacked all the conceivable traffic engineering measures and traffic calming techniques such as traffic lights, road signs and markings, proper traffic islands and medians, proper roundabouts, proper bus-bays etc.		
Understaffed traffic police	The blue cop who looked after 36 vehicles per day on an average during 1982 (first reorganization of traffic police) was required to manage about 478 vehicles per day during 2008.		Management of traffic especially on the intersections become difficult
	Requirement of manpower at intersections	414	
	Manpower sanctioned and in position	280	

(Source: Departmental Records)

To overcome the problems of traffic in the city, the traffic police suggested engineering measures in a meeting (2008) with the Chief Engineer PWD Jammu and others as discussed in table-92.

Table 92

Suggested Measures	Details
Construction of alternate roads / bridges / flyover	At 10 places
Improvement / widening of roads	At 18 places
Mini Bus stops with passengers sheds / Bus Bays	16 places
Parking lots	7 places
Sub-ways / overhead bridges	10 places
Construction of medians / Dividers	15 places
Speed Breakers	24 places
Construction / Redesigning of traffic circles	10 places
Installation of traffic signal system	55 intersections
Construction / utilization of New Bus stands	6 places
Creation of Auto stands	136 places

(Source: Departmental Records)



People park their vehicles on the road side at Gandhi Nagar in absence of parking palace



Traffic jam in absence of traffic engineering measures at Jewel Chowk



Commercial vehicles parked on the road side in absence of appropriate vehicle stand at BC Road



Vehicles parked on the road side in absence of appropriate parking palace at Gandhi Nagar

Physical survey of these places revealed that engineering measures to control traffic congestion in Jammu as suggested by the traffic police had not been taken up by the concerned departments despite a lapse of three years. Further, records showed that Electronic Traffic Signals had not been installed despite constitution of committee by the Government for the purpose during November, 2008.

The Chief Engineer, PW (R&B) Department, Jammu stated (April 2011) that various proposals were under consideration of the department to tackle the traffic hazards and decongestion in the city. He further stated that the construction of a fourth bridge on river Tawi had already been taken up to ease the traffic congestion at Bikram and Jewel junctions. It indicated that the Government had not given priority to tackle the alarming position of increasing traffic pressure on the city despite having embarked upon a plan in 2008.

Conclusion

Police infrastructure in terms of police stations, police posts, lower and upper subordinate quarters was inadequate to meet the requirement of the department. Mobility of police stations was poor which affected response time of the personnel to reach the crime spot immediately. Crime cases pending investigation had increased

substantially ranging from 1107 cases in the year 2007 to 4158 cases in the year 2011 as a result the law and order situation in the Jammu District is alarming. Traffic management especially at intersections where the axle load was high was not up to the mark causing increase in the death, disabilities and hospitalization cases.


Recommendations

Adequate infrastructure should be ensured to make policing efficient.

CHAPTER 8: MONITORING

The District Development Commissioner is responsible for monitoring the progress of implementation of various developmental programmes undertaken in the District, including all the Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS). The State Government has also given priority to the monitoring and physical verification of all the developmental schemes including CSS. For effective monitoring, the State Government created (June 2006) the post of Additional District Developmental Commissioners at District levels. He is to tour intensively along with departmental officers to carry out monitoring and physical verification of all the developmental schemes for at least 15 days during a month.

Records showed that the District authorities had reviewed and monitored only construction works taken up in the District. The implementation of the flagship programmes such as NRHM, SSA, ARWSP, SJSRY, waste management etc. had not been monitored by the authorities. Besides, the District authorities had not toured adequately to monitor all schemes for at least 15 days during the month. The Additional District Development Commissioner stated (April 2011) that the implementation of CSS had also been monitored and the inspection reports thereof had been kept separately. No such records were, however, produced to Audit.



(Subhash Chandra Pandey)
Principal Accountant General
Jammu and Kashmir

Srinagar/Jammu
The

Countersigned



(Vinod Rai)
Comptroller and Auditor General of India

New Delhi
The

Appendix-I

List of water supply schemes wherein cost and time overruns had occurred

(Reference: Page: 45)

(₹In lakh)

Name of the scheme	Date of Start/ Due date of completion	Estimated cost/ Revised cost	Expenditure	Cost overrun	Time overrun (Years)
WSS Migrant Camp Muthi Phase-I	2003-04/2006-07	286.00/463.00	422.00	136.00	4
WSS Bozigar Basti	2003-04/2004-05	85.18/95.70	95.70	9.52	6
WSS Keran	2003-04/2004-05	165.48/165.48	238.52	73.04	6
WSS Trilokpur	2006-07/2007-08	74.77/172.00	117.45	42.68	3
WSS Dhok Paloura	2006-07/2008-09	169.00/297.68	188.97	19.97	2
WSS Ajeet Nagar	2006-07/2007-08	139.00/296.25	158.08	19.08	3
WSS Jandrah	2003-04/2007-08	53.75/215.00	164.95	111.20	3
WSS Majra Kotli	2003-04/NA	62.30/130.89	129.35	67.05	-
WSS Chak Rakhwalan	2003-04/2004-05	61.80/93.25	93.25	31.45	6
WSS Dhan Jakhari	2003-04/2004-05	110.30/186.61	175.62	65.32	6
WSS Surisar	2003-04/2004-05	124.15/172.00	156.30	32.15	6
WSS Chutra	2005-06/2007-08	90.98/290.62	155.31	64.33	3
WSS Nagrota	2003-04/2004-05	110.00/203.80	171.53	61.53	6
WSS Seodha	2007-08/2008-09	117.00/148.50	146.24	29.24	2
WSS Bhatti Peer Tinda	2007-08/2008-09	98.18/265.44	155.38	57.20	2
WSS Pandorian	2007-08/2007-08	49.80/52.53	52.53	2.73	3
WSS Dheenday Khurd	2007-08/2007-08	80.72/100.91	99.44	18.72	3
WSS Laswara Makanpur	2007-08/2007-08	95.50/114.51	113.56	18.06	3
WSS Kotli Jabowal	2007-08/NA	68.17/129.45	103.16	34.99	-
WSS Chak Modyar	2007-08/2008-09	84.45/153.76	114.30	29.85	2
WSS Nandpur	2007-08/NA	84.05/218.53	159.90	75.94	-
WSS Nihalpur Simble	2007-08/2007-08	79.45/175.45	154.03	74.58	3
WSS Chakroi	2007-08/2008-09	49.20/109.52	109.08	59.88	2
Total				1134.51	

Appendix-II

List of incomplete road projects due land dispute involving forest and private land

(Reference: Page: 59)

(₹In lakh)

Name of road project	Sanctioned cost	Date of start	Stipulated date of completion	Expenditure incurred	Time overrun (in Months)	Reasons for incompletion
Miran Sahib to Darsopur	12.52	03.09.2009	03.06.2010	12.11	9	Non-availability of forest/private land
Dagair to Panaya	377.79	25.11.2007	20.11.2008	233.62	30	Unrealistic estimates led to preparation of fresh DPR
Chowki Choura to Ghar Majoor	393.92	18.10.2007	29.09.2008	241.43	30	Dispute with original contractor Forest Tenders invited and work allotted
Nadore to Kore Jagir	129.05	23.02.2009	26.07.2009	119.57	20	Non-availability of private/forest land
Bugazina to Jindlehar	30.47	10.10.2008	06.07.2009	7.23	21	Non-availability of private/forest land
RS Pura Meerru road to Raipur Gujjran	24.45	10.09.2008	12.06.2009	16.50	21	Non-availability of private/forest land
Kuffi to Godhan	313.42	21.03.2009	20.03.2010	252.46	12	Non-availability of private/forest land
Chingani to Showapatta	149.10	11.09.2008	10.06.2009	123.93	22	Non-availability of private/forest land
Nud to Sarian	175.63	10.09.2008	15.06.2009	59.83	21	Non-availability of private/forest land
Jindrah to Jallar	208.76	04.03.2009	25.10.2009	182.18	17	Non-availability of private/forest land
Rajwal to Chamarkee	139.51	20.09.2008	16.06.2009	120.00	21	Non-availability of private/forest land
Jabta to Challani	260.35	25.11.2008	31.10.2009	75.51	17	Non-availability of private/forest land
Tara to Doha	260.15	01.12.2008	31.12.2009	174.26	15	Non-availability of private/forest land
Jamotia to Pail Via Bade Pail	833.07	22.10.2008	30.04.2010	675.55	12	Non-availability of private/forest land
Upgradation of road from Sarore to Arnia	465.13	02.03.2009	10.09.2010	356.74	5	Non-availability of private/forest land
Upgradation of road from Distributory No.-1 to Hamirpur Kona	836.38	29.02.2009	31.08.2010	643.67	7	Non-availability of private/forest land
Khugga to Jeri	1764.59	07.03.2009	17.09.2010	1190.78	6	Non-availability of private/ land

Appendix-III

Installed capacity of receiving stations vis-à-vis peak power load

(Reference: Page: 79)

Name of Receiving Station	Installed capacity	Peak Power Load
Nanak Nagar	2×10 MVA	24.09 MVA
Channi Himmat	10+6.3 MVA	21.90 MVA
Ashok Nagar	1×10 MVA	13.90 MVA
Parladpur	1×6.3 MVA	7.43 MVA
Chatha	1×10 MVA	10.19 MVA
Suhagpur	1×6.3 MVA	7.62 MVA
Chak Shera	1×10 MVA	10.28 MVA
Chakroi	1×6.3 MVA	6.66 MVA
Badyal Brahman	1×6.3 MVA	6.66 MVA
Miran Sahib	2×6.3 MVA	12.95 MVA
Canal	2×10 MVA	21.00 MVA
Jhajjar Kotli	1×3.15 MVA	3.90 MVA
Akhnoor	2×6.3 MVA	15.90 MVA
Roop Nagar	1×10 MVA	12.57 MVA
Toph	1×10+1×6.3 MVA	17.33 MVA
Jourian	1×6.3 MVA	10.86 MVA
Thather	1×3.15 MVA	3.24 MVA
Phariwala	1×3.15 MVA	5.43 MVA
Khour	1×3.15 MVA	7.33 MVA
Barmal	1×4 MVA	4.2 MVA
Sohal Bhalwal	1×3.15 MVA	5.8 MVA
Ranjan	2×2.5 MVA	5.24 MVA
Pargwal	1×3.15 MVA	13.04 MVA
Bhalwal	1×6.3 MVA	8.76 MVA
Total	203.50 MVA	256.28 MVA